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
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# INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS.

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## THE MORALITY OF STRIFE.

ALL who have thought earnestly on moral questions, and in particular have reflected on the causes of and the remedies for immorality, the failure to do what is right in themselves and others, must have recognized that the causes of this failure divide themselves naturally under two distinct heads. One set of such causes may be summed up in the general statement that men do not *see* their duty with sufficient clearness; the other set in the statement that they do not *feel* the obligation to do it with sufficient force. But there are great differences of opinion among thoughtful persons as to the relative importance of these different sources of wrong conduct. The commonest opinion, I think, is disposed to lay most stress on the latter, the defect of feeling or will, and even to consider the defect of intellectual insight as having comparatively little practical importance. It is not uncommon to hear it said by preachers and moralizers that we all *know* our duty quite sufficiently for practical purposes, if we could only spur or brace our wills into steady action in accordance with our convictions. And this is, I think, so far true that, if we suppose all our intellectual errors and limitations to remain unchanged, and only the feebleness of character which prevents our acting on our convictions removed, an immense improvement would undoubtedly take place in many departments of human life. But one result would accompany this which would certainly

not be an improvement, at least in its consequences. We all recognize the dangers of fanaticism; but what is a fanatic? I know no other answer than that a fanatic is a person who acts up to his convictions when they are opposed to the common sense of mankind. If, therefore, we suppose that the element of intellectual error in the causes of wrong action remains unchanged, while the element of feebleness of character, weakness of motive or will to do duty, is entirely removed, we must suppose fanaticism enormously increased; and when we had to strike the balance of gain and loss to human happiness resulting from the change, I am not quite sure that we should find the gain so clear as is sometimes supposed.

Considerations of this kind have led some thoughtful minds to take an exactly opposite view, and to regard it of paramount importance to remove the intellectual source of error in conduct, holding with Socrates that the true good of each individual man is really consistent and harmonious with the true good of all the rest; and that what every man really wants is his own true good, if he only knew what it was. But this view also is too simple and unqualified, since a man often sacrifices what he rightly regards as his true interest to the overmastering influence of appetite or resentment or ambition; nor, I fear, if we measure human well-being by an ordinary mundane standard, can it be shown that what conduces to the earthly welfare of any one individual will always conduce to the earthly welfare of the rest. This idea of a universal and complete harmony of the interests—at least the earthly interests—of all human individuals belongs to an optimistic illusion as to human relations, which in the present age of the world has nearly faded away. If we confine our attention to this world alone, and suppose men's feelings and wants unaltered, we must admit that the utmost intellectual enlightenment would not prevent the unrestrained pursuit of private interest from being anti-social, anarchical, and disorganizing. Still, allowing all this, it seems to me that a very substantial gain would result if we could remove from men's minds all errors of judgment as to right and wrong, good and evil, even if we left other causes of bad conduct unchanged. Suppose, for in-

stance, that every one who is liable to drink too much had clearly present to his mind, in the moment of temptation, the full amount of harm that his insobriety was doing to his bodily health, his reputation, his means of providing for those dependent on him: some, no doubt, would drink all the same, but the majority of those not yet in bondage to the unnatural craving would draw back. Suppose, again, that any one who is wronging a neighbor saw as clearly as any impartial judge or friend would see the violation of right that he is committing: surely only a thoroughly bad man would persist in his wrong-doing. And thoroughly bad men are after all rare exceptions among the beings of mingled and checkered moral nature of whom the great mass of mankind consists, and who on the whole mean only to maintain their own rights and not encroach upon the rights of others,—though doubtless from a mixture of intellectual muddle with passionate impulse or selfish negligence they are continually liable to wrong others.

Improvement in moral insight, then, seems to me as much practically wanted as improvement in feeling and will; and perhaps the gain from the former, if taken alone, is less mixed with danger. But it is not my wish to decide whether, for moral improvement, we are most in need of a stronger impulse to do our duty, or of clearer insight as to what our duty really is. I have drawn attention to the distinction chiefly in order to make clear the aim of what I am about to say on the morality of strife. I shall not primarily seek to strengthen the *motives* to the performance of duty in this department of conduct, but to merely assist in the solution of certain intellectual difficulties which arise when we try to get a clear idea of duty.

In speaking of strife, I shall have primarily and chiefly in view that most intense form of conflict which we call war, in which masses of civilized men elaborately try to destroy each other's lives and incidentally to take each other's property. This is the strife which, from its fundamental nature and inevitable incidents, causes the most intense and profound moral aversion and perplexity to the modern mind. At the same time it seems to me that the deepest problems presented by war, and the deepest principles to be applied in dealing with them,

are applicable also to the milder conflicts and collisions that arise within the limits of an orderly and peaceful community, and especially to those struggles for wealth and power carried on by classes and parties within a state. Indeed, these latter—though conducted by the milder methods of debate and vote—often resemble wars very strongly in the states of thought and feeling that they arouse, and also in some of the difficulties that they suggest.

Now, in considering the morality of strife, the difference of opinion which I have been discussing as to the causes of wrong conduct meets us with especial force. Many will say, when they hear of moralizing war, that the moralist ought not to acquiesce in its existence; he ought to trace it to its source, in the lack of kindly feeling among human beings. Spread kindness and good will; make altruism predominate over egoism; and wars between states will come to an end among civilized men because there will be no hostile emotions to rouse them, while within states strife will resolve itself into a competition for the privilege of doing good to others. I do not deny that a solution of the problem of war for the world might be found in this diffusion of kindly feeling, if sufficiently ardent and universal. But for this effect the universality is necessary as well as the ardor. The increase of the "enthusiasm of humanity" in a moral minority, in a world where most men are still as selfish as now, would have no tendency to prevent strife; for if around us some are wronging others, the predominance of altruism, though it will diminish an individual's tendency to fight in his own quarrels, will make him more eager to take part with others who are wronged; and since, so long as we are human beings, our kindly feelings must flow more strongly in special channels, as they grow in intensity we shall only become more prompt and ardent to defend against unjust attacks the narrower communities and groups in which we take special interest. Increase of sympathy among human beings may ultimately do away with strife; but it will only be after a long interval during which the growth of sympathetic resentment against wrongs seems not unlikely to cause as much strife as the diminution of mere selfishness prevents. The Founder

of Christianity is recorded to have said that he "came not to bring peace on earth, but a sword," and the subsequent history of Christianity offers ample and striking confirmation of the truth of the prediction. And the same may be said, with at least equal truth, of that ardor for the secular amelioration of mankind which we find presented to us in these latter days as a substitute for Christian feeling.

For it is to be observed that, even among men as they now are, war or any other form of earnest strife is not usually—as cynics imply—a mere collision of passions and cupidities; it is a conflict in which each side conceives itself to be contending on behalf of legitimate interests. In the wars I have known, as a contemporary, this has been strikingly manifested in the sincere belief of religious persons generally—ordinary plain honest Christians on either side—that God is on their side. In the wars of ancient history, a people's belief in the special protection of the divinity was not equally an evidence of their belief in the justice of its cause, since each nation had its own deities who were expected to take sides with their worshippers; but in a war between modern Christian nations, worshipping the same God, the favor of heaven implies the justice of the cause favored; and it is sometimes startling to see that not only is each side convinced of its overwhelming claims to the favor of heaven, but it can hardly believe in a similar sincere conviction on the other side. Perhaps some of my readers may remember how, in the Franco-German war of 1870, the pious utterances of the Emperor William excited the derision of Frenchmen and their friends; it seemed to the latter not only evident that the invading Germans were brigands, but even impossible to conceive that they did not know that they were brigands. This strikingly shows how war among human beings, of the degree of rationality that average civilized humanity has at present reached, is normally not a mere conflict of interests, but also a conflict of opposing views of right and justice.

I must not exaggerate; I do not mean that in modern times unscrupulous statesmen have never made wars that were substantially acts of conscious brigandage, and have never



been applauded for so doing by the nations whom they led, who have suffered a temporary obscurity of their moral sense under the influence of national ambition. I do not say that this has not occurred; but I do not think it is the normal case, and I shall leave it out of account, partly because it does not seem to me to give rise to any moral problem which we can profitably discuss. The duty of resisting such unscrupulous aggression is simple; and, though there may be a question how far any nation is bound to intervene when it is not directed against itself, it is a question to which no general answer can well be given.

Similarly in any strife of parties and classes within a state, there is conflict of interests; not of bare interests, but interests clothed in the garb of rights, and in the main the garb is not hypocritically worn. The mass of human beings as we know them are too moral to enter into a struggle on behalf of interests which they know to be divorced from right and justice. I do not say that they are not easily led to believe that what is conducive to their interests is just,—men's proneness to such belief is proverbial,—but the belief is generally sincere; and though, again, in the heat of party conflict many things are done from passion and eagerness to win which are known to be wrong, these are deplorable incidents of party strife, they do not make up its moral texture. If, then, normal human strife is due not merely to colliding interests, but to conflicting views of rights, it would seem that we might hope to reduce it to comparative insignificance if we could only find and make clear the true definition of the rights in question. For though the interests of all individuals, classes, and nations are not harmonious, their rights are; that is the essential difference between the two. You cannot be sure of bringing disputants into harmony and peace by enlightening them as to their true interests, though you may in some cases; but you must do this if you can really and completely enlighten them as to their true rights, unless they are bad enough to fight on in conscious wrongful aggression. Such completeness of enlightenment, however, we cannot reasonably expect to attain; the complexity of human relations and the imper-

fection of our intellectual methods of dealing with them preclude the hope that we can ever solve a problem of rights with the demonstrative clearness and certainty with which we can solve a problem of mathematics. The practical question, therefore, is, how we can attain a tolerable approximation to such a solution.

To many the answer to this question seems simple. They would apply to the disputes of right between nations, and the disputes of right between classes and sections within the modern state, what I will call the *external* method of solution; *i.e.*, by referring the dispute to the judgment of impartial—and, if possible, skilled—outsiders, as the legal disputes of individual members of a civilized community are referred to arbiters, judges, and juries. I call this an external method, because it does not require any effect to be produced on the intellects and consciences of the disputants; they are supposed to remain in their one-sided and erroneous convictions, indeed they are almost directed to concentrate their attention on their own one-sided views, and—if I may so say—harden themselves in their one-sidedness, because their function in the process of settlement is to advocate their own case before the outside arbiter; they are not supposed to be convinced by his decision, but merely to accept it for the sake of peace.

The method takes various forms, according to circumstances. In the case of disputes between nations, it takes the form of a substitution of arbitration for war; the practical—or, if I may so say, the technical—problem comes to be how to get a wise and impartial court of international arbitration. A similar method is widely advocated for the settlement of the disputes between laborers and employers, within the limits drawn by the existing law, which have so long been a prominent feature of our present industrial condition. But in the still deeper disputes between classes and sections within a community, which tend to changes in the established legal order, the expedient commonly recommended is somewhat different; it consists in the construction of a legislature on the representative system, so adjusted and balanced that each class and section has enough representatives to advocate its claims, but

not enough to constitute it a judge in its own cause; the decision on any proposed change in laws or taxation affecting the interests of different sections in opposite ways is always to rest with the presumably impartial representatives of other sections. Now, I do not wish to undervalue the external method in any of these cases; I think the attention of statesmen should be seriously directed to making it as perfect as possible. But I am anxious to show that it is not safe to rely on it for a complete and final removal of the evils of strife.

Let us begin by considering the application of the external method—the reference of a dispute about rights and wrongs to an impartial arbiter—in the case of individuals living side by side in an orderly society. I certainly think it would be a gain if this method was applied more carefully and systematically than is at present the case. Of course the extreme of strife is prevented among orderly members of a state by the intervention of law; but many important conflicts among friends and relatives, causing much unhappiness, are beyond the sphere of law courts; and in many of those which must ultimately be decided by judges, if the conflicting parties do not come to terms, it would save much time and trouble and bitterness of feeling if they were terminated at an earlier stage. In all such cases it is much to be recommended that any one, before asserting rights or resenting wrongs offensively, should refer the questions at issue to the judgment of a competent and impartial outsider, if such can be found. But it is easy to see that this method in private quarrels is only of limited application. First, the occasion of strife may be too sudden; it may leave no opportunity for advice. Secondly, the difficulty of finding an arbiter of the requisite impartiality and sincerity is often insuperable. I say “sincerity” because there are so many amiable and delightful persons whose chief problem in a quarrel among their friends is to consider how far the general duty of veracity will allow them to sympathize alternately with both sides, and who generally solve the problem by treating this duty of veracity as very elastic. And among persons whose sincerity and zeal may be trusted, it may be very difficult to find one who is not likely from

nature or circumstances to have a decided bias in favor of one or other party. Taking everything into account, if the matter at stake is important, most men will feel that they cannot conscientiously, in justice to those whose interests are indirectly involved on either side, throw the final responsibility of deciding on any friend. However difficult it is for a man to be a fair judge in his own cause, he must face the difficulty.

With this analogy before our minds, let us turn and see how far arbitration is adapted to the solution of international strife. Let us place ourselves at the point of view of a nation that is being drawn into what it regards as a just war, according to the received principles of international justice. It is obvious that any serious and unprovoked violation of international duty must be held to give a state whose rights are violated a claim for reparation; and if reparation be obstinately refused, it would seem that—so long as states are independent—the offending state must be held to have a right to obtain it by force, with the aid of any other states that can be persuaded to join it. This exercise of force need not necessarily amount to war. For instance, if the property belonging to a state or any of its members has been unjustly seized by another state, reparation may be obtained by reprisals; but it is most probable that such reprisals, being resisted, will lead to the thorough-going appeal to physical force as a means of settlement, which we call war. Well, at this point it is asked, by many earnest philanthropists, “Why should not the offended state make a proposal to submit its claims to arbitration, and why should not the offending state be made, by the pressure of public opinion, to accept this proposal.” I cannot agree with those so-called practical men who waive this suggestion aside as out of the range of practical politics. I think that much may be hoped, in the way of reduction of the danger of war between civilized states, from improvements in the machinery of arbitration, and a more extensive adoption of the improved machinery; and I am most strongly in sympathy with the efforts of those who keep urging these points on the attention of statesmen and of the public. But I think that

such efforts are more likely to attain the limited success which can alone be reasonably hoped, if those who urge them bear in mind the inevitable limitations of the applicability of arbitration to the conflicts of right between nations.

In the first place, the violation of right which leads to a conflict may be a continuing evil, which requires immediate abatement as well as reparation; and the violence required for this abatement is likely to lead to further violence on the other side, so that the conflicting states may be drawn into the condition of war by a series of steps too rapid to allow of the delay necessary for arbitration, and which involve so many fresh grounds of complaint that the decision of the original dispute may easily sink into insignificance. But the second reason is more important. The interests at stake may be so serious that a state, believing itself able to obtain redress by its own strong hand, cannot reasonably be expected to run the risk of a wrong decision of the arbitrator, either from partiality or from other causes. Or, to keep closer to the moral problem actually presented, I should rather say that the government of a community cannot feel justified in thus risking the interests of the community intrusted to it. This will be especially likely to be the case where the quarrel is one that involves a conflict of principles, widely extended among civilized states, since in such case it will be difficult to find an impartial and trustworthy arbiter. Thus, in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries it would have been almost impossible to find such an arbiter in Europe in any quarrel between a Catholic and a Protestant state, and in the nineteenth century it would be almost impossible to find such an arbiter in any quarrel caused by the claims of a nationality struggling for independence. And even apart from conflict of principles, the ties of interest and alliance that bind nations together may render it difficult to find arbitrators whose absence of bias can be trusted when the interests at stake are grave.

Now, I think that history shows that minor violations of international rights—such as arbitration undoubtedly might settle—have rarely been the real *causes*, though they have often been the ostensible causes and the real *occasio* s, of momentous wars.

The most serious wars of the European group of states have been the combined result of conflicting fundamental principles, religious or political, and conflicting national interests of great real or supposed importance; and where such conflicts arise arbitration is rarely likely to be an effective means of preserving peace, since the conflict of principles renders it difficult to find an arbiter whose decision both sides can sincerely acquiesce in as just, while the magnitude of the interests at stake must make acquiescence in an unjust decision appear a supine and cowardly abandonment of patriotic duty. Hence, though the international law which arbitrators can administer may be most useful in removing minor occasions of controversy and in minimizing the mischief resulting from graver conflicts, I do not see how it is to provide a settlement for the graver controversies which will enable us to dispense with war. This will perhaps appear more clearly if we reflect for a moment on the special difficulty of defining international rights and the manner in which opposite views of imperfectly defined rights tend to be combined with discordant interests,—partly from the absence of a central government of the community of nations, partly from the fewness of the members of the society of nations and to the consequent greater importance of an individual nation relatively to the whole society, partly from the difficulty of defining a nation and its imperfect unity and cohesion as compared with that of individual human beings, and partly, too, from the greater difference in degrees of civilization in the society of nations. The first of these causes renders necessary and legitimate an extension of the right and duty of self-defence, which it is very difficult to limit. War is not only obviously just against actual aggression, but when aggression is unmistakably being prepared, the nation threatened cannot be condemned for striking the first blow, if this is an important gain for self-defence. But this easily passes over into anticipation of a blow that is merely feared, *not* really threatened. Indeed, this enlarged right of self-protection against mere danger has often been further extended to justify hostile interference to prevent a neighbor growing strong merely through expansion or coalescence with other states,



without anything like aggression. Now, here I think that moral opinion may do something. It should set itself more steadily than it has done against this latter extension of the right of self-protection. Still, it is obviously difficult to define exactly the degree of alarm that would justify hostile action. It is still more difficult to decide, on any clearly just principles, how far the right of national self-preservation may be legitimately extended into the right to prevent interference with "national development,"—*e.g.*, if nation A appropriates territory over which nation B is hoping to extend its sway some time or other. At the same time, this is a cause of strife that we must, I think, expect to operate more intensely as the world gets fuller. With each successive generation the demand for expansion on the part of civilized nations is likely to grow stronger; and the more serious the interests involved, the more difficult it will be to obtain acquiescence in the rules determining the legitimate occupation of new territory, which must inevitably be to some extent arbitrary. And the question is complicated by the differences in grade of civilization, to which I have referred; for the nations most advanced in civilization have a tendency—the legitimacy of which cannot be broadly and entirely disputed—to absorb semi-civilized states in their neighborhood, as in the expansion of England and Russia in Asia and of France in Africa. As, I say, the tendency cannot be altogether condemned, as it often seems clearly conducive to the general happiness that the absorption should take place; still, it is obviously difficult to define the conditions under which this is legitimate, and the civilized nation engaged in this process of absorption cannot be surprised that other civilized nations think they have a right to interfere and prevent the aggression.

When we turn to the part of the earth tolerably filled with civilized nations,—to Western Europe,—it seems that the duty of avoiding substantial encroachment would be so clear that it could not be violated without manifest immorality, if only such nations had perfect internal unity and coherence. I do not see, *e.g.*, how any quarrel could easily arise between France and Spain—apart from collisions of interest in other

parts of the world—except of the minor kind which arbitration might settle, unless there was something like avowed brigandage on one side or the other. But we have only to look at Germany and Italy to see that even Western Europe is far from being composed of states of this type; and even if internal unity were attained for a time, it might always be broken up again by some new division.

I therefore think it inevitable that, at least for a long time to come, every nation in the most important matters—as individuals in matters not within the range of law courts—must to an important extent be judge in its own cause; it may refer some of its disputes to arbitration,—and I hope the number may increase,—but there are others which it cannot so refer, and it must be judge as to the limits of such reference. Other considerations might be adduced, tending to limit still further the normal sphere of arbitration in international controversies; *e.g.*, it might be shown that even where both sides in such a controversy are animated by an adequate and preponderant desire for peace, an acceptable compromise is often more likely to be attained by direct negotiation than by reference to an arbitrator. But it belongs to a political rather than an ethical discussion to dwell on points like these. I have said enough to show why even civilized nations, in which the majority are so far moral as to be sincerely unwilling to fight for a cause known to be wrong, cannot be expected to avoid war by arbitration, except to a very limited extent.

Where, then, the sphere of the external or political method of attaining international “peace with justice” ends, the special sphere of the internal or properly moral method begins; if we must be judges in our own cause, we must endeavor to be just judges. It appears to me, however, that there is hardly any plain duty of great importance in which civilized men fail so palpably as in this. Doubtless the impartiality required is difficult; but, as the Greek proverb says, “the difficult things are noble;” and I am persuaded that even the imperfect beings who compose modern nations might perform with more success the judicial function—which, in a modern state under popular government, has become, in some degree, the business

of every man—if national consciences could be roused to feel the nobility and grapple practically and persistently with the difficulties of the task. At any rate, the thoughtful and moral part of every community might fit themselves for this judicial function with more care, and perform it under a sense of graver responsibility than is now the case. I am not urging that they should keep coldly aloof from patriotic sentiment; when the struggle has commenced, it is doubtless right for most if not for all men to side with their country unreservedly; but at the earlier period, when the cloud of discord that is to cover the sky is as yet no bigger than a man's hand, it is surely the duty of all moral persons, according to their gifts and leisure, to make an earnest and systematic effort at an impartial view of the points at issue.

There are three stages in such an attempt, which are not always distinguished. First, we may endeavor to put ourselves in the opponent's place, carrying with us our own principles and views of right, and see whether, when we look at the opponent's case from the inside, there is not more to be said for it than appeared when we contemplated it from the outside. Secondly, if we have no doubt that our opponent is in the wrong, according to principles of right that we sincerely hold, we still have to ask ourselves whether we apply these principles not merely in claiming our rights, but also in practically determining the performance of our duties. For if there has been divergence between our actions and our principles, though it may not be a reason for abandoning a present claim,—for two wrongs do not make a right,—it is an argument for mildness and for a spirit of compromise. And, thirdly, if there seems to us to be a real difference of principles, then comes the most difficult duty of endeavoring to place ourselves in an impartial position for contemplating the different sets of principles, and seeing if there is not an element of truth in the opponent's view which we have hitherto missed. It is hard to bring a man to this when once the complex collision of principles and interests has begun; and it is still harder to bring a nation to it; but it is a plain duty imposed on us by reason, and it is the most essential part of the in-

ternal method of aiding the transition from strife to concord, without which the perfecting of the machinery of arbitration does not seem to me likely to achieve very great results.

My limits do not allow me to discuss in detail the various forms of strife carried on within an orderly modern community, from which destructive physical violence is approximately excluded. But, if space permitted, I think it might be similarly shown that, in the graver disputes between classes within a state, we cannot rely on the external method alone for realizing the social peace and concord which only justice—I do not mean ideal justice, but a fair human approximation to justice—can give. For the most skilfully adjusted representative system will not really protect us against a majority, formed by a combination of selfish interests, becoming practically judge in its own cause; and the belief in the natural right of the majority of any community to do what it likes is a political superstition which is rapidly passing to the limbo of such superstitions. The only hope of preventing strife within modern states from growing continually more bitter and dangerous lies in persuading the citizens, of all classes and sections, that it is not enough to desire justice sincerely; it is needful that they fit themselves, by laborious and sustained efforts to understand the truths mingled with opposing errors, for the high and deeply-responsible function, which democracy throws on them, of deciding and declaring social justice. Otherwise, I see no reason why the strife of sections within a community should not lead to war in the future, as it has done in the past.

HENRY SIDGWICK.

## THE FREEDOM OF ETHICAL FELLOWSHIP.

IN a journal of theoretical and practical ethics it may be permitted to claim a place for an account of a group of societies called ethical, and devoted to the advancement of ethical knowledge and practice.\* The spirit of these societies is expressed in the caption of the present article. They offer to their members a moral fellowship or comradeship, the distinctive mark of which is freedom; the word being used primarily in the negative sense to indicate the absence of any limitations of the fellowship to the professors of a particular creed, or the adherence to a particular metaphysical system, while there is at the same time an underlying reference to the positive content of the term "freedom," inasmuch as it is the belief of those who established the Ethical Societies that the broader fellowship which they contemplate will prove favorable to the larger scope and exercise of the moral faculty itself.

Co-operation for moral ends is the aim of the societies. There is, indeed, one department of morals in which the co-operation of persons widely differing in religious opinion and belief has, to a large extent, already been secured,—namely, in "good works." The abatement of the controversial spirit in theology and the softening of sectarian prejudices, in which our age rejoices, has brought about this happy result. It is, nowadays, no unusual thing to see Roman Catholics, Protestants of every denomination, Jews, and Freethinkers sit on the same charitable committees and unite in efforts to procure food for the indigent, to build hospitals for the sick, and, in what way soever, to relieve the needs of suffering humanity.

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\* The substance of the following article was delivered in the form of an address to the students of Cornell University on May 19, 1890.

Thus far the lesson of universal brotherhood has been impressed.

It is the aim of the Ethical Societies to extend the area of moral co-operation, so as to include a part, at least, of the inner moral life ; to unite men of diverse opinions and beliefs in the common endeavor to explore the field of duty ; to gain clearer perceptions of right and wrong ; to study with thorough-going zeal the practical problems of social, political, and individual ethics, and to embody the new insight in manners and institutions.

Now, in view of the received opinion that a religious or philosophical doctrine of some kind is the only adequate basis for moral union, it will be necessary to explain and justify the position just announced in some detail. Let the reader put himself in the place of men who are sufficiently free from the influence of tradition to be willing to plan their lives anew ; who are as ready to question current doctrines, with a view of testing their real value, as the inhabitants of a distant star suddenly descending upon earth might be conceived to be ; and who, moreover, happen to be supremely interested in making the best of their lives, morally speaking. They are told that it is indispensable for them to adopt some form of faith if they would succeed in what they propose. But here two objections present themselves. First, no single form of faith is universally adopted, and there is even to be observed a tendency in modern society towards increased divergence in matters of belief. The sects are multiplying. On the other hand, there are good men in all the churches and outside the churches. No one will deny that there exist in the Catholic Church veritable saints,—that is, persons who lead really saintly lives. No one will doubt that men of admirable character are to be found in every one of the greater or lesser sects into which the Protestant camp is divided. And no one who is not utterly blinded by prejudice will gainsay that persons enamoured of the “beauty of holiness” are also to be found among Jews and Freethinkers. They are at present hindered by the circumvallations of sectarian opinion from coming into touch, from working with united force towards the ends which they all alike cherish. It is



necessary, therefore, in order to speed on these ends, to disregard the conflicting creeds. If the charitable work of society is better done because the most able and most zealous persons, regardless of sectarian divisions, combine to do it (and no one questions that this is so), is it not reasonable to expect that greater moral progress in other directions, too, would be achieved if all who love the right would help each other in the study and practice of it, no matter how they may disagree with respect to its ultimate sanctions? Moreover, since, in any community, the number of persons seriously and deeply interested in the ends of moral progress and capable of promoting them is small, it seems all the more intolerable that these few should be kept apart and estranged from one another. They should, rather, be brought together. The best men in every community should be formed into a coalition, so that their efficiency, both singly and collectively, may be increased, and that they may present a united front to the moral evils by which the very life of society is threatened.

The same objection lies against the adoption of a philosophical formula, or set of formulas, as a basis of moral union. In the first place, there is no philosophical system which commands universal assent. Is any one hair-brained enough to suppose that he can propose one? If not, then we must choose, and whichever way our choice may fall out we shall hinder moral co-operation. Shall we adopt the philosophy of Kant? of Hegel? of Schopenhauer? of Mill? of Spencer? of Comte? To select any one of these would be tantamount to ruling out the adherents of all the rest. But there are excellent men, men whose moral co-operation is worth having, in each of the schools. Why, then, exclude them? Why weaken the small band of earnest workers by drawing the line of demarcation along the narrow boundaries of any metaphysical theory? To adopt a philosophical formula as the basis of union would be to proclaim ourselves a philosophical sect; and a philosophical sect is the most contemptible of all sects, because the sectarian bias is most repugnant to the spirit of genuine philosophy. And there is yet another reason why it would be ill advised to build up a society—that is to

say, an institution—upon opinion as a foundation. Not only can we never be absolutely sure that our religious and philosophical opinions or convictions are the highest expression of truth attainable in our day, since many of our contemporaries differ from us, but even if we possessed this certainty, it would still be a wrong and a hinderance to the further extension of truth, to raise above our opinions the superstructure of a social institution. For institutions in their nature are conservative; they dare not, without imperilling their stability, permit a too frequent inspection or alteration of their foundations. Let us be careful, then, how we embed opinions, which require constant modification, in such foundations. The wealth and depth of spiritual insight would, no doubt, to-day be greater in the world if spiritual truths had been kept in the fluent state and had never been made the corner-stones of organized churches. It is a significant fact that the highest reaches of the religious life were ever attained in the early days of religions, before the visions of the seers had crystalized into hard and fast dogmas; or during epochs of reformation, when the organized forms of creed and worship, till then prevalent, had been broken up and had not yet been replaced by others. Is it altogether a vain hope that the spiritual life may be kept plastic by leaving it hereafter to the free play of individual spontaneity?

The history of thought enforces the same lesson with regard to philosophic opinion. \* Wherever institutions have been established on the basis of a prescribed philosophy, the energy of the mind in the pursuit of truth has flagged and stagnation set in. So long as Aristotle ruled the schools, the human mind sat like a caged bird within the bars of his system and seemed incapable of further flight. So long as a special kind of orthodox opinion was petted in every American college and anxiously protected against the intrusion of rival speculation, the American colleges hardly rose above the level of high-schools. It is the influence of the German universities that is now setting them free. The principle of the German university exactly expresses what we have in mind. The German university permits conflicting theories to vindicate

their claims within its walls. It has witnessed during the present century the rise and fall of a number of metaphysical dynasties which have successively occupied the throne of philosophy in its midst. But the university committed itself to none of these systems, conscious of a larger mission in the pursuit of ever widening and extending truth. And this is the secret of the commanding influence which it exerts throughout the civilized world to-day. The Ethical Society, so far as it is an institution devoted to the advancement of moral knowledge, adopts the principle of the German university. It is consecrated to the knowledge of the Good, but not to any special theory of the Good. All theories are welcome in so far as they can aid us the better to know, the more precisely to distinguish, right from wrong.

But an Ethical Society is an institution not for the advancement of ethical theory only, but also, and pre-eminently, for the improvement of ethical practice. And, it may be asked, how is this end to be attained, unless an agreement has previously been reached with respect to first principles? As some one has expressed it, "Men will not act as they ought unless they know why they ought." It is necessary to offer them a reason, or reasons, for moral conduct. Therefore, an Ethical Society without a philosophic or religious basis will necessarily lack coherence. Granted that it may subsist for a time on the enthusiasm of its leaders, yet it will crumble to pieces as soon as the compelling force of personal influence is withdrawn. Now this statement—that men will not act as they ought without a reason—is the fundamental objection which meets us at every turn. Is it well or ill founded? (Certainly, an illiterate man of generous impulses may leap into the water to save the life of a drowning fellow-being without realizing the theoretical grounds on which rests the doctrine of the sanctity of life. A good son may perform his filial duties without comprehending the moral theory of the parental and filial relations. A person who has received timely succor from another may display genuine gratitude towards his benefactor without being in the least capable of analyzing the somewhat subtle principle which underlies the duty of gratitude. And the humblest

citizen may lay down his life for his country without understanding the ideal of the state. Men have thought logically before ever they were acquainted with the formal rules of logic; even children use the syllogism without knowing so much as its name. Men admire what is beautiful and are displeased with what is ugly and deformed without being able to give an account of their preferences, much as men see without possessing a theory of vision and walk without understanding the mechanism of locomotion. There are certain predispositions, founded in the very constitution of the human mind, which impel and regulate its functions. These driving forces, coming from within, constrain our moral judgments. Conduct comes first; the laws of conduct are winnowed from experience, are won by reflecting upon the lines of conduct which we have actually followed, and comparing them with those which we are impelled to approve of. I would not be understood as saying that this instinctive morality is the best or the highest. I am engaged in refuting the fallacy which lies in the assumption that men will not act unless they know the reason why.

It is highly important to discriminate between the inextinguishable desire on the part of intelligent man to live in harmony with himself,—that is, to bring his emotional and volitional nature into agreement with his reason, on the one hand, and the actual play of the motive forces which govern him, on the other. It is one thing to say that, after men have acted for a long time and have reached the stage of reflective self-consciousness, they will try to borrow from the realm of ideas a sufficient reason for accepted rules of action, and another thing to maintain that men will not act at all unless they possess a reason. Nor is it possible to deny that, after these reasons have been formulated, they do modify human conduct, though to what extent they do so would be difficult to determine. Certain it is that men constantly act in obedience to motives, which are often worse, and sometimes fortunately better, than the doctrines they profess. Our reasoned-out scheme of ethics depends upon first principles,—that is, upon ideas with which we seek to bring our volitions into agree-

ment. These ideas are imported from the region of speculation or of science. They are, necessarily, of various types, as represented, for instance, in the various systems of religion and philosophy, and there is a tendency towards ever-increasing variation. In regard to them, therefore,—that is, in regard to first principles,—it is hopeless to expect agreement. But the main leadings of the moral force within us, as exemplified in the preferences of civilized men, are, on the whole, in one direction. And we have only to observe these leadings to collect from them certain secondary principles, which will answer as a practical basis for moral union. The distinction between primary and secondary principles is vital to the Ethical Society. As an example of secondary or practical principles, I may mention the Golden Rule, which, though it by no means includes the whole of duty, covers a vital part of it. Consider the precept that we should act towards others as we would have them act towards us. Plainly, it may be defended on various grounds. The egoistic hedonist may advise us so to act on grounds of enlightened self-interest. The universalistic hedonist may exhort us to carry out the rule in the interest of the general happiness. The evolutionist may recommend it on the ground that it is the indispensable condition of social order, and, therefore, of social progress. The Kantian may enforce it because it bears the test of universality and necessity. The follower of Schopenhauer may concur in teaching it on grounds of sympathy. Is it not evident that the simple rule itself is more certain, more safe, more secure, than any of the first principles from which it may be deduced? With respect to them, men have differed and will differ. With respect to the rule itself, there is practical unanimity. And it is the business of the ethical teacher to impress the rule; to lead men to obey it, by the contagion of his own earnestness and example; to extend the application of it to cases to which it has not yet been applied, and thus to refine the practice of it.

As Ethical Societies, we make the accepted norms of moral behavior our starting-point and the basis of our union.

"Whilst the parties of men," says Locke, "cram their tenets down all men's throats whom they can get into their power, and will not let truth have fair play in the world, nor men the liberty to search after it, what improvement can be expected of this kind? What greater light can be hoped for in the moral sciences? The subject part of mankind, in most places, might, instead thereof, with Egyptian bondage expect Egyptian darkness, were not the candle of the Lord set up by himself in men's minds, which it is impossible for the breath or power of man wholly to extinguish." It is to this "candle of the Lord set up in men's minds" that we look for illumination. It is in the light which it sheds that we would read the problems of conduct and teach others to read them. We appeal directly to the conscience. But, it may be said, by way of criticism, that the utterances of conscience in different ages and among different peoples are variable and often conflicting. To which we answer, that we appeal to the conscience of the present age and of the civilized portion of mankind. Again, it may be said that, even in civilized nations, there is no complete agreement in regard to the standard of right and wrong. To which we answer that we appeal not to the abnormal, but to the normal conscience, as represented by the educated, the intelligent, and the good. Once more it may be objected that the moral judgment, even of the good, is often warped and deflected by the influence of passion and self-interest. To which we reply, that different men are apt to be tempted on different sides of their nature; that their judgment is likely to be correct in cases where their own peculiar weaknesses do not come into play, and that, on the whole, these deflecting influences mutually neutralize each other. (There remains as a residue a common deposit of moral truth, a common stock of moral judgments, which we may call the common conscience. It is upon this common conscience that we build. We seek to free the moral life from the embarrassments and entanglements in which it has been involved by the quibbles of the schools and the mutual antagonisms of the sects; to introduce into it an element of downrightness and practical earnestness; above all, to secure

to the modern world, in its struggle with manifold evil, the boon of moral unity despite intellectual diversity.

The contents of the common conscience we would clarify and classify, to the end that they may become the conscious possession of all classes. And in order to enrich and enlarge the conscience, the method we would follow is to begin with cases in which the moral judgment is already clear, the moral rule already accepted, and to show that the same rule, the same judgment, applies to other cases, which, because of their greater complexity, are less transparent to the mental eye. That cases may arise under this procedure which the simpler rules will not fit, and which will compel the expanding and recasting of our ethical maxims, is a result as much to be expected as desired. For it is in this way that the moral knowledge of the race will be advanced, and that moral progress will be secured without prejudice to moral unity. "Life," says a well-known writer, "is the great antiseptic. The untrammelled action of the moral forces of society sustains its integrity as surely as the unhindered flow of a river sustains the sweetness of its waters." And not only does the application of ethical maxims to life sustain the integrity of morality, but it tends, in the manner just described, to the extension of its territory, to the reclaiming of those vast waste-lands of human conduct, which still remain, at the present day, unmoralized. Indeed, the "midwifery" of action in bringing to birth the true principles of action may be put forward as the cardinal thought of the movement in which we are engaged.

And here it may be appropriate to introduce a few reflections on the relations of moral practice to ethical theory and religious belief. To many it will appear that the logic of our position must lead us to underestimate the value of philosophical and religious doctrines in connection with morality, and that, having excluded these from our basis of fellowship, we shall inevitably drift into a crude empiricism. I may be permitted to say that precisely the opposite is at least our aim, and that among the objects we propose to ourselves none are dearer than the advancement of ethical theory and the up-building of religious conviction. Let me attempt to set this

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matter in a clearer light. Ethics is both a science and an art. As a science its business is to explain the facts of the moral life. In order, therefore, to improve it as a science, it is necessary before all to fix attention on the facts, to collect them, to bring them into view, especially the more recondite among them. It is necessary to effect in the treatment of the subject a revolution analogous to that which has taken place in the natural sciences,—namely, instead of beginning with theories and descending to facts, to begin with the facts and to test theories by their fitness to account for the facts. But the moral facts, unlike those with which the natural sciences deal, are not to be found in a stable, external order; they are discovered within ourselves, they are found in moral experience. Hence, the richer our moral experience is, the more likely we shall be to possess an adequate inductive basis for our moral generalizations. It is not from the solitary thinker who passes his days in the closet, apart from the varied life of men, not from the metaphysician who has spent the greater part of a lifetime in grappling with the fundamental conceptions of space and time, of matter and force, that we may expect the truest ethical philosophy. Many of the moral systems which have had a certain currency in the world plainly suffer from one fatal defect,—the shallow moral life of their authors. The superstructure of reasoning which they have raised is true to the approved rules of mental architecture, but the premises on which the whole is founded are narrow and poor. Rather will he be fitted to advance ethics as a science who unites with the discipline of the trained thinker a profound practical insight into the various moral relations, such as is gained only by experience. And, on the other hand, since the spread of right ethical theories depends quite as much on the public which controls as on the author who propounds them, it is equally important that the general public shall have the facts of the moral life placed within their reach. And this again can only be accomplished by leading them into the ways of moral experience. (Now, the Ethical Society sets men doing; it insists on moral action.) It thus tends to uncover the moral facts, to bring into view the deeper facts



previously overlooked. And every addition to the fund of facts is in the nature of a provocative to the thinker, calling upon him to modify, purify, and to enlarge his theoretical conceptions.

And again, ethics is an art. As such its office is to offer suggestions for the practical improvement of conduct. But will these suggestions be forthcoming unless the likelihood exists that they will be appreciated? Will there be a supply unless there be a demand? The purpose of the ethical movement is to create such a demand, to collect into societies men who, being desirous of improving conduct, feeling deeply the need of moral betterment, will by their attitude of expectancy call such suggestions forth. Can any one doubt the great influence which the industrial arts have had upon the promotion of knowledge? Can any one question that the desire to utilize electricity for practical purposes has had the effect of attracting eminent minds to the scientific investigation of electricity, with fruitful results, to the understanding of the subject on its purely theoretical side? Can any doubt that chemistry as a science has gained by the solicitations which have come to it from the textile and other industries? Or will any one deny that the fine arts attain their highest splendor when the artist is sure of a public prepared to expect and ready to appreciate the best he can do? When men are bent on having something done, so that it be within the compass of human capacity, there usually rise up those who will do it for them. The Ethical Society is a society of persons who are bent on being taught clearer perceptions of right and wrong, on being shown how to improve conduct. At least, let us hasten to add, the ideal of the society is that of a body of men who shall have this bent. Is it vain to hope that there will in time arise those who will render them the service they require?

To recapitulate, we maintain the capital importance of right motives, without which morality dwindles into mere legality. We impress the truth that the whole value of the deed is in the motive which inspires it. We take towards ethical theories a twofold attitude: holding it to be the prime duty of every

one in his individual capacity to rise to the ever clearer apprehension of first principles, but for that very reason abstaining in our collective capacity from laying down any set of first principles as binding. We do teach ethical theories in our societies and hold ourselves free, each to the best of his ability, to defend and recommend his own. But our bond of union is not a common doctrine, but a common practice, a common understanding as to ways of living. Just as the refined and educated are distinguished from the vulgar by their manners, these, however, relating chiefly to the externals of behavior, so we may hope that the Ethical Society will in time come to be distinguished by certain modes of behavior, these, however, related to the inmost matters of the soul. (It is the aim of the Ethical Society to help its members to reach this higher moral development, and to this end to bring forth institutions in which the better life will be embodied and secured. The instrumentalities hitherto employed in furtherance of these aims have been chiefly educational,—schools for the better mental, moral, and æsthetic training of young children; public lectures on Sundays; the discussion on the platform and in classes of the principal moral problems, such as the right relations of the sexes in and out of marriage, the right relations of the social classes to one another, the moral side of economic questions, the true ideal of the state. The charitable work of the societies has been so far prominent as to appear in the eyes of some their distinctive feature, and the false impression has thus gained ground that the Ethical Society exists purely for philanthropic or humanitarian purposes. But charity, apart from its importance as a social duty, has been employed by us chiefly as an educational instrument, as a pedagogue unto the higher life, as a plough wherewith to make the first incision into hearts hardened by selfish and sordid interests, to prepare them for the reception of the seed of moral ideas.

Finally, it remains to speak of the attitude of the Ethical Society towards religion. Recent investigations in primitive culture have given us glimpses of a time when religion was still distinctly unethical. As we follow the line of develop-

ment upward, we see that the ethical element is introduced, at first as a subordinate factor, that it becomes gradually more and more prominent and dominant, and that religious conceptions become ever purer and more elevated in proportion as this moral factor works its leaven into them. It is safe to say that every step forward in religion was due to a quickening of the moral impulses, that moral progress is the condition of religious progress, that the good life is the soil out of which the religious life grows. Witness the prophetic movement among the Hebrews, the rise of Buddhism, the Protestant Reformation! And why may we not add, the founding of Christianity itself to our instances, or rather place it at the head of the list. The teachings of Jesus, as they have been handed down to us, are capable of being condensed into the one great lesson,—that it is necessary to live the spiritual life in order to understand spiritual truths. The truths of religion are chiefly two,—that there is a reality other than that of the senses, and that the ultimate reality in things is, in a sense, transcending our comprehension, akin to the moral nature of men. But how shall we acquaint ourselves with this Supersensible. The ladder of science does not reach so far. And the utmost stretch of the speculative reason cannot attain to more than the abstract postulate of an infinite, which, however, is void of the essential attributes of divinity. Only the testimony of the moral life can support a vital conviction of this sort. (He who is enslaved by his senses will be sense-bound even in his thinking. But he who triumphs over his passions may realize in himself the impact of a spiritual force different in kind from the forces of nature.) He who having received an injury returns it, obeys a mechanical law analogous to that which causes a cannon to recoil or an elastic ball to rebound. But he who forgives his enemy becomes conscious of a spiritual law to which the mechanical interaction of phenomena affords no parallel. Thus, too, he who in affliction so far prevails over his will as to assent to the loss of personal happiness, and goes on working and striving for the general good, ceases to be a mere atom among the circling worlds, and becomes aware in his own soul of that

public nature in things to which he yields. "Blessed are they that mourn : for they shall be comforted ;" " I say unto you, love your enemies ;" " Whosoever looketh on a woman with an impure eye hath committed adultery already in his heart." Plainly, the precepts of Jesus enforce the truth that the purification of the heart is the condition of spiritual perception. "Only the pure in heart shall see." The symbols of religion are ciphers of which the key is to be found in moral experience. It is in vain you pore over the ciphers unless you possess the key. Face answers face as in a mirror, and only like can understand like. To understand the message of a great religious teacher one must find in his own life experiences somewhat akin to his. To measure the stature of those who stand on the pinnacles of mankind one must rise to an eminence in line with theirs, however inferior in height. To the children of the world,—that is, to worldly-minded men,—what meaning, for instance, can such utterances as these have ? "You must become as little children if you would possess the kingdom of heaven ;" "You must be willing to lose your life to save it ;" "If you would be first you must consent to be last ; if you would be masters you must serve." To the worldly-minded such words convey no sense ; they are, in fact, rank absurdity.

The Ethical Society is planted outside the churches for the reasons detailed above, but it should be regarded by them as a friendly ally. All the fruits it may be expected to produce,—the better moral training of the young, the clearer delineation of the boundaries of right and wrong, the awakened sense of responsibility with respect to social problems, the wiser methods of fashioning character,—all these the churches may adopt and seek to harmonize with their own aims. The Ethical Society is friendly to genuine religion anywhere and everywhere because it vitalizes religious doctrines by pouring into them the content of spiritual meaning.

And beyond the churches, also, it is fitted to embrace the ever-increasing masses of the unchurched, inasmuch as it provides for these a resting-place on their journey towards the new religious home. Nay, more than that, a movement

for moral culture appears to be the indispensable positive condition of a new *avatar* of the religious spirit. A new moral earnestness must precede the rise of larger religious ideals. For the new religious synthesis, which many long for, will not be a fabrication, but a growth. It will not steal upon us as a thief in the night, or burst upon us as lightning from the sky, but will come in time as a result of the gradual moral evolution of modern society, as the expression of higher moral aspirations, and a response to deeper moral needs.

FELIX ADLER.

## THE LAW OF RELATIVITY IN ETHICS.

### I.

It is the intention of this essay to prove that the validity of all the moral laws rests on definite relations and conditions, and that the law of relativity—the fundamental law of knowledge—therefore applies also in the sphere of ethics. It will appear in the sequel that this view helps to bring out the essential points of the nature of ethical perception and moral laws.

We will begin by inquiring in what sense and with what justice we speak of moral laws at all. The term "law" is not used here in the same sense as it is employed in natural philosophy, psychology, or sociology. For it is not the business of ethics to point out the rules which are the basis of *actual* human desire and conduct, but those principles and ideals which *ought* to underlie them; the standard to which it must submit. That meaning of the word "law," which may be employed in philosophical ethics, reminds one of the way the word is used in positive law, in theological ethics, and in the science of positive morality,—viz., of manners and the principles on which public opinion is founded. But philosophical ethics is distinguished from these sciences in that it is not dependent on any external authority, natural or supernatural. On the

contrary, it attempts to draw its principles and ideals out of human nature itself, as we know it by experience. Some have concluded, from the foregoing, that it is unwarrantable to speak of moral laws.

A law, according to John Austin, presupposes two parties,—one who formulates it and the other for whom it is formulated; and its binding quality lies in the fact that he who formulated it has the power to maintain it by attaching pain to its infringement. While, therefore, the law, upheld by authority, produces uniformity of action, on account of particular deeds being determined by its express demands, the word may at the same time mean a general rule illustrated in particular cases. It is the latter part of the conception of law, and only that, which we have in mind when we speak of natural laws. We think, therefore, of the regular succession of phenomena, without finding it necessary to conceive the regularity as an effect of an authoritative will. And even if the common use of the term be allowed, it is yet definitely denied by Austin that this conception of law may find application in those rules of conduct which the individual man establishes for himself and acknowledges. For here there is neither a natural law nor a power above the individual that might maintain the law in case of its being infringed. "For though he may fairly purpose to inflict a pain himself, if his conduct shall depart from the guide which he intends it shall follow, the infliction of his conditional pain depends upon his own will."\* But does there not exist a psychological basis of the conception of moral law which indicates the three elements to be found in Austin's strict definition? Those elements were (1) a relation between a higher and a lower; (2) a general rule of action; (3) the maintenance of this general rule by the infliction of pain in cases of transgression.

There are in man different feelings, each one characterized by its special sensational and intellectual contents. Among these feelings there is one attached to the self-preservation of the individual, and there are other impulses which permit the

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\* "Lectures on Jurisprudence," i. p. 214.

individual to enter into the joys and sorrows of others. Every feeling is also a motive to action; consequently it is possible that a motive which regards the comprehensive order of things and the well-being of a greater group should assert itself in the presence of another which is only determined by the particular limited interests of the individual. In such a case there will be something in the individual which reaches beyond himself, and which assigns to him a place as a particular part of a greater whole. From which it follows that the well-being of the aggregate may sometimes require the sacrifice of that which regard for the well-being of self may demand of a single being. There will then result two unlike feelings in the self-same individual; one, an impulse bound to the conception of a wider order of things; the other an impulse attached to a narrower sphere. Here, then, we have the first element in the conception of law. No other relation exists, as a matter of fact, even when the party that formulates the law is an external authority. For this authority must necessarily reveal itself by raising a feeling, be it one of fear or reverence, and the law will therefore make itself known in this case, too, by the relation of two feelings or impulses within man. For him who can exterminate the emotion of fear or reverence, the law does not exist. It follows that philosophical ethics applies that conception of law with the same justice as jurisprudence, theology, and positive morality. I do not enter here more closely into the question as to how this inner contrast between a wider and a narrower regard originates within the sphere of emotion and impulse. Under the influence of social life this contrast has gradually developed in man according to psychological laws.

In philosophical ethics we shall meet with the third element in the conception of law as we have already met with the first.

Austin believed that it depended only on the individual's will as to whether he felt pain from the violation of the laws springing out of his own nature. But if the moral law be only the formulation of an impulse determined by reference to a greater whole, it will not be able to experience resistance and contradiction from other parts of the nature of individuals

without exciting a more or less severe pain. When the impulse, rebelling against the acknowledged moral law, cannot wholly displace or eradicate the other impulses which led to its recognition, there springs up an inner discord, which we call bad conscience or repentance. And it does not depend on the arbitrary choice of the individual whether this pain shall arise or not; it follows with psychological necessity from the given conditions. That which is expressed in the guilty conscience and in repentance is nothing accidental or arbitrary, but an inevitable result under the actual circumstances,—as inevitable as the external punishment, when the state is strong and clever, and quick to seize the transgressor of civil laws. The state is not always successful in capturing the criminal. In the same way it may happen that repentance does not appear when the impulse driving one to the acknowledgment of a greater whole is extinguished, or when the latter impulse is not sufficiently strong and vivid to assert itself against the contrary impulse.

Finally, it is possible to show that the property of being a universal rule is part of the moral law. In the idea of the greater whole to which the individual feels himself attached—the family, the clan, the nation, humanity—he has a principle from which he is able to deduce universal rules as to his will and conduct. If he does not want to contradict himself, he is obliged to judge the condition and the inclination of his will by the loftiest and most universal stand-point he knows of; and this stand-point is the thought of the great total of which he feels himself to be a part. The particular rules follow then with logical necessity from this thought, if once acknowledged. The science of ethics is only a development of that which is implicitly contained in universal sympathy as gradually developed in the human race.

If, therefore, the use of the conception of law in ethics has been proved justifiable, it follows from the evidence produced that the universal principle, as well as the rules deduced from it, have value only *in relation to*, and *under the condition of*, a positive psychological basis. If men should be found in whom this basis could not be shown to exist, it would result therefrom that they



would not, and could not, acknowledge moral laws. What position to take towards such individuals is a question which we shall touch later on. We only maintain here that all moral laws are solid only in relation to a positive psychological presupposition. This is *the psychological relativity of ethics*.\*

## I I.

But it is not sufficient to determine the psychological basis and the corresponding ethical principle. The circumstances under which the rules deduced from the principle need to be applied are so entangled and complex that it is difficult, nay, impossible, to find rules which might be applied without hesitancy in all special conditions and circumstances.

The universal law cannot foresee all possible circumstances in which a man might be forced to make a final resolution. This difficulty the moral law has in common with the legal and theological law, as well as with the laws of positive morality. Life is too rich and manifold to be forced into a cut-and-dried system. The conditions pass into one another by many different shades and colors. There are no sharp dividing lines. The *general* law, under which *all* cases should be classed, soon becomes inapplicable in a particular, definite, and unique instance. The moral law must, therefore,—if it is not to sacrifice the true right of life to a seeming consistency,—only judge the general direction or the *tendency* of the will; and not give any special instruction as to how one should act unconditionally on particular occasions. In no other way can the general validity of the law be reconciled with the varying circumstances that differ with occasions and ages. This may be called the *historical relativity* of the contents of the moral law.† On the same psychological basis, and according to the same universal standard, different decisions must be made under different historical conditions and circumstances, as well in regard to the order of society as in regard to the

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\* I have developed this thought before, but more from a methodological point of view in my "Ethik" (Dan. ed., 1887, pp. 35-37; Germ. ed., 1888, pp. 39-42).

† Compare my "Ethik," Dan. ed., p. 160 f.; Germ. ed., p. 184.

actions of the individual. What is possible at one point in the stage of development is not possible at another. A type of the state, or the family, which might be introduced everywhere without delay, can as little be constructed on the principle of universal welfare as on any other. Every social order presupposes that the individuals who are to compose it live under certain positive inner and outer conditions. No social structure can grow on barren ground.

Hence the moral laws do not lose their significance. It is true they cannot tell us how to meet every swelling billow on the sea of life, or how we should cross in a certain definite course. But they can inform us in what direction we should steer; and they make it possible that our compass should guide us unerringly, even if the way be not straight. The moral laws formulate the general demands made by the highest aim of our endeavor. The means to the satisfying of these demands may vary within wide limits. But when the general tendency of the will is understood, and when a man's character has sufficient strength and consistency, the particular ways and means will be found without any danger of a conflict with the final aim. Kant has justly said that casuistry is not a science, but an art, "not a theory of how to *find* something, but a practice in how to *seek* for truth."

Casuistry treats of the problems which are given birth to by the complex nature of objective conditions, when a decision in accordance with ethical principles is to be made. It seeks to resolve the conditions into their elements for the purpose of drawing from the general principles a conclusion adapted to the given circumstances. It establishes general rules for doubtful cases, or seeks, by the help of fictitious examples, to develop the power of finding the right course. But analyses and universal rules cannot always transfer us from one case to another. It may be right, for example, that a higher and a broader aim should override a lower and limited one; but to decide which is the more comprehensive aim in any given case is just the difficulty. For all aims are bound together so closely that, even apart from the varying multiplicity of circumstances, one cannot be touched without leading to changes in a great

many of the others. And how are we to decide with certainty beforehand whether the good or the bad effects of a certain class are overbalanced by interfering with them?

It cannot be laid down unconditionally that, in a definite case, the larger aim should be preferred to the narrower; so that, for instance, when the interests of the state are clashing with those of the family, the interests of the latter should always yield, or that my interest should always give way when it comes into collision with those of several others. For the healthy development of life is not only founded on its extent, but also on its power and depth,—not only on its breadth, but also on its intensity. A deeper and fuller life may be enjoyed in a narrower circle of society than in a wider one. The power itself that holds the wider circle together is developed and nourished in the narrower circles of society; so that the living strength of the former is dependent on that of the latter. A feeling of community arises within the limits of the narrower circle, which, after having grown appreciably, expends itself until it becomes an important part of that which sustains the larger communities. True productivity is born in the narrower circles. The new thoughts and the new powers originate in them. In cases of conflict, therefore, to have regard to compass merely should not be considered decisive. Something similar holds in reference to the preservation of the individual. The life of mankind gains in vigor in proportion as its individual members have the power to maintain and assert themselves materially and intellectually. Within the range of individual ethics, self-assertion should not, without further consideration, be sacrificed to social devotion,—as little as the interest of the smaller part of the community should be sacrificed unhesitatingly to the larger part. How difficult, then, to give a right decision in a particular case without doing damage to the evenness and depth of life, or to its width and duration.

Another case of casuistry is presented by the position men should take in regard to other men's prejudices. Bentham\*

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\* "Of the Influence of Time and Place in Matters of Legislation" (Works, i. p. 180).

has given us the following rule: "He who attacks prejudice wantonly and without necessity, and he who suffers himself to be led blindfold a slave to it, equally miss the line of reason." But how are we to decide in an isolated case, whether an attack be necessary or not, or whether it is degrading slavery to accommodate one's self to prevailing prejudices? The circumstances vary here to a special extent. And the question is, whether the individuals in question are able to overcome the inner as well as outer difficulties into which we may plunge them, when we attack what they considered unshakable, and what lent their life fulness and strength.

Bentham means that we are too much inclined in our day to deny that the best laws of our time would have been the best ones for former times. But in these striking words he enunciates the principle of historical relativity: \* "Were I to choose to what I would (most truly and readily) attribute these magnificent prerogatives of universality and immutability, it should rather be to certain *grounds of law* than to the laws themselves; to the principles upon which they should be formulated; to the subordinate principles deducible from those principles, and to the best plan upon which they can be put together; to the *considerations* by which it is expedient the legislator should suffer himself to be governed, rather than to any laws which it is expedient he should make for the government of those who stand committed to his care."

### III.

1. Besides the *psychological basis* and the *historical circumstance*, a third factor has to be taken into account,—a third condition by which the moral decision has to be determined. This essay aims to draw attention particularly to this third factor because of its not being generally made as conspicuous as the two others (especially the second). This factor enters when different individuals with like ethical principles and in like circumstances, but *with different dispositions and capacities*, have to be considered. Just as like principles do not lead to

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\* Ibid., p. 193.

like results under varying circumstances, so they do not lead on like occasions to like results, when the individuals who will and act have different natural dispositions. This is *the individual relativity of ethics*, or its personal equation.\*

The several ethical theories seem to agree on the point that the moral laws or commandments are valid for all men under the same circumstances. The theory of ethics, which is based on the principle of authority, starts with the assumption that the authority demands the same things of all persons. On the one hand we have the eternal will, and on the other hand those who are to follow its commandments. The laws of the state and the imperatives of custom are in like manner the same for all men. Respect for persons, it is said, there is none. According to the intuitive school a universal law flows out of human reason, which every one is obliged to follow, if he is not to come into conflict with himself,—that is to say, with what corresponds to the universally human in his nature. The disciples of the principle of universal welfare have often been inclined to conceive it similarly. They deduce the moral laws from the principle of universal welfare in relation to the given circumstances, and then consider those laws to be valid for all.

That a mistake is made here may be proved as follows: *On account of their different capacities and impulses the same demands will have a highly different practical bearing on individuals.* The demand of a certain degree of self-control over a natural impulse will, for instance, have a very different significance for different individuals, because the impulse in each may vary in intensity. That which the one accomplishes without the slightest effort, because of the harmony between the demand and the original disposition, the other may achieve only after a hard and prolonged struggle, while the third is perhaps utterly powerless to overcome his intractable dis-

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\* I have already pointed this out in my "Ethik" (Dan. ed., p. 133 f.). It is treated more positively in the German edition (p. 154 f.), where I have described the law of individual relativity as the law of relativity in ethics. In this article I employ the phrase "law of relativity" in a broader sense, making it embrace psychological, historical, and individual relativity.

position. That which agrees with the inclination of the first becomes with the second a moral action carried out with great effort and conscious will-power, and signifies with the third an insoluble task on account of his having lost sight of the conditions from the beginning. The law is in *reality* not the same for all three. And it is of no use to distinguish here between the law itself and the different capacities of the individuals to fulfil it. For the differentiation of the moral law from the theological or judicial law lies in the fact that it takes its origin in human nature itself. It does not come from without, but ought to issue from a man's innermost being. But, in that case, it cannot be reached by mere deduction from general principles and common circumstances, without regard to the idiosyncrasies of the special individuals. As long as only these two points are taken account of when the law is deduced, so long it is not yet the law for the individual, but only an abstract and impersonal claim. *The real moral law must not only be addressed to the individual, but must also be individualized in such a manner that the very being of the individual, through the fulfilment of the law's tendency, should receive a higher development.* Account must be taken of the special starting-point of volition and action that lie in the nature of these particular individuals. Else the law would ask something different (be it more or less) from one individual than from another. Only when it is expressed *differently* for each individual, according to his capacities, does the law really ask the *same* thing of all.

This naturally follows from the principle of universal welfare. The single individual is not only subordinated to the law which expresses the conditions of the welfare of mankind, but he is himself a peculiar member of mankind. Two considerations must, therefore, be harmoniously united in the right law,—regard for mankind, and regard for the individual. The law is not discovered—it is not the right law—if both requirements are not fulfilled. While the individual in his acts and endeavors works for the welfare of mankind, he should work at the same time for his own welfare, considering that he himself is a part of mankind. He must have, there-

fore, his own particular ethics, which will differ qualitatively as well as quantitatively from the ethics of other individuals. His nature and his disposition, too, are determining factors in the formation of the law.

It would be a serious misunderstanding if one were to conclude from the above that all self-sacrifice is wrong. Self-sacrifice resulting from enthusiastic love and free resolve is the expression of the innermost being of an individual,—the feeling of an ardent desire within him. Self-assertion and self-sacrifice melt into one, in an act of devotion. Life has only value now, however strange this may seem, in being sacrificed. But the question in each particular case is, whether the individual has the ability of such self-sacrifice. This kind of action can be demanded, with as little justice as other actions, from every individual alike, because the ability and the impulse to devotion and enthusiasm are really not alike in different persons.

According to Weber's law, a sensation does not depend on the absolute strength of the external impression, but on the relation between the present and the past impression, which latter has already determined the condition of the percipient. So, from an ethical stand-point, must the thing required of an individual be deduced, not from general principles and the given conditions, without reference to the constitution of his character, but from the relation between the objective demand and the demands or dispositions of the individual, the proportion of which will be different for different individuals. The purely objective demand may be compared to a burden which is, in itself, of the same weight, but is differently felt on the shoulders of different people.

A complete individualization of the moral laws is consequently required. A formula which should embrace all, or a great number of individuals only, would be rough and superficial. When  $\pi$  is to be determined, we may be satisfied sometimes with the fraction  $\frac{22}{7}$ ; but when greater demands of exactitude are made, we get to several hundred decimals, and may still think of a greater exactitude. Just as we always miss something when we give a psychological description and

explanation of a man's character, because we are unable to grasp all shades and individual traits on account of their great complexity; so when we want to determine the individual task, we shall find in every man shades of differences which cannot be exhaustively expressed in a general formula; or, to put it more clearly, in the same formula separate coefficients have to be inserted for each individual. The judicial laws are the same for all, and the current moral laws are formed on the pattern of the judicial laws. A fine sense of individual differences in respect to quality and quantity is still extremely rare.

The same train of thought which caused the moral judgment to go back from the action to the motive must necessarily go back one step further, and consider the capacities and dispositions which condition the origin of the motives. The possibility of the springing up of a motive is not the same in all individuals. Only an extreme indeterminist would assume, as a German lawyer has recently done,\* that "the moral power to repress lawless impulses must be an unalterable quantity which has to be assumed as normally present in all men, without regard to individual capacity." An assumption like the above conflicts so strongly with all psychological experience, that there is no doubt of its becoming rarer in scientific circles. A motive may not only assert itself with varying strength, but its influence on the will is dependent on the relation between its own strength and the strength of the other motives present. Thus it will happen, as Butler † has already pointed out, that two men have the same degree of pity; but one has a strong feeling of ambition or revenge, while these feelings are very weak in the other. They will occupy, as regards ethics, very different positions.

2. Aristotle is the first thinker who directed his attention to the problem we are discussing. When presenting his well-known doctrine of virtue as the right mean, he lays it down expressly that, objectively considered (*κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ πρᾶγμα*), the

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\* Quoted in "Vierteljahrschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie," vi. p. 201.

† Sermons, xii. (Works, Oxford, 1874, ii. p. 159 f.).



mean is the same for all, because of there being two points to be kept equally distant from ; but, subjectively considered (*πρὸς ἡμᾶς*), the relation is a different one on account of the individual's dispositions. Just as the same amount of food does not suffice both the practised athlete and the mere beginner in gymnastics, so the true mean of the emotional life cannot be found at the same point in all men (*τοῦτο δ' οὐχ ἐν οὐδὲ τὸ αὐτὸ πᾶσιν*)\*. That which may be called courage in the one, because it presupposes the suppression of strong fear, may be practised by the other without any effort of the will and the overcoming of self. This idea is applied by Aristotle in an interesting manner to all the special virtues.

This Aristotelian doctrine, which gives proof of a surprisingly fine appreciation of the importance and the right of the individual, is in strange discord, as I have shown elsewhere,† with the conspicuous position which Aristotle allots to the state in contradistinction to the individual. He has made no attempt to explain how that seemingly individualistic doctrine may be reconciled with his objective social theory. More is often demanded socially from the individual—so it seems at least—than he is able to fulfil according to the "right mean" determined by his nature. There is a range of problems, dealing with the relations of the individual to society, of which the ancient thinkers had not yet any clear conception. Aristotle's theory remains, nevertheless, one of the most ingenious thoughts to be found in the realm of ethics.‡

It may perhaps be said that Aristotle, in his doctrine of the individually determined right mean, unwittingly raised a problem which is in itself insolvable. It may seem that we have to choose between two equally doubtful expedients, the one landing us in an ethical objectivism, according to which

\* *Eth. Nicom.*, ii. 5 (p. 1106 a, 32).

† "*Ethik*," Dan ed., p. 133; Germ. ed., p. 154.

‡ The idea of the individualization of the moral law has been drawn attention to in later times by Jakobi, Schleiermacher, and especially by Beneke ("*Physik der Sitten*," 1822); also in Danish literature, by A. S. Orsted, in a paper "*On the Limits between Theory and Practice*" (1811).

a universally valid moral law is untenable, because the law has to be formulated quite differently for every individual; the other, into an irreconcilable conflict between personal ethics and the moral demands of the social life of mankind. But the elucidation of the moral law we have attempted above will enable us to get out of this dilemma.

Subjectivism is disposed of by the fact that, though the moral law must assume a multiplicity of forms in and for the different individuals, the *tendency*, the aim, may yet remain the same for all. The moral laws formulate, as we have seen from another point of view, tendencies or directions for the conduct and order of life. When several boats are sailing against the wind, they attain,—on account of their different dimensions and structure,—with equal efforts, different results. But this does not hinder them from observing the direction of their destination, for the destination lies in the continuation of their course. The objective view, therefore, does not fall away when we plead for the individualization of the moral law. Ethics must consider individual differences in capacities and dispositions as actual starting-points, which are not to be destroyed, but to be made as fruitful as possible. It is true that they are a barrier to ethics considered as a science; but a barrier which not only indicates the limits of thought, but also the rich manifoldness of life that cannot wholly be classed under particular headings, although the feelings of many individual beings are directed against the final aim of human action. This aim, at the same time, is so lofty that the importance of individual differences in the application of an ideal standard diminishes in great measure, if it does not altogether vanish.

The other seeming conclusion disappears when the relation between the individual and society is clearly grasped and the real meaning of the moral law rightly conceived. The individual is, from beginning to end, a part of society, and *the life of society is no other than that contained in its members*. The goal of humanity is consequently unattained so long as its claims on the individual cause an irreconcilable discord within him. When the will of society cannot be carried out without

involving the deterioration and the extermination of the individual, it is a proof of some imperfection in the order of society. The ideal is reached only when the individual's efforts in the cause of society also serve the free and harmonious development of his own faculties and impulses. The greatest welfare is to be found where every individual develops himself in his own manner, and stimulates a similar development in other individuals. The individual is, then, at once means and end. The point is that work in the *direction* of the moral aim accomplishes itself within the individual, but that the *amount* of work that may be accomplished depends on, and varies with, the stored-up capabilities. Every law which gives not only the direction of work, but also its quantity—"the *quantum satis* of the human will," to use Henrik Ibsen's expression—can only state an average or a minimum. Thus it fares with the moral law in its positive historic form. The standard applied by the individual to himself in a certain age and a certain country will bear the stamp of his time, his social rank, and his race. He judges his conduct as he thinks an impartial spectator of his people would judge it. And even if the claims he thus makes on himself be fulfilled, rather by the general tendency—the innermost soul—of his desires than by a number of adequate actions, it has still its great pedagogical value in that the demands bear the stamp of objectivity as well as that of ideality. The desire to rise beyond his actual conduct will animate him the sooner and easier. The contrast between the ideal and the social demand, on the one hand, and the actual desire of the individual, on the other, may often be a necessary transitional stage to the setting free of those moral efforts that lie within the power of the individual. A spark is necessary to give freedom to the locked-up energy. And there are natures whose energies can only be set free by a painful conflict with objective principles. The way to harmony leads with them through discords.

The two propositions—that the moral law should formulate the *direction* of conduct, and that it should act *educatively*—stand in close connection with one another. For both de-

mands are fulfilled by the types or ideals which the moral law holds up before us. The direction points to an ideal and calls to imitation at the same time.

The clear distinction between scientific and actual ethics, between moral philosophy and moral exhortation, obtrudes itself here. It is of importance, practically speaking, that the aim for all should be high, in order to develop the energies. It seems necessary to ask too much when we desire to get the necessary amount of work done. But scientific ethics, in determining the conception of the moral law, can take no cognizance of practical necessities. It does not enter into the scientific consideration, whether it be easy or difficult in practice, to find the law which is appropriate to the particular nature of a certain individual. Scientific ethics, on the other hand, in spite of seeming contradiction, presents an ideal to the art of right conduct, for it can hardly be doubted that moral teaching will become efficient in proportion as it is individualized. General moralizing cannot be held to be effectual.

3. It may be asked, "Is not the moral law deduced from the principle of welfare? Is this not a conclusion which no regard for the nature of the individual can shake? What is therefore fair and just according to the general principle, must be valid for *all* individuals." But, as we have already pointed out, each individual, with all his capacities, is part and parcel of that organism whose well-being is to be promoted. When, consequently, an inexorable demand is made for something which transcends his powers, there results an incongruity between society and the individual which contradicts the principle of welfare itself,—an incongruity whose cause may be other than the individual. That suffering which is inflicted on the individual by the irreconcilable demands of his own nature and those of society is to be looked upon not only as a punishment,—like the suffering that arises from the disagreement of the individual nature and external nature,—but also as a misfortune. When it is found that changes in the structure of society and the consequent conditions established for the individual have often more influence on the occurrence

of crimes than penal reforms,\* then it is clear that it is wrong to consider a given community and its demands as absolutely just, and the individual and his definite nature and dispositions as absolutely responsible. The individual, as regards society, is both cause and effect, and, what needs to be specially pointed out, he is an effect before being a cause. Even if in the nature of the individual there should be the germs of an anti-social disposition, their development might have been checked by a better state of society, or they might have been turned into other channels, or transformed into harmless ways, while the present state of society offers them, perhaps, the conditions of a full development. The more, then, the government of society is consciously undertaken, the greater becomes its responsibility towards the individuals constituting it.

If this point of view be correct, we may expect intimations of it in theology and in law, although these disciplines assume the absolute antithesis between the objective law and the individuals who are subject to it. Now, I find a trace of the individualization of the moral law in the part which grace and pardon play in these two disciplines. For in grace or pardon there is expressed more or less clearly a regard for the individuality of the actor and his mental states. The orthodox theological school goes so far as to maintain that the natural man is unable to fulfil the law. Grace, consequently, in asserting that the whole personality of a man is not appealed to by the law, contradicts it. The very possibility of a reconciliation implies that the law is not absolutely authoritative as over against the individual, else there would be a down-right contradiction in the reconciliation. And when, in agreement with the orthodox doctrine of reconciliation, the sacrifice by which the transgression is propitiated is made by God himself, who is the giver of the law, one might recognize in this a symbolical expression of the fact that the real injustice must be

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\* G. Tarde, "La Criminalité comparée," p. 61 : "Changez les conditions, s'il se peut, de la société, bien plutôt que son système de pénalité, et sa criminalité se modifiera." On the social causes of crimes, compare Mischler, in "Handbuch des Gefängniswesens," published by Holtzendorff and Jagemann, ii. p. 474, 481, f.

attributed to the law and not to the individual. A pardon is considered legally as the self-correction of the law,\* or, as an older jurist puts it,† “To help to eke out the imperfections of the laws, to do away with the incongruity between the legal punishment and the desert of the individual transgressor, and also to harmonize wisely the *inflexible rigor of the immutable law* with the *fickle inconstancy of individual guilt*, and thus to reconcile justice with fairness, is the power put into the hands of the supreme head in the form of the right to pardon.” If justice itself is in need of a reconciliation, it must be on account of its imperfection. Between the opposite legal theological poles of sin and grace, crime and pardon, oscillations take place in the direction of the two extreme points which have truth for their centre. On account of the difficulty of finding the exact centre we go beyond our aim,—first in the one direction, then in the other. Instead of moving diagonally, we move first to the one and afterwards to the opposite side of the parallelogram; and there are natures, as has been remarked before, who cannot develop unless these contrasts exist, and who are unable to move diagonally.

I find this thought more or less consciously underlying the whole modern development of penal reform. When the minimum of outward morality demanded of its members by the state requires different efforts, for the natures of individuals are different, it becomes the duty of the state to take cognizance of these differences, and to seek in the natures of its members for starting-points of a development in the direction of that which the law demands. The fixing of the law and the punishment is only part of its duty. It seems not to have entered men’s minds that the administration of punishment is of no less importance than penal legislation and penal decisions, and that the experiences in the administration of punishment are of essential importance for the penal legislation of the future. That the personal equation has imperfect

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\* H. Jhering, “Der Zweck im Recht,” i. p. 428.

† Anselm von Feuerbach, “Aktenmässige Darstellung merkwürdiger Verbrechen,” Giessen, 1828, i. p. 353.

justice done to it, in the penal law and penal decision, comes out clearly at the time of the execution of the sentence. The experiences in this department will, therefore, in the future evermore react on penal legislation. Franz von Holtzendorff said not long ago, "Modern theories of punishment must be built on induction and on the experiences of penal administration, rather than that the latter should be built on *a priori* theories."\* It has come to be admitted more and more that in penal laws one has to do with the personality of the criminal, and not with the crime as an objective occurrence. There is a demand for sentences, in the place of irrevocable decisions, which shall leave the term of punishment undetermined, and also leave room for the consideration of the character of the individual at the time of the execution of the punishment. A distinct classification of criminals with treatment differing according to character is also demanded. The penal reforms in this century (from the time of John Howard) are permeated by the idea that the criminal, if possible, should return to human society, not only humiliated and restrained, but really reformed. The fact has been generally acknowledged that some people, according to their inner and outer circumstances, are next door to crime, while others are far removed from it. The right of the individual against abstract impersonal laws is thus gradually being recognized. Individualization and humanity go hand in hand, and are in reality inseparable.

In an ideal state only that would be demanded of each individual which lay within his range and power. The demand would be suited to his peculiarities in the same manner as in the education of a child the demand is suited to its stage of growth, producing thereby the development of its forces and preventing the suppression of its individuality. The social disadvantages which would arise from requiring unlike things of different individuals would have to be balanced by special measures. As long as we cannot realize this ideal of a state,—all the institutions and laws of which have an educational in-

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\* "Handbuch des Gefängniswesens," i. p. 387. The following remarks relating to the development of prison-justice are taken from this work.

fluence,—so long must the state do that part of the work by its administration of punishment which it has failed to accomplish in a more directly ethical manner. The established order leads to the hard and painful oscillation of contrasts around the invisible centre of the ideal order.

4. Casuistical problems will often solve themselves when the individual factor is taken into account. Viewed in a purely objective light, it may be impossible to decide in a particular case whether one should work for a larger or for a smaller community, or whether the stress should be laid on the extension of the results of civilization among as many as possible, rather than on the bringing forth of a new civilization, which would provisionally serve only a few. Questions of that sort will, as a rule, be resolved by the fact that each person has faculties and dispositions which determine his *calling*. For it is part of the conception of a calling that a man's duty is not only fixed by general ethical principles, but also by his individual capacities. The conception of a calling is founded on the idea that mastership implies limitation,—all willing and acting being concentrated on something definite,—and that the limitation is mainly the outcome of individual capacity and individual energy. It is these impulses that "call;" for energy has a tendency to awaken a corresponding desire. If, for example, we consider proficiency in the service of culture, we shall meet men whose faculties are fit only for activity in a narrow sphere, and whose efficiency is, therefore, limited to care for the well-being of their own selves and their neighbors, their work consequently being at best of only indirect importance outside the narrower sphere. Again, there will be other men who are fitted to impress their fellow-men and work for them, and who are properly employed in the extension of the benefits of culture. And still others will have sufficient instinct and energy to open new paths and discover fresh possibilities. These latter will follow their handicraft and tend the first blossoms of the civilization of the future, in spite of contradiction and want of understanding on the part of the people. The individual *who knows himself* will not waver as to where he should turn. But the main difficulty is just that of knowing



one's self, as Socrates, the founder of ethics, taught so impressively. The great importance of the fundamental thought of Socrates shows itself here. Self-deception is very easy when we try to discover our capacity and determine its limits. No objective criterion is wholly sufficient in this case. One must always risk something. Every choice is here a practical hypothesis to be verified by experience. An individual who introduces incorrect co-efficients in his ethical formula would not be able to accomplish his task.

The same holds when, as an example to illustrate the law of relativity in ethics, we consider *self-control* instead of vocation.

Self-control in some things may coexist with total absence of self-control in other things. The Indians, for instance, are able to bear the most horrible sufferings when they fall into the hands of their enemies, or when, by voluntary submission to castigations and tortures, they aim to propitiate and do honor to their gods. Illness, too, they suffer without complaint; and they demand of their wives to bring forth without exclamations of pain. In their outward behavior they always preserve perfect calmness, spotless gravity and decency, even when the strongest passions upheave them inwardly. But in the presence of enjoyments of food, drink, and games, they cannot restrain themselves. It needed great exertion on the part of some chiefs to lay down the rule that drunkenness is a vice. This is a proof that self-control is not a constant factor, independent of all other parts of the inner life of man.

A special application of the principle of individualization has to be made in relation to the sexual instinct. Different individuals are very dissimilar in this respect. There are persons whose instinct harmonizes with their moral feelings, not demanding satisfaction where it is not the basis of a deep devotion to another individual, who is looked upon with joy and admiration. This is the more important, considering that the satisfaction of the sexual instinct, not being possible without relation to another, is specially subject to a moral judgment. Apart from this relation and the resulting responsibility, the satisfaction of the sexual instinct would have to be judged

only from an individual or egoistic point of view,—that is to say, by hygienic considerations, or with regard to the harmonious development of the mental and bodily health of the individual. But the great problem, the moral difficulty, originates in the fact that the powerful instinct which gives rise to such strong feelings, and is so important for the development of the individual, is to be satisfied without causing physical or moral harm to other individuals, or interfering disastrously in the right social order. Besides the happily constituted individuals we have mentioned, there are others in whom the instinct exists in its original brutality as a mere physical desire, the satisfaction of which may go along with indifference towards its object. With others, again, the instinct is comparatively strong; but they are able to divert it by thought or other labor. There are, on the whole, countless gradations, up to the “morbidly increased sexual desire,” which shows itself, according to Krafft Ebing,\* in “neuropathic constitutions.” There are individuals who suffer “greatly during a great part of their lifetime under the burden of the constitutional anomalies of their emotional life.” The two sexes are generally in this respect differently disposed. The harmony between the sexual instinct and the true devotion to another individual is certainly far more prevalent with women than with men. But with men also, as we have just said, the strength of the instinct and its relation to other motives varies immensely. The numberless individual differences are generally overlooked, and yet they are the most important point in the sphere of sexual ethics. Equally absolute assertions are made by two opposite parties. On the one hand, strict universal commandments are formulated without seeing that a very different burden is laid on the shoulders of different people. On the other hand, a physiological necessity is proclaimed, to which all must submit. The one, as well as the other, is unwarranted by the facts of the case. The sexual instinct in man arises under different conditions than in the animal world. When the instinct becomes mature in a human

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\* “*Psychopathia sexualis*,” Second Edition, p. 34.

being, there has already taken place a development of the power of self-control in other directions. Ideas and emotions now exist which do not readily yield to the instinct, and which, when the attention and interest for moral self-maintenance are roused, weaken it and bring it into agreement with the other demands of life. Only let it not be forgotten that self-control, considered as a negative virtue, is a psychological impossibility. It is too often left out of sight in ethics that one impulse can only be displaced by another. The strength of the inclination to be suppressed is not the only thing to be considered. It is also necessary to take note whether there is room for other inclinations that could absorb the store of energy. Deep love and great enthusiasm are wanted to fill the heart. The law of relativity in ethics is here a pure consequence of the law of the conservation of energy.\* The energy at the disposal of our mind or brain is, at any given moment of time, limited. The more energy expended in the satisfaction of the one desire, the less remains at the disposal of the others. Annihilation is impossible, but transformation into other forms lies within the range of possibility. The great heroes of self-control had a profound enthusiasm for other aspects of life than that which they wanted to forsake. The power of self-control which the Indians exhibit when they are wounded in war, or suffer pain in prison or in religious devotion, is determined by their ideas of honor, their dispositions, and their religious belief. The circumstances under which they lived did not favor the growth of motives opposed to licentiousness. In proportion as an individual progresses in intelligence, taste, and sympathy, there is an evolution of a higher sensibility, which, as Leslie Stephen† has remarked, produces a feeling of disgust and contempt for sensual excesses, even apart from their probable consequences,—a sensibility acting as promptly and imperatively as any other elementary sense.

The struggle of self-control lasts until the new application

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\* The law of inertia could also be applied here. By this law Spinoza proves the following important proposition: "Affectus nec coerceri nec tolli potest, nisi per affectum contrarium et fortiozem" (Eth., iv. 7).

† "Science of Ethics," pp. 192, 198, 200.

of energy gains complete ascendancy. This struggle assumes very different proportions in different individuals, in accordance with the relative power of their original or acquired tendencies. With some men the transition is never completed without a struggle. There are others who have to struggle hard, and yet are unable to gain a sure footing. The will-power expended by the latter is far more serious than that expended by the former, however small the outward result appears. The reason that Jesus associated more with the fallen women than with the Pharisees may be, perhaps, that he found in the prostitutes an inward endeavor and desire which were, it is true, unable to break down the opposing barriers, but yet stood in more intimate relation with the ideal moral law than the self-satisfied uprightness of the Pharisees.

The law of relativity throws light on many moral problems that would otherwise remain insolvable, by showing that the actual moral development starts from different points. It teaches us to combine the theory of ethics with the practical acknowledgment of the manifoldness of life.

5. Where there is an agreement between the task arising from the general principles and the particular circumstances, and the capacities and desires of the individual, we have the happiest man, and, if the task be sufficiently great, the greatest man. The points to be noticed in such men are the inner security and harmony with which they fill their station in life, in spite of inner and outer struggles. Here we have the "organic morality" spoken of by Herbert Spencer. That there are people of this kind is a fact, whatever may be its explanation. They are patterns for other men. It must here be maintained that the task laid on the individual is not based merely on unchangeable circumstances fixed once for all ; but that the individual may make it his duty to change the given circumstances, if possible, by dint of his own capacity and desire, and his allegiance to the highest principles. The great pioneers of humanity experience a development of capacities and desires which, under the actual conditions, cannot be satisfied, and which, therefore, give rise to new conditions. Individuals of this type arise probably through one of those

variations which are, according to Darwin, the condition of development of new forms of life. Their right is at one with their capacity. They become also, through the very development of that which lies in their nature, emblems of a new tendency in one of the departments of human life, and, therefore, helps to the progress of the race. Nature and art, nature and duty, act here in immediate unison. These men possess the law in a higher sense than may be said of those who do not contain the possibility of a higher development. But "organic morality" may, of course, also exist in the latter, for the harmony of nature and task is conceivable in both.

The complete opposite of such natures would be found in individuals in whom not the slightest desire or ambition in the direction of the moral law could be detected. All the coefficients of the ethical formula would alike be zero. No demand, however pedagogically formulated, would meet with any response. Among other things, the problem arises now, whether there are incorrigible criminals. This is a question which has been positively affirmed within recent years by the *Italian criminal-psychological school*.

This school has great scientific merits. The ordinary moral and legal view goes no further than the action and the motives lying nearest to it, and fails to investigate the cases which produced the whole character of the actor. The indeterminism formerly ruling was favorable to this view. The anthropology and psychology of crime, which owe so much to the Italian school, seek to do away with this one-sidedness. The intention of this school is to discover the bodily and mental peculiarities of the criminal, and to trace them to their causes. On this basis it has singled out the criminal type (*homo delinquens*) as a special variety of the general human type. Among the bodily peculiarities of the type, Lombroso specially mentions marks on the cranium, the brain and the features, which must be regarded as retrogressive deviations from the type of the *civilized* man, such as the small capacity of the cranium and the small and narrow forehead. Among the mental peculiarities he alludes especially to a marvellous insensibility to pain, with which a not less strange lack of pity probably stands in

natural connection. The vaso-motoric reflexes are weak on the whole, and typical criminals can rarely blush. Moral sensibility is wanting, and shows itself, as Despine had already pointed out, in the great rarity of remorse. The whole type is to be explained according to Lombroso and the Italian school by atavism. This disease arises in our day by deep prehistoric layers protruding in the midst of civilization. The absence of motive and the utter regardlessness of typical criminal actions are thought inexplicable on any other hypothesis, and the frequent relapses and meagre effect of the best considered systems of punishment are held intelligible only when such reappearing primitive forces are assumed.

The moral sense, says a prominent Italian scholar, Garofalo, in his "*Criminologie*," is the work of centuries. When, therefore, as experience proves, some individuals have not been benefited by it, but are suffering from innate moral insensibility, showing itself in the total absence of pity, even in its most elementary forms, how could one imagine that any impression or education could accomplish in a lifetime that which the race had to acquire through repeated experiences during thousands of years? Man is good from instinct, not from reflection. If the instinct is wanting, what other force is to take its place? Individuals, who are not victims of passing temptations, but who go back repeatedly to their criminal haunts, or whose comparatively slight motives to action and revolting manner in carrying them out give us insight into a rooted antisocial disposition,—such individuals it is impossible for a civilized community to assimilate. They would have been in their place in former civilizations, and even now, perhaps, in Dahomey or on the Fiji islands; but it is hopeless to wish them to be incorporated in our social life. Towards them society can have no duties. On the contrary, it is a duty it owes to itself to eliminate "molecules" harmful to the life of the remaining parts of the organism. It is also an individualistic one-sidedness to assert that criminals of that type have any rights at all in opposition to society. Social necessity is unconditional, and social reaction suffers no resistance.

Thus far go Lombroso and Garofalo. The view advanced

by these scholars is of interest to us in this place, because they assume absolute moral insensibility in some men. Not only individual relativity, but also psychological relativity is thus done away with. An order would have to be supposed in criminal natures diametrically opposed to the order on which human development, conscious and unconscious, is based. And there would be no means of overturning the former order, unless by a war of extermination. Before we give our assent to such a doctrine, we must first subject it to a close examination.

(a) To deduce the innermost character of a man and the possibilities contained in him from isolated instances is always unsafe. According to Garofalo the crime need not be even exceptionally great, and yet the examination of the criminal's character by a judge versed in anthropology and psychology may be sufficient to determine whether the individual can accommodate himself to the demands of society, or whether he should be eliminated. Nay, not even an action is always necessary, an attempt is considered sufficient.

The conclusion drawn from the absence of repentance is equally unreliable. It is met with in criminals who have been sentenced to death, or in prisoners, such as Doctijevski saw in Siberia, who have not been subjected to true pedagogical treatment. The fact that repentance cannot be awakened within the short time that elapses between the committal of the crime and the execution of the sentence of death, or that repentance has not been aroused in prisoners submitted to the ordinary treatment, customary down to our present time, does not entitle us to conclude that it could not be aroused *under any circumstances whatever*. The frequency of relapses, too, points to rooted tendencies rather than to incorrigible ones.

Garofalo objects to fixing the time for criminals sentenced to prison, "because it is impossible to determine in the crime the part which is owing to the surrounding conditions and the part of which the individual himself is the cause." Only after a prolonged trial, in which one comes to be more intimately acquainted with the character of the individual, may the period

of punishment be fixed.\* By what right, then, can one demand absolute elimination in some cases? For the unreliability of the insight into a criminal's character, which causes the period of punishment not to be fixed beforehand, must also destroy the possibility of laying down elimination as the only possible expedient.

(b) A new problem arises when the incorrigible antisocial dispositions are explained by atavism. How could such marked peculiarities that influence not only one side of an individual's character, but his whole nature maintain themselves in the race along with peculiarities of a totally different kind? How could the thread which connects the individual with the primitive race escape being woven together with that other thread which links it to the directly preceding generations and the institutions and traditions produced and transmitted by them? To put it in other words: granted that the explanation by atavism is correct,† yet *atavism is no proof that society owes no debt, and consequently no duty to the individual*. For if the antisocial germs have maintained themselves in the race in a latent form for so long a time without being transformed, that must be the result of failings and imperfections in the life of mankind itself. The perfection of social conditions and the moral life generally must be measured, not by the positive advance alone, but by the lost and neglected possibilities. The more perfect the state of society is, the more does it act on the innermost being of individuals. Atavism, therefore, is in itself a sign of social imperfection, and does not justify placing society and the criminal over against each other as absolute right and absolute wrong. In placing criminals, both as regards body and mind, outside the

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\* "Criminologie," p. 395.

† G. Tarde has criticised this explanation in his "Criminalité comparée." He arrives at the conclusion that, though there are unquestionable physiological and anatomical analogies between born criminals and savages, and though criminals, like all monsters, exhibit retrogressive traits, yet these traits are *combined in them in a peculiar manner*. It is wrong, therefore, to judge our ancestors by this method (p. 46). The combination, then, must be explained, and it surely cannot be independent of social evolution.



limits of society, the Italian school, strange though it be, reaches the same conclusion as indeterminism and individualism, though these in other respects are their direct antipodes.

(c) When Garofalo teaches, as formerly Despine had done (and before him Anselm von Feuerbach), that moral insensibility may remain latent until outward occasions bring it to light; when he teaches that, though poverty be not the cause of crimes, yet many men would have remained *latent* criminals only, if they had lived amidst different surroundings and had not been poor, then it is clear that society must be a concurring cause, its order always more or less conditioning the surroundings of the individual. We may make as sharp a distinction as we like between mere opportunity and actual cause, it must always remain more or less artificial, for *the sufficient cause consists both of the external opportunity and the inner disposition*. This point must be made all the more prominent, because those "opportunities" constitute the tremendous difference between two latent criminals, declaring the one incapable of assimilation, and admitting the other to continue his life as a social molecule undisturbed.

(d) *Inherited dispositions have always a certain indefiniteness* which render it possible, through education and external conditions, to develop them in various directions. A fatalistic tendency in nature, nullifying all experience, occurrences, and endeavors, cannot be proved to exist. Even if a good education and favorable circumstances should be powerless to stifle the evil germ, but were able only to effect its growth without causing social mischief, it is all the same true that a bad education contributes extraordinarily to its growth. It will be, therefore, impossible to draw a sharp line between that which is owing directly to the individual and the circumstances under which he lives (which are mostly the outcome of the social order). Absolute egoism is very often not present at all. Regard for the family may often be highly developed in criminal natures, preventing the rousing of the criminal instincts except at the sight of strangers. A possibility may be found here to awaken wider sympathy. For human love itself, in the first instance, has started from regard to the

family, and gradually embraced larger circles. Another starting-point should be looked for in the egoistic feelings of the criminal and in his desire to assert his personality. Doctijevski remarks that *useless* labor would be the severest punishment for the criminal. Useless labor makes personality something hollow, of no importance to either self or others. This remnant of true self-esteem would be unable, without some external stimulus, to overcome the indolence which forms an important feature in the criminal type, but it could offer a starting-point for their education. Modern systems of punishment are justly convinced of the truth that education should be carried on by means of labor.

(e) That our institutions have not solved the problem of the increase of crime, and especially the prevention of relapses, is no proof that there exist incorrigible criminals,—individuals in whom no moral desire can be awakened, and who could not be brought into any relation with the moral ideal. Though unconditional return into human society be not always possible, there might still, perhaps, be awakened a desire which would lead, however slowly, in the direction of the ideal. A reconciliation would then be possible, and *absolute* elimination be out of the question. For it is probable that our ideas of punishment have reached their full growth? Reform has only just begun. People, until lately, have busied themselves more in thinking out punishments which would satisfy the pleasure of revenge and the desire of intimidation than to find ways and means by which to exert an influence on the character of the criminal, thus making good, by a retarded education, what had been neglected at a former period of the present order of society. This was the result of the external view that people took of crime. The exclusive thing considered was that the crime *had* been committed, and little notice was taken of the *how* and the *why*. The Italian school, by its works, which throw light from so many sides on the character of the criminal, will contribute much towards extinguishing these incorrect ideas. The merit is independent of the correctness of the particular conclusions the school draws from its labors.

It remains at least an open question, after all this, whether there are human beings who are utterly incorrigible, and in whom no sympathy for the moral law can be awakened, however much the law may be individualized. The reply to the above question is not of decisive importance for the general theory I intended to develop in this essay. But if the theory of the quantitative and qualitative individualization of the moral law be correct, it challenges us at least to greater caution when declaring that some individuals are *absolutely* unsusceptible to moral influences. If each individual has his own moral law, that question is much more difficult to answer than if we were justified in assuming an objective law which every one has to follow. A sense for individual differences, and a patience that could wait till the hard crust is broken, would then be needful. The position taken in respect to criminals—"the criminal type"—has been for a long time similar to that customarily taken by Europeans in regard to other races. Just as it has been denied, without any further inquiry, that the latter have any capacity for civilization,\* dooming them forthwith to extinction, so it has been denied that there is any likelihood of criminals having a moral sense, and forthwith they are sentenced to "elimination."

6. Finally, I shall enter a little more closely on the question already referred to, that the meaning of individual differences in ethics is not exhausted by the necessity of a thorough individualization of the moral law, or by the fact that life acquires more fulness and manifoldness than if it were ordered according to definite general rules. The progress of mankind also is intelligible only on this hypothesis.

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\* The criticisms with which Th. Waitz meets the assertion of the incapacity of the North American Indians for civilization are of interest in connection with the above. He says, among other things ("Die Indianer Nordamerikas," p. 74), "The long persistence of the North American Indians on a very low level of culture proves certainly little or nothing against their essential capacities, since they have not been placed for any considerable time under conditions favorable to progress. And, furthermore, when a people has not been affected, so far as we know, for many centuries by anything which might have a transforming influence on its organization and mode of living,—on its inner and outer life,—it is probable that a far greater power and a much longer time would be required to succeed in carrying out a transformation than *vice versa*."

Evolution in the organic world, so Darwin taught, is only possible when variations are ceaselessly going on. Of the spontaneous yet inexplicable variations, those are selected and retained which are of most service to the continued persistence of life. They become thus typical of continued biological evolution. An analogous case is found in the sphere of ethics. Those in whom the properties of character demanded by the moral law develop with the greatest power and in the highest degree, and who can overcome the inner and outer resistance with ease, or, if by hard struggle, yet in such a manner that barriers which stood in the way of human development can be broken through, they perhaps do not stand higher than the many who have to struggle hard to maintain only the level of development, and who generally keep on the beaten high-roads of life, but they are types able to guide, encourage, and to console. They do not merely indicate, as patterns to be imitated, *the way* and *the direction*, but they also show the possibilities contained in human nature. Human beings are closely related to one another, in spite of the great individual differences that exist between them; and it is fair to conclude that what had been attained by those who have made the greatest progress is also attainable to a certain degree by others. As Herbert Spencer has said, "What now characterizes the exceptionally high may be expected eventually to characterize all, for that which the best human nature is capable of is within the reach of human nature at large." \* History shows us that those men who have been moral patterns for long periods were not always filled with strong and enduring essential contrasts, or had characters that bore the stamp of inner struggles, but were rather harmonious souls, who lived and breathed in a great idea, to which the different desires of their natures subordinated themselves without any severe struggle. And this is plain, for he whose strength is expended in inward warfare cannot easily present to another the picture of the perfect human type, especially not that of a powerful personal effort directed towards an important

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\* "Data of Ethics," p. 256.

aim. In religious mythology this has been carried to such an extent that the ideal man has been represented as sinless, and attempts have been made to remove from him every trace of actual human suffering. This is aiming beyond the mark. But it, nevertheless, is a proof of the need of lofty types, a need which can never be dispensed with, if life is not to become shallow and insipid.

The individual relativity of the moral law does not consequently destroy the solidarity of the human race, for its unity consists in and through the manifoldness of the individuals. The right to speak of a moral law, as I have attempted to show, lies in the common direction and tendency of life, and out of this, in spite of all differences, springs the unity of mankind.

HARALD HÖFFDING.

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## THE ETHICS OF LAND TENURE.

It is expected that the assailants of private property in land should outnumber the defenders. This is usually true of an institution having great moral strength, "*Qui s'excuse s'accuse*;" a plea *for* such an institution involves a certain concession. Should advocates take the floor when the verdict has been given? In free countries the people's sense of right expresses itself in laws; and in modern states it has actually pronounced in favor of the private ownership of land. In our own country forty-four States, whose governments reflect the local popular will, have successively established the system, and the Federal government, reflecting the will of the whole people, has confirmed it. All have sustained the system from year to year by current legislation. Should we strengthen such a verdict by an apologetic plea? Moreover, in practical life argument counts for less than experiment. If a single one of our States were to appropriate land-values, it would become an object-lesson for the people of forty-three others, and would teach them more facts concerning the rights of land-ownership and concerning the utility of the system than discussion could

ever do. Practical policy may safely be allowed to conform to the results of experiment.

As a problem in ethical philosophy, the question of the rights of land-owners merits the attention that it is receiving. This study may and should be an unbiased one; let true principles lead us where they will. The moral question in itself is of paramount consequence. Is the private ownership of land inherently wrong? Are present holders chargeable with virtual robbery, and are future purchasers about to become so chargeable? If so, the direct effects of the system on the character of men dwarfs all pecuniary interests in importance. We leave out of account all land obtained by force or fraud, and all that is owned under systems that obstruct the free purchase and sale of it. We limit our studies to the area where real estate is bought and sold like any commodity. If here the buying of land and paying for it makes a man a partner in a fraud and justly liable to a forfeiture, the sooner we know this moral fact the better.

It so happens that the special assailants of the land system are defenders of the general right of property, and that they base their attack on the principle on which property rests. "To every one his product; the state has created the value of land, and to the state it belongs." We will not only admit at the outset all special rights that society may acquire as a collective producer, but we will concede the paramount right which the state has in all property. In its organic capacity it is the supreme owner of everything; the silver and the gold belong to it. If a "natural-right" theory be made to exalt the individual and depreciate the state we will have none of it.

As between man and man the principle of natural rights is valid. A person owns, first, his own active faculties, and, secondly, his own sentient capacities. Nature meant that he should use his muscles to satisfy his desires. He usually does this by creating a product. He raises fruit and eats it, and the fruit becomes a necessary link between the active powers, which he owns, and the receptive powers, which he also owns. It completes the circuit of influence that nature intended that he should exert and receive. The man's per-







such conditions, a matter of indifference in what form property is invested, provided that the content is secured to us. The state may take, by eminent domain, anything that we own; it will pay for what it takes and leave our essential property intact.

We are not reducing wealth to an abstraction; it is always concrete and material. The value that is the essence of a man's estate is always embodied in something. When the state recovers for a creditor the sum that is his due it makes over some material thing to his possession, and protects that thing so long as he desires to keep it. It is the nature of organic as distinct from individual economy to compel the things that constitute a man's estate to continually change. Now, to keep in a man's possession a perpetually changing list of concrete things always worth a certain sum is precisely identical with protecting a certain value embodied in a constantly shifting list of concrete things. Exactly this is what is done by the state for business-men. If we look at a particular concrete product we shall find it in the possession now of A, now of B, again of C, etc.; and we shall find the state guarding it in each relation. If we look at the fortune, say, of B, we shall find it embodied now in one lot of things, now in another, again in a third; and we shall find that the state secures to B the possession of each of the things only during a transient interval. What it permanently secures to him is a value; through all changes he keeps his thousand dollars.

Now, we may test the validity of a man's right to property in two ways: we may look at it in kind and see whether there is anything on his inventory that he ought not to have, or we may look at it in value, and see whether it is worth more than it ought to be. Any wrong will show itself at once in both of these ways. A thief will at some time have in his possession some concrete thing obtained by force or fraud, and not by the voluntary cession from an earlier possessor that gives a valid title. During this interval the wrong is capable of being righted in kind; the stolen article may be restored to its owner. Even after the article has been sold to the purveyor of such goods the thief will have a value that

he has not created, and the injury that he has done to the owner of the stolen article may be righted in essence. Is the land that is held by private owners wrested or filched from some more valid claimant? Does the essential property of the landlord include a value that the holder has not earned or inherited? Such are the two forms of the same question that tests the validity of landed property.

We, of course, exclude from consideration lands obtained by such force or fraud as the law recognizes and forbids. What we wish to know is whether land that is mine according to the statutes is also mine according to the finer rules of ethics. Is legal property in land different from other property under moral law? Applying the two tests in their order, we ascertain, first, whether a piece of land in the possession of an individual has been gained wrongfully. Monopolies are liable to be morally wrongful; is the owning of land thus tainted? Is it in any way contrary to the spirit of the laws? to the true will of the state?

The term monopoly is used with a list of meanings that would vitiate any argument that should make use of all of them. The term naturally designates an exclusive right of sale vested in one legal person. If we can buy mineral oil only from one corporation, that artificial personage has a monopoly; if two or three companies have oil for sale and compete with each other in fixing the price of it, the term cannot be accurately used. If, however, sellers are few, and if competition, while not destroyed, is restrained, there may be said to be a monopoly of an incomplete kind; and this is the variety that is often popularly indicated by the term. In a certain still looser mode of speech all wealthy men are monopolists; is there any accurate thought at the basis of this usage? If we analyze it we shall be led to an important distinction, which is akin to the one that we have made between the form and the essence of property. The exclusive privilege of selling a particular commodity is a monopoly of form; the exclusive possession of the value inherent in commodities is a monopoly of content. In this sense property owners, as a class, monopolize all the wealth of society, and a single capi-









continuous existence and retaining its identity from generation to generation, the answer to this question is simple. If a state originally owned its land, in the fullest sense of the term, it had the right of voluntary alienation which is inherent in such ownership. Increments of value, present and future, are its property; in alienating them it gives away its own. If the attainment of its ends requires that they be transferred to others, the title of the grantees is valid. To deny to the state the privilege of alienation is to essentially abridge its natural rights; it is to make its ownership of the land incomplete.

It is evident, indeed, from what we have said that there is a certain ultimate ownership that the state does not part with when it assigns land to private holders. What it does is to place this commodity in a general way on a par with houses, tools, etc., which particular persons keep and use, but which the sovereign state still owns in the sense in which it owns all property. This reserved right of the sovereign is the means by which every natural right of individuals to land is certain to be protected. An extreme view asserts that in assigning to one man the use of a piece of land the state defrauds others of their inalienable right to it. What, then, is the nature of this inalienable right? Is it a claim to personally occupy and till a portion of the soil? If so, then civilization carries with it the necessity of defrauding most of us. Division of labor, organized production, takes men away from the farm; but it gives to them their shares of its fruits. It is clear that the right of a man to a share in the earth consists in a right to be served by it, not to personally occupy and till it. Let A use the plough, B the saw and the plane, and C the shears and the needle; if all are better fed, housed, and clothed than they would have been if they had lived each on his little farm, then the earth is a better servant to them than it would have been under such a plan of isolated living. Their claim on it is satisfied. It rests with the state, as the guardian of men's natural rights, to declare under what system the earth best serves them. If it does so under the system of private ownership of land, then the state executes its trust by establishing that system. To such trusts as this modern

states are never unfaithful. Eagerness to secure population did not make America in its early days careless as to men's birthrights. We shall see how well it has protected those birthrights while pursuing the course that has filled our territory with comparatively prosperous occupants. That it will always protect them is made certain by the ultimate ownership of all property which it reserves to itself. The state might change the land system if its supreme objects were ever to require it, though it would never lay the burden of making the change wholly on the men who at the time might happen to be land owners; it would make good to them the special loss that they would suffer. Such a case is hypothetical. For the present the private owning of land exists because the supreme ends of the state have required it.

That the attainment of the ends that the early state had in view required a permanent alienation of land is apparent. Offer to settlers land with a reservation, say to them that you will at a later date seize a part or all of its value, and how rapidly will this community grow in numbers and in wealth?\*

To secure such growth the state elected to give land in perpetuity to its citizens; and the actual attainment of its purposes has been the offset for the gift. We are populous and wealthy, and the land has made us so. The state had the power to give to individuals valid titles to land; it elected to do so, and has gained what it sought by the means.

It is a fact to be noted that the early government made over the coming increments of land value largely to the men who by their presence were to bring them into existence. It was no pre-existing wealth with which the government endowed its citizens. It did not thrust its hand into its own pocket and hand over to the new-comers a value therein found. What it gave to them was a future value that would come into existence if they settled in the country, not otherwise. "Here," said the young state to its immigrants, "is a possible value that you may create by your presence and activity;

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\* It is suggestive to notice, in this connection, the free land, with a free passage from Europe, tools, seeds, and a stipend of six dollars per month for one year, that the Argentine Republic has, for a time, offered to immigrants.







viding of tracts that are too large for wage-earners to hold or to use into lots of a size and value adapted to their condition. It offers to them such lots in return for small and periodical payments, and aids them at the outset by advances of money, building-material, etc., with which to make needed improvements. With his own land under his feet and his own roof over his head, the worker develops an energy and frugality not otherwise to be hoped for, in earning and saving the promised payments. It is this that has filled most of our cities with a population having a vital interest in the preserving of civil order and of economic activity and progress. Against powerful adverse influences it has made Chicago safe against anarchism. It affords at present the substantial ground for hoping that municipal governments may become, in the end, generally honest and efficient, and that the interests of a widely-diffused culture may receive their powerful aid.

The diffusion of landed property among private owners, as fostered by the present state, has sustained the rate of wages. It is a favorite argument with the assailants of the system that so long as homesteads are freely offered by the government to all who want them, general wages are set by the gains of the settlers. If a man is induced to remain a village blacksmith or a carpenter, he must get as much from his employers as he could get by tilling the rich land that the state offers in profusion. It may well be that in a new country wages are set by the real gains of the men in the homestead farms; but in what do these gains consist? What is the nature of this land-holder's income that sets the standard of wages? Is it solely an agricultural product? Does it come from the sale of crops? Far from it. The gains of that kind amount to zero during the first year, and to very little during the second. The breaking of the most docile prairie-soil costs more than the sod-crop will sell for. The settler's gain lies for a time wholly in the increased value of his land. He starves for a year or two that he may be independent thereafter. His land makes him poor to-day; but, in time, it will make him comfortable. The discount value of his future estate, the present worth of the coming independence, is what attracts him to the

farm. This hope it is that acts on the standard of wages. If a blacksmith or a carpenter is to be kept at work in his shop, he must earn enough to induce him to forego the prospect that now lightens the farmer's work and privation; and it is the expected increments of land-value that are the basis of this prospect. This value diffuses itself, thus, among all classes, and, from the settlement of America until now, has sustained the rate of pay for empty-handed labor.

This influence is at its maximum when government lands are to be had in the vicinity of the wage earners' homes. It is powerful when they are to be had in the remoter sections of the country, and is very appreciable after the good lands have mainly passed from the government's keeping. Railroad companies and speculative owners have often a more pressing interest than the state itself in expediting the settlement of the tracts allotted to them, and may even offer them on terms that, as compared with the free lands of the government, leave not much to choose. As between getting remote land for nothing, and getting accessible land for from five to ten dollars per acre, payable in a series of future years, the choice may at times lie in favor of the purchase. In buying such land there is to be experienced the temporary struggle, and the coming independence in case the struggle is carried through to success, that we noticed as the homestead farmer's lot. The growing value of the land itself is still a decisive factor in the coming good fortune. Land sold by speculative holders to men who buy it on such terms is to-day an element in sustaining the rate of American wages.

If the land were to be the virtual property of the government and leased to cultivators at its economic rental value, no such effect would be realized. The alternative of hiring land is worth nothing to the artisan. Economic rent resolves itself into the product of cultivation that remains after current wages and interest are paid. Hire land and a little capital; contract to pay interest and a sum that, year by year, is found to be all that then remains above current wages, and does it need much arithmetic to show that what you keep for yourself will be current wages, neither more nor less? In





of this instrument itself, the land is a six per cent. investment for ten thousand dollars; and such may well be its market price. If theory ever forgets this point, practice never does. To dealers in land it is a primary fact; and every workman who has bought a lot knows that the price he has paid or agreed to pay is composed in part of the discount value of the coming increments.\* When they come, they reward his past or present sacrifices. Such increments of value a landowner, under the system of free and active sale, has either already earned or is in process of earning.

Are there no abuses in our land system? Emphatically yes; and they could be indicated if so doing were germane to this discussion. They are to be remedied by a process that is in harmony with the spirit of civilized governments and not contrary to it, namely, by taking from private owners the form and not the content of their investments,—by taking land itself, but giving to men the honest value that they have saved and put into it. If a state reverses that policy and seizes the value, it abandons a cardinal function; it even undoes a work the doing of which insured the evolution of government itself, and ranges the accumulated power of the state on the side of anarchy. Will you “take the kernel and leave the shell?” It is the kernel and not the shell that has been honestly earned. This fact will make itself apparent in a way that will stop further discussion if in any quarter of the civilized world the experiment of confiscating land-value shall ever be tried. On whom would the loss then be inflicted? Not merely on the millions who have titles in fee simple, but on all who have made loans on land as security. It would fall heavily on savings-banks and insurance companies, with their myriads of depositors and customers; on loan and trust companies; on institutions, educational and benevolent, with their beneficiaries. To every one it would come in the shape of a seizure by the state of property invested in accordance with its own positive invitation. Take such values

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\*The purchaser of land often has to consider, in the same way, the prospect of a decline in its value, and must always take the risk of such a decline.

by a confiscating act, and to every loser and to every observer you will offer a final demonstration of this principle of ethics,—value honestly earned and invested in forms that the state, for its own right purposes, prescribes is a primary subject of the state's protection.

J. B. CLARK.

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## THE COMMUNICATION OF MORAL IDEAS AS A FUNCTION OF AN ETHICAL SOCIETY.\*

THIS is a subject which has been much discussed in private among members of our body, and when it was suggested that there should be lectures upon the work of an Ethical Society, I thought that it might be profitable, one evening, to interchange ideas on this most difficult aspect of our operations.

It is in great part a practical question, and is very ill-fitted for dogmatic treatment; and in dealing with it I feel more especially the truth of what a friend observed to me the other day. "You know," he said, "I think all preaching has a certain affinity to bad manners." Then, on the other hand, it is of no use talking at all unless one speaks pretty freely; so I wish to throw out quite boldly the suggestions that present themselves to me, and to illustrate them as distinctly as I can, just in order that people may think over such things, if what is said comes home to them, and if not, they can pass it by.

Everything is contagious. We are all of us always communicating ideas, and more especially moral ideas, and it might be said that an Ethical Society could exist without making any *special* attempt in this direction by platform utterances or by teaching the young; it might exist for various classes of useful work, or as a federation of more limited organizations, united only by the actual definite sympathy of fellow-workers; and by such an existence it would still through its work, be communicating moral ideas.

But the ethical movement has had from the beginning a point of view which its members have been desirous to com-

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\* A lecture delivered for the Ethical Society, Essex Hall, Strand, London.







a unique question of the shape and growth of a particular individual life, and no collection of thinkers can put themselves in the place of one man, much less of every man, so as to tell him, "Thus and thus your life must be shaped." All attempts at general guidance of this kind are and remain platitudes. The great satirist Rabelais knew this when he depicted a man asking advice whether or no he should marry. At the end of every sentence in which he states his case, as his wishes vary and the color of his statement varies with them, his interlocutor's advice alternates between, "Well, then, marry," and, "Well, then, don't marry!" through several closely-printed pages. Most of us, I think, who have asked or who have given specific advice, will recognize the portraiture.

But do I say, therefore, that there is nothing in the conception upon which I am commenting? No; I think there is something in it. When such suggestions are made to one, I think one ought always to look round and ask one's self, "Now, is there anything which has been actually done to which this idea should direct one's attention, and what conditions of possibility do the actual facts suggest?" And if we hold tight to the truth that morality is a way of living, and that important questions of the way of living are important questions of morality, then we find that international conferences do take place on grave moral matters with valuable results. International arbitration, international copyright, the labor and short-hour question, the suppression of the slave trade, primary education, poor-law, and charitable administration,—in all these provinces, and many more, the experts of different nations have held intercourse, and have done much to arrive at reciprocal enlightenment and a common ground of action.

Now, what are the conditions of these useful and effectual deliberations? Clearly, I think, in the first place, a special tribunal or conference for each kind of questions; and, secondly, as the essential reason for this condition, a previous habituation of the assessors, by work on common lines, or by the pressure of a common and definite necessity, in entering into one another's lives.

It is not, then, that the members of the conference are to be regarded as moral pundits, and that others come to them for the resolution of specifically 'moral cases'; it is, rather, that one man or woman is toiling, say at infant schools, in London, and others at Naples, and in Berlin, and in New York or Chicago, and all these can come together consciously to good purpose, because, in the bonds of a common work, their lives were already united. Let me take one homely example. Ask your chorus of pundits, "Is it moral to break down the responsibility of the parent for the sake of a direct good to the child?" I cannot predict the answer of such a chorus, but one thing I can say with absolute certainty: it must begin with an *if*. "If the good to the child is genuine, does not undo itself, can *only* be got by the sacrifice of parental responsibility, and so on, then——" What on earth can such a reply tell any reasonable creature that he did not know before?

But now let us suppose that we have a conference of managers of schools, together with experienced poor-law or charitable administrators. Let us take the history of family after family, analyze it, observe the effect of free dinners and of self-supporting paid dinners, both on the family and on the neighborhood, and then let us—do what? Pass a resolution on the matter? Yes, if we like; but, chiefly, let us go back to our work and shape it as best we can, not necessarily in the same mould all over the world, but in the light and in the strength of the vital moral experience which, by others' help, we have now made our own.

I think that this condition of a definite common work or common necessity, shared by those who are to decide, and relevant to the question to be decided, gives us the type and limit of what is useful in moral decisions by experts, and of the persons to whom alone such a decision can be of value,—namely, those who share the common experience in question.

(2) On the other hand, a question has been raised, how far abstract philosophical matter should enter into the communication of moral ideas. All that I have to say to-night is in answer to this question in its most general sense, but in a more





county next year?" A timely question of this kind is about the best that ethical art will do for us.

But, to be serious, I do feel obliged to speak strongly upon the direct application to life of abstract formulæ. When I hear of its being a question of "justice," how much a man should be paid *per* hour, or how the land of the country should be held, I feel a positive sense of horror. I *know* that nothing can result from such a point of view, except that any forthcoming prejudice or superstition is withdrawn from reasonable criticism and embodied in a fanatical creed. The superior morality of a form of land-tenure or of a special economic arrangement seems to me a superstition which precisely takes rank with that of the divine institution of private property. I have seen somewhere, in these discussions, the phrase "abstract justice." If ethics has a word to say on the subject, it is that abstract justice is a very well-chosen formula to express what is necessarily unjust. Justice is a concrete, the condition produced by a reasonable organization of society. Plato ought surely to have taught the world thus much in two thousand years.

Speaking generally, then, I am strongly of opinion that to compare ideas about morality with moral ideas is a very dangerous thing. I would never, for example, tell people that there is a standard which they ought to follow, and a sanction which they ought to value. As a general rule, perplexities of conscience are avoided by living out one's own life and attempting always rather to enlarge one's point of view organically than to vary it capriciously.

Thus, taking ethical ideas to mean ideas about morality, and moral ideas to be leading ideas in life, I should direct myself to communicating, as a rule, moral ideas, and not ideas about morality.

I am very well aware that in an intellectual age this distinction is not absolute, but the nature of science makes it certain that the distinction will always exist.

The idea, for example, that it is especially desirable to feel good, or to feel bad, is an idea about morality; the idea of a particular good thing to be done is a moral idea. Any formula

of justice, such as equality or merit or need, is, standing by itself, an idea about morality; the conception of some definitely possible good life is a moral idea. The idea that self-sacrifice is virtuous is an idea about morality; that conception of his particular task for which a man will "scorn delights and live laborious days" is a moral idea. The idea that the will is free when the man is good is an idea about morality; but the will can only be liberated by the apprehension of particular moral ideas.

Ideas about morality, then, are the abstract or scientific renderings of moral ideas. They have value both as an element of the great fabric of knowledge, which is one of man's characteristic achievements, and as a clue which may help us in framing a distinct and organized conception of our moral environment. But we do not adequately realize that the clue is not the organized conception, and may even be a hinderance to it. The way of methodic science is a long way, and its half-way houses are unsatisfactory. Many and many a soul has died of spiritual hunger in the midst of spiritual plenty, because these aids to vision prevented him from using his eyes. The result of all science and philosophy is to see things as they are, and he has done himself a very evil turn who has gone up into the abstract world and has not come down again. "I suppose you mean the great philosophers," it will be said. Oh, no, I do not; they know their way in both worlds safe enough. --I mean the small philosophers, such as we are ourselves, when, in our very aspiration after the general form, we lose our hold of the particular substance. I do feel that in the ethical movement we are not free from this risk, which has been the pit-fall of what is commonly known as Christian philanthropy. To the general aspiration, "I want to do good," the first answer is, "Then live out your own life thoroughly and intelligently." It is right in one's leisure time, or if one has no peremptory private duties, to find a sphere for work such as ours in guilds and schools and lecturing. But I most earnestly believe that the fault of the present time is, on the whole, distraction, and that one great cause of this distraction is the notion of a general duty to do good, or some-







Aristotle says somewhere, in one of those crushing sentences that make one doubt whether it was worth while to live after that great man, "It is one thing to repeat the formulæ of knowledge, and quite another thing to possess the knowledge." I think we sometimes suppose that moral ideas have been communicated to us when they have not. I am not a revivalist preacher; but the test question, to ascertain whether we have or have not apprehended moral ideas, is pretty much the same that such a preacher would ask his congregation if he wanted to know how their souls were getting on. What can one do now that one could not do before? Does one enjoy better books? Does one care more for true things or for beautiful things? Has one a deeper hold of one's civic or neighborly duties, of one's family or parental responsibility, of one's humanity as embodied in one's daily work? If no change of this kind has taken place, then one may have been much interested or excited, and may have participated in a certain ethical dissipation, but one has not apprehended any moral ideas. "Active impressions," said Bishop Butler, "by being repeated, become stronger; passive impressions, by being repeated, become weaker." The terms seem incorrect; but the sentence expresses a fact.

However, we do not want discouragement, but encouragement; so reminding ourselves, in another Greek saying, that "great things are hard," we will approach the problem itself with the help of a comparison or two.

I spoke of a difficult mathematical idea, that of the differential calculus. None of us here, if we have not been trained in the subject, found it at all easy, or worth our while in later life, to apprehend that idea in a workman-like way. Nor, again, should we for the most part be justified in devoting the time and labor which would be needed to make us thoroughly expert political economists or thoroughly competent biologists. The ideas of mathematics, of political economy, and of biology must, therefore, as systematic and complete ideas in these sciences, remain, as a rule, beyond our reach. But if we ask whether mathematical or economical or biological conceptions are wholly without meaning for us, and without influence on

our lives, why that, I think, we should deny. Helmholtz, Clifford, Mill, Jevons, and Darwin have very deeply influenced the intellectual life of our age, and half directly and half indirectly of all of us here. We have learned from them probably not so much as we think, but certainly something. They, or others following them, have applied their great ideas to the organization of experiences which come home to us, and to the definition of relations which lie within our ken. Some one, perhaps, has even demonstrated to us some simple physical relations of sound, or some contrivances tending to self-preservation in a plant, or the statement and refutation of the antiquated wage-fund theory. And, besides this, all our experience in daily life is unconsciously organized or crystallized in new shapes, embodying and revealing the new points of view as they gradually permeated life.

We may thus form some guess, I think, what sort of thing to aim at and to expect in the communication of moral ideas.

I must interrupt myself here to recall what I said about contagion. The talker is, I think, very much more likely to get moral ideas from the busy men he talks to than they are to get them from him. But we agreed to assume, this evening, that there is to be talking, and the only question is how it may be made most useful. And we must remember that the talker or teacher may be of use, if only by interpreting back to his hearers those very moral ideas which he has gained from them. Moreover, it will be seen, from what I am going to say, that the most useful teacher for our purpose is not so much a man of abstract theory as a man of reasonable experience. Theory also, of course, is one work among others.

Now, in throwing out suggestions about our function in the way under discussion, I want to put before us what in one sense, though not in all, is the hardest case. Let us assume, as it was suggested to me by some remarks of Dr. Coit's that I should assume, that our audience consisted less than it does of reflective and leisured people, and more of men and women whose lives permit but little book-learning and are hard throughout and liable to extreme hardship. Have we, it was asked of me, anything to say to these? Is not the Statement





unintelligible, which comforts and strengthens. I note one further point: his official position makes him the representative of the general sympathy. A strong consciousness of solidarity is needed to compensate for this feeling. For most of the poorer class in our town, however, the accustomed form of consolation is already known to be valueless.

But passing from these most extreme cases, which always demand some special qualities in those who deal with them, and in which the sufferer is destitute of the reasonable habits of mind which give solid human strength, let us think of the more general question, "What message have we for the working man or woman?"

The general form of the answer must be that which we have given above; our message, as we deliver it, cannot be the *idea about morality*, and which is expressed by saying that humanity is sufficient for itself; it must be rather those moral ideas by which, in the various ranks and phases of life, humanity is made to feel and to be in very truth sufficient for itself.

I once asked a great philosophical teacher, "Am I not right, sir, in thinking that you are influenced by the categories of Hegel?" "Yes," he replied, "they are very useful things; but one need not tell everybody that one uses them." He was not thinking of any concealment, of course, but merely of not puzzling people with abstractions. And so, even if you use ideas about morality, you need not show them except to such people as may be interested to see them. What *must* be communicated is a point of view worked out in life; and in some particular form of life which those whom you wish to help will recognize as their own. Take as an example the modern ethical doctrine of the freedom of the will, which I may state broadly in the abstract form, "A man is free when he has found himself in his moral environment." To make men and women realize this cardinal condition of their humanity, you must not talk about *it*, but you must talk about the facts in which it has its truth *for them*. I should think that, if, as I hope, the parents of some of the little children in our Infant School come next week to see what goes on there, *they* would receive some elements of the organized view of life cor-

responding to this "idea about morality." That is to say, they would see, and perhaps be told, in simple language, by ladies to whom this education is a heart-felt reality, how the child is being helped to grow and act, and in growing and acting, to be spontaneous and yet orderly. (Even marching to music is, in its degree, and for young children, an object-lesson in moral freedom.) It is finding satisfaction in doing a thing rightly, finding yourself in the order of the world. I know very well that people do not take in these ideas all at once. Rome was not built in a day. But let them once be interested, and they will soon catch hold of the free and happy humanity that is brought out in their children. And of course the whole of life can be treated in such a way as this, and, moreover, its range can, though most gradually, be extended.

But, above all things, the knowledge and experience must be real and vital. You must not take it into your head to illustrate free will, and get up the subject of infant schools to do it with. That is scamped work, and must produce a bad moral impression. You must have really entered into the faith of the sufficiency of humanity, in that particular form in which you were to treat of it. And then, gradually, the organized life which forms your moral ideas will grow up in the minds of those with whom you are in contact; and then, "though he fall he shall not be utterly cast down." For they will have laid hold on reality, on the true value of life.

The fatal home-sickness of the Swiss or the Scotch Highlander, touching and romantic as it may be, is ascribed, not without justice, to the simple singleness of his hold on reality. The single root is cut, and the tree withers. A man's power of endurance is measured by the depth and fulness of his life, and it is the communication of such a fulness in the shape of moral ideas—that is, of intelligent interests—which constitutes, I suppose, our message to the poor.

Need the ethical teacher himself have reflective ideas about morality? My own conviction would lead me to answer in the negative. Thorough moral ideas, in some department of life, are the indispensable condition. Truth agrees with truth, and a reasonable man, with sound experience in im-



portant matters of knowledge or of practice, will be able to communicate something of the order and grasp of his own moral organization. Any one who has had the good fortune to be gradually trained in some complex perception, as, for instance, the perception of beauty, by the teaching of other minds more gifted than his own has a fair example of the process which I understand by the phrase, communication of moral ideas. It is not to create new things; it is not to dig up hidden things; it is merely to open our eyes and hearts that we may see and feel things as they are. It is incredible, I think, to the very young or inexperienced, how the pictures in a gallery, or the poems in a book, gradually through long years, as our point of view becomes truer, are transformed from mere paint and canvas, and words and rhymes, into living meanings and spiritual symbols. Just so, and just as incredibly to those who think they see already all that common life can show, do the simple and familiar facts of life change their perspective and their grouping and their value, and become instinct with significance, and grapple us with an ever-new reality.

For my own part, then, I feel no hesitation whatever about the question that was put to me. What may become in the future of any particular society I do not know. But that moral ideas are the essence of humanity, and can be awakened to consciousness in—this is a better phrase than communicated to—all in whom humanity is still alive, I entertain no shade nor shadow of a doubt. Nor do I doubt that the condition of success is to envisage life in its fulness, without sacrificing its organization, or so that to all sorts and conditions of men their own humanity, which alone can do them good, may be interpreted. From the nature of this work it is plain that mankind cannot, as one used to think, be saved by one man nor by one society. All that we can do is to take the portion of work or of teaching that lies within our individual range and try to make it thorough and reasonable. Patience and thoroughness are, I think, the chief watchwords in the communication of moral ideas. Failure generally means indolence or superficiality or narrowness.

What we are to do, I take it, is, in the first place, to live our own lives out solidly and rationally, and in the second place, to frame such utterances and such teaching as naturally arise from reasonable and energetic minds thoroughly versed in the various relations of humanity. And so living and so teaching, whether in or out of an Ethical Society, we shall be communicating moral ideas in their true form as growing germs of life. And although I am no advocate for quasi-religious proselytism, or for the multiplication of new societies, yet I see clearly that in the interval now before us, until a free humanism shall become the spirit of the civilized world, it may be well for men and women to band themselves together in holding up the banner of such a humanism for the help and encouragement of the isolated. And undoubtedly in so doing it may fall to their lot, by plain sense and true-heartedness, both of word and deed, to bring reasonable activity and reasonable faith within the reach of courageous spirits struggling in solitude. This is a meaning which might be found in those splendid verses that draw the moral of Goethe's Faust, putting into the song of the angels in paradise something more appropriate to plain men and women on earth :

" We rescue from the evil one  
This spirit high and brave ;  
Who still aspires, and labors on,  
Him we have power to save."

There is no magic in the matter, you see ; every soul must save itself ; but between it and others there is no unfathomable gulf ; and life, like everything else, can be communicated. We have to see to it that the life which we are communicating is solid and sound. Half-culture, half-insight, half-devotion, half-conviction are the insidious enemies of our work. The spirit in which moral ideas have their being, and by which alone they can be communicated, is expressed in the familiar motto of the "strong, much-toiling sage," whose name I have just mentioned.

" And I vowed it, then and there,  
Vowed all halfness to forswear,  
In the whole, the good, the fair,  
Absolutely living."

BERNARD BOSANQUET.

## DR. ABBOT'S "WAY OUT OF AGNOSTICISM." \*

## I.

IN the brief compass of a little more than eighty pages of text, and after a few pages of well-written introduction, Dr. Abbot has here attempted "to show that, in order to refute agnosticism and establish enlightened theism, nothing is now necessary but to philosophize that very scientific method which agnosticism barbarously misunderstands and misuses." Readers of the same writer's well-known "Scientific Theism" will find in the present volume a fashion of argument with which they are already in general acquainted. They will admire, meanwhile, the courage by virtue of which the author chooses to meet his adversaries, armed not with the numerous pages in which philosophers usually love to array themselves, but, as it were, with so few pages that they might almost seem by comparison, like David's five smooth stones from a brook. In an age of many words, students who are not without wordy sins on their consciences must therefore indeed envy Dr. Abbot his light equipment and his courageous willingness to enter upon so serious a task with so little external assistance. There is one kind of external assistance which our author, to be sure, does not disdain; his text fairly bristles with italics and small capitals, a device which possibly serves to set off what the author is pleased to consider the extremely "modern" character of his work, through the contrast with so antiquated and unfortunate a typography.

If we leave the manner of the book for the time and pass to the matter, we shall find, first of all, as a noteworthy feature, the author's sense of his personal originality as to method,

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\* The "Way Out of Agnosticism; or, the Philosophy of Free Religion," by Francis Ellingwood Abbot, Ph.D., late Instructor in Philosophy in Harvard University. Boston: Little Brown & Co., 1890.

and, in part, even as to result. In so far as the result is a monistic theism, Dr. Abbot, of course, can be under no illusions as to the widely-spread agreement among many ancient and modern thinkers concerning the substantial truth of this doctrine. In so far, however, as the statement of this doctrine involves technical formulas of a philosophical sort, Dr. Abbot is confident of the newness of many of his propositions; and, with more courage than sense of humor, he is even pleased to name what he thinks to be his philosophical discovery concerning "Universals," the "American Theory of Universals," as opposed to the "Greek" theory, which he finds "undeveloped," and the "German" theory, to which he attributes a "malign influence." The "Greek" theory is essentially Aristotle's. By the "German" theory is meant conceptualism. As to Dr. Abbot's originality, we receive also yet other and numerous assurances. "By a wholly new line of reasoning," drawn from the sources of "science and philosophy," the work of this book is to be accomplished. So the opening "Note" informs us. And, again: "The first great task of philosophy is to lay deep and solid foundations for the expansion of human knowledge in a bold, new, and true theory of universals. For so-called modern philosophy rests complacently in a theory of universals which is thoroughly mediæval or antiquated" (p. 12). At the conclusion of the book we learn that we have been shown "the way out of agnosticism into the sunlight of the predestined Philosophy of Science." This "way," it is plain, might, according to its author's view, be called with some propriety the "American" way; and, in sum, Dr. Abbot's sense of the originality of his philosophical thought is such as to seem, in this age when the historical continuity of human thought is so constantly in our minds, fairly childlike in its confidence and in its simplicity. How well founded it is, we can only estimate after we have looked a little more closely at the doctrine.

## II.

"The necessary beginning-point of all philosophy, which deserves to be called scientific," is in this volume as in the au-

thor's previous one, the principle, here stated on p. 5, that "the universal results of the special sciences, including the method common to them all, are the only possible data of philosophy or universal science." "Universal Human Knowledge," however, as thus defined, is embodied in "Universal Literature," in so far as this is a record of the positive results of human thought (p. 10). Universal literature depends upon language as its means of expression, and language is impossible without universal terms, in which, "in the last analysis," all human knowledge is "contained" (p. 11). "The results of science must be permanently stored in this form, and can only be found in this form." How necessary, then, the comprehension of the nature and objective relations of "Universal Terms." The true theory of these terms, now, is that they express universal meanings or "Concepts," and that any one of these stands for "the universal *what-is-meant*" (p. 13),—i.e. for "the genus."

To understand the nature of knowledge, then, we must know what is the truth behind this word "genus." All science, Dr. Abbot teaches, presupposes that, in so far as we possess verified acquaintance with nature at all, we do know *real*—not abstract or ideal, but *actual*—genera in nature. "Nothing is known by itself alone; it is known through its kind. The essential constitution of every genus is *that of many things in one kind, one kind in many things*; the unity and multiplicity are known inseparably together. Hence the genus is in no sense an abstraction, but the concrete totality of many realities in one reality" (p. 14). Hence, again, the genus has an "essentially organic constitution;" and "science itself may be defined as knowledge of the genus, that is, knowledge of the universe as the highest kind which includes all other kinds." It is, meanwhile, some genus in the foregoing sense which is known through any scientific concept or word; and the word or the concept reveals "never the independent, isolated, or unrelated thing, nor yet the common essence of many unrelated things as a mere abstraction, but always the concrete kind of many interrelated things as one self-related reality" (p. 18). A fair example of a genus (p. 24)

is the "family" in human society ; for a family in every case is "essentially and necessarily composed of several individual members" (p. 25), whose relations "in their totality make up the family constitution, and are precisely as real as the individuals related, inhering in the family *as such* and *as a whole*, and subsisting neither in any one individual member, nor in any outside observer." "Nay, more : no individual as such can exist except as a member of some family precisely as real as himself." Meanwhile, "all individuals compose the genus family. All families compose the genus society. All societies compose the genus mankind. All individuals = all families = all societies = all mankind." Again (p. 26), "in this union and interrelation of many in one and one in many, in this immanent relational constitution by which many individuals exist and are indissolubly united in one kind, lies the very essence of the family," which thereby exemplifies the genus as it is found everywhere in the "world-order." Another example of a genus is "mankind" (p. 40). "Mankind" may be, for the sake of precision, distinguished as a "concrete universal kind or genus, including all concrete individuals," from "Man" as the "Concrete Individual," and from "Humanity" as the "Abstract Class Essence," including only the universal nature which is common to all men as a class, and excluding all that is peculiar to each individual. "Humanity," in this sense,—viz., as "human nature,"—is then not the real genus, and has no "independent reality." "It is real, but only as existing in all real men," while the genus or "kind" is as real as the individuals, and in case of mankind "has its generic peculiarities, such as heredity, bisexuality, gregariousness, and all other attributes which can exist only through the social correlation of many individuals in one kind." Other examples of the genus are "book," "house," "tree" (p. 33), and the "three categorical types of Real Being," which the author discusses in his closing sections,—viz., "Machine," "Organism," and "Person."

The genus is therefore, of course, distinct from the individual as such. It is also distinct from the "abstract class essence." The relations of the three are, however, that (omit-

tung Dr. Abbot's small capitals, in which the words next following are printed by him) "the Individual Concrete Thing and the Universal Concrete Kind reveal each other through the Abstract Class Essence which is common to both."

I have used Dr. Abbot's words in stating the foregoing notions about "Universals," because he plainly makes much of these forms of expression himself, and has a right to his words in so far as they are his own. As to the use to which he puts this "new, bold, and true" theory, this "American theory of Universals," I have space only for an inadequate suggestion. "The Universe," namely (p. 45), as the "supreme Kind of Kinds," is the "real genus in itself," and we learn about *this* genus, as a whole, "by studying the constitution of its own finite parts. Each known part reveals one character of the whole." "The real essence of the individual thing, and the real essence of the universal kind more or less repeat, exemplify, and manifest each other" (p. 47). Hence we can and must judge of the character of the highest genus by virtue of an examination of the genera known to us. The principle of the reciprocal relation of thing and kind, extended to the universe, authorizes us to generalize from actual to possible experience. Upon this authorization all science depends; and we must be sure that "the essential constitution of the universe more or less repeats, reflects, and reveals itself in miniature in the constitution of the innumerable concrete kinds of which it is itself the absolute unity" (p. 44). "Real knowledge of any of these kinds is, just so far, real knowledge of the Universe as the supreme Kind of Kinds."

If this suggests the procedure of "scientific philosophy" in general, the detail of the procedure is more fully suggested when we observe that in the universe of science these are, according to Dr. Abbot, the three types of Being: the "Machine" (under which name Dr. Abbot includes all embodiments of natural processes *quâ* mechanical), the "Organism," and the "Person." These, then, properly studied, will, as subordinate genera, reveal or manifest something of the nature of the highest genus itself,—*i.e.*, the Universe as Infinite Being.

Otherwise the American theory of universals is vain, and we are yet in our sins. For while ordinary agnostics, when they observe "machines" or "organisms" or "persons," remain still with foolish heart darkened as to the nature of the "Supreme Kind of Kinds," those who have escaped into the sunlight of the predestined philosophy of science know that, as the American theory teaches, and as the malign "German" theory does not teach, the higher kind and the lower kind reciprocally "manifest each other," so that in knowing persons, and the rest, we already know something of the universe. But still further, a closer examination of the concept of a "Machine," reveals to Dr. Abbot that a machine without an Organism, which constructs the machine "as a causal means to some definite organic end of its own," is an "abstraction," and can have no true reality. The reasoning by which Dr. Abbot reaches this result is, of course, supposed by him to be in principle founded upon his doctrine of the reciprocal manifestation of thing and kind and so on the "American" theory. In fact and in detail, however, the argument as stated will appear to any reader, who is not altogether in love with Dr. Abbot's formulas, nor yet terrified by the italics and the small capitals, as naught but our familiar friend the design argument, in forms which were in use some time before the discovery of America. By the aid of the science of "anthropology," to which Dr. Abbot, as "scientific philosopher," appeals on p. 50, he learns that men use axes as tools, and accordingly he gives as "anthropological definition" of machine, "a causal means between man and some definite human end." A reference to honeycombs, spider-webs, and the like, suggests the further generalization that "the essence of the Real Machine is to mediate causally between an Organism and its End," and one is thus led to a conception of a machine as a "material whole constructed by an Organism as a causal means to some definite organic end of its own" (p. 52),—a concept which, just because it "contains all the essential elements of the physical and anthropological concepts, but is more comprehensive than either," thereby shows that the concepts of the Machine and the Organism (*i.e.*, of natural processes as mechanical, and



of organic processes as teleological) are "universally, necessarily, and inseparably connected." This monstrous *non sequitur* is supplemented by a "discovery of supreme importance" (p. 53),—viz., that "the constitutions of the Machine and of the Organism involve each the other, and therefore are intelligible each through the other alone." The only further suggestion of a proof for this discovery is given in the illustrations on page 53, which show that; as guns and scythes, and the like, are used by men to "extend their organisms," the "Real Machine is only an Artificial and Separable Organ for Self-Extension of the Organism. When not used it is only a functionless lump of matter."

I am far from discussing here the truth of Dr. Abbot's conclusions apart from his method of reaching them. I am only reporting the nature of his "way out," just as a way. On p. 55 this "way" leads through an argument, presumably in Dr. Abbot's judgment, "wholly new" when applied to philosophy, although he quotes text-books which have already formulated it in special science. This argument assures us that the "causal nexus," in mechanical nature would remain utterly mysterious unless we supposed it to be in essence one with our own "conscious effort." This gives us another indication of the inextricable linking of the two concepts of "efficient causality and finality." With the remainder of the discussion, which leads Dr. Abbot along well-trodden roads to the monistic theism of his closing pages, where (as Julian Schmidt once neatly said of certain passages in Fichte) *Er in's Erbauliche uebergeht*, I will not just here deal, except by way of remarking that the capitals and the italics become none the less numerous as the topics under consideration become more exalted.

### III.

It is due to Dr. Abbot's position and past services as a writer and a leader of liberal investigation, in this country, to give at least as full an account as the foregoing of his latest work, and I should be glad if I had time for fuller quotations. It is due also to the extravagant pretensions which he frequently makes of late as to the originality and profundity of

his still unpublished system of philosophy, to give the reader some hint of what so far appears to be the nature of our author's contributions to philosophical reflection. But now, as to the estimate of the book, I must, however, insist that no amount of agreement with Dr. Abbot's monistic and essentially idealistic conclusion—no such agreement, I repeat, as I myself feel with this outcome, and no sympathy, such as we shall all sincerely feel, with his desire to serve our careworn and doubting age—can blind or ought to blind any intelligent reader to the essentially vicious and injurious nature of Dr. Abbot's fashion of argument. Of novelty, good or bad, the book contains, indeed, despite its vast pretensions, hardly a sign. The agnostic, meanwhile, who should actually be led "out" by Dr. Abbot, would be of necessity a person of so unreflective a mind, so ignorant of the history of thought, so badly afraid of italics, so little grounded in his agnosticism, that, whatever humanity might dictate as to the value of any pious effort to benefit his soul, there may be grave doubts whether his philosophically self-critical powers were worth the trouble of saving. And I say this not because I have the least desire to be disrespectful to Dr. Abbot, whose sincerity and earnestness are throughout admirable, but because the book, as it stands, forces such a judgment upon one, and that for the following simple reasons:

For the first, it is useless for any thinker in our day to undertake to philosophize, without both the time and the coolness of judgment needed to form some clear consciousness as to his own historical relations; and Dr. Abbot is hopelessly unhistorical in his consciousness. His "American Theory of Universals" is so far from being either his own or a product of America that in this book he continually has to use, in expounding it, one of the most characteristic and familiar of Hegel's technical terms, namely, "concrete," in that sense to which it is applied to the objective and universal "genus" itself. Dr. Abbot's appropriation of Hegel's peculiar terminology comes ill indeed from one who talks of the "malign influence" of the "German" theory of universals, and who interprets this theory as teaching that, in case of his own

illustration of the "family," "the observer and the family are one, and the observer is that one." As applied to Hegel's theory of universals, which is certainly not to be called precisely an "American" theory, Dr. Abbot's description of the consequences of the "German" theory would be an intolerable slander. And this I say not to defend Hegel, for whose elaborate theory of universals I hold in no wise a brief, but simply in the cause of literary property-rights. When we plough with another man's heifer, however unconscious we are of our appropriation, however sincerely we seem to remember that we alone raised her from her earliest calfhood, it is yet in vain, after all, that we put our brand on her, or call her "American." Hegel himself never made any secret of his own historical dependence, but at all events it was Hegel who, as the outcome of his study of the history of thought, said, in speaking of the relation of the universal and the individual, "Der Begriff (substantially one with Dr. Abbot's genus in so far as the latter is "one kind in many things and many things in one kind") ist das schlechthin Konkrete." And Hegel's *Begriff*, I repeat, is *not* Dr. Abbot's merely subjective "concept," which the "German theory" shall put wholly "in the observer." On the contrary, as § 167 of the "Encyclopädie" has it, "To say that a judgment shall be merely subjective in sense, as if I attributed a predicate to a subject, contradicts the very form of expression of the judgment, which is objective: 'The rose is red,' 'Gold is a metal.' *It is not I who merely attribute something to them.*" Nor is this a chance word of Hegel's. His whole system depends on the assertion that there is an objective Begriff, a universal kind, manifested in the individuals, and at the same time, as universal a truth, as real, as they are, and making the individuals possible. For this reason—viz., *because* of this objectivity and reality of the *Begriff*—Hegel calls it "concrete," makes it organic, precisely as Dr. Abbot does, so far, at least, as concerns this initial definition, and then tries to demonstrate, in his own fashion, that this concrete and objective universal is a person. Now Hegel's whole theory may be false; but what is certain is that Dr. Abbot, who has all his life been working in an

atmosphere where Hegelian ideas were more or less infectious, has derived his whole theory of universals, so far as he has yet revealed it with any coherency, from Hegelian sources, and even now cannot suggest any better terminology than Hegel's for an important portion of the doctrine. Yet in the volume before us we find all this pretentious speech of an "American" theory, and discover our author wholly unaware that he is sinning against the most obvious demands of literary property-rights.

Discussions about priority are indeed often of peculiar uselessness in philosophy, just because of our inevitable bondage to the history of thought, and to the common notions of our age. I should therefore owe the reader a hearty apology for the suggestion of the present discussion, were it not for the light that it throws upon Dr. Abbot's whole method of work. If we are unable to discover, after the most sincere and pious scrutiny, our own most obvious debts, is it not a little hopeless for us to undertake to straighten the world's accounts, and to lead all the agnostics of our generation out of their reflective embarrassments?

If the book is thus based upon an historical misjudgment, the main doctrines, regarded as Dr. Abbot's, are, in the second place, not a little confused in statement. So far, I have said, as Dr. Abbot actually defines his genus, his "concrete kind of many interrelated things as one self-related reality," his genus is nothing but Hegel's *objektiver Begriff*. Meanwhile, however, Dr. Abbot, as "scientific philosopher," disdains to give any argument for this doctrine of the genus but the bare *Versicherung*, as Hegel would have said, that *so it is, since so science assumes*. Beyond this assurance here, as in his previous book, Dr. Abbot, who has an especially keen hatred for sceptically critical reflection upon fundamental truths, has nothing to suggest to his agnostics, by way of leading them "out," save a certain lofty and stern abuse of their dreary scepticism, an abuse which has a well-known and somewhat clerical sound, and which may be left to one side here along with the rest *des Erbaulichen* of which the book, as I before said, contains a little. The edifying is indeed one of the most necessary

and useful things of life; but it has as such no place in a philosophical argument about fundamental problems. We ought not to be enticed to accept a philosophical theory by the suggestion that it is "new and bold." We ought not to be warned away from a critical scrutiny of the bases of science by hearing that, "If popular agnosticism only had philosophy enough to understand the logic of its own denials, it would be a mad plunge into bottomless, shoreless, skyless ignorance, —the suicide of reason itself in a delirium of cowardice." This sort of thing, one may remind Dr. Abbot, is very much what the parson said of old to us in the country village: *nur mit ein bißchen andern Worten*, and with the further difference that the parson of old used, if I remember rightly, to warn us that just such evil consequences would follow from any doubt as to Jonah's precise relations with the whale. Agnostics of any experience are used to such speeches, and we shall in vain get them "out" after that fashion.

But if one looks a little further at Dr. Abbot's development of the doctrine of the genus, one finds indeed at least this about it which, if not precisely either novel or "American," is at all events not wholly due to Hegel. I refer to a certain unexplained confusion in his mind as to what his *genus* shall be or imply. A given "family" in human society, as would seem from his chosen example, is a genus as against its individual members. Meanwhile, "book" and "house" are just as truly genera. All these genera have an "organic" constitution, and are "units" of existence (p. 15). They exemplify the "concrete kind of many interrelated things as one self-related reality." Each of them, namely, has "an inherent system of relations or immanent relational constitution," and Dr. Abbot is never weary of pointing out that relations are as real and objective as are the related things. "Immanent in the very nature of being, this principle of the objectivity or reality of generic relations, is the absolute condition of the possibility of a World-Order" (p. 26). The "relational constitution" of each genus is discovered by "classification" (p. 14), and this, as scientific and methodical procedure, depends upon "observation," which first discovers real genera, "hypothesis,"

which tentatively extends generalizations, and "experimental verification," which tests hypothesis (p. 36). Through the "immanent relational constitution" thus discovered, we find that "many individuals exist and are indissolubly united in one kind" (p. 26); and this "indissoluble" unity of the individuals in the kind is again apparently the same as Dr. Abbot's "organic" unity of the generic constitution of things.

Now, it needs no special ingenuity to suggest that this doctrine about the organic and "indissoluble" unity of things in their kind, has very different values when applied to the "family" of Dr. Abbot's illustration, and when applied to such a "genus" as, say, corkscrew, or rat-trap, or rainbow, or pebble, or atom, or tiger, or constellation. All these last are unquestionably "genera" of some sort. And I should fully agree with Dr. Abbot that the relations among things which these various generic names imply are as real and objective as the things related. This objective "relational constitution" of things is to my mind a very certain truth, although I should not, like Dr. Abbot, refuse to inquire as to the philosophical basis of this truth before making it the basis of the rest of my philosophy. But granting that truth, it is the barest confusion to dump thus all the genera into one place, as it were, and talk of the "indissoluble" unity of many things in one kind as if it were characteristic of every genus. "Indissoluble" and "organic" relations subsist, after a fashion, between the members of a given family, because, should any members die or go away, just this family must cease to exist in its old form as a genus, and must, if it persists at all, become an altered genus. No *such* organic relations characterize, however, the rat-traps and the pebbles. Even the genus tiger is unaltered by the death of thousands of tigers. The pebbles resemble one another, and this resemblance is indeed an objective fact in nature, dependent upon no observer (save God). But to call the pebbles, and the rat-traps, and the corkscrews, and the tigers, and the rainbows, genera, each one of which is a "concrete kind" of many interrelated pebbles, or rat-traps, or corkscrews, or tigers, or rainbows, as one "self-related reality," and to illustrate this "organic relational constitution" by the

further case of a family with its interrelated parents and children, brothers and sisters,—all this is but to confuse, surely not to clarify. Hegel, whose doctrine of the organic unity of thing and kind Dr. Abbot has unconsciously appropriated, was himself far too sly a bird to be caught by the chaff of such confusion. His *Begriff* is objective and organic, and it owns the whole universe; but the various corkscrews and the individual tigers and rainbows are still not by any implication suggested as “necessarily united.” On the contrary, Hegel’s ingenious system of graded categories, with its successive forms of Being,—viz., *Sein*, *Dasein*, *Existenz*, and *Wirklichkeit*,—gave a formula which enabled him to declare *das Wirkliche* through and through organic, while leaving room for all sorts of imperfect realizations of unity in the lower realms of *Dasein* and *Existenz*. I would not desire to recommend Hegel’s devices to Dr. Abbot, for they might produce worse effects upon his agnostics than even his present account of things. I only wish to suggest that the actually true doctrine of the organic unity of the world requires of us more adroitness in its statement that is involved in simply declaring every possible genus an organic unity, and avoiding distinctions. The pebbles have “unity” because they resemble one another; the atoms because, in addition, they have, or may have, physical and chemical relations; the corkscrews or the rat-traps because of their community both of structure and of purposes. The “family,” however, shows us a wholly different sort of organic or “indissoluble” relation among its members; while the constellation in the heavens is again a sort of “genus” in relation to the stars that compose it; but its unity, while indeed founded upon the “immanent relational constitution” of the world in space, has a yet widely different “organic” character from that suggested by the other “genera” mentioned. I use, indeed, examples which are my own; but Dr. Abbot has only himself to blame if, stating the “immanent relational constitution” of all genera in this direct and naïve way, without any distinctions, he forces upon a reader such reflections. In brief, as the foregoing reference to Hegel suggests, Dr. Abbot’s doctrine is in so far “American” as it is

Hegel with the subtlety of that crafty old fox left out. Hegel managed to make the *Begriff* organic, and yet leave room for the confused genera of ordinary observation. Dr. Abbot marks all genera with the same stripe, sees "indissoluble unity" in every case of objectively significant classification, and so makes indeed short work of "agnosticism," but unfortunately of the clearness of his whole thinking also.

For, of course, the whole use of this "American theory of universals" is to prove, by means of the reciprocal relation of thing and kind, that the universe as a whole has such unity as certain of its parts—to wit, "organisms" and "persons"—are already empirically known to possess. This is the whole question at issue between Dr. Abbot and his agnostics. No other line of investigation shall be "scientific" or "modern," except a study of empirical nature in the light of the "American theory." And this theory is, "Every genus is an organic unity of interrelated individuals in one self-related kind." Hence the kind of kinds, containing as it does persons and organisms, is at once in a fair way to appear as a person with an organism. Dr. Abbot's agnostics have, however, a right to ask how the organic unity of the universe, as the highest genus, differs from the organic unity of the rat-traps in the genus "rat-trap," or of the rainbows in the genus "rainbow," or of the tigers in the jungle, or of the stars in the constellation? Why is the human "family" a better case of the immanent relational constitution of the objective world than is the genus "corkscrew"? Upon the answer to such questions all must turn for these unhappy agnostic readers.

And Dr. Abbot indeed "more or less" feels, I apprehend, how the bare and undeveloped assertion, that science knows organic and unified genera, is not enough to make clear the peculiar unity which he attributes to the One Person. Hence the detailed discussion of machine, organism, and person, as scientific genera, in the concluding sections of the book. A more hopelessly "mediæval" discussion it would be hard to find. The design argument in all its dogmatic and animistic play with analogies is here repeated as if it were something wholly new. A "machine" needs a maker and a user.



*Proof*: men make axes. Science discovers physical nature to be a machine. *Ergo*: science discovers the world of physical nature to need a maker and a user. This maker and user cannot be a part of nature, but must be the whole of it. Hence the world is one organism. A further proof of the same bold and new doctrine is found in the fact that (as M. Deschanel observes, in the revised sixth edition, by Everett, of his "Elementary Treatise on National Philosophy") "we obtain the idea of force through our own conscious exercise of muscular force" ( p. 57 of Abbot). Several other persons have said the same thing. Hence (p. 64) "the universe is a real organism." As for the rest of the argument, it is short and easy. The universe as a whole has nothing outside of it. Hence, for the real organism which is the infinite, "self and not-self are numerically identical. But numerical identity of self and not-self, subject and object, constitutes the unity of self-consciousness in the person. Consequently the infinite universe cannot be a real organism without being a real person too."

And so, finally, after this somewhat detailed study of Dr. Abbot's little book, I feel constrained to repeat my judgment as above. Results in philosophy are one thing; a careful way of thinking is another. Babies and sucklings often get very magnificent results. It is not the office of philosophy to outdo the babies and sucklings at their own business of receiving revelations. It is the office of philosophy to undertake a serious scrutiny of the presuppositions of human belief. Hence the importance of the careful way of thinking in philosophy. But Dr. Abbot's way is not careful, is not novel, and, when thus set forth to the people as new and bold and American, it is likely to do precisely as much harm to careful inquiry as it gets influence over immature or imperfectly trained minds. I venture therefore to speak plainly, by way of a professional warning to the liberal-minded public concerning Dr. Abbot's philosophical pretensions. And my warning takes the form of saying that if people are to think in this confused way, unconsciously borrowing from a great speculator like Hegel, and then depriving the borrowed conception of the peculiar subtlety of statement

that made it useful in its place,—and if we readers are for our part to accept such scholasticism as is found in Dr. Abbot's concluding sections as at all resembling philosophy,—then it were far better for the world that no reflective thinking whatever should be done. If we can't improve on what God has already put into the mouth of the babes and sucklings, let us at all events make some other use of our wisdom and prudence than in setting forth the "American theory" of what has been in large part hidden from us.

I speak plainly. Moreover, I give this work a treatment whose minuteness is wholly out of proportion to the value of the book criticised. Were I writing for expert students of philosophy, this paper would have been much briefer. But I write for the general reader, as well as for the expert. And, I repeat, nothing less than the foregoing fulness and plainness of speech is due to Dr. Abbot's rank as a public teacher, and to his well-earned reputation as a man who wants to advance the cause of sound religion. That cause, by his practical labors, as editor and counsellor, by his personal devotion to high ideals, by his heroic sacrifices in the service of duty, he has long indeed advanced; and I trust that he will very long continue to do so. But if we will philosophize in public, we must be content to be judged by formal criteria of a very impersonal sort. If not every one that saith Lord! Lord! is a good servant of the Lord, surely it is equally true that not every one who preaches a lofty creed and lives up to it can give even an American theory of why he holds it. And, in judging of the actual work of philosophical writers, we must lay friendly esteem aside in so far as it is necessary to do so for the cause of the "greater friend." In brief, in estimating these matters of the accuracy and fruitfulness of our reflective thought, we must show no mercy,—as we ask none.

JOSIAH ROYCE.

## A SERVICE OF ETHICS TO PHILOSOPHY.

WITHOUT essaying formal definitions, we may say that ethics is at bottom the sense of right, as science deals with facts, and philosophy attempts to reconcile what is, what ought to be, and all other objects of human interest in some comprehensive conception. In an earlier day we might have spoken of ethics as science; but now, since "science" is correlated with what can be dealt with by the methods of observation and experiment, it conduces to clearness of thought to distinguish ethics from science, inasmuch as ethics deals with purely ideal conceptions, which can neither be seen nor handled, nor experimented with, and are true to the mind alone. The maxim, for example, "Do unto others what you would that they should do to you," does not indicate of itself what happens, or ever has happened, or ever will happen,—it is a rule prescribing what should happen. It is not gathered from experience or founded on experience; it is a demand of the mind. How far any one has acted according to the maxim is, of course, a question for science, and to be settled according to purely scientific methods; ideal conceptions of what men ought to do have not the slightest value in determining what they do in fact; moral idealism and historical realism are perfectly compatible. But though every man acted according to the maxim, such knowledge would be of a fact merely, not of a rule; and to determine why men should so act, resort would have to be had to speculation.

It is the fashion of our day to find in the results of moral conduct its justification; we are to obey the Christian maxim, for example, because so we help to make men happy or to prolong their lives. But what we do not realize, or realize but faintly, is that there is an assumption underlying all this,—namely, that men's happiness or length of days are ends we must respect. As matter of fact, these ends are often not re-

spected; and the best we can say is that they always should be; in other words, that the right rule would be to respect them. Hence, instead of being led to solid facts, on which to base the Christian maxim, as was expected, we are simply led to another rule—and a rule as purely ideal—as difficult to obey as ever was the Golden Rule of Jesus. In truth, we can never found a rule on facts, but only on some deeper rule. Science may tell us what means we must use to secure our ends (it may well be that it alone can tell us), it may inform us as to our resources in making any moral effect; but as to what our ends should be, as to the supreme rules of action (springing as they must from a determination of those ends), the science that works by observation and experiment knows nothing, and can know nothing; they belong to another realm than that with which it deals.

Hence, ethics may be of service to us to-day in enlarging our philosophy. We hear much of a "scientific" philosophy. The scientific method has yielded such rich results in certain spheres that it is no wonder that generous and ambitious minds have conceived the idea of applying it in all spheres. Could but all knowledge be verified! Could our speculations only be rigorously 'tested! Then with what firmness we might face an unwilling world,—and we could well afford to relinquish some unverifiable ideas for the sake of publishing others with absolute confidence! Yet what ideas can we verify? Verification is, of course, the testing of ideas by facts or the observed relation between facts; we think, we conjecture,—and then we observe, we experiment; and as the result of the process, we say that our thoughts are either true or not, or still uncertain. The ideas, then, that we can think of verifying are those that relate to facts or the relations between them. Ideas in the field of psychology, of sociology, of history, as well as of physics in its various branches, are all actually or conceivably verifiable; ideas as to the twentieth century and its social order can ultimately be compared to the fact as truly as ideas with regard to the social system in which we live. But how can we verify ideas not as to what happens or exists, but as to what ought to happen or exist? In

the very nature of the case, they cannot be tested by the fact, since they are not ideas of fact. If we say, this is a just man, or this is a just social order, the assertion is a verifiable one,—we can compare the conception with what is; but if we say, this man or our existing social order ought to be just, we leave the realm of fact altogether; though justice can actually be predicated of neither, the assertion may be just as true. Hence, reluctant as we may be to admit it, moral ideas belong just to the realm of unverifiable ideas, we have to believe in them, if we believe in them at all, not because they have the fact on their side, but because of their own intrinsic attractiveness and authority. He who really believes in them would believe in them all the same, though in all his experience and in all the ages of history he never discovered a living embodiment of them; yes, he might rise to the sublime height of the poet, and own them still with reverence, though

“ Hatred and wrong had been proclaimed  
Law through the worlds and right misnamed.”

Hence, he who admits ethical ideas into the circle of his belief can never be content with strictly “scientific” philosophy. So far as scientific means clearness and systematic arrangement of conceptions, he will, of course, crave scientific philosophy and no other; but so far as “scientific” denotes reliance on observation and experiment, so far as “scientific philosophy” is put forth as a new method of philosophizing, it must inevitably be regarded as incomplete. Beyond the realm of what is and happens, ethics opens another realm of what ought to be. Alongside of every man, of every action, of every institution, of every social order, is the notion of what they should be. 'Tis not another set of facts, but a prescription, an ideal of what the facts should be. 'Tis barely possible that in nature there is sometimes the separation between the reality and the idea; but we know that this is true of men,—at least of most men and social institutions. Science gives us one account of man; ethics another; science tells us of the law according to which in reality men ordinarily act, the law of self-interest; ethics of the law according to which they

should act, the law of justice and brotherhood. The scientific view easily begets contempt; ethics begets hope and trust. If I may venture the illustration, a difference between Carlyle and Emerson lay in this,—that Carlyle saw men more nearly as they were, while Emerson regarded them in the light of what they should be, and saw them transfigured. The glory of man entranced Emerson, the littleness of *men* awoke the scorn of Carlyle. Yet these varying points of view are not inconsistent; and both are true. But the elevating, the consoling, the inspiring truth is on the side of Emerson. If we sink too completely in the critical view of human nature, we shall not know whether it is worth redeeming. During the last century, in France, a cry went up from noble spirits oppressed by the theological poverty of the ancient régime, *Elargissez Dieu*,—and to an age like the present, whose thought is dominated by conceptions borrowed from physical science, the appeal comes, Enlarge your philosophy, take off the bands and let ideas beyond the narrow bounds of fact freely circulate.

And ethics not only enlarges our philosophy, by opening to our view higher heights or deeper depths than science is aware of; but it gives us something ultimate in philosophy, ideas that may be fairly classed as ultimate truths. Ethics does not take the place of philosophy, it can be no more than a part of our total view of things; and yet, if I mistake not, it is not a part that is dependent on other parts (save as all truths are mutually correlated) but it is an original and elemental constituent of the whole. To Emerson, moral truth was a part of the first philosophy; the moral sentiment, he said, declared the law after which the universe was made; and I think that, after criticism has done its perfect work with such a saying, this residuum of pure gold remains,—namely, that whatever may be the actual forces in the world at any time, justice and love are rightfully supreme over them all, and that these are so interwoven with the order of things that nothing out of harmony with them can long stand. We have to explain many things, or seek to; matter, the whole material universe, once seen to be an order of sensations, de-

mands an explanation beyond it; all that happens, that begins to be, requires an explanation; all matter-of-fact laws, like gravitation, chemical affinity, and the like, the contrary of which are perfectly conceivable, may find their *raison d'être* outside themselves, may exist, for example, ultimately for moral ends; but the moral laws are neither effects nor things that happen, nor is their contrary conceivable,—they do not exist for ends beyond themselves, but to dominate all other ends; their victory in a universe, a universe transfigured by them, would be its own reason for being—a real end, a consummation, beyond which no greater glory could be. No man can ask without cause for shame, why should he do justice, why should he love? These are his life, the things for which he exists,—aye, if he wished to be just for some ulterior gain, he could not do so, for justice is in the heart, is on principle or it is not at all; and he who practises it for profit, or to gain notice or applause from man or God, dishonors what is most sacred in the world.

It has ever been the faith of religion that there is such a thing as intuition of divine things; that the soul can in some sense know the object of its worship; that it need not feed on hearsay, and tradition, and arguments, but can have vision. (It is the imperishable glory of transcendentalism) in our country that in the decay and disintegration of the ancient creed, it sounded this high note. What matters it that it mingled some romancing with its philosophizing, that it hypostatized truth and justice and turned them into substances? It had that living sense of the ideas, of their immediate authority, of their independence of the doubtful data of history, that was so wanting at the time, that was so necessary, if in the new conditions our calculating, thrifty, Yankee blood was to be stirred to generosity, to idealism, and real religion. "There are parts of faith so real and self-evident that, when the mind rests in them, the pretensions of the most illuminated sect pass for nothing," said Emerson; and, for my own part, when, amid all the things I can waver or doubt about, my mind turns to right and justice, I feel at once their claims, I own their sovereignty, and know, with the good bishop, that had they

might as they have right, they would rule the world. That right and justice actually rule the world may be open to dispute, but that they ought to, that they are supreme over all else, that our part as men is to help make them rule, that human life has this as a part of its ultimate law and aim,—of this I am as sure as that the sun is in the heavens; and the sense of it seems to lend infinite dignity to this quick-passing life of ours.

How we shall put these data of ethics, along with those of science and of art, and of all the other elements of human culture, into a comprehensive conception or philosophy is another question; but to my mind materialism is insufficient, and all the indications seem to me to point in the direction of a purified theism. It is not, however, to present a philosophy, but to hint at the assistance which ethics may give us in building up a philosophy that I now write.

WILLIAM M. SALTER.



## BOOK REVIEWS.

THE METHODS OF ETHICS. By Henry Sidgwick, Knightbridge Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Cambridge. Fourth Edition. London and New York: Macmillan & Co. Pp. xxx., 522.

Professor Sidgwick's classical work on *The Methods of Ethics* in its fourth edition now lies before us. Few books deserve to the same degree as this to be recommended to students of ethics; for few to a like degree constrain us to clear and exact thinking; few like this give us a habit of prudence and caution in our ethical reasoning.

The author shows that the various ethical methods which are used in ordinary life, and which are set up by philosophers, may be reduced to three,—that of Egoism, of Intuitionism, and of Utilitarianism. This exposition, conducted in a convincing manner, and the searching criticism of intuitionism are, perhaps, the most valuable contribution which Professor Sidgwick has made to systematic ethics.

The new edition takes the same point of view as the second and third; compared with the latter it shows, in general, relatively few changes. Accordingly the same fundamental objection holds against it which had to be brought against the former editions. Professor Sidgwick has not proved that the method of egoism, besides being a possible method and one often in actual use, is also an *ethical* method. He defines an ethical method as "any rational procedure by which we determine what is *right* for individual beings to do, or to seek to realize by voluntary action;" it is said to have as its "special and primary object to determine what *ought* to be" (the italics are ours). Now I am unable to find in myself the consciousness that I *ought* to strive for my own greatest possible happiness, and I cannot, therefore, recognize egoism as an *ethical* theory. The author affirms that a "self-evident element, immediately cognizable by abstract intention" (pp. 383, 386) lies at the basis of egoism. This "self-evident principle" is "that 'of impartial concern for all parts of our conscious life.' We might express it concisely by saying 'that Hereafter *as such* is to be regarded neither less nor more than Now;' . . . that the mere difference of priority and posteriority in time is not a reasonable ground for having more regard to the consciousness of one moment than to that of another. The form in which it practically presents itself to most men is 'that a smaller present good is not to be preferred to a greater future good' (allowing for difference of certainty)" (p. 381). Naturally I am willing to grant the validity of this principle, but I cannot recognize it as a basis for "Rational Egoism," since it is equally involved in "Rational Benevolence." In what way does it hold less good for conduct towards others than for that towards one's self? Ought not the father or mother to take into account

also their child's future as well as its present? And ought not all men to consider the future generations, and not say, "*Après nous le déluge?*"

Professor Sidgwick gives the following as the principle which underlies the duty of benevolence and utilitarianism: "That the good of any one individual is of no more importance, from the point of view . . . of the universe, than the good of any other; unless, that is, there are special grounds for believing that more good is likely to be realized in the one case than in the other. And it is evident to me that as a rational being I am bound to aim at good generally,—so far as we recognize it as attainable by my efforts,—not merely at a part of it; . . . that one is morally bound to regard the good of any other individual as much as one's own, except in so far as we judge it to be less, when impartially viewed, or less certainly knowable or attainable" (p. 382). I recognize the truth of this principle, and would say with our author, "The propositions, 'I ought not to prefer a present lesser good to a future greater good,' and 'I ought not to prefer my own lesser good to the greater good of any other,' do present themselves as self-evident; as much (*e.g.*) as the mathematical axiom that 'if equals be added to equals, the wholes are equal'" (p. 383). But it is impossible for me to see how antagonism can ever arise between these two self-evident principles.

In the "Contents" (p. xxx.) the author gives the following sketch of what he says in the "Concluding Chapter," where "the Mutual Relation of the Three Methods" is presented: "It is not difficult to combine the intuitional and utilitarian methods into one; but can we reconcile Egoistic and Universalistic Hedonism? In so far as the latter coincides with common sense, we have seen in B. II., chap. v., that no complete reconciliation is possible, on the basis of experience; nor does a fuller consideration of sympathy, as a special utilitarian sanction, lead us to modify this conclusion, in spite of the importance that is undoubtedly to be attached to sympathetic pleasures. The religious sanction, if we can show that it is actually attached to the utilitarian code, is, of course, adequate; but its existence cannot be demonstrated by ethical arguments alone. Still, without this or some similar assumption, a fundamental contradiction in ethics cannot be avoided." But if such an assumption is necessary, then the "very important question whether ethical science can be constructed on an independent basis" (p. 503) is to be answered in the negative.

The writer of this criticism cannot spare Professor Sidgwick a repetition of the very serious reproach, which he made ten years ago, upon the publication of the second edition, and then again upon the appearance of the third,—that, *without sufficient reason*, Professor Sidgwick affirms a "fundamental contradiction in ethics," abandons the independence of morality, and opens the door to moral scepticism. He says (p. 504), "The negation of the connection (of virtue and self-interest) must force us to admit an ultimate and fundamental contradiction in our apparent intuitions of what is reasonable in conduct; and from this admission it would seem to follow that the apparently intuitive operation of the practical reason, manifested in these contradictory judgments, is after all illusory. . . . In the rarer cases of a recognized conflict between self-interest and duty, practical reason, being divided against itself, would cease to be a motive on either side."

G. VON GIZYCKI (Berlin).

DIE ETHISCHE BEWEGUNG IN DER RELIGION. Von Stanton Coit, Ph.D. (Berlin), Sprecher der South Place Ethischen Gesellschaft in London. Vom Verfasser durchgesehene Übersetzung von Georg von Gizycki. Leipzig: O. R. Reisland, 1890. Pp. 227.

The Ethical Societies of America and England do not represent Professor Sidgwick's opinion, that egoism is an ethical theory and that ethics must therefore borrow a premise from theology or metaphysics. Their point of view is clearly and distinctly set forth in the first three of the fourteen lectures of which the book before us consists,—“The Ethical Movement in Religion,” “Why Ethics instead of Religion?” “What Ethics?” The principal teaching of the Ethical Societies, according to Dr. Coit (p. 1.), is this, “that the bond of religious union should be solely devotion to the good in the world.” The Ethical Society, therefore, unlike the church, “excludes no one because of scepticism as to the existence and personality of God or the Divinity of Christ,” although it denies neither the existence nor “the possibility of the knowledge of the existence of God.” It is not an agnostic, or positivist, or socialist, but purely an *ethical* society. To solve theological or metaphysical questions is left to the individual members of the Ethical Societies; accordingly, “one may be a theist, another a materialist, a third an atheist. “We simply maintain,” says Dr. Coit, “that no one shall make his theory a barrier between himself and his fellow-men.” The second doctrine is, “that each man must bestow the highest reverence of his heart . . . upon the doing of every individual duty as it presents itself to him.” “We believe that right conduct is the way, and the only way, of a joyful, peaceful, inspiring life.” “Akin to this doctrine of the supreme importance of right conduct is our affirmation,” says the author, further, “that this human life of ours—even though we have no outlook towards an immortal existence—still contains adequate motive, more than sufficient incentive, to work and suffer for mankind and to carry out the severest injunctions of duty.” “In the light of our highest reason, rational self-love can make no claim to be on a par with universal love; therefore there is no dualism, as it has been called, in the practical reason, no doubleness, no conflict between the moral right of self and of society. For self makes no claim whatever when it is lost in devotion to universal welfare” (p. 35 *et seq.*). Dr. Coit sets himself directly in opposition, therefore, to Professor Sidgwick's defence of moral scepticism (p. 37).

Besides the above-named lectures, the work contains speeches on the following subjects: “The Ethics of Prayer,” “How to Build up the Inner Life,” “The Adoration of Jesus,” “The Dangers of Radicalism in Religion,” “Intellectual Honesty in the Pulpit,” “The Social Responsibilities of Young Men,” “The Home Discipline of Children,” “The Ethics of Shakespeare,” “Robert Elsmere,” “Ethical Culture as a Religion for the People.” The writer of this review (who is also the translator of the work) hopes that the book will gain a place in permanent literature. Only a few of the lectures contained in it have as yet been published in English.

G. v. G.

**ETHIK. EINE DARSTELLUNG DER ETHISCHEN PRINCIPIEN UND DEREN ANWENDUNG AUF BESONDERE LEBENSVERHÄLTNISSE.** Von Dr. Harald Höffding, Professor an der Universität in Kopenhagen. Unter Mitwirkung des Verfassers aus dem Dänischen übersetzt von F. Bendixen. Leipzig: R. Reisland, 1888. Pp. xiv., 492.

Of all the more recent books on systematic ethics, I regard Professor Höffding's "Ethik" to be the best. Condensed as it is, it offers a completed whole, both in its treatment of philosophical principles and in its practical application of them. It is the work of a wise and good, a highly-cultivated, and, in the best sense of the word, a modern mind. It was prepared for beforehand by a valuable little book on "Die Grundlegung der Humanen Ethik" (German edition, 1880), and by the "Psychologie" (Leipzig, 1887), one of the most excellent and readable presentations of this science that we possess.

The first part of the work treats of "The Presuppositions of Ethics." The author here explains the relation of positive morality to scientific ethics, proves that philosophical ethics is independent of theology and metaphysics, and examines the principles and methods of ethics. He shows that a gradual succession of different points of view is possible. The most radical is that of "the sovereignty of the moment" (represented by Aristippus). By reasoning it cannot be overthrown, as little as the next higher, that of "the sovereignty of the individual;" and likewise also there is no merely logical transition from this stand-point to that which regards the welfare of the family or cast or nation or race or of all mankind as the ethical aim. The transition to a higher stage is attainable only through a development of the feelings; to bring it about is not a task of an abstract logical, but of a psychological-pedagogical nature. When the conditions of life for the higher, the more comprehensive whole are formulated in definite thoughts, the ethical law arises. From the point of view of "human ethics," which takes into account the totality of sentient beings, "the contents of the law can be nothing else than the principle, that conduct ought to aim at the greatest possible welfare and the greatest possible progress for as many conscious beings as possible." The objective principle, therefore, which Professor Höffding recognizes is that of universal welfare. "In accordance with this principle," he explains, "no action and no institution or manner of life founded upon conduct is of worth, so far as it does not further the life and happiness of conscious beings." "The principle of welfare has the same place in ethics which the principle of causality has in the theory of knowledge."

An excellent analysis of conscience follows. In it the author sees "a great race-instinct," which develops—through the clearer and distincter evolution of the ideas that direct it—into "practical reason." The inner sanction of conscience alone is adequate in itself to maintain the moral life in its integrity. Thereby is received the independence of ethics, as regards dogma and metaphysics. The next chapters treat of "The Freedom of the Will," "Moral Evil," "The Theory of Welfare," and the division of ethics into individual and social ethics. The former is disposed of in about sixty pages, the latter requires three hundred. The part on social ethics falls into three divisions,—*"The Family," "Civilized Society,"* and *"The State."* Both parts are full of wise teachings and

spirited observations. Of special interest are the chapters on those "burning questions," The Women question and the Social question.

As I understand, an English translation of this admirable work is planned.

G. v. G.

SYSTEM DER ETHIK MIT EINEM UMRISSE DER STAATS-UND GESELLSCHAFTS-LEHRE. Von Friedrich Paulsen, a.o., Professor an der Universität Berlin. Berlin : Wilhelm Hertz, 1889. Pp. xii., 868.

Like the work of the Danish philosopher, Professor Paulsen's book is not a work of mere scholarship, but it gives us the quintessence of the author's own life and experience. But the German thinker's mind belongs to a more conservative type, both in matters of philosophical principle and of social reconstruction.

After an introduction on the essence and aim of ethics, the author gives, through about one hundred and fifty pages, an "Outline of a History of Views of Life and of Moral Philosophy." Especially noticeable is his presentation of early Christianity. He shows how fundamentally different this is both from the Greek and the modern view of life, in that it condemns the things of this world and finds the true home only in another. According to Professor Paulsen, Christianity brought "three great truths" into the consciousness of humanity: "Suffering is an essential side of life;" "Sin and guilt are an essential side of life;" "The world lives by the sacrificial death of the innocent and the just."

The second part of the work treats of the "fundamental ethical conceptions and questions of principle." The author first defines the conception of the good. Good signifies "fit to bring forth certain results, which at last all converge into one object,—human welfare." Reasons, which seem to me quite inadequate, induce the author to reject the identity of universal welfare with universal happiness or pleasure. Universal welfare consists, in his opinion, in every one's attaining "the highest good," and this consists "in the normal or healthy exercise of all the functions of life themselves, with which the nature of this being is endowed" (p. 210). This definition does not seem to me to possess the clearness which the highest criterion of action must have. Ought all the faculties of every man to be developed? Are there not also bad tendencies? But the author himself does not abide by this definition; he soon (p. 215 *et seq.*) gives another in that he declares "A human life has worth in proportion as the specific and higher functions in it are developed and in proportion as these have drawn the lower ones into their service. . . . The activity of the social and intellectual virtues and excellences accordingly constitutes the proper goal of human life. . . . We have, therefore, gone wholly back to the Aristotelian definition,—Happiness or welfare, or a perfect life, consists in the activity of all virtues and excellences, especially the highest." But how can the author speak of "higher" and "lower" energies when he has yet to establish the worth of things? How can he speak of virtues before he has settled what good actions are, since virtues are nothing else than characteristics, which guarantee good actions in the future?

Professor Paulsen's disquisition on the highest good terminates with the transcendental. He says (p. 217), "We name the All-real, so far as we consider it

as the highest good, God; and its manifestation in the immeasurable reality we call the kingdom of God. . . . The practical view ends with the equally unattainable and equally unabandonable conception of God, or of the highest good."

The next section of the book contains a finely-thought-out criticism of pessimism, the theory of which the author regards to be just as untenable as that of optimism. To him personally the most probable thing is that happiness and unhappiness in the world exactly balance in the scales. Nor does he believe that, in the course of time, this relation will become more favorable; and just as little, that virtue will grow more in the world than vice. "The vibrations about the zero-point will become greater, but the sum remains the same." That is not a consoling result. It is, therefore, easy to understand why the author flies in thought from this to a future world. He affirms that "the kingdom of God is not of this world. . . . The world of the senses is not the world itself. In the contradiction between that highest idea and the actual, as it presents itself to us, I can only see a new reminder, not to find the final view of things in the empirical reality as it is presented to us." Thus once more does Professor Paulsen lead us out of philosophy into theology.

In the excellent chapters which follow, on "Duty and Conscience," "Egoism and Altruism," "Virtue and Happiness," the author stays in earthly regions. Then follows a chapter on the "Relation of Morality to Religion." The author defines the latter as "belief in a transcendental world." In his opinion an immoral life is not a logical consequence of any belief or unbelief; it is also "not necessarily an actual effect;" still, in his opinion there exists between morality and religion a "necessary inner connection;" the good man, in his opinion, inclines towards an "idealistic" (religious) view of the world; the bad man towards the opposite,—an observation that makes one feel the lack of that conscientious caution which Professor Paulsen is accustomed to maintain in non-theological disquisition. The analysis of principles closes with a successful short discussion of the "Freedom of the Will," in which he represents the deterministic standpoint.

The practical part of this work, embracing nearly five hundred pages, and discussing in detail individual, social, and political life, seems to me more valuable than the theoretical part. The chapter on the emancipation of women is strikingly conservative. Professor Paulsen seems to think that women already have acquired essentially the position which they must occupy for all future time. He wishes to withhold from them active participation in public life, and directs them to the home. And, for all that, almost a million women in Germany at present are occupied in industrial life (in 1887, eight hundred and eighty thousand four hundred and ninety-six women were insured in the funds for relief of the sick).

Professor Paulsen's work in many parts is masterly, rich in profound and fruitful thoughts and finely-felt observations; and we must say that—in spite of all objections which may be brought against it—it is one of the best German works in ethics.

G. v. G.

GESCHICHTE DER ETHIK IN DER NEUEREN PHILOSOPHIE. Von Friedrich Jodl, o.ö., Professor der Philosophie an der Deutschen Universität zu Prag. I. Band: Bis zum Ende des 18. Jahrhunderts; mit einer Einleitung über die antike und christliche Ethik. II. Band: Kant und die Ethik im 19. Jahrhundert. Stuttgart: J. G. Cotta, 1882-89. Pp. xi., 446, and xiii., 608.

Professor Jodl's work is the most complete and the best presentation of the history of ethics which German literature possesses; and I do not think it is excelled by any English or French work. As of both the works just reviewed, one can say also of this, that it is not the product simply of industry and of the understanding, but of character. The pulse-beat of the approaching twentieth century can be plainly detected in it. And it is attractively written and therefore not limited in its circulation to scholarly circles.

This is not the place to bring forward objections to the author's historical or philosophical conception of particular points. They would apply especially to the first volume; the second, published six or seven years later, shows how much the author's sphere of thought in the mean time had been cleared, corrected, and developed. The chapters on Kant, Feuerbach, Comte, and on the religious question are especially masterly. And the words with which he closes his exposition of the relation between positivism and spiritualism brings home an important truth,—“The opposition is growing continually sharper between the powers of the past and the minds of the future; more and more faint begin to sound the voices of the mediators; it is becoming more and more certain that victory belongs only to those who are wholly uncompromising; more and more urgent becomes the decisive choice.” The closing words of the whole work are these: “The ideal in us and faith in its increasing actualization through us: this is the formula of the new religion of humanity, with which Mill's thoughts come together into unity; the supplement to that protest of poetic pessimism, the point of most intimate contact of Mill with the most progressive thinkers of the two other great civilized nations, Comte and Feuerbach, that, in a word, is the problem of the future. The day will come when the rays of thought which now cause only the highest, freest mountain-peaks to glow will illumine humanity to its lowest depths.”

G. v. G.

WILLIAM LLOYD GARRISON, 1805-79. The Story of his Life told by his Children. Vol. I. 1805-35 (Pp. xx., 522). Vol. II. 1835-40 (Pp. xi., 480). Vol. III. 1841-60 (Pp. xii., 509). Vol. IV. (Pp. ix., 425). New York: The Century Co., 1885-89.

WILLIAM LLOYD GARRISON. Autorisirter Auszug aus William Lloyd Garrison, 1805-79. The Story of his Life told by his Children. Von Georg von Gizycki. Berlin: A. Asher & Co. 1890. Pp. vi., 145.

Garrison's biography is not only an historical, but also an ethical reading-book of the highest order, a well of enthusiasm, of hope and gladness for all who would devote their energies to the happiness of the human race. On the twentieth anniversary day of the founding of the *Liberator*—Garrison's renowned paper—a Boston lawyer, Charles List, challenged Garrison to write his life. “Such a work,” said he, “would be a biography which among those of this

century would be most read and valued for many centuries, and would in some measure enable posterity to have with them that presence which I desire for them." "We have," continued he, "one distinguished autobiography in this country. I believe it is not surpassed by any in the world. It is that of Benjamin Franklin. It is a simple story. It tells the experience of an excellent and a great man. But it is not connected with any great leading idea, and cannot serve as a foundation-stone for an historical movement. That for which I ask, if it will be given, will be the greatest contribution which literature has made to the cause of liberty." Garrison did not write his biography; but the work of his sons, which is before us, is, in the material, the same thing, and is perhaps completer and more to be trusted. It consists in great part of passages from Garrison's own speeches, from newspaper articles, and letters, and of contemporary notices, from print and manuscript, by his friends and enemies; it is therefore free from the mistakes of memory, which cling almost inevitably to an autobiography. The diligence, thoroughness, impartiality, and literary skill of the editors are admirable. The work does not simply portray with conscientious fidelity the life of one of the most distinguished men of the nineteenth century; it is at the same time a trustworthy, condensed history of the great anti-slavery movement, whose founder and moral leader Garrison was. No one, therefore, who would study the history of America or of moral reforms should fail to read these volumes. And they are at the same time highly interesting; they read not unlike an exciting romance.

G. v. G.

**WHEELBARROW: ARTICLES AND DISCUSSIONS ON THE LABOR QUESTION.**  
Chicago: Open Court Publishing Co., 1890. Pp. 303.

Readers of the *Chicago Radical Review* (now defunct) will remember with what interest and keen curiosity they followed a course of articles which appeared in its pages, a few years ago, over the signature "Wheelbarrow." These articles and others by the same hand have since appeared in *The Open Court*, and are now gathered into handsome book-form, prefaced by an all too brief autobiography. The author's name is not given, but, we believe, is well understood to be General M. M. Trumbull. The articles are upon various phases of the "labor question," and are written in a style that might well be envied by many men who have had all the advantages of university training. There is a clearness of statement, a lightness of touch, a picturesqueness, a play of humor, a sense of form and proportion that lift many of them to the level of "literature,"—a position, it is needless to say, which ordinary economical writing does not attain. Yet the writer was a poor English boy, at the age of thirteen worked at the rate of a dollar and a quarter a week for thirteen hours a day, became a Chartist, and after emigrating to this country (in an emigrant ship where sixty-two out of the four hundred passengers died *en route*, such were the pestilential conditions of the vessel) took his first job as a roustabout in unloading a schooner, and soon was working with wheelbarrow, pickaxe, and shovel on a railroad. Later, indeed, owing to the freedom of opportunities in this country, he became a lawyer, member of a State Legislature, and brigadier-general on the Union side in the Civil War. The writer of this notice knows the influence which General



Trumbull has had upon the working-people of Chicago, as an eloquent and persuasive speaker no less than as a contributor to periodicals. He was one of the few (from the "respectable" class) who stood out against the public clamor for the heads of the Anarchists; yet he was no friend of anarchism, had converted earlier leaders in that agitation from the error of their ways, and agrees neither with Socialists nor with Henry George, nor, so far as can be made out, with any single school of reformers. In the midst of feverish agitations he has kept his head cool and held to a course of his own; sheer mental vigor and unquestioned integrity have served to keep for him the respect and affection of all kinds of working-people. His economical stand-point would be regarded by many as rather old-fashioned, following, as he does, mainly in the lines of the orthodox English school and preaching somewhat sternly self-help against paternalism. At any rate, the manliness and moral elevation of these writings commend them to all striving to find a way amid the tangled social mazes of our day; whether as a result they follow his way or not, they cannot fail to derive inspiration for courageously following their own.

W. M. S.

# INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS.

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## THE RIGHTS OF MINORITIES.

In times past government has generally meant the rule of minorities over majorities. As conservatives are fond of reminding us, even the most democratic governments of the ancient world were aristocracies of slave-owners. The free citizens of Athens were a democracy among themselves, but an aristocracy, if we think of all the human beings inhabiting Attica. And, even in cases where "inhabitants" and "free citizens" have been nearly convertible terms, cities and states governing themselves democratically have yet denied political rights to subject peoples. The free citizens of Uri allowed their bailiffs to rule despotically the inhabitants of the Ticino valley. Thus, the struggle for freedom has in the past generally been the struggle of the majority against a privileged minority. Where there has been no such struggle, this has been because the majority have acquiesced in their political subordination or have never yet awakened to a sense that anything else is possible except blind obedience to the one or the few. Such political torpor can continue more easily where all alike are the slaves of an absolute despot. Where the practices of free government (*i.e.*, government by discussion, instead of government merely by force) prevail even among a limited number, an example is set, which the many in course of time will desire to imitate. It is therefore more dangerous for a republican than for a monarchical government to practise

tyranny or claim exclusive privilege. The history of ancient Rome is the history of a gradual extension of citizenship to those previously excluded,—an extension won by party-struggles.

Democracy, in the full modern sense, means the rule of the majority. For practical purposes the majority must be taken as, for the time being, the representative of all. If all cannot have their wishes gratified, it is the less evil to adopt the view of the greater number. This is democracy in its lowest terms; in its ideal it means a great deal more than a machine for carrying into effect the wishes of the majority. It may be urged that it is very absurd to expect the whole to yield to the decision of half *plus* one: and a democracy may limit itself by requiring that important changes can only take place with the consent of two-thirds or three-fourths of the persons voting or even of the persons entitled to vote. But no practical person will go so far as to require unanimity in large bodies. To expect unanimity, as is done in a Russian village community, belongs to a very crude stage of political thinking and is apt to mean the tyranny of the most obstinate. In judicial matters it is somewhat different; there may be good arguments for requiring unanimity in a jury, but I am not concerned to defend the English system. Yet, even with regard to that, one has heard of the Irishman who accused the other eleven of being "obstinate;" *he* knew how to assert the rights of minorities. Obstinance is a very good thing in its way, as I shall have occasion to point out afterwards; but on the whole one is likely to get a more rational expression of opinion by recognizing the principle of "counting heads instead of breaking them." Thus there inevitably remains a minority whose wishes are overridden. Of course this minority may be a different one on different questions; but the effect of party government is to make a great number of questions run together.

The claims of a minority to consideration may be merely a survival of claims to exclusive privilege. The dethroned rulers may not "give way with a good grace," and may expect in a changed constitution to retain their former position.

The extent of the change, which has taken place, may be disguised from them by the way in which it has come about, as in those countries that have been fortunate enough to grow gradually out of one form into another. Birth and wealth, with the advantages of education and position which they may carry with them, give a person *prestige* in a community however formally democratic it may be; but the person of birth or wealth may go on to demand an express recognition of his advantages. Now such a claim on the part of a minority a democracy cannot recognize without defeating its very principle; and it may be questioned how far any such recognition ultimately benefits the minority itself. An express and formal superiority awakens jealousy and dislike;\* an actual superiority of any obvious kind gets in a democratic country abundant opportunities of asserting itself,—in the case of wealth only too abundant opportunities.

It is a claim of a very different and more important kind which is made in Mill's "Liberty,"—a claim for the minority, put forward, however, not so much on behalf of the interests of the minority themselves as on behalf of the future and general well-being of mankind. All great movements of progress, it is pointed out, have begun with minorities; and thus, if the opinions and efforts of a minority are repressed and thwarted, progress may be hindered and future generations suffer. Others, again, go further and, echoing Carlyle's words, urge that, as the population consists mostly of fools, to allow the majority to rule is to allow the fools to rule. Knowledge, except of the loosest and most meagre kind, is the possession only of the few; and so, it is argued, we must turn to the experts, and disregard the clamor of the many.

On this subject of the authority of the few and the many respectively considerable confusion shows itself every now and then. It may be as well to try to clear it up a little. On the one hand, it is undoubtedly true that all scientific truth is known only by a few experts; others must accept it as their

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\* *E.g.*, the Prussian "three-class system," according to which all voters are distributed into three classes with equal votes, according to the amount of direct taxes they pay,—a system vigorously denounced by Lassalle.

authority. On the other hand, there has always been a tendency to believe that the mass of mankind cannot be entirely in the wrong; that there must be some truth in what is generally believed. And the actual growth of democracy and of the democratic spirit might seem to have enormously increased the force of the authority of general consent. To escape from this apparent contradiction we must carefully distinguish between the ground on which we accept scientific truth and the ground on which we adopt practical maxims. The vast mass of mankind have believed that the sun goes round the earth, have believed in witchcraft, in ghosts, etc. And this universality of belief is sometimes urged as an argument in favor of the truth of such opinions. It does prove that the scientific disbeliever is bound to show, not merely that such beliefs are erroneous, but also how they can have arisen and become prevalent. In the case of the relation of sun and earth, that is easy enough. The popular view, which still survives as often as the most scientifically-minded person talks of sunrise and sunset, is the first obvious interpretation of the impressions of sense. And similarly (though the matter is often much more complex) a knowledge of the mental history of the human race—a knowledge enormously increased of late by the careful study of savage tribes—will explain the wide acceptance of beliefs which the growth of science tends to discredit. But in all such cases the minority of trained minds has an authority that does not belong to the majority of untrained minds.

This legitimate authority of the expert is often used as an argument that government must be in the hands of a select class. It is sometimes even used as an argument for an hereditary aristocracy,—which of course it does not support at all. It might seem to support the rule of an intellectual aristocracy, if we could get together such a body,—Plato's "philosopher kings." On the strength of this argument the Fellows of the Royal Society might claim to teach us lessons in the art of government. But the argument rests on a confession between what is true for the intellect and what is practically expedient. If the majority of a people have a strong,

though it may seem to the educated observer a perfectly unreasonable, belief in monarchical institutions,—are ready to die for their king,—then, however superior we may think republican institutions; it would be folly to impose them from without upon an unwilling people. It is of no use to give any people the best constitution (or what we think such) unless we convince them that it is the best, so that it becomes the best *for them*. All government is based upon opinion. This is the dictum of the cautious conservative Hume as well as of the democratic prophet Rousseau. Matters of detail can indeed be best decided by experts, and cannot be properly decided at all except by them (they must, however, be experts in the art of administration, and not merely in some theoretical science). But the mass of a nation must be convinced of the value of the general principle which is being carried out; else what we might judge the most salutary changes will be ineffectual. Of course the existence of an institution is often itself an important factor in producing the opinion favorable to it; but it is the favorable opinion, and not the mere legal existence of the institution, that makes the institution of any value. If the mass of a people believe a law to be unjust, it matters not that a few highly-cultured gentlemen at the head of affairs are perfectly satisfied of its justice; to the people it is an unjust law and has none of the binding force of law on their sentiments and conscience. And laws which people generally (I do not mean a few stray persons here and there) think it right to violate are producing the very opposite moral effect from that which good laws ought to produce. That this or that law or institution is suitable for us or the reverse is not a proposition of the same kind with the proposition that such and such things do or do not happen in the course of nature or history. That the Romans lived under such and such a constitution is a proposition, with regard to whose truth or falsehood the opinion of the scientific historian outweighs any amount of popular belief or tradition. But that such and such a law or constitution is good for us is only true if we think it so, after a fair trial. To use a familiar illustration, it is the wearer of the shoe that knows whether the

shoe pinches. The scientific shoemaker alone may know why it pinches and how to remedy the mischief. But if the scientific shoemaker were to convince you that the shoe did not pinch, he would convince your intellect only, if the shoe continued to hurt your foot; and you would go in future to the unscientific shoemaker who could give you comfort even without science. So it is with constitutions and laws. Those who have to wear them must judge whether or not they fit; and therefore they must have the decisive voice as to the general principles, though, as already said, details had better be left to experts. Ends must be approved by the feeling of the many; the means must be chosen by the intellect of the few. This is, in fact, the *raison d'être* of representative democracy,—the many choose the few to carry out their wishes.

The distinctions, *first*, between scientific and practical matters; *secondly*, between judgments about ends and about means, may seem almost too obvious to need statement. But obvious distinctions are apt to be overlooked; and it is worth uttering truisms, if we can get rid of the fallacious argument that because the few may be wiser than the many therefore the few should rule the many, otherwise than as their ministers and stewards.

Those who are ready for all practical purposes to accept the will of the majority as decisive yet sometimes think it necessary to propose various expedients for securing what is called "the representation of minorities." The danger of the non-representation of minorities seems to me to be a good deal exaggerated by Mill and other advocates of "proportional representation" and similar schemes. It would indeed not be difficult to make out a *prima facie* case for the absurdity of the whole system of representative government if we attended merely to the arithmetical possibilities of its mechanism. Thus, in Great Britain, the determining power lies with the majority of a cabinet, which is supported by a majority of the House of Commons, which is elected, it may be, by a bare majority of the electors; so that the representative system seems, when carried out, to defeat itself and to put power into the hands of a very small minority of the whole popula-

tion,—ultimately perhaps into the hands of “the odd man.” But this seeming absurdity results from an abstract and artificial way of looking at the matter. The will of these few persons is only effective because they do represent (or at least did, at some time, represent) something very much more than a small fraction of the population. No scheme that can be constructed by human ingenuity will make a representative chamber a quite perfect mirror of all the various sets of opinions in the community. It is only a question of more or less; and, what is very important, any arrangement that is adopted must have the merit not merely of being simple to work, but of looking simple. Even the suspicion of trickery must be avoided. This is, of course, the great advantage of the system of equal electoral districts with single members, and “one man one vote.” Even so, it may indeed happen that a majority of the elected chamber may represent a minority of the electors,—if one party have extremely large majorities in some places and be defeated by extremely narrow majorities in others. Accidents like that will happen in the best regulated constitutions; but the chances are certainly against their happening to any very great extent. But when such arithmetical possibilities are insisted on, it is forgotten, in the first place, that each individual member has many other attributes besides being the member for so-and-so, and, in the second place, that there are elements in the living constitution of a country besides those written down by constitutional lawyers. An elected assembly is powerful indeed. It may, like the British Parliament, be legally “omnipotent;” and yet there is a power behind it, a power that acts not merely at the time of a general election, but continuously,—the power of public opinion. The newspaper and the public meeting and the petition are real factors in a modern constitution. It is easy enough to see the defects of each of these organs of public opinion, easy enough to throw ridicule upon them. But that is to miss their true significance. The newspaper ought to represent the power of intellect applied to practical matters; it is too apt to represent largely the power of money; not merely the capital that is needed to float it, but the money



that comes in through advertisements. The political and moral consequence of advertising would, however, be too long a story to begin now; to have named it may suffice. Then, as to public meetings: there are many people who scoff at them. "Got-up agitations," "power of the strongest lungs," and so on. Those who talk in this way seem to forget that, though you may make a "flare-up" with a few shavings and a lucifer-match, to keep up a steady heat you need coals as well. There cannot be such a thing as an agitation that lasts, grows, and for which people sacrifice a great deal, and which is nevertheless merely "got up." A continuous agitation is not a cause but a symptom of discontent. Public meetings, petitions, pamphlets, newspaper articles, are, however imperfectly, organs of public opinion, and much better and more effective organs than assassination or even than epigrams, which take their place in despotically governed countries.

Where there exists such organs of public opinion and a tolerably sound, even though not ideally perfect, representative system, any minority which has really got life and vigor in it can make itself felt. I do not think that, if it were possible, it would be desirable to construct any political machinery for giving a prominent place to the opinions of minorities that will not take the trouble to assert and to spread these opinions. The all-important and essential right of minorities is the right to turn themselves into majorities if they can; this means freedom of the press, freedom of association, freedom of public meeting. "Give me," said Milton, "the liberty to know, to utter, and to argue freely according to conscience, above all other liberties." Minorities that grumble at the whole world round them and have no desire and no hope of convincing other people are not a valuable factor in political or social life. They are, in all probability, the decaying survivals of a past type and not the first germs of a new.

In a genuinely democratic government votes are nominally merely counted; in reality they are weighed. Not indeed in the sense that wisdom always weighs the heaviest; in what constitution, outside Utopia, does that happen? But in the sense that the energy and contagious enthusiasm of a few,

who represent some living and growing idea, far outweigh the indifference and apathy of great numbers. Great movements begin with small minorities; but these minorities must consist of persons who wish to make others share their convictions. From this follows all that can be laid down in general terms about the rights and—what we are less apt to think of—the duties of minorities.

The right of spreading one's opinions implies two things, neither of which must be absent: first, certain legal and constitutional securities; and, secondly, a certain condition of public sentiment. Without the latter the former cannot be obtained unless exceptionally, as, for instance, under an enlightened despotism; and that is really no exception, for securities dependent on the strong will of one enlightened and big-minded man can hardly be called constitutional, and are an uncertain bulwark of liberty. On the other hand, without explicitly recognized legal safeguards public sentiment is a somewhat fickle protector of liberty. Outbursts of fear, fanaticism, and intolerance are only too possible: and a good deal is to be said even for the merely moral force of a formal "declaration of rights." A people in its calm or its generous moments may well protect itself against its own lower moods. And the strong hand of the state is often needed to protect the individual against undue social pressure.

I do not know whether the subject of the ethics of toleration has ever been adequately treated. Toleration is often supposed to arise solely from indifference. This is not the case. In fact, indifference makes toleration superfluous. Toleration, shown by those who "care for none of these things," is no virtue, though it may be a public duty in a magistrate "indifferently administering justice." The toleration of contempt may, indeed, be very useful to those who are jealous and in earnest. The kind of toleration which is most valuable, which can only exist in a morally healthy society, and which will help to keep the society healthy and make it healthier, is toleration shown by those who have faith in the reasonableness of their own beliefs and who are, therefore, willing to face the full light of criticism. Persecution,—and

by persecution I mean here not what any aggrieved individual may call such, but the forcible suppression of *opinions*, (every society is obliged to use force for the suppression of certain overt actions, and the time between expedient and inexpedient compulsion will be drawn differently by different persons),—persecution arises mainly from two sources,—fear and a particular form of belief in the supernatural. If people do seriously believe that they are in possession of truth guaranteed to them by other authority than that of human reason, of course they will not accept the free use of reason as a test; and there is always a risk that, if sufficiently powerful, they will endeavor to repress the spread of what they conscientiously regard as dangerous opinions. Those who believe that Divine truth is something different from human truth will be apt to believe that the civil magistrate must defend the Deity by the power of the sword. This type of belief is really a form of fear,—it is fear of human reason; and only as this belief becomes rarer or weaker by the secularizing, or, I would rather say, the humanizing of politics does toleration become possible. But fear may make even those who appeal to reason persecutors in self-defence. It is difficult, if we are quite just in our historical judgments, to condemn entirely the harsh measures employed by small societies holding unpopular beliefs,—*e.g.*, the Calvinists of Geneva or the founders of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.\* When a society is struggling to exist at all, cohesion is so essential that it may well require uniformity of belief. A rigid bond of custom is necessary to its earlier stages. Only after cohesion has been obtained is freedom of discussion possible and advantageous. Furthermore, complete freedom of discussion is only possible and is only valuable when there is a general diffusion of education, and when the habit of settling matters by discussion, instead of by force, has become established. In admitting this we

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\* All strong Protestants have appealed to reason by discarding the Church as the interpreter of Scripture. Many of those who boast themselves the representatives of the Reformers have shrunk from the consequences of their Protestantism, when the historical critic says to them, "You have appealed unto Reason; to Reason you shall go."

must not, however, forget that discussion itself is one of the most important means of education. There are indeed people—"misologists," Plato would have called them—who say: "Controversy is of no use. Those who take part in it go away holding the same beliefs as before, only holding them more dogmatically as the result of having had to fight for them." If the fighting is physical, this is always the case; it is not true of intellectual controversy fairly carried on. During the actual discussion, indeed, each may stick to his opinion: it might even be said that unless people showed some obstinacy a debate would always be a failure. For minds in a perfectly flabby condition discussion is impossible: it implies a certain amount of mutual resistance. But if people are really in earnest and care more for truth than for victory, it will be found that after any serious discussion both parties have probably modified their opinions, and out of the conflict of two opposing principles may spring a new one, victorious over both. It is by the conflict of ideas that intellectual progress is made.

Professor Bryce in his great work on "The American Commonwealth" has made clear a very important distinction between "the tyranny of the majority" and "the fatalism of the multitude," which is often confused with it. "A majority is tyrannical," he says (vol. iii. p. 133), "when it decides without hearing the minority, when it suppresses fair and temperate criticism on its own acts, when it insists on restraining men in matters where restraint is not required by the common interest, when it forces men to contribute money to objects which they disapprove and which the common interest does not demand.\* The element of tyranny lies in the wantonness of the act,—a wantonness springing from the sense of overwhelming power,

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\* I assume that the "and" is emphatic and that this clause must be taken as qualifying the previous clause. If a tax is legally imposed by the majority for a purpose which the common interest (in their judgment) demands, a minority may disapprove this purpose, but they have no *moral* right to refuse payment of the tax, unless they are conscientiously convinced that such an act of rebellion is their *duty*, as the best means of bringing about what they regard as a better state of affairs.

or in the fact that it is a misuse for one purpose of power granted for another."

Simply because the minority disapprove of the enactments of the majority they cannot rightly describe the rule of the majority as "tyrannical." In a democratic constitution, with elections recurring sufficiently often, and proper safeguards for liberty of expressing and spreading opinions, the right of the minority is, as I have said, to turn themselves into a majority if they can; and it must be added, it is their duty also, if they continue to believe in themselves. But here comes in that "fatalism," which is so often wrongly described as the tyranny of the majority; the apathy of minorities is one of the frequent weaknesses in democratic communities. As Professor Bryce has put it, "the belief in the rights of the majority lies very near to the belief that the majority must be right" (*ib.*, p. 124). To give way for the time to the legally expressed will of the majority is a necessary and salutary consequence of popular government; but to lose heart and give up effort is an illegitimate and evil consequence of it. It is the duty of a minority to obey, unless conscience absolutely forbids; in which extreme case it may become a duty to resist. If we are using language strictly, there never can be a *right* of resistance. Rights are the creation of society, and there can be no right of the individual or of any number of individuals *against* the society of which they are members. When we speak of "natural rights" we really mean those rights which we think to be the very best that a well-organized society should secure to its members. In the American "Declaration of Independence" the time-honored phrase about the right of resistance is wisely supplemented by the addition of the better and truer word, "duty."

Resistance may, in extreme cases, be the only way of protesting against what we hold to be an unjust and mischievous law and the only way of getting it altered. But the problems of practical ethics involved in this question are not easy. The limits of justifiable compromise cannot be laid down in any hard and fast *a priori* rules. If it really goes against a man's conscience to obey a *law* (I am not speaking of arbitrary,

illegal commands, where the right and duty of disobedience are clear enough), he can, if we use language strictly, claim no right to disobey, but it is his duty to disobey, at whatever cost; if he obeys against his conscience, he loses his own self-respect and lowers his character. Only let him be perfectly sure that it is his conscience that urges him and not some merely selfish motive of personal dislike or offended pride. To justify this statement and this distinction, it would of course be necessary to explain what is meant by "conscience;" but that would carry one too far into difficult questions. Suffice it to say for the present—and I think the supporters of most ethical systems would agree with this statement—that the dictates of a man's conscience will on the whole correspond to the better spirit of the community round him, or at least to what he regards as such; and therefore the man who disobeys a law is acting in the interests of what he conceives to be the future well-being of society. Of course a man's conscience may correspond to a superseded social type, but it will not be a superseded type in his own judgment. Posterity may come to disapprove many actions and yet bestow admiration on the motives of those who did them. Even where an individual has no conscientious objection to render obedience himself, it may occasionally be his duty, in the interests of the future well-being of society, to join others in resisting and even in rebelling, provided that there is no reasonable hope of getting a bad law or a bad constitution altered by peaceable means, and provided also that there is a reasonable hope that the resistance or rebellion will be so successful as to lead to an alteration in the right direction.\* Such is the terrible duty that occasionally falls on the shoulders of a minority, to bear the brand of the criminal now that others in time to come may render a willing obedience to better laws. Society is apt to make mistakes, to number the patriot or the saint among transgressors, to crucify a prophet between two thieves. But the individual is apt to make mistakes also, and there have been martyrs for bad causes.

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\* "On the Ethics of Resistance," see T. H. Green, "Philosophical Works," ii. p. 455, ff.

If, however, democracies prove at all true to their ideal, if they live according to the ethics of the age of discussion and not according to those of the earlier ages of force, this duty of resistance should become less and less needed. If majorities, while requiring obedience to laws constitutionally passed after full and free deliberation in what they sincerely believe to be the interest of the whole community, sacredly preserve the liberty of thought and discussion both by express legal securities and by a general sentiment of toleration, it is the duty of a minority, while yielding a loyal obedience to the opinion that has prevailed for the time (except in those rare cases to which I have referred) if not convinced of its excellence, to continue a peaceable agitation till their own opinion prevails. If we are really in earnest about our opinions, it is a duty to endeavor to get others to accept them by means of the appeal to reason; it is also a duty, and often a very hard one, to give them up candidly, if we are genuinely convinced that we have been in the wrong. It is a duty to assert our opinions, wisely of course, and with toleration for others, *even if those others be in the majority*; but it is a prior duty to use all the care we can to make sure that our opinions are right, that what we assert eagerly and persistently is really worth asserting. It is utterly untrue to say that we are not responsible for our opinions. That was a false doctrine invented as a bad argument for a good purpose,—the attack upon religious persecution. Opinions are not trivial matters. What is quietly thought and talked about now will affect what is done very soon. Ethical legislation is constantly going on in our every-day conversation, wherever two or three are gathered together to discuss the conduct of their neighbors. And we cannot escape our responsibility for our share in this ethical legislation, however insignificant we may feel ourselves in presence of the great multitudes of our fellow-mortals. To these great multitudes each of us is responsible; and we owe it to them to oppose them, then and then only, when reason and conscience urge us to do so.

DAVID G. RITCHIE.

## A NEW STUDY OF PSYCHOLOGY.\*

## I.

MORE frequently than other students of philosophy, both the theoretical and the practical investigators of ethical problems have to take counsel of related departments of philosophical research. Theology, the philosophy of nature, and psychology, are all significant, if not for the first formulation, then at all events for the development of an ethical theory. This fact it was which justified, in my own mind, the somewhat elaborate treatment that, in the first number of this journal, I gave to a recent book on theism. May I not plead a still stronger justification for a study, in this number, of a new book on psychology? The effort to state one's ethical principles in such a fashion as to make them independent of the capricious facts of inner and outer nature, the effort to say, as Kant said, that the moral law needed only the reason to formulate it, is an effort which we have all learned, nowadays, to respect,—and even to make for ourselves,—but also, in the outcome of our work, to modify. Above all, as one must recognize, the ethical theorist must take account of the psychological data that will affect the final statement of his doctrine in its application to mankind. "Eternal and immutable morality" remains merely a pious wish unless one shows, in psychological terms, how the moral law looks after it has entered the mind and heart of man. Professor Höffding's assertion, in the first number of this journal, of the principle of the psychological relativity of ethics, has, from any point of view, an important measure of justification.

If one asks what departments or special problems of psychological research especially and primarily concern the student of ethics, one naturally takes one's start from the doctrine of

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\* "The Principles of Psychology." By William James, Professor of Psychology in Harvard University. In Two Volumes. New York. Henry Holt & Co., 1890.



the will itself. The theory of motives, and of the relation of will and intellect, here immediately attract one's attention. Yet there can be no fruitful treatment of these topics except on the basis of a general notion of the structure of the conscious subject himself. It would be a long tale to set forth the almost numberless crudities of fundamental psychological theory with which ethical systems have often burdened themselves. In general one can say that the psychological concepts used by many ethical writers, even in recent times, have been too often, like those employed by pedagogical systematizers, essentially antiquated, and that only a comparatively few ethical treatises have taken pains to keep in touch with the advance of psychological discussion. It is here, as elsewhere in research, the case, that those who apply a science too frequently content themselves with the principles that were in vogue in a previous generation, while those who lead in the advance of a line of investigation have little time to think of its applications. In the theory of motives, and in the general doctrine of the will, it is too customary for writers on morals to confine themselves to decidedly simple and outworn fashions of psychological formulation. Their categories may thus indeed seem to serve the immediate ends of their own discussions; but are far too *naïve* and elementary for the present state of research in the science whose results they pretend to borrow. To discuss the problem of free will without knowing anything of the recent researches upon reflex action, upon the "feeling of effort," and upon the "automaton" theory, is to miss the kind of maturity that a wide experience, and a continual revivifying of our ideas by fresh empirical illustrations, is needed to bring. And I, who say this, certainly do not speak as one who hopes for any true and yet merely empirical *solution* of the free-will problem itself. What I do mean, however, is that if speculation must often transcend experience, in its reflective questionings at least, if not in its systematic assertions, it is still true that you have no right to transcend what you fail to appreciate; and that experience is everywhere full of fresh suggestion to the speculative inquirer. The marriage of experience and speculation is not the des-

potic sovereignty of either. Kant taught us already how close to phenomena the loftiest of theories must cling, even at the moment when its speculative reflection has the *a priori* or "transcendental" interest of which Kant himself was so fond. Know the most recent empirical formulation of the facts upon which you mean to reflect, and *then* reflect as profoundly, and, if necessary, as "transcendentally" as you can: that is the lesson of Kant's own method, just as it was the secret both of such success as he won, and of such failure as his old-fashioned empirical psychology necessarily involved. Well, even as the free-will problem must be but crudely discussed, in our time, by any one who is not acquainted with the interesting alternatives that recent empirical psychology suggests in its discussions of effort, of reflex action, and of other similar processes; just so, as I confess, there is something very sad about the crudity and *naïveté* of many ethical writers who nowadays still treat the question of pleasure and pain as motives, without the least sense of the entirely novel light in which modern biological research, and, yet more, modern pathological psychology, have put all the problems involved in this question. When I find a man still asking himself whether or no the good Samaritan could have been moved to his charitable deed by anything besides the "pleasures of sympathy," or the "pains of pity," and whether any man can act solely from the so-called "disinterested" motives; when I find such inquiries pursued in the old-fashioned way, by a simple, introspective analysis of this superficial and momentary consciousness of ours, I feel as if I saw men fighting a tournament in mediæval armor. Has such a simple-minded inquirer ever considered investigations concerning the comparative psychology of the will, investigations of the type that were so prettily summed up, some years ago, in Schneider's fine book, "*Der Thierische Wille*,"—a book as crude, to be sure, in its own way and form of speech as it was deep in its suggestiveness? Has this inquirer, again, never heard of the pathology of the will, and of the beautiful dissections of motive that disease furnishes to the lover of human nature? Have such studies never got him out of the Philistinism that

confines its psychology to the deliberative moments of a few sane and commonplace men in their least passionate decisions? Or has such an investigator, once more, never reflected on the manifold biological relations of what we call our "motives," or our "temperaments,"—relations suggested by the words "heredity" and "evolution"? If such things have indeed occurred to him, then let him not neglect to examine them further, merely because they are but "empirical" matters after all. For what is more "empirical" than the superficial study of the passing consciousness, with which so many writers on the theory of motive have generally contented themselves? Bentham is here not more empirical than Dr. Martineau, when the latter, for instance, assures us in his "Study of Religion" (vol. ii. p. 229) that "No one can sincerely deem himself incapable by nature of controlling his impulses," and proves this personal superiority to motives by nothing better than a frequent appeal to his own immediate inner consciousness. Dogma against dogma, what is there to choose, between the empiricism of a clergyman of admirable training and character, who tells us that he finds himself always capable of rising superior to the play of motives, and the other empiricism of a lover of abstract formulæ, who says that pleasure and pain are our masters, and that every moment proves it? If, then, we are thus to have conflicting experiences presented as arguments, let us at least go the whole length of experience, compare its facts over a wider range, examine its varieties, its caprices, its endless wealth of varied mental symptoms. Then at least, if we have so far decided nothing, we shall at least have got the problem in shape for our speculative reflection. We shall at least have escaped the narrowness of judgment involved in believing whatever we seem to find in our own momentary choices.

Such are a few first suggestions of the kind of aid that a wider study of psychology can give to the student of special ethical problems. It is indeed true, as I myself have tried to show in previous studies of the subject,\* that philosophical

\* Such as the one contained in my "Religious Aspect of Philosophy" (Boston, 1885).

ethics has one province of its own, where, by reason of its own chosen abstractness, it is free from the dominion of psychology, and where the empirical facts can illustrate, but never either confirm or refute its principles. This is precisely that province of ethics which deals with the moral law as such in its ideal character. But just because of the speculative dignity of ethics in this its own field of abstract research, we must be the more careful lest, in dealing with the empirical illustrations, applications, and approaches that lie all about the central citadel of ethical philosophy, we offer an unworthily superficial analysis of the mental data which concern so noteworthy and genuinely exalted a doctrine. Speculation, divorced from a wide study of experience, is itself in great danger of degenerating into so much the more shallow an empiricism, just as empirical study, when it refuses to countenance speculation, usually falls prey to the most fantastic kind of dogmatic metaphysics. This often-illustrated paradox is receiving fresh illustrations in our own day. As there are learned psychological students who are actually in terror all the while lest somehow they might be guilty of making philosophical assertions, so there are students of philosophy who dread the contamination of the empirical facts of mental science. And as those who fear philosophy are so much the surer to give themselves over sooner or later to vague philosophizing, so those who condemn most fiercely empiricism are the most likely to content themselves with an especially narrow and ill-chosen set of experiences.

Synthesis of speculation and experience means, then, health, maturity of insight, a sense of the alternatives that philosophy has to consider, a sense of the profound principles that experience involves. Hence, for my part, I welcome most cordially from the point of view of the philosophic student books that, like Professor James's treatise before us, offer novel suggestions, treat psychology from a relatively novel outlook, have philosophical bearings, unite keen introspection with a wide range of comparative study, and so help us towards the desired many-sidedness of insight. Shall I weary the ethical student, then, if I describe this treatise at some length?

## II.

Few books more frankly avow their limitations, and especially their philosophical limitations, than does the present work. We usually regard our philosophical doctrines, if we have any, much as young mothers do their first-born. We may even fear to try to express how much we love them, or what faith we have in them. What we are sure is that they are as they ought to be, that we have an incommunicable assurance of something final and complete about their type, and that we pity the cold world which cannot understand this dearness of our treasures. Our author feels no such tenderness regarding his own speculative presuppositions. He has presuppositions indeed. He states them as plainly as he shows us their incompleteness. He does not try, as many nowadays do, to hide the fact that every psychologist who is more than an elementary student or a Philistine must really formulate philosophical hypotheses, whether or no one is man enough to confess the fact and to take the responsibility for it. Professor James is well aware that you can go no distance in studying mental life or its symptoms without at least tentative philosophical reflections, vague or definite, conscientious or cowardly. And Professor James himself is indeed as conscientious about his philosophical presuppositions as he is tentative. The limitation that I mention lies partly in this tentativeness itself and partly in the curiously intermediate position that our author's chief metaphysical hypothesis occupies among the various possible views as to the nature of mind. I shall endeavor in what follows to state this hypothesis, to indicate its value as a provisional means of formulating the facts and problems of psychology, and then to suggest a little of the wealth of the contents of these volumes, bearing in mind, as I do so, especially the needs of the student of ethics, to whose undertakings Professor James offers many especially valuable contributions. It is true that among the limitations of content which are avowed in the preface stands prominent the omission of a special chapter on the moral sentiments. But the book is full of stimulus to the ethical student.

First, then, as to the method and presuppositions of the work as a whole. We have become accustomed, heretofore, to three fairly distinct types of treatment in text-books of psychology, in so far as they were at all frank with their theoretical presuppositions. The first type is the old-fashioned one. For that psychology was the science of the "mind." The mind was an entity, of whose nature we might otherwise know much or little, but of which we at all events knew that it had a certain substantial unity. This entity might or might not be endowed with various faculties or powers. It usually was so endowed. The various types of mental facts as experience presented them were classified with reference to what power of the mind they stood for or resulted from. Their organization was explained by the mind's own unity; their sequence was due to the relations between the mind and other things.

This theory failing to give complete satisfaction as a means of explaining the mechanism of mental facts (as, for instance, in case of the "laws of association") it was supplemented, or often was succeeded, in the treatment of many authors, by the theory of the "ideas," and their "associations." This theory, whose first beginnings date from the seventeenth century, and in particular from Locke, was much elaborated by the association school, was given a classical elaboration of statement by Herbart, and has widely entered into modern psychological literature. Its methods were originally conceived after the analogy furnished by the science of mechanics. The simple ideas of the mind were defined, in much the same way as the particles in mechanics. They had mutual attractions and repulsions, which in the case of the psychology of Herbart gave rise to extremely complicated hypothetical processes, most of which went on below the level of consciousness. The resultants of the attractions and repulsions of the elementary ideas were perceived in the sequence of mental states as they appeared in consciousness. Or again, as in the somewhat simpler psychology of the English Association schools, where the effort to give a complete mechanics of the attractions and repulsions of ideas was seldom if ever elabo-

rated, the attempt was made to explain by certain simple laws of association not only the occurrence of ideas in memory, but the formation of higher conscious processes, such as those of will, belief, and even reasoning. In case of both the Herbartian and the Association schools, the fundamental hypothesis of psychology was thus the existence of simple ideas and their relative permanence in nature, even when they were out of consciousness.

A third method of psychological science has been developed only in recent years. Abandoning the hope of a sufficient analysis of mental states or powers by means of mere introspection, the modern experimental or neurological school has frequently endeavored to confine its investigations to the facts and laws of the nervous system, with only such use of introspection as was found absolutely indispensable, and with only such analysis of mental life as was required for the purposes of experimental investigation. It has of course been very common to combine this method with more or less analysis of the sort practised by the Association school; and in recent literature we have even one curious case of a writer who has set side by side in the same book an old-fashioned analysis of the mind into its faculties after the taste of the Scottish school, and a fragmentary collection of experimental observations drawn from the literature of modern physiological psychology.

One great merit of Professor James's book consists in the fact that it does not adopt primarily any one of these three familiar points of view. Professor James has a great deal to say of nervous processes; and he does not neglect the unity of consciousness, and still he has found a way of treating psychological doctrine so novel and yet so natural that one can only be surprised at the relative novelty of the undertaking itself, when one observes how obvious the point of view is when once it has been assumed. This point of view one may best describe by calling it the naturalist's point of view of psychology. Instead of analyzing the mental states into ultimate atomic ideas after the fashion of the physicist, instead of appealing to the conception of the entity called the

mind, after the fashion of traditional metaphysical psychology, Professor James adopts as his unit in mental analysis a conception suggested by the analogy of that unit which we are accustomed to call the simple Function in the other biological sciences. In analyzing physiological processes, it is customary not to seek in the ultimate molecular constitution of tissues, nor in the elementary mechanical and physical and chemical processes that go on in these tissues, for the ultimates of the biologist's analysis. We should like to get at these molecular processes if we could, but we cannot. On the contrary, the naturalist is provisionally content when he has analyzed the complex process far enough to discover the relatively simple functions that enter into it; these and their relations he describes. What constitutes a simple function is of course incapable of exact definition. (The conception is once for all a teleological notion.) The simple function is as much of the process as can be understood alone, and as has significance in itself. Now in Professor James's account of mental life, the units of his mental processes are such functional units. What he calls very frequently the passing moment, with its content and its form, with what is directly present to it, and with the "fringe" or conscious tendency with which this content is always or at least frequently surrounded: this is Professor James's mental unit. Of such moments the mental life consists. Our author is never weary of pointing out the vanity of so analyzing this moment into ultimate constituents as to forget that its unity is a fact of experience, and not a product of any association of ideas that could have a permanent existence outside of it. In this fashion the facts of mind come to possess for Professor James at once the kind of unity which the mind theory was accustomed to demand as a postulate of psychology, and the direct empirical reality which the students of the association ideas used to pretend to be seeking, although their theory was often very far from being merely empirical. One might thus define Professor James's unit as so much of the mental process as may be supposed to run parallel to a relatively simple nervous function in the cortex of the living brain, in so far as this



cortex functions with a certain unity. The value of this point of view for purposes of descriptive psychology seems to us very great. The curse of the psychology of the Association school has frequently been over-analysis. Of this the now somewhat famous mind-stuff hypothesis has shown an important but unsatisfactory consequence. Mental life has been analyzed until nothing but mind-dust remains, and the misfortune has been that this mind-dust was as mythical, or at any rate as hypothetical in its character, as ever the unitary mind of the older hypotheses had been. In consciousness, at any rate, absolutely simple ideas do not occur. The ideal unity of the Associationist school had to be sought below the level of consciousness. It was in vain, for example, that one called a musical melody an association of tone ideas. The tones themselves, even when there were no chords, were not simple ideas. Physical analysis showed that their causes were complex. Psychological hypothesis, seeking complexity in the mental elements wherever there seemed to be complexity in the physical causes, was forced to imagine atomic elements of the simplest ideas of tone, elements that in the last analysis might correspond to the single pulsations of the waves of sound as they were transformed into nerve vibrations. Perhaps even something simpler might need to be sought for. But for Professor James all this hypothetical analysis of mental life into unconscious elements, of which it might be constituted, in case they existed and were capable of combining to form it, has small interest. The unconscious in every form, and above all the unconscious mind atom, he steadfastly rejects. In the other direction, however, his use of the simple "passing moment" as his unit is such as to enable him, with greater skill indeed than philosophical finality, to avoid those questions concerning the unity of the mind as a whole, and the inter-relation of the moments in one Self, which have taken up so much time in the traditional psychology whose basis was the entity called mind.

No better brief account of the general point of view thus suggested can be given than the following passages furnish. Professor James says in his preface, page 5 :

"I have kept close to the point of view of ~~natural science~~ throughout the book. Every natural science assumes certain data uncritically, and declines to challenge the elements between which its own 'laws' obtain, and from which its own deductions are carried on. Psychology, the science of finite, individual minds, assumes as its data, (1) thoughts and feelings, and (2) a physical world in time and space with which they coexist, and which (3) they know. Of course these data themselves are discussable, but the discussion of them (as of other elements) is called metaphysics, and falls outside the province of this book."

And, again, at the close of his chapter on "The Consciousness of Self," another passage, which may be understood very fairly by itself, is equally expressive:

"To sum up, now, this long chapter. The consciousness of self involves a stream of thought, each part of which as 'I' can (1) remember those which went before, and know the things they knew; and (2) emphasize and care paramountly for certain ones among them as 'me,' and appropriate to these the rest. The nucleus of the 'me' is always the bodily existence felt to be present at the time. Whatever remembered past feelings resemble this present feeling are deemed to belong to the same 'me' with it. Whatever other things are deemed to be associated with this feeling are deemed to form part of that 'me's' experience; and of them certain ones (which fluctuate more or less) are reckoned to be themselves constituents of the 'me' in a larger sense,—such are the clothes, the material possessions, the friends, the honor and esteem which the person receives, or may receive. This 'me' is an empirical aggregate of things objectively known. The 'I' which knows them cannot itself be an aggregate, neither for psychological purposes need it be considered to be an unchanging metaphysical entity like the soul, or a principle like the pure ego, viewed as 'out of time.' It is a thought, at each moment different from that of the last moment, but appropriative of the latter, together with all that the latter called its own. All the experimental facts find their place in this description, unencumbered with any hypothesis save that of the existence of passing thoughts or states of mind. The same brain may subserve many conscious selves, either alternate or coexisting; but by what modifications in its action, or whether ultra-cerebral conditions may intervene, are questions which cannot now be answered.

"If any one urge that I assign no *reason* why the successive passing thoughts should inherit each other's possessions, or why they and the brain-states should be functions (in the mathematical sense) of each other, I reply that the reason, if there be any, must lie where all real reasons lie, in the total sense or meaning of the world. If there be such a meaning, or any approach to it (as we are bound to trust there is), it alone can make clear to us why such finite human streams of thought are called into existence in such functional dependence upon brains. This is as much as to say that the special natural science of *psychology* must stop with the mere functional formula. *If the passing thought be the directly verifiable existent, which no school has hitherto doubted it to be, then that thought is itself the thinker*, and psychology need not look beyond. The only pathway that I can discover for bringing in a more transcendental thinker would be to

deny that we have any direct knowledge of the thought as such. The latter's existence would then be reduced to a postulate, an assertion that there *must* be a *knower* correlative to all this *known*; and the problem *who that knower is* would have become a metaphysical problem. With the question once stated in these terms, the spiritualist and transcendentalist solutions must be considered as *prima facie* evidence on a par with our own psychological one, and discussed impartially. But that carries us beyond the psychological or naturalistic point of view."

The passage is long, and suggests many more considerations than I have time to develop. But I have desired to give in a typical instance the author's method of work. This life of passing thoughts into which consciousness is analyzed, needs, according to Professor James, only the one fundamental hypothesis *that the moments as they pass really know one another, that the present is actually acquainted with the past*, in order to give as a resultant of the whole life such unity as we need for purposes of psychological science. As to this relation of knowledge itself, whereby the various moments are united in one life, it will be seen that Professor James frankly regards it as ultimate for the psychologist. Frankly, moreover, he admits the possibility of a very different philosophical interpretation of this relation of knowledge from that which he himself finds it convenient to make use of. As to the significance which I have just attributed to this point of view, in its relation to the task of descriptive psychology, the whole book is a sufficient proof of the value of Professor James's unit as a standard of measurement, as it were, in psychological description. The live moment, the passing thought, once its cognitive power assumed, becomes, in Professor James's hands, an extremely plastic and at the same time an empirically applicable conception. In terms of it the stream of consciousness itself, the growth of self-consciousness, the phenomena of discrimination (upon which latter Professor James lays great stress), the facts of the time-consciousness, and numerous other of the problems of descriptive psychology, receive a treatment that to my mind bears everywhere the marks of vitality, and of the naturalist's loving attention to real processes in live things. To many, indeed, in these days, especially among the students of experimental psychology,

the descriptive side of the doctrine has become highly unsatisfactory. I have often felt myself, although I am no experimenter, that were it not for the significant suggestions of modern pathological psychology, the attention of the student would be sure to be drawn constantly more and more away from the descriptive examination of the inner life to the mere observation of its external symptoms. I confess to finding my interest in a large number of purely introspective questions aroused afresh by Professor James's keen scrutiny and vigorous treatment, and I can only attribute his success in great measure to the essential significance of this relatively novel point of view which I have been thus far expounding.

But I spoke at the outset of the philosophical limitations which Professor James so frankly avows. One sees now where they lie. These multitudes of passing moments are indeed the ultimates for the naturalist. But even for him they must possess, as we have seen, that mysterious cognitive function which must needs become the starting-point of a new philosophical inquiry. The cognitive function itself has been an old topic of interest for the present writer, who has ventured to publish more than one discussion of it, and who still finds unshaken by any of Professor James's analyses, his own conviction that these little selves, these homunculi of Professor James's empirical descriptions, can find no logical resting-place short of that conception of the logical unity of self-consciousness, which Professor James himself finds of so little service in psychology. As a fact, meanwhile, the universal self of post-Kantian idealism is indeed no psychological conception, and Professor James doubtless does well to leave it out of account in his descriptive undertaking. I mention my own view here only to suggest that I do not accept the naturalist's attitude as final, any more than, as I conceive, Professor James himself does. Here, as everywhere in his book, there is a charming willingness manifest, to abandon all provisional assumptions whenever they shall prove no longer serviceable, a willingness that, as I said, is as rare in philosophy as it is advisable.

I have spoken above of the curiously intermediate posi-

tion that our author's chief metaphysical hypothesis occupies among the various possible views as to the nature of mind. It is now evident wherein this intermediate character consists. The metaphysical hypothesis referred to is the one expressed in the just-quoted words of Professor James, "If the passing thought be the verifiable existence, then that thought is itself the thinker, and psychology need not look beyond." Intermediate, as I say, this hypothesis between the mind theory on the one hand, with which it shares the notion of the unity of the thinker, even although this thinker is but momentary, and the hypothesis of the atomic idea, on the other hand, with which it shares the tendency to accept and to describe in relatively simple terms the empirical facts of the passing consciousness. An interestingly intermediate position this hypothesis also holds with respect to the question of the relation of the nervous system to the mind. Instead of saying, on the one hand, that the mental, as the manifestation of a spiritual entity, is something whose unity cannot be expressed with any sort of relation to the nervous facts, this doctrine, dealing only with the passing moment, in each case, is able very closely to relate the content of the moment with the type of nervous function then going on. On the other hand, there is no effort on Professor James's part to make the parallelism between the mental and physical so close as to seek after the fashion of the mind-stuff theory for the mental atoms that correspond to the ultimate constituents of the physical process. Once more, it is the unity of the function which on both sides is determinant for Professor James.

Of the strictly physiological portions of our author's book, one who, like myself, is relatively a layman can for the first only say that they are full of learning and suggestiveness. Of the relations between some of these physiological discussions and the problems that interest the ethical student I shall have a word to say farther on.

## III.

The contents of the two large volumes, whose method has now been suggested, may next be summarized. An opening chapter speaks in general of the close relation between mental process and cerebral conditions, and outlines the scope of psychology. Chapters ii., iii., and iv. treat of questions of nervous physiology, discussing first the "Functions of the Brain," in the light of an independent analysis of the recent literature, then sketching certain "general conditions of brain-activity, and passing, under the head of "Habit," to a treatment of the phenomena of the "plasticity of neural matter" and its consequences, as shown in the formation of nervous habits. Here it is (on pp. 122-127) that the author makes his first excursion into the realm of practical application, under the heading "Ethical Implications of the Law of Habit." These implications are indeed treated in a strictly practical fashion, and possess, as they are stated, novelty of form rather than of matter. The most noteworthy bit of advice is one on p. 124, founded on the implications of the physiological theory of nervous habits,—“Seize the very first possible opportunity to act on every resolution you make. . . . It is not in the moment of their forming but in the moment of their producing *motor effects* that resolves and aspirations communicate the new ‘set’ to the brain” Thus, as Professor James would illustrate (p. 127), “The physiological study of mental conditions is the most powerful ally of hortatory ethics.”

Chapters v. and vi., of the first volume, discuss two allied problems of wide theoretical interest,—“The Automaton Theory” and the “Mind-stuff Theory.” To the latter Professor James opposes the presuppositions of his naturalist’s point of view. “Mind-stuff” is an absurdity, because every moment of consciousness has its unity as well as its ingredients. The “Automaton Theory,” for the rest, is an effort to express the relations of mind and brain by making them merely parallel, and by setting consciousness over against the mental facts as their ineffective accompaniment.

The only proof, however, that can be given for this theory is a metaphysical one, founded on *a priori* views of the nature of causation. The naturalist himself rejects such dogmatism about what sort of causation is possible. For him you first of all take the facts of life as they come, and you take them without endeavoring to give them more than a tentative philosophical formulation. You analyze them indeed, but your theories are provisional. "The particulars of the distribution of consciousness, so far as we know them, point to its being efficacious" (p. 138). The higher a brain, the more unstable its reactions would be likely to be, unless they were somehow directed. "A high brain may do many things, and may do each of them at a very slight hint. But its hair-trigger organization makes it a happy-go-lucky, hit or miss affair. . . . The performances of a high brain are like dice thrown forever on a table. . . . All this is said of the brain as a physical machine pure and simple." But admit that consciousness is efficacious, and the problem is much simplified. In short, it is better to be straightforward and so far relatively uncritical with our naturalist's point of view. We may hereby gain philosophically in the end.

The sense in which consciousness is efficacious for Professor James is a point, however, that of course has especial interest for the ethical student. In fact, our author's point of view with regard to this matter is, in view of the triteness of the subject, a relatively novel one. Its nature cannot be made clear without some further reference to the very interesting analysis of the nature of consciousness, which appears in chapters viii., ix., x. We may defer the discussion of the matter until the completion of our general sketch of the contents of the work. Attention, Conception, Discrimination, and Comparison are discussed in chapters xi. to xiii. Chapter xiv. on Association, and chapters xv. and xvi. on Time and Memory, complete volume first. Volume second opens with a series of discussions on the traditional topics which are commonly so prominent in psychological text-books: Sensation and Imagination, and the Perception of Things. Chapter xx., on the Perception of Space, contains a very lengthy state-

ment of a theory which Professor James has previously expounded in *Mind*. The ethical student finds no matters that especially concern his own undertakings until he reaches chapter xxi., on the Perception of Realities. Under this head Professor James discusses the Psychology of Belief, whose voluntary and essentially ethical character he vigorously defends and copiously illustrates. Chapters xxii. and xxiii., on Reasoning and on the Production of Movement, are once more chiefly theoretical. On the other hand, chapters xxiv. to xxvi. will throughout interest the student of ethics. The author's interesting analysis, in chapter xxiv., of Instinct in Man, his equally interesting defence, on page 403, of the thesis that man has "more instincts than any other mammal," the now somewhat noted and decidedly original account of the Emotions, in chapter xxv., whose basis is an essay published, in 1884, in *Mind*; and, finally, the remarkable analysis of the Will itself, in chapter xxvi., form, when taken together, the core of the most significant ethical doctrine suggested in the work. Chapter xxvii. is devoted to the phenomena of Hypnotism. Chapter xxviii. makes an excursus into the Theory of Knowledge, to discuss necessary truths and the effects of experience.

The contents of our work thus suggested in general, we may return to matters which chiefly concern the ethical student. It will be seen that Professor James's general analysis of consciousness, as we have already suggested its nature, is of considerable importance for the formulation of the problems of applied ethics. In the first place, no one can fail to notice the connection of the conventional discussions of the theory of motive in ethical treatises, with one or the other of those theoretical views concerning the nature of mind, both of which, as we have seen, are inconsistent with the naturalist's point of view in psychology, as we have found Professor James expounding it. With considerable and unwise *naïveté* the theory of motive has usually regarded the mind as either a spiritual entity, upon which the motives acted, much as forces act in disturbing the equilibrium or in directing the motion of a body in space, or else has treated the mind as a bundle of



ideas, and the motives as certain individual ideas among the rest, linked to their fellows according to the laws of association. The poverty as well as the elementary character of these categories is obvious. The problem of free will, for instance, from the point of view of the first way of stating the theory of motive, becomes the largely metaphorical question whether the mind is able in any wise to direct its own path in the midst of the opposing forces that solicit it to turn this way or that, or where it is after all bound to follow the mechanical "resultant" of all the forces. On the other hand, the theory of motive, from the point of view of the Association school, is concerned with the similarly metaphorical and question of the fashion in which the somewhat mythical or, at any rate, hypothetical "ideas" attract and repel one another when we are determined to action of any sort. From the point of view of Professor James's analysis the problem is much more subtle, and at the same time more empirical, because once for all the field of the consciousness of the moment is from his point of view so complex a thing. Here is the passing thought of Professor James's analysis, at once a unity and a manifold of impressions. It has a "fringe" or "tendency," it is linked with the past and future by a mysterious "cognitive" tie, it stands in a most intimate relation to the whole condition of the brain cortex at the moment; in short, it suggests by the wealth of its relations a vast number of possible alternatives, both as to its causation and as to its significance. If these alternatives were mere consequences of an arbitrarily invented theory, they would be indeed unwelcome complications of problems which, as every student knows, are already complex enough. But in view of the fact that, as has been said, both introspective and comparative examination of the mental processes and of their organic relations seem to justify Professor James's description as at all events a much better provisional account of the facts of mental experience than the opposing theories have been, all this complication of the facts is instructive rather than disheartening, and aids to give the problems of motive and will a very valuable formulation. The nature of this formulation can best be made clear

by a few words concerning our author's treatment of "Reflex Action," and of its relations to the mental process.

That consciousness runs parallel in some fashion or other to the nervous "reflexes" is now a familiar commonplace of the text-book. Adherents of older psychological theories are accustomed nowadays to admit this parallelism even where they can make nothing of it. Considerable difference exists indeed as to the use of the term reflex action, and many writers are accustomed to insist upon limiting the application of the term itself to those nervous adjustments which are not attended with consciousness. But whatever may be said about the convenient term, there can be but little question on the whole as to the thing. If reflex action be defined as equivalent to nervous adjustment in general,—that is, as including all those processes whereby an organism, in Spencer's phrase, "adjusts inner to outer relations,"—then there can be no question that even the highest conscious processes accompany such nervous adjustments. Without continual stimulation from without, be that stimulation slight or great in amount, there is little or no normal cortex activity discoverable, while, on the other hand, every stimulation, as Professor James frequently and skilfully illustrates, produces more or less obviously its appropriate adjustment. Accompanying such adjustment runs the train of conscious activity itself. In what way now, in the case of voluntary activity, or of those mental states which tend towards activity (*e.g.*, the emotions), is the nervous related to the conscious process? In the interpretation which shall answer this question there are even to-day the widest possible differences among psychologists. Those who make use of the traditional theory of the mind as an entity would be disposed to say that a volition, whatever its other nervous concomitants may be, *precedes* the initiation of the nervous process which results in the carrying out of the volition, and is therefore, relatively speaking, a foreign and independent fact, of whose nature you can give an account only in mental terms. Others, who have used rather the categories of the Association school, have regarded the voluntary impulse as corresponding to, or else as the beginning of, the motor

outflow of the nervous discharge itself. Such writers have insisted on the existence of what they have called a "feeling of effort or of innervation." Some writers, like Wundt, have essayed a sort of synthesis of this notion with the former one, and have found in the conscious act of initiating a motion something which Wundt defines as the "apperception" of the motor act in question. This "apperception" has been something intermediate between the free act of the old-fashioned "ego" and the "ideas" of the Associationists. It has been conceived as something capable of determining in another than a mechanical sense the direction of the nervous discharge, and as being in its nature at least partially parallel to the outgrowing nervous current itself. In short, the alternatives suggested by the facts of experience have even thus far been regarded as decidedly numerous. It is Professor James's merit to have defined in this region yet one more alternative. At first sight this alternative seems indeed, as described at the outset of our author's account, to be one that threatens to do away with the efficacy of consciousness altogether. The "feeling of effort," says Professor James, "is, on the whole, rather a *result* of the motor activity as expressed in the consequent organic condition than a feeling that accompanies the nervous outflow itself. So far Professor James is indeed at one with a considerable number of recent writers. The assumption of a distinct feeling of innervation seems to him unnecessary. There is no introspective evidence of the feeling of innervation. And as to the act of volition itself, Professor James says, on page 501, of vol. ii., that "an anticipatory image of the sensorial consequences of a movement, plus (on certain occasions) the fiat that these consequences shall become actual, is the only psychic state which introspection lets us discern as the forerunner of our voluntary acts." On the whole, then, as Professor James has it (on page 519), the "idea of the end tends more and more to make itself all-sufficient." A vast number of acts come to appear in this way as what our author calls "ideomotor acts." In recognizing these Professor James is again once more in agreement with a considerable number of modern writers. Every rep-

resentation of a movement involves more or less the movement itself. As the present volume says (page 527), "try to feel as if you were crooking your finger while keeping it straight. In a minute it will fairly tingle with the imaginary change of position." In case of "deliberate action" there is the presence in mind of several different and antagonistic ideas of action, no one of which is yet carried out, just because they all are antagonistic. After this fashion we have both in the case of the single volition and also in case of the deliberate action nothing so far but *the conscious process corresponding to the faint nervous excitation which would itself result from the carrying out of the act in question*, and which, in so far as no nervous process antagonizes, passes over immediately into the completed act itself. Thus far, indeed, there is no novel alternative, only a denial of the necessity of any consciousness corresponding to the feeling of innervation. In the complex case of deliberation and hesitation the consciousness consists of a number of ideas of antagonistic ends, or results of action; and this consciousness corresponds to many simple nervous processes, each one of which is a faint repetition of previous nervous experiences of the results of a completed motor process. Where then, in all this, is there so far room for any conscious process which could be regarded as interfering dynamically with the nervous mechanism? Previous brain conditions and present stimulation result in the arousing of the ideomotor nervous processes. The consciousness of the single act, or of the deliberate hesitation between two acts, accompanies and so far reflects this simple or complex nervous condition. If one now takes into account that, in Professor James's interesting theory of the emotions, he identifies them also, even the most stirring and significant, with masses of sensation that stand for diffuse nervous excitations, aroused in general in a reflex way, one sees the road apparently clear for a theory of the connection between the nervous and the mental process, which would render the latter entirely inefficacious. As to the emotions themselves, they are, as Professor James skilfully argues, connected, just in proportion to their apparent vigor and passionateness, with diffuse physical excitation,

superficial or visceral, or both. There is no reason for supposing that their conscious content is otherwise than correspondent to this physical excitation itself, or that the excitation needs any but a reflex explanation. In a given environment the complicated organism responds by this wave of excitement, which may itself be either a case of skilful adjustment, or an accident of maladjustment, and which may be due either to normal or to abnormal organic conditions. Consciousness *runs parallel to this excitement*, in so far as the excitement is the source of disturbances of a sensory character. Where then is the room for any dynamic interference of conscience? The mental act of will which was to initiate bodily acts becomes so far merely an idea of the end which might result if a given remembered act were carried out. The will accompanies an ideomotor process. Even in deliberation there is thus far nothing essentially new. Even in passion, in longing, in the most active of emotions, consciousness is so far but the accompaniment of a reflex. But just here appears a new consideration, and one very characteristic of our author's whole point of view.

Throughout his whole discussion, namely, the *content* of consciousness, however complicated it may be, however significant it may appear, is described with immediate reference to its nervous concomitants. The greatest ingenuity is shown in taking advantage of every indication which experience suggests, in order to illustrate the intimacy and the minuteness of the connection. What distinguishes consciousness, however, from a mere accompaniment of the reflex processes is with Professor James something rather about the *form* of the consciousness, or about the peculiar "tendency" that after all can still be found in the moment, apart from its content. So much, however, does Professor James's method resist any abstract statement that it is best once for all to mention the point where the true activity of consciousness appears in his account. "We reach," says he, "the heart of our inquiry into volition when we ask by what process it is that the thought of any given object comes to prevail stably in the mind" (page 561). The idea, as we have seen, of an end is

already the accompaniment of the initiation of the act which tends towards that end. *Motives*, so-called, are *ideas of ends* which, owing to their conflict, are unable to pass over into acts so long as they remain mere motives. The experience of deciding a conflict of motives is, then, *the experience of the triumph of one idea of the end over other ideas*. The act of voluntary decision is experienced as an *act of conscious attention to an idea*, and nothing else. Volition is primarily a relation, says Professor James, "not between ourself and extra mental matter, but between ourself and our own states of mind. It is unqualifiedly true that if any thoughts *do* fill the mind unqualifiedly such filling is consent." If then the problem of volition is the problem of attention to an idea, the question of the activity of consciousness as affecting motor processes becomes the question *whether attention is in every case and in every shading a mere accompaniment of the reflexes of adjustment themselves*. If in consciousness an idea once present and of itself already tending to rise or to fall in clearness can be as it were reinforced or held by an inner deed of choice, then there will be in consciousness something more than what is merely parallel to brain process. It is indeed impossible to determine by direct psychological experience whether such a genuine free will, such a genuine indeterminism of attention does exist. The decision as to such a reality as this is for Professor James to be made solely upon ethical grounds. He says, page 572, "My own belief is that the question of free will is insolvable on strictly psychologic grounds. After a certain amount of effort of attention has been given to an idea, it is manifestly impossible to tell whether either more or less of it *might* have been given or not. To tell that, we should have to ascend to the antecedents of the effort, and defining them with mathematical exactitude, prove, by laws of which we have not at present even an inkling, that the only amount of sequent effort which could *possibly* comport with them was the precise amount which actually came. Measurements, whether of psychic or of neural quantities, and deductive reasonings such as this method of proof implies, will surely be forever beyond human

reach. No serious psychologist or physiologist will venture even to suggest a notion of how they might be practically made. We are thrown back, therefore, upon the crude evidences of introspection on the one hand, with all its liabilities to deception, and, on the other hand, upon *a priori* postulates and probabilities. He who loves to balance nice doubts need be in no hurry to decide the point. . . . Taking the risk of error on our head, we must project upon one of the alternative views the attribute of reality for us; we must so fill our mind with the idea of it that it becomes our settled creed. The present writer does this for the alternative of freedom, but since the grounds of his opinion are ethical rather than psychological, he prefers to exclude them from the present book."

I have summarized at some length, and still with an unfortunately abstract fashion of condensed statement, the author's discussion of volition, because I think it very valuable to have the new alternative here suggested brought to the attention of ethical students. This notion that there is, after all, but *one* act that can possibly be an act of free will, and this an *act of attention* to an idea already presented to consciousness, is closely related to a number of views that have already been expounded in the course of modern ethical discussion. Yet I know of no other psychological writer who has made so much of this alternative from the point of view of his own doctrine, or who has brought it into so close a relation to the physiological data, as they are at present before us. I may as well refrain here from any philosophical criticism of Professor James's alternative, partly because my office is here only that of a reporter, not that of one who presents his own views; partly, too, because I mean to print ere long, in another place, my own philosophical notions as to the problem of the will. But I wish very heartily that the readers of this report may be induced to study for themselves our author's vigorous and suggestive chapters. As for the notion itself, that the only activity of consciousness is the purely intellectual activity of confirming or withdrawing attention to an idea already suggested, that the only "fiat" possible is the fiat,—“Let this idea which is now mine remain mine (or cease to be mine),”—no-

body who knows the literature of ethics or of religion can fail to see how widespread has been, not indeed the philosophical formulation, but the practical use of this notion in the past. The "sin against the Holy Ghost" was mainly a sin of attention. One knew the light, which had divinely shone in the darkness, and one chose thereupon to comprehend it not.

This topic leads us back to the question of pleasure and pain as motives. And here Professor James shows us the value of the naturalist's point of view, which studies live creatures as if they were alive, and is willing to examine the passing moment as the wealthy thing that it is, without looking for vague and purely schematic abstract statements whose universality shall be as evident as their inadequacy. The importance of real pleasures and pains as motives, especially in the mature consciousness, is unquestionable; but how can the naturalist observe the reflexes of live creatures in all the enormous complexity of their nervous life, and still suppose that our half-conscious gestures as we talk, or the passing shades of expression on our countenances, are the results of the "pleasure" that they give us or of the "pain" that they reduce? How, again, studying the inner life itself, can one call the restless, "headlong rush of consciousness" (to quote a phrase of our author's), whereby we hasten from moment to moment of life, an expression of the "desire for pleasure?" How, again, are "insistent ideas," which are found in all gradations from the normal to the most abnormal forms, cases of the "search for pleasure?" A "fixed idea" may be a painful one, and usually is so. Yet it persists, and *just because it is painful*. Or again, when the tongue wears itself sore on the point of a broken tooth in a sort of longing to make out what that is which is thus intruding into the mouth; when a man at the edge of a precipice painfully desires to leap down, and shudders, and desires afresh; or, finally, when a tune that we hate "runs in our heads,"—are these cases of a flight from pain, or a pursuit of pleasure? Upon facts similar to these Professor James founds his interesting criticism of pleasure and pain as motives. I have already pointed out how full of suggestion such considerations are. Ethical writers who have



wished to vindicate "disinterestedness," or to show how the still small voice of duty may triumph over the loudest calls of pleasure and pain, have begun too high up in the scale of psychological analysis their conflict with Bentham and the Hedonists. The fact is that the ordinary theory of motives in hedonistic discussions of the ethical problem is founded upon psychological analysis such as no naturalist ought for a moment to regard as adequate to the reflexes of living organisms. The voluntary activities begin, as Professor James points out, by impulsion from behind, not by attraction as before. The "idea-motor" acts, even on a very high plane, express the presence of the "idea of an end," and this end may itself, as in case of the idea of jumping over the precipice, be very painful. Yet does it tend to carry itself out. On the highest plane, when we "balance motives," and decide by a "fiat," the triumphant idea may be a very pale one or a comparatively painful one. It wins then because we attend to it, and whether or no attention is free, certain it is that attention often rather *determines pleasure and pain themselves*, than is determined by them.

#### IV.

A number of tentative suggestions have now been set down as they come to us from Professor James's book. Throughout, as will be seen, the value of his very wealthy volumes lies rather in their manifold study of facts, in their wide range, in their novelty of suggestion, than in their systematic finish. The book will probably be accused of formlessness. The accusation is one that the author may receive with equanimity. Psychology is at present an essentially tentative, growing, suggestive, and formless doctrine. Whoso gives his book finished shape is sure, nowadays, to contribute fallacious generalizations to his science, instead of empirically well-founded summaries. For some years past, the wiser teachers of psychology have been accustomed to send their pupils to the monographs rather than to the text-books for aid in fruitful private study. What was this custom but a confession that the day for the "system of psychology" is past. Systems of

philosophy we shall always have, and for a good reason. The text-book of psychology must be wisely tentative, suggestive, unfinished. That is what is true of Professor James's book. The naturalist does not live amidst sharply-defined forms, but among moving and plastic live creatures. What he can offer us is verity of description, keenness of analysis, heartiness of appreciation, philosophical suggestiveness of outlook. And Professor James, with his robust temperament, so fearlessly expressed in his fine and manly style, with its brilliancy, its oddities, and its vigor, has offered us just this. His "passing moments," which can "know" and which can freely "attend," which are "self-related," and which have "unity," and which are still so intimately bound to the "neural process," have just the paradoxical and hypothetical character which requires one, in one's philosophy, to go beyond them, and to declare them but illusory expressions in phenomenal form of an infinitely deeper truth, while they have meanwhile the vitality and the plasticity which will make them long valuable to the student of empirical psychology, and vastly significant to the inquirer in ethics.

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JOSIAH ROYCE.

## THE INNER LIFE IN RELATION TO MORALITY: A STUDY IN THE ELEMENTS OF RELIGION.\*

IF we had to classify human feelings and emotions, we might do so in respect to the narrowness or the extent of the objects to which they attach. They would thus fall into a series of concentric circles, of which the body and its wants would be the centre. Beyond the feelings of pleasure and pain in connection with it would be the feelings of sympathy and affection which rise in the presence of a world of beings like ourselves. Beyond that again would be the feelings which have for their object the more general aspects of the world at large, such as the æsthetic emotions. Finally, beyond all these would be the emotions, which are proper to the

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\* Delivered as a lecture for the London Ethical Society.

thought of the world in the widest of all its aspects as an organic whole. It is the world of thoughts and feelings which the universe in its widest aspect calls up in us that I call the inner life. I mean by it what Clifford calls "cosmic emotion,"—the emotion which is felt in regard to the universe or sum of things viewed as a cosmos or order.\* I call it the "inner life;" but if any one thinks this term inappropriate, inasmuch as the object of the thoughts and emotions I refer to is on my own showing not the closest or the inmost but the farthest away and the outermost, I shall not quarrel with him. Nevertheless the life I refer to is opposed to the physical life of pains and pleasures and to the social life of sympathies and aversions in that, while these latter of their very nature issue in outward actions, the emotions I speak of, though they do not as I hope to show *end* in the human soul, yet themselves call forth no series of outward actions directed to other ends than those which our individual and social life suggest. They impart a spirit and diffuse an air over the rest of life: they have no separate external expression of their own. In another sense too they may be contrasted with the rest of man's life as the inner to the outer. They are in a peculiar sense a man's own. While the so-called egoistic and social feelings at every point relate us to others, cosmic emotion isolates us and gives us a certain sense of independence of our neighbors. This is true only in a certain sense. In another sense it gives us a new, perhaps the deepest point of contact with our neighbor. I hope to make this more evident hereafter. Meantime for the purpose of illustrating what I mean by calling this the inner life, I note that it is that on which in all ages men have fallen back when the other and more external life of pleasure, of business or of social work, has failed. It is the inner life because the satisfaction it is fitted to afford is in the last resort independent of outward circumstances. It is the citadel of man-soul. With this behind him the heroic soul can face defeat, dishonor, death itself. Without it he has no recourse but to come to terms with outward fortune. In the last resort a man must stand

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\* "Lectures and Essays," W. K. Clifford.

upon the thought of what he is or has been in the system of things to which he has belonged. He has to square his account with this, to find strength and consolation, dismay or remorse, in the private thought of the relations he has made with the world of which he has been a part.

We hear much nowadays of the solidarity of man; and I desire to say nothing that could be interpreted as a denial of this great truth. Yet I wish here to lay the stress on an aspect of man's life which more than any other is his own, and in a sense separates him from his neighbors. As in the physical world we have come to see that no point of matter can be understood or even apprehended at all, except in relation to every other, so in the moral world we now know that no individual can be understood except in relation to his natural and social environment. Yet as in physical science we are told that no molecule really touches any other, or is solid with it, but oscillates in a free field which belongs to itself alone, so there is a sense in which the individual man in the last analysis has an inner field of life which is proper to himself alone. The pivot of this inner life is the thought of himself as a part or member in a universal order.

My object in this paper is to answer the questions: 1, what this thought is, or ought to be; 2, what are some of the forms which the feeling it rouses takes; 3, what are some of its special relations to social morality; and 4, what practical means may be suggested under modern conditions for the cultivation of it.

It is undoubtedly true that in the minds of many, in recent times, a shadow has been cast over this aspect of our lives. The cause of this is to be sought for in the fact which explains so much of the mental unrest of the present time,—namely, that we live in an age of transition. In the field of which I am speaking the last two or three generations have witnessed a species of disenchantment. In the less sophisticated ages of the world, which are sometimes called the “ages of faith,” the relations of man to the order of nature and the government of the world were depicted in forms which M. Arnold called “fairy-tales.” Feeling was permitted to grow

and entwine itself round a picturesque view of the origin and history of the cosmos. This view while in principle fundamentally sound, yet in detail was of the nature of the case largely mixed with fiction.\* The inevitable progress of thought has therefore done its work with it. The unrest of disillusionment of which I spoke has set in. Feeling has had to be disengaged from an object no longer intellectually maintainable. If I might for the moment represent human feeling under the metaphor of the ivy and creepers that clothe an ancient wall, its present state might be compared to that of these same creepers when the wall has fallen into decay. They lie helpless and confused upon the ground, and only take their proper place and form again when they have found a new support for their clinging tendrils. As yet in the moral sphere the new support has been long appearing. For while this process of disillusion and disengagement has been going on, little success has hitherto attended the attempts at reconstruction. Indeed such attempts having usually been made in the name of theology, are commonly regarded with a certain impatience and suspicion. And this not without cause, for they are commonly put forward in an obviously apologetic interest, so that there is some ground for the sweeping criticism of J. S. Mill,† that "the whole of the prevalent metaphysics of the present century is one tissue of suborned evidence in favor of religion." It is at any rate true that little satisfaction for thought, little inspiration for feeling, can be drawn from the substitutes for the older view which have gained a hearing. One and all they have had but a ghostly existence, like the shades in Homer, and are now on the point of vanishing away. The pale theism which Carlyle called "the faintest possible," the barren mechanism of materialism which he called the theory of an "absentee god," pessimism itself which its author so triumphantly put forward as the solution of the riddle of the world,‡ have had

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\* As dreams have been called the mythology of real life, so mankind in the mythopoeic age may be said to have been asleep and dreaming.

† "Essays on Religion."

‡ See Professor Wallace's "Life of Schopenhauer," p. 110.

their day, and ceased to be. The result of many of these and similar failures has been to beget in the minds of many a rooted aversion to every hint at a cosmology. No light, they hold, is likely to be shed on our daily lives from the contemplation of the order of the universe as a whole. They bid us forget our religious unrest in the practical duties of every-day life. With regard to its pains and trials we can get no further than the utterance of the Hebrew agnostic, "Man is born to trouble as the sparks fly upward." As to daily duty, that is clear enough. Best leave star-gazing and cosmic longing to others; as for us, let us take Voltaire's advice in "Candide" and "cultivate our gardens."

Yet there are many to whom this conclusion appears (and I think rightly) eminently unsatisfactory. It is not in their power even though they thought it desirable to accept it. They are forced to look beyond the moment and the day: to ask whither it all goes, what it all means. True, "man is born to trouble as the sparks fly upward," but the sparks as they fly have a place and a destination in the universe of things. So also have man's labor and trouble. Moreover, in order to cultivate our own gardens we have to look beyond our own garden wall. We have to look to our neighbor's, to the winds, the seasons and all the world besides. So too in life we have to relate our little field of duty to society, to humanity, to the whole system of the world in order properly to understand and worthily to fulfil it. Does the world as we know it really afford no justification for this attitude of mind? Does it tell us nothing of itself which may be related to our daily lives, round which cosmic emotion may twine and again become a source of strength and not of weakness and distraction in our lives?

This is perhaps the most vital question we can put to ourselves. It is one moreover which now, for the first time in the world's history, we are able to approach with some hope of a favorable answer along the lines of scientific demonstration. Let no one suppose that in saying this I intend to follow the distinguished lead of Mr. Fiske,\* and to endeavor

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\* See "The Destiny of Man and the Idea of God."

to find in the evolutionary view of the world arguments for theism and personal immortality. I do not in any way claim for the doctrine of evolution that it can be pressed into the service of any existing religion or form of belief. I merely intend to point out in opposition to the moral agnosticism I alluded to above, that the view of the world which is most characteristic of the time in which we live, so far from being "naturalistic," irreligious and non-moral, has in reality laid the foundation for an entirely new attitude of mind towards the cosmos at large. The angle of observation is once for all changed. With the change of our thoughts will come in due time a change of our feeling about the world, and following the change of feeling for the whole we may expect to find a change of feeling towards that part that constitutes the daily life of each.

Consider what precisely this new view is and involves. When Kant declared in his celebrated saying that there were two things which he contemplated with ceaseless awe, "the starry heavens without and the moral law within," he was not merely alluding to two objects which overpower the imagination. He was thinking not so much of the vastness of the one or the sublime suggestions of the other as of each in its own sphere the type of a cosmos or system of related laws. The saying introduces us to the two sides of the world which are prominent in the newer science and philosophy. *Without the world* is a system of intelligible relations of part to part, stretching itself out in space, moving forward in time. It is now known to be no mechanical combination, but an organic whole, in which each part in space, each epoch in time is only comprehensible in view of the whole of which it is a part, the end to which it is a stage. This organism is the invisible background which is presupposed in these partial glimpses of it which we call common perception and the special sciences. Nature, history, human thought as we know them are the pulses of its onward movement. It itself in its eternal progress is that in which they live and move and have their being. Here we have no arbitrary creation of an external will as the old cosmology taught, nor yet a

mechanical totality of independent parts, but a self-evolving, self-differentiating, self-enriching whole (conscious or unconscious I do not now ask, but at any rate) throbbing with life and unconquerable energy. If again we look *inwards* we have the *human conscience* as the symbol of a microcosm of moral relations between the different parts of our nature on the one hand and the different members of human society on the other. As the starry heaven without stands for the hidden system of laws which bind the external world together, so the moral law stands for that unseen order which is gradually but surely evolving itself in the life of man. The vision of this kingdom of righteousness is not revealed to all. All are indeed called by the voice of conscience to search for it in the common relations of life, as all the knights are summoned to the search for the Holy Grail, but it is only the pure in heart who really see it and feel it there. Nevertheless it is there for all as the hidden basis upon which all that is of value in their life and the life of their community is built.

To have mind and heart open to these two aspects of the world as an outer and an inner system is much. If no other cosmic emotion were possible than that to which Kant refers, this itself would be of value. But our inner life refuses to be content with this. It demands a higher point of view. Poets and prophets have always had visions of a higher, and now the progress of science seems about to establish as a reasoned conclusion what they have clung to as a faith. These two sides of the world must show themselves to be but different forms in which the central principle of its vitality makes itself known to us. The connection between the system of external nature and the moral life of man, between the stars in their courses and our struggle for truth and light beneath them, has always been a dream of the cosmic consciousness. All religions have asserted it. It is for instance the great theme of Greek tragedy, which aims at exhibiting the cosmic laws of justice and retribution, "laws which in the highest heaven had their birth," sweeping like a hurricane through families and cities and laying them desolate. It is the subject of the Hebrew prophets to whom, as M. Arnold



has shown, righteousness was as much the law of the universe and a force in outward nature as a state of the human soul. It is this faith again that gives its beauty and value to mediæval Christianity, which echoes in all that is most permanent in Christian literature and is reasserted with magnificent faith by our own poet of nature. What gives Wordsworth's Ode to Duty its cosmic value is not to my mind the address at the beginning to the

"Stern daughter of the voice of God."

That is hackneyed enough and might have been the mere echo of a theological dogma. The ring of the poet and the fresh religious inspiration appears first when he reverses his glance, and instead of interpreting in orthodox fashion the inner law as a divine command which nature obeys in another field, directly asserts the identity of the laws of nature with the law of duty:

"Thou dost preserve the Stars from wrong;  
And the most ancient Heavens, through Thee, are fresh and strong."

That which the poets have all along asserted as an intuition it seems not unlikely that we shall in a sense at least know as a fact. The development of this idea will be the chief function of theology, or whatever the science which treats of this aspect of things in future may be called. In relation to ethics, with which we are here concerned, it means in general that the only ultimate description we can give of good action is that it is action which tends to realize the ends of nature. The end of nature is the progressive enrichment of life by the evolution of organism. Good action then will always be found on ultimate analysis to be just the action that tends to the enrichment of the individual and social organism. Good action, says Clifford,\* is that which "makes the organic more organic." And similarly from the other side when we try to describe the ends of nature it is next to impossible to do so except in terms of the highest organism she has yet produced, that of human consciousness and the society by which it lives. "In the principle of nature," says Clifford again, "we

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\* See his brilliant essay on "Cosmic Emotion."

must recognize the mother of life, and especially of human life; powerful enough to subdue the elements, and yet always working gently against them; biding her time in the whole expanse of heaven to make the highest cosmos out of inorganic chaos; the actor not of all the actions of living things but only of the good actions."\*

This cosmic principle clothing itself in the twofold garb by which we know it, which we may call reflecting the natural and the moral cosmos, is the ultimate object of the emotion I began by describing as the inner life. Whether the poet and the religious man would recognize this as an adequate substitute for the object of their deepest feeling I do not propose to inquire. It is probable they would not without the additional attributes of will and consciousness. Personification is the very life and breath of poetry, as it is also of one form of religion. And as we all even the most prosy of us have a streak of poetry in our composition, we all have a bias in favor of personifying the ultimate principle of life and being. As moreover we never quite know how much poetry and imagination influence our ordinary views of outward things, so we never quite know how much the personal view of the soul of the world influences our thought and action. "We never know," says Goethe, "how anthropomorphic we are." Hegel adds, "we can never be anthropomorphic enough." Without going so far as this I know no reason against our being as anthropomorphic as we can. The one thing of which we must make sure is, that we permit no anthropomorphic conceptions to stand between us and our loyalty to the truth wherever it may lead us. I am not sure that the prejudice against such conceptions among thinkers in England is not due to the fact that they have fallen into the hands of theologians instead of being left to the religious man, and so become hardened into dogma instead of being cherished as poetry. As Taine wittily says of us,† "You have learned men in Eng-

\* The personification in this last passage is interesting. Clifford has just been pointing out the advantage of the modern scientific over the old religious view in that we do not require to personify it.

† "History of English Literature," vol. ii., Essay on J. S. Mill.

land but you have no thinkers. Your God impedes you. He is the Supreme Cause, and you dare not reason upon causes out of respect for him." However this may be, the question does not properly fall within my subject. I am not attempting to fix the conception of religion or the object of it, but to point to the best thoughts of the day about the cosmos as a basis of an emotion which is essential to the fulness of the moral life.

I have tried to make plain the general character of this emotion and the general nature of its object. Further illustration of what I mean may be drawn from some of the specific forms under which it appears.

First and foremost it brings with it that which lies at the root of all religion and has sometimes been used to define religion,—the sense of dependence. By this I mean the feeling that accompanies the knowledge that we did not make ourselves; that we are born into and supported by a world which our individual wills did not make. Individualism and kindred forms of atheism reach their height in the claim to have been a "self-made" man. Religion, on the other hand, begins in the more or less conscious recognition that we are at every moment of our lives dependent upon a natural and a social order which we may learn how to use but which we certainly have done nothing to create. The feeling of dependence which the knowledge of man's place in the universe of things brings home to him appears in early stages in the race and the individual as a vague sense of fear in the presence of forces other and mightier than himself. It perhaps reproduces itself as such in each of us (however high our civilization) in moments of abnormal experience, as in sickness, or in some moral crisis, or in the presence of great natural forces like storm and earthquake. But generally it has passed in us into a higher form.

The step by which it does so introduces us to another form of the life I am considering. As it is the vagueness with which the great forces of nature and human life are conceived and the ignorance of their laws which turn the sense of dependence into fear and superstition, so the growth of knowl-

edge turns fear into confidence and reverence. Strange parallelisms are spelt out between the law of nature and the law of life. (The laws of conscience, of nature and the state are seen to hide beneath them a certain beneficence of their own. By obeying them the religious man realizes that he obeys the law of his own life. (He is reverencing himself in reverencing them.\* This is the second form of the sense of dependence. It has purified itself from craven fear and risen to a sense of fearless faith in truth and right. Truth and right are the laws of nature. He who stands by them has and need have no fear. He desires nothing but what nature desires and what her "august laws" will bring to pass. His ends are her ends. He has "hitched his wagon" to the stars as Emerson directs us all to do. It is no longer he who works, but nature works in him to will and to do of her good pleasure. Similarly in reference to society and social duty, it is not so much he who works for his own ends, but man who worketh in him. It is this confidence that has sustained all great men. They have felt themselves to be on the side of the Time Spirit, that in them the spirit of the age has found an utterance. Even Napoleon could say that he was not a man but a thing,—*i.e.*, that he was the instrument of forces that were greater than himself. I believe this faith has been more or less consciously felt by all the greatest men. Perhaps no better definition of a great man could be found than one who both feels and understands his relation to the world. The man who merely feels it without understanding it is the fanatic: he has enthusiasm without insight. The man who understands it without feeling it is the genius, the philosopher, the cynic, or the devil: he has insight without enthusiasm. The great man is he who both understands and feels, who has both insight to know and enthusiasm to make nature's will prevail.

But even the hero is human. He may faint or fail. His will may be weak, his judgment may err, or the powers of this world may be too much for him. In weakness and failure two other forms of the cosmic emotion I am describing emerge. When a man fails to do his duty he may feel re-

\* Cf. the double meaning of the Greek *αἰδώς*.

morse, self-contempt, despair, without going further than the thought of a moral relation to the community in which he lives. But when added to this and emerging from it he has a sense of a wider brotherhood and a universal system of law and order which have been outraged by his conduct, remorse deepens into repentance and contrition. These are psychologically perfectly distinct from the former, and are no more to be confounded with it than is cosmic feeling with social sympathy.

Consider again the case where the failure is not due to ourselves at all. The feeling which in the time of our strength had been a militant confidence in truth and justice becomes resignation in the hour of failure. Here again we have an emotion perfectly distinct from that which we might feel without any, or upon another cosmic faith. It is different from Stoic endurance, from hard-hearted indifference or cynical contempt of pain. And the difference comes from our conceiving ourselves to be members of a system of things whose ends are the same as ours and yet which has other means of working them out than by our instrumentality, other ways than the way in which we hoped to serve it.

To pursue this account on the lines I have indicated will be the work of psychology when that science gets into the hands of men who recognize this as a permanent and valuable aspect of human life and are not afraid to work it out in their text-books. Meantime I have said enough by way of illustration of what I mean by the inner life. I hope too I have said enough to show that the cosmic emotion, which is the fundamental element in it, is no mere vague aspiration after an impossible knowledge or a supra-mundane happiness, no mere "desire of the moth for the star," but, on the contrary, a principle which with a solid basis in the best thoughts in our own time about reality may be of the utmost value in practical life. As I have hitherto spoken of this relation to life only in general terms and by way of implication, it may be well to set down one or two of the special points at which it becomes visible.

1. If, as I began by maintaining, it is psychologically in-

controvertible that the thought of the world as a whole in relation to ourselves brings with it an emotion of its own, there is an element of our nature here which claims recognition on its own merits equally with the self-regarding or the sympathetic emotions. To cultivate and develop it is therefore to enrich, to starve and neglect it is to impoverish the inner life. The faculty of relating ourselves to the world in its widest which is also its deepest aspects, with its appropriate feelings, is a side of our mental and emotional life which we must feel ourselves bound to cultivate if we own to the duty of self-culture at all. Quite independently therefore of any perceived connection between it and the rest of every-day life, I should maintain it to be a duty to cherish this side of mind and heart. Nor is the duty any the less incumbent in a time of intellectual change and transition. At such a time indeed neglect of it is apt not only to be condoned, but to be represented in a confused sort of way as a duty which we owe to intellectual sincerity. Just as it has been wittily said that a "man gives up religion and goes to church," so it is sometimes thought that by giving up going to church one is performing a sort of religious duty and advancing the cause of truth. But the duty at such a time may be precisely the other way, if for no other reason than that as all intellectual progress starts from a basis of feeling, the feeling namely of interest in the object, so where the feeling of interest in any particular aspect of the world is permitted to die, intellectual progress in regard to it is thereby rendered impossible.

2. But I have already shown that the assumption of the preceding paragraph is unjustifiable. This side of our life is not independent of ordinary every-day duty, nor ordinary duty independent of it. We have already seen that it invests our every-day duties with a new meaning. It gives them a wider range by connecting them with the general life of the world. If we can no longer look at our life as the old theology did, in the light of a task that is done under the great Task-master's eye, this does not mean that we are henceforth to regard it as nothing more than the isolated effort of our individual wills. Between

these ways of looking at our life there is the one I have tried to describe. It sets before us an end common to us with all other men and with the system of the world as well, by our contribution or failure to contribute to which we stand condemned or acquitted before the tribunal of our own souls. Whatever then we regard as the sanction of the moral life (and from this point of view it does not matter much what we regard it to be), it acquires force and dignity from being looked at "under the form of eternity." Morality is thus raised to a higher power; it passes from "mere morality" into "morality touched with emotion," and thus becomes a species of religion.

3. But, not only is morality thus enforced but its contents are enriched by the addition of new virtues. I have already spoken of resignation. I cannot understand how the psychological peculiarities which mark this feeling can be explained except in the light of what I have called "cosmic emotion." Its importance as an element in the ideal character is often overlooked by the purely moral teacher. It has usually been left to the religious writer to give it its place in the ethical ideal of a noble character. This in our own country John Henry Newman has not been slow to do. In describing a gentleman in his "Ideal of a University," he finely says of him in this connection: "He is patient, forbearing, and resigned on philosophical principles; he submits to pain because it is inevitable, to bereavement because it is irreparable, and to death because it is destiny."

Another virtue, which if it does not take its origin at any rate only reaches perfection in one who has cultivated the inner life in the direction I have described, is religious tolerance. And by this I do not mean merely that negative virtue of letting men do as they like in religion. This Tom Paine used to describe as "not the opposite of intolerance but the counterfeit of it." \* I mean the active principle of sympathy with the forms under which persons with different education and under different circumstances from our own conceive of

\* See the witty passage in "Rights of Man:" "Political Works," Truelove, p. 311.

their relations to the macrocosm. This is a very different state of mind from that species of half-contemptuous indifference with which advanced persons frequently treat the religion of their neighbors. It is one moreover which I cannot conceive of as a powerful and fruitful element of character, except in one who himself believes in the reality of the inner life in some such form as that I have described.

As to pursue the subject in a former part of this paper was said to be the work of the psychologist, to pursue this one is the work of the moralist. I have said enough to make my meaning clear. Without, therefore, pursuing it further here I come to the last question: How is it proposed in the present state of opinion that we should endeavor to cultivate the inner life? Will not any direct attempts to do so where they are not intellectually dishonest be apt to be artificial and unreal? The question bristles with difficult points and perhaps ought not to be attempted at the end of this paper. I can only offer some hints as to the line in which the answer may be sought.

1. There are many who with a minimum of faith in the *dogmas* of the churches and chapels can still appropriate so much of the spirit of the original institution as to make it well worth their while to attend their *services*. I neither recommend nor dissuade from this practice. It has always seemed to me a matter of degree—the relative degree, I mean—in which the critical faculties are stimulated and the moral and cosmic quickened. (This will depend a good deal on the arrangements and surroundings of the particular place of worship. I can myself go, as I have often done, to a little Highland Presbyterian church, where none but fishermen and crofters habitually worship, and come away from the primitive sermon and service in every way the better for it. On the other hand, I seldom enter a country church in England without being struck with the artificiality of the social and ecclesiastical arrangements represented there and the state of decrepitude into which a noble and ancient institution seems on the point of sinking.)

2. There is undoubtedly a growing number of those who



cannot under any circumstances habitually go to church or chapel. Supposing these people sincerely anxious to keep themselves in touch with the life I have been describing, I admit they have a most serious difficulty to face. Either they will attempt some substitute for themselves and their families, and run thereby the risk of its becoming something artificial and formal, or leaving the matter to take care of itself, will run the risk of starving a real moral want. As a practical suggestion in such cases it may be pointed out that quite apart from Christian literature, against which in the case I am contemplating I may assume a prejudice, there are numbers of books which are in the best sense religious. Many of Plato's dialogues appear to me to belong to this class,—especially perhaps the *Phædo*, the *Apology*, the *Crito*, and *Republic X*. There are the meditations of Marcus Aurelius, the *enchiridion* of Epictetus, and the writings of the Stoics generally. There are the *Vedas* and *Upanishads* of India, now mostly accessible in English. There are the great teachers and poets of our own time, all, as is necessarily the case, steeped in those ideas of organic connection and cosmic order which I have pointed out are characteristic of our century. All these and many more, not neglecting the great Jewish and Christian Scriptures, the *Imitatio Christi*, Jeremy Taylor's *Great Exemplar*, and Butler's sermons, are books which the "library of no gentleman," if he wishes to be a gentleman in Newman's sense of the word, should be without. (Whether in the family life special times should be set apart for reading them I do not pretend to say, any more than whether opportunities should be sought for the public use of them. So long as this section of your library is held in esteem by yourself and your household it does not really much matter. If, on the other hand, books in it lie in out-of-the-way shelves and are covered with dust from year's end to year's end, it is time perhaps that you thought of instituting a morning or an evening reading.)

3. I have a third suggestion which I divulge with some hesitation. It is that to some the study of philosophy may be the best means to the end we are speaking of. "The neces-

sary creed of all the just and good," says Schopenhauer,\* "is: I believe in a metaphysic." I do not mean to say that all saints must be philosophers, any more than I claim that all philosophers are saints. I wish merely to suggest that those who find other doors to saintship or saintly comfort barred against them may as a last resort try philosophy. Novalis declared that philosophy, "could bake no bread, but it would find you God, freedom, and immortality." Without making any so lofty claim for it, I maintain that as its subject is just that widest aspect of things which is the object of the inner life, its pursuit as a study may be no unimportant aid in realizing to ourselves the reality of that life itself. (It is related of the philosopher Hegel that his landlady, being much distressed at his irreligion, complained one Sunday morning that he did not go to divine service, to which the philosopher is said to have replied, "Das Denken ist auch Gottesdienst.")

In what has gone before I have not been trying to construct a new religion as a substitute for the old one. In so far as I have been dealing with what is called religion at all, I have not been trying either to rehabilitate or to supersede it. (I have only been trying to show that when all is said for and against religion, as it is commonly understood, there remains as the inmost sanctuary of the human mind a sense of relationship with an eternal order.) This order is at once "not ourselves" in that we did not make it, and our true selves in that we only truly live in so far as we work for it and with it. And if this be so, I wish to suggest, in conclusion, that it is time we were done with mere negation in the region of the soul. The views about this that many occupy themselves in exposing are themselves already dead, and "the mere negation of what is dead is dead too." "The problem," says Carlyle in his "Characteristics," "is not now to deny, but to ascertain and perform." To ascertain what the world of fact is and demands of us and to perform it. It is idle to bid us separate these two and to call us to performance while we give up the ascertainment as hopeless and irrelevant. I have tried to show that it is not irrelevant; I believe it is far from

\* Quoted in Wallace's Schopenhauer, Great Writer Series, p. 95.

hopeless. Whether we have as yet truly ascertained the meaning of it all is another question. (All I claim is that we are on the right lines if we cling to the great watchwords of our own time,—Evolution, Progress, Organic Order. Man's thoughts on these will be the soil from which the inner life will in future spring, or, to revert to my former simile, the support round which our deepest emotions will twine themselves. That inner life, these emotions, will be much the same as they have been in all ages. They have been the most powerful creative force in human life in the past. They will continue to be so in the future. "From that mystic region and from that alone," says Carlyle in a similar connection in the essay I have just quoted, "all wonders, all poesies and religious and social systems, have proceeded: the like wonders and greater and higher lie slumbering there."

J. H. MUIRHEAD.

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## MORAL THEORY AND PRACTICE.

IN the first number of this journal four writers touch upon the same question,—the relation of moral theory to moral practice. Professor Sidgwick touches it incidentally in raising the query whether what is wanted is not moral insight as much as reinforcement of moral motives; Mr. Adler touches it in discussing the relation of the organization and work of ethical societies to ethical theory; Mr. Bosanquet has one of its aspects for his subject in discussing the functions of such societies in promulgating moral ideas; and, finally, Mr. Salter is led to conceive that a great service to moral philosophy has been the fact that it has separated the "ought" from judgment as to what is, and thus kept open a region beyond science.

If any one of these writers had happened to find it within his scope directly to discuss the question of the relation of moral theory and practice, it is not likely that this article would ever have been written, but finding the subject touched

upon, without direct analysis, in so many ways, I was led to attempt to clear up my own ideas. The very presence of four such articles seems to indicate that the question is in the air, and that, therefore, any moderately rational effort to clear it up for one's self may not be without interest. If Mr. Adler and Mr. Salter seem to be made the objects of my remarks in this clearing-up process, I hope it will not be attributed to a polemic spirit. Rather than seek some more impersonal, and therefore more remote, form of statement, it seems good to let the tensions discharge as they first arose; and it is through these articles of my friends that they arose.

It seems to me that I can detect in much of current ethical discussion a lurking idea that moral conduct is something other than, or over and above, conduct itself,—understanding by conduct distinctively human action, that based upon and realizing ideas. Because the notion lurks it is difficult to dislodge,—all the more when the lurking is so evanescent that one feels, in attacking it, as if the holder of its fortress might himself disown its presence. But there is an ally of this idea which is not indeed marshalled in open array upon the battlefield, but about whose presence there can be no doubt,—the idea that moral theory is something other than, or something beyond, an analysis of conduct,—the idea that it is not simply and wholly “the theory of practice.”<sup>1</sup> Moral theory, for example, is often regarded as an attempt to find a philosophic “basis” or foundation for moral activity in something beyond that activity itself. Now, then, when the question comes up as to the relation of moral theory and moral conduct, the man who denies any intrinsic connection is without doubt in possession. One will hardly have the hardihood to stand and assert that until the Platonic, or the Kantian, or the Spenserian system of philosophy has been “proved,” moral activity is impossible. Again, moral theory is not seldom conceived as, in Mill's phrase, a nautical almanac, or an ethical prescription or cook-book,—a collection of “rules” for conduct. When this view of moral theory is held, I, for one, shall not say nay to the man who states that there is no intrinsic connection between theory and practice. The hortatory pulpit and its

modern congener and heir-apparent, the editorial page of the newspaper, may be left to uphold the idea that precepts are the great moral force of the world. But yet it does not go assured that there is no intrinsic relation between theory and practice. The trouble may be, after all, in an aborted conception of theory.

What, then, is moral theory? It is all one with moral *insight*, and moral insight is the recognition of the relationships in hand. This is a very tame and prosaic conception. It makes moral insight, and therefore moral theory, consist simply in the every-day workings of the same ordinary intelligence that measures dry-goods, drives nails, sells wheat, and invents the telephone. There is no more halo about the insight that determines what I should do in this catastrophe of life when the foundations are upheaving and my bent for eternity lies waiting to be fixed, than in that which determines whether commercial conditions favor heavy or light purchases. There is nothing more divine or transcendental in resolving how to save my degraded neighbor than in the resolving of a problem in algebra, or in the mastery of Mill's theory of induction. It may be well to bow with bated breath before every working of intelligence, but to baptize moral insight with any peculiar sacredness is to find a changeling in our hands,—sentimentalism.

Moral theory, then, is the analytic perception of the conditions and relations in hand in a given act,—it is the action *in idea*. It is the construction of the act in thought against its outward construction. *It is, therefore, the doing,—the act itself, in its emerging.* So far are we from any divorce of moral theory and practice that theory is the ideal act, and conduct is the executed insight. This is our thesis.

It is true a man can walk without a certain kind of knowledge of the process of locomotion; that he can eat without a certain kind of knowledge of foods and of digestive processes.\* But if this is to prove that conduct is other than an expression of "theory," of the conceptions of intelligence, the basis of this analogy must be looked after. A man can plough with-

\* See in Mr. Adler's article, vol. i. No. 1, pp. 20, 21.

out a knowledge of aeronautics, but this hardly proves that ploughing comes before a knowledge of how to plough, and that the knowledge of how to plough is gleaned from reflecting upon the various acts of ploughing already performed. A man may talk through a telephone without understanding the theory of its construction, but it would hardly be a safe inference that therefore he could talk through it without knowing what he was going to say, much less without knowing how to talk. The child who walks may not "understand the mechanism of locomotion," but he had once painfully and slowly to form a theory of walking none the less. I should hardly know where to find a better example of the dependence of conduct upon theory than the toil of learning to interpret and connect those signs upon which the mastery of the act of locomotion rests. And if Mr. Adler thinks the dependence of practice upon theory in locomotion has ceased with adult life, the observation of some patient suffering with complete cutaneous anæsthesia will serve to test the hypothesis. What the well-worn illustrations of walking without knowledge of the theory of locomotion, of reasoning without knowledge of the syllogism, etc., prove is that a man may know some things without knowing others,—others which, in ultimate analysis, are related. Where, however, there is anything which deserves the name of conduct, there is an idea, a "theory," at least as large as the action. Because the theory is narrow in scope it is not lacking; and it is narrow only so far as the corresponding act is abstract and partial. The average man can walk without *much* theory, because walking is not an act of *great* content. The specialist in locomotor diseases, and the painter of men and animals in motion, finds in his larger activity a knowledge of the mechanism not out of place.

And I hope the reader will not miss the point in the illustrations. For any *act* (as distinct from mere impulse) there must be "theory," and the wider the act, the greater its import, the more exigent the demand for theory. It is not likely that the wheels of moral movement are to be reversed after two thousand and more years. It was Socrates who initiated the movement, when he said that "an unexamined life is not one

to be led by man." Whatever may be the case with savages and babes, the beginning of every ethical advance, under conditions of civilized existence, must be in a further "examination of life." Not even customary morality, that of respectability and of convention, is freed from dependence upon theory; it simply lives off the funded results of some once-moving examination of life.\*

Perhaps, however, I shall be told that I am somewhat disingenuous in identifying an idea of action with moral theory; that theory perforce means a reflective and systematic account of things, while an idea means simply a mental conception of what should be done. I hope there is some such objector, for it gives me occasion to say that I think that such a separation of theory from idea is at the root of the confusion which I am trying to clear up. My claim is precisely that an idea of what is to be done and moral theory are identical; that the sole difference between the idea of a child, that he ought to learn the multiplication-table, or be kind to his baby-sister, and the widest moral theory—the one recognized as theory by every one—is simply one of degree of analysis of what practice is, and not a difference of kind. Action to the child is narrow and partial, and his theory is limited.

\* As Mr. Adler never expressly defines what he means by moral theory, his stand-point is, of course, difficult to deal with. But it seems to be taken for granted throughout that moral theory is something apart from the practice of which it is the theory. We are told of "borrowing from the realm of ideas a sufficient reason for accepted rules of action." We are told of motives which are different from professed doctrines, and finally of ethical theory as dealing with ideas *imported* from the region of speculation and of science, etc. (pp. 21, 22). What is this "rule" of action? If it is not an idea, a theory, I should like to know why it is allowed longer to cumber the earth. The morality of external command is no morality at all. Again, men indeed *profess* doctrines which do not touch their characters, but neither do the professions touch their intellects,—*i.e.*, they are not doctrines at all, but dogmas. For a doctrine, a theory, is, I take it, a mode of intellectual activity; a dogma, a burden or load upon intellectual activity. To identify moral theory with ideas imported from outside moral practice without any attempt to justify such a conception of theory is, I submit, a most startling performance. —I should have supposed antecedently that theory is theory of practice. Is it not time that, before an attempt is made to divorce practice from theory, we should have a little effort to define what is meant by theory?

To come to close quarters with what seems to me a radically false notion of moral theory, let us take the council of pundits, called into being by Mr. Bosanquet. The question is regarding the morality of breaking down the responsibility of the parent for the sake of a good to the child. Now the reason that the answer of these pundits, as recorded by Mr. Bosanquet (page 83 of No. 1), is of no special use is not because it is theory, but because it is *not ethical* theory. It seems a truism to remark that every theory is of its own subject-matter, and must be wholly relevant to its subject-matter. And yet this truism is all we need in order to see that the pundits have not given a conclusion in terms of moral theory at all. Conduct is absolutely individualized. Abstract action, action which is not categorical through and through, is the one last contradiction of logic and of life. There is no such thing as conduct in general; conduct is what and where and when and how to the last inch. The pundit, then, who begins his sentence with "If" is engaged in an analysis to reach a conclusion, and not with the conclusion as such at all. If he deserves a place on the council, he will surely decline to consider an abstract case when brought before him. Or, rather, so far as he does consider the abstraction, it will be simply for the sake of the sure-footedness gained in going on to consider the concrete,—to make certain that no important condition has missed due regard in the analysis. He will say, Let me know your specific case in all its concreteness and we will spell it out together, not in order to find some abstract rule under which it may be brought, but in order that we may see what *this* case really is. And the resulting moral "theory" is the theory of the case,—a thorough-going analysis of it. The need for such analysis is simply that the needed action may be truly moral (that is, intelligent practice); that it may meet all the demands of the relationships involved, instead of being one-sided, that is, more or less sentimental.

What I am getting at, in a word, is that the ordinary idea of moral theory shears off the very factors which make it *moral* theory at all and reduces it to the plane of physical theory. Physical science does deal with abstractions, with



hypothesis. It says, "If this, then that." It deals with the relations of conditions and not with facts, or individuals, at all. It says, "I have nothing to do with your concrete falling stone, but I can tell you this, that it is a law of falling bodies that, etc. You must make your own allowances in applying this universal formula to the special case, according to the peculiar circumstances of the special case." Now, the pundit who should allow his final deliverances to go out in the form of "If this, then that," (excepting as a way of saying "I do not know enough of this concrete case to have any theory about it"), would be denying the sole condition of *moral* theory; he would be mutilating the moral fact, the individualized act, till it was a mere bundle of abstractions.

Shall I be told, then, that there can be no such thing as moral theory at all? That it is impossible to get a theory which shall be concrete and individualized as the act is concrete and individualized? Ah, but my objector, there *is* such a thing. Every man, before he acts, always has such a theory unless his act is one of mere impulse. It is true enough that he may not exhaust, that he may never exhaust, all the real concreteness of the act; but none the less his idea of the act is individualized as far as it goes; it may be a smaller individual than the real act, but this does not make it an abstract universal. What he sees, in a word, is *this* act, although the "this" he sees may not be the true complete "this."

What we come to is: Moral theory cannot exist in a book. It is, I believe, a popular superstition to identify science with a lot of formulæ and statements in a book. I have my doubts whether even the physical sciences exist as a lot of general statements held apart from facts; I suspect that our physical sciences have their existence only in our neutral attitude toward the world of fact, that they get real existence only as they become part and parcel of the meaning of the world that we daily perceive. But I am very certain that moral science is *not* a collection of abstract laws, and that it is only in the mind of an agent as an agent. It is his perception of the acts that need doing,—that is, his perception of the existing world of practice in all its concrete relationships.

In last analysis, then, the value of our council of pundits will depend upon this: not whether theory helps practice, but whether the council is capable of the kind of theory demanded. Moral theory, so far as it can exist outside of the particular agent concerned with a special act, exists in the mind of him who can reproduce the condition of that agent. Just because moral practice is so individual or concrete, you can theorize for another only as you "put yourself in his place." Browning's "Martin Relph" or "Clive" is then the model for our band of pundits rather than Kant's "Critique of Practical Reason."\* Put in logical terms, the question is whether our judges can use, in their judgments, the "category" of self, or only that of abstract law.

"This is all aside from the point," I think I shall hear. The question is not whether theory must be back of action, but whether a given theory of ethics, the Kantian, the Hedonistic, the Hegelian, must be behind it. Well, if this is the point, I would it were clearly stated. It is a dangerous procedure which concludes that because moral practice can occur without this or that ethical analysis, therefore there is no intrinsic and absolutely indispensable connection of theory and conduct.

But let us take the point so raised. What shall we say of the relation of an ethical "system," that of Mill or Spencer, to moral conduct? Or, adopting the phraseology of Mr. Bosanquet, let us admit that so far we have been speaking of "moral ideas," and now go on to raise the question of the value of "ideas about morality" for action.

I must revert again to the position already taken. Moral conduct is precisely that which realizes an idea, a conception. The breadth of action (so far as moral value is concerned and not historical outcome) is measured by the insight of the agent. What are the conditions which require action, and what is the action which they demand? Just so far as this question is raised and answered, action is moral and not *merely* instinctive, or sentimental. This is evidently a work

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\* You meet persons who want to argue about such a poem. They are parallel with those who reduce moral theory to a lot of ifs and ans.

of analysis. Like every analysis, it requires that the one making it be in possession of certain working tools. I cannot resolve this practical situation which faces me by merely looking at it. I must attack it with such instruments of analysis as I have at hand. *What we call moral rules are precisely such tools of analysis.* "I ought not to lie." Very well, then, would doing so and so be telling the truth? What is telling the truth in this instance? "I should do as I would be done by." Very well; what would I have done to me in this case? that is to say, what are the personal relations involved here? Some, who would be the first to repudiate the practical consequences in the way of casuistry logically involved, entertain the idea that a moral law is a command: that it actually tells us what we should or should not do! The Golden Rule gives me absolutely no knowledge, of itself, of what I should do. The question of what in this case I should do in order to do as I would be done by has still to be resolved, though the Golden Rule be a thousand times my maxim. The rule is a counsel of perfection; it is a warning that in my analysis of the moral situation (that is, of the conditions of practice) I be impartial as to the effects on me and thee. Or, it is the statement of a principle,—the principle of individuality, that the activity of every man concerned has an equal claim for consideration; that though I be a great Pharisee or the high-priest himself, I am bound to consider the welfare of that miserable sinner of a publican as I would my own. About the specific act to be done it tells, I repeat, not a jot. But it is a most marvellous tool of analysis; it helps me hew straight and fine in clearing out this jungle of relations of practice.

What this rule is, that every rule is, which has any use at all. This is the grain of truth in Mill's idea of a nautical almanac. The almanac, after all, does not tell the sailor where he is nor how to navigate. It is an aid in his analysis of the required conditions of right navigation. In the supreme art of life the tools must be less mechanical; more depends upon the skill of the artist in their manipulation, but they are none the less useful. Our mastery of a required case of action

would be slow and wavering if we had to forge anew our weapons of attack in each instance. The temptation to fall back on the impulse or accident of the moment would be well-nigh irresistible. And so it is well we have our rules at hand, but well only if we have them for *use*.

What is the connection of this, however, with special philosophic systems? Just this: the rule as a tool of analysis is an idea. The Golden Rule is, as suggested, the idea of the value of individuality; the rule of truthfulness is the idea of the transference of media in all human exchanges, etc. A philosophic theory of ethics is a similar idea, but one of deeper grasp, and therefore wider hold. It bears much the same relation to the particular rule as this to the special case. It is a tool for the analysis of its meaning, and thereby a tool for giving it greater affect. It is hardly necessary, I suppose, to profess the deepest respect for the Golden Rule, but this is not inconsistent with recognizing that if it were not held open to reflective criticism, to analysis of meaning and bearing, it would surely degenerate into a mere external command. That it, or any other rule, may be a workable tool, that it may really give aid in a specific case, it must have life and spirit. What can give it the life and spirit necessary to make it other than a cramped and cramping petrification except the continued free play of intelligence upon it?

The Golden Rule itself, in other words, except as an idea among ideas, would speedily become either an external command, a merely speculative abstraction (an ideal with a big I, and no r for reality at all), or that deadest of all dead things, a preacher's mere exhortation. What would this particular rule have amounted to practically if there had not been ideas back of it, which vivified it by taking it out of its isolation, and by making it one element in a vast picture of the world,—the Pauline idea, for example, of a divine spirit incarnate in all mankind, and the Stoic idea of a republic of humanity? And if the Golden Rule now seems to stand and do its work by itself, it is because these other larger ideas, and such as they, have so realized themselves; have died as mere ideas, and been buried in the common consciousness of men, now

arising thence as in effect a normal part of the outlook upon life. They have become so integrated with the content of the Golden Rule that the latter itself has become a vast idea, or working tool, of practice.

Now it will be found, upon examination, that every philosophic theory of ethics performs in its degree this same service. It serves, at its time, to preserve the minor rule, the instrument of the ordinary man, from fossilizing. Let rules be conceived as formal prescripts of some outside law-giver, human or divine, and utilitarianism responds with its new criticism,—its insistence upon their relation to human welfare. Let rules slip away into sickly sentimentalism, or harden into rude militarism, and a Kant responds with his equal assertion of law and freedom.\* And in time these ideas filter into the average consciousness, and their truth becomes, wholly unawares to the average consciousness, a part of the ordinary insight into life,—a part of the meaning of the world of practice in which we live. Life looks different to-day to the man to whom Bentham and Kant are not even names, because of the formulæ of the greatest good, the autonomy of will, and the categorical imperative. In conclusion, it is a piece of scholasticism to suppose that a moral rule has its own self-defining and self-applying content. What truth-telling, what honesty, what patience, what self-respect are change with every change of intelligence, with every added insight into the relations of men and things. It is only the breath of intelligence blowing through such rules that keeps them from the putrefaction which awaits all barren idealities.

There is and can be, then, no rigid line between "ideas about morals" (if only they be really ideas,—movements of intelligence) and "moral ideas." The former are the latter in the making. It is only as our moral ideas, our conceptions of this and that thing which needs doing, are reinforced and reconstructed by larger inquiries into the reality of human relationships that they are preserved. And it is only as our

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\* I hope I shall not be understood as endeavoring to account for the genesis of these ethical systems. I am simply illustrating the part they may play in keeping alive and active moral "rules."

ideas about morals realize themselves, only as they become part of the working behavior of the mind towards its concrete duties, that they are other than curiosities for the collector of the bric-a-brac of thought. That they are other, that the history of ethical thought is a record of profound interest to him who has the eyes to read, is because this history is a history of enlarging action; because moral theories are man's first reconstruction of the moral world into a larger and freer one.

And while it lies somewhat beyond my topic, I cannot refrain from saying that no undertaking is more tedious, because more fruitless, than the attempt to pump up moral motive forces. Set as low an estimate as we please upon the place of knowledge in action, and as high a value as we can upon the emotions, how are we to get the interest, the emotion? People are somewhat tired of hearing, "You ought to do thus and so;" they are somewhat tired of hearing, "If you would only do this and somebody else would do that, and so on, how much better everything would be." This condition of fatigue may be due to the depravity of human nature; but I think it is rather due to its goodness; human nature refuses to be moved except in the one truly human way,—through intelligence. Get the fresher, more open outlook, the refined and clarified intelligence, and the emotions will take care of themselves. They *are* there, and all they need is freeing. And it is, in power and not in word, the truth that makes free. Besides intelligence, I see but two means of moral emergence: that of hortatory preaching and that of some scheme as panacea. And both of these, it seems to me, are but attempts to replace intelligence by argument. And what, after all, is argument but halved—or quartered—intelligence?\*

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\* As Mr. Adler discusses the relations of theory and practice, not *per se*, but in connection with the wisdom of founding an ethical society upon a philosophic system, I may avoid misunderstanding if I say that I am not discussing the latter question even by implication. It is one thing to believe that moral theory is in so chaotic and fractional a state that consciously to build an organization upon some one part of it would lead to formalism and inefficiency. It is surely another to hold that moral practice and moral theory have no essential and intrinsic unity.

But I have another and perhaps a larger wave to face. What is the relation of knowledge, of theory, to that Ought which seems to be the very essence of moral conduct? This is the question raised by Mr. Salter, and, as I understand him, he contends that no amount of science, of knowledge, can establish obligation, either in general or in a particular case. For science is of the "is," duty of the "ought," and the ought is separate from the is.

I hardly know where to begin in dealing with this conception. It opens immense fields of philosophy, both historically (compare, for instance, the movement of German ethics from Kant to Hegel) and theoretically. Besides, I seem to find two minds in Mr. Salter, with one of which I am in most hearty agreement. After contrasting in the blankest manner the world of fact and of morals, he goes on to suggest that moral forces are not only rightfully supreme over the actual forces in the world at any time, but "are so interwoven with the order of things that nothing out of harmony with them can long stand" (p. 117). This would imply that moral forces *are*, and that they do not exist nobody knows where outside the actual world, but are themselves supremely actual. With this view I find myself, as I remarked, in large sympathy; but (aside from the fact that I can see no way of reconciling it with Mr. Salter's other mind) it needs much analysis. If this view means that "justice" and "love" (the moral forces specified by Mr. Salter) are something in themselves, a superfine addendum to the rest of things, or a sort of tempering of the otherwise hard physical forces, I can only confess my incapacity to frame any corresponding conception. If it means that "justice" and "love" are not something in themselves which somehow rule over and sanctify the rest of reality,—morally lawless and unsanctified in itself,—but are the actual forces of reality, taken at a certain angle and scope of working, it conveys intelligibly to me.

But limiting the question as best I can, I should say (first) that the "ought" always rises from and falls back into the "is," and (secondly) that the "ought" is itself an "is,"—the "is" of action.

The "ought" is never its own justification. We ought to do so and so simply because of the existing practical situation ; because of the relationships in which we find ourselves. We may, by an abstraction, which is justifiable enough as a means of analysis, distinguish between what is and what should be ; but this is far from meaning that there is any such separation in reality. Let us take, then, a specific case : Here is a street-car conductor, and the question is whether he should (ought to) join in a strike which his Union has declared. I do not intend to make and resolve some hypothetical case, but simply, in order to get out of that undoubtedly adorable, yet somewhat vague, realm to which we so naturally incline when we discuss obligation, call up the kind of fact which constitutes obligation. The man thinks of his special work, with its hardships, indeed, and yet a work, an activity, and thus a form of freedom or satisfaction ; he thinks of his wage, of what it buys ; of his needs, his clothing, his food, his beer and pipe. He thinks of his family, and of his relations to them ; his need of protecting and helping them on ; his children, that he would educate, and give an even start in the world than he had himself ; he thinks of the families of his fellows ; of the need that they should live decently and advance somewhat ; he thinks of his bonds to his Union ; he calls up the way in which the families of the corporation which employs him live ; he tries to realize the actual state of business, and imagines a possible failure and its consequences, and so on. Now where in this case do we get beyond concrete facts, and what is the "ought" but the outcome of these facts, varying as the facts vary, and expressing simply and only the situation which the facts form, so far as our man has the intelligence to get at it ? And how does this case differ from any case of moral action ?

What has become of moral rules and laws in this case ? I cannot go over the ground already gone over (pp. 193, 194 of this article), but I must repeat that a man's duty is never to obey certain rules ; his duty is always to respond to the nature of the actual demands which he finds made upon him,—demands which do not proceed from abstract rules, nor from



ideals, however awe-inspiring and exalted, but from the concrete relations to men and things in which he finds himself. The rule, at worst and at best, is but an aid towards discriminating what the nature of these relations and demands is. It may be true, as Mr. Salter says, that the Golden Rule does not indicate anything that happens; in the same sense, however, it is true that the law of gravitation does not indicate anything that is. Both laws, as *mere* laws, are abstractions or hypotheses; and to keep them abstractions, to keep them away from the facts, is to keep them from indicating, or pointing to, anything. Taken in any full meaning, the law of gravitation indicates an order of physical fact in which matter behaves thus and so; the Golden Rule indicates an order of social fact, in which it is true that persons act thus and so, and not simply desirable that they should act thus and so. The Golden Rule has no more meaning apart from the real constitution of a social order than the law of gravitation has apart from the real constitution of matter and force.

In a word, a man has not to do Justice and Love and Truth; he has to do justly and truly and lovingly. And this means that he has to respond to the actual relations in which he finds himself. To do truly is to regard the whole situation as far as one sees it, and to see it as far as one can; to do justly is to give a fit and impartial regard to each member of this situation, according to its place in the system; to do lovingly is to make the whole situation one's own, not dividing into parts of which one is a warm *meum* and the other a cold *tuum*.

The correctness of the exact definitions given is a matter, of course, of no importance. The point is that all definitions given must be given in the same terms,—terms, that is, not of mere “oughts,” but of concrete ways of acting in reference to a situation, not unearthly, but of facts. Let, for example, our conductor be fixed upon justice. Now, just so far as he is able to resolve “justice” into specific relations between men and men, so far he will have a definite end in view, and such emotions as are aroused within him will simply quicken him in his effort to realize these relations. But just so

far as he cannot translate "justice" into such actual relations, so far it becomes a sentiment,—it is justice in general, at large. And this sentiment is almost sure to turn into a bitterness of feeling which leads astray,—to a blind feeling that things should be overturned because they are not what they should be.

And every duty, every ought, so far as it is not the outcome of analysis of the situation demanding action, must come to some such mere feeling. The logical consequences of the separation of the "ought" from the "is" is worshipping blind impulses, labelled love of justice, of truth, of humanity. Its final term is the apotheosis of sentiment, of the pious sigh, "Oh, would that things were otherwise!" If the "ought" escapes this mire, it is only to run upon a rock,—the bare, brute fact of "oughtness" with no essential meaning. It stiffens into a rigid external must, imposed no one knows why or how. The attempt to keep the "ought" unrationalized undoubtedly springs from a desire to keep it pure; to free it from dependence upon some ulterior reason, in the sense of a reason behind the act itself. But to deny that the moral act, the "ought," has a meaning behind the act itself is not incompatible with recognizing that the "ought" itself has a reason, that it is a perfect nest of meanings. To evacuate the "ought" of this intrinsic rationale is to drive out all moral quality and render it the compulsion of a superior force. It is only because the "ought" rests upon and expresses the "is" that it is something more than vague, ill-directed sentiment or rigid external command.

If the "ought" and the "is" are so close to each other, where is the relative distinction? Here: the "ought" is the "is" of *action*. There seems to be an opinion that obligation, the "oughtness," is something superadded to the analysis of the act itself; that we may have examined never so thoroughly the content of a proposed act, of some suggested end, without the idea of obligation ever presenting itself, the result being some intellectual judgment regarding bare fact. Some machinery, the exact nature of which I have never found stated, is then called in to clap on the "ought," and thus give a moral aspect to a hitherto coldly intellectual matter.

The creaking, lumbering *Deus ex machina* which in nick of time projects its proper entity upon the stage of human knowledge has, however, so often been replaced by the smooth, swift workings of a single intelligence, that we may gather courage for the hope that the "ought" too is from intelligence rather than a somewhat let down from supernal flies or sprung from an unearthly trap.

It must be remembered that the material of judgment here is practical, not theoretical. The question is not concerning the given state of things, but concerning an end to be adopted; or, rather, it is concerning the bare actual fact only so far as that points to some active outcome, to some end. The difference between a practical and a theoretical consciousness is that the former is consciousness of *something to be done*. And this consciousness of something to be done is the consciousness of duty. Suppose, once more, our conductor. He has thought out, as best he may, the existing situation, and has come to the conclusion that the only act which meets the situation, as he understands it, is to join the strike. Now, does he require some new power of mind to bring in the "ought," and to tell him that this is the act that should be done? The very question he has been considering is a question of action, of practice; what is the especial line of conduct to be followed here? The outcome of his reflections has been just: *This* step is the one to be taken. The difference between saying, "This act is the one to be done, this act will meet the situation," and saying, "The act *ought* to be done," is merely verbal. The analysis of action is from the first an analysis of what is to be done; how, then, should it come out excepting with a "this should be done"? Just as the consciousness of truth is not adventitious to a judgment of fact but constitutes its content, so the consciousness of obligation is not an annex to the judgment of action. Any being who is capable of acting from ideas—that is, whose conduct is the attempted realization of proposed ends—must conceive of these ends in terms of something to be done—of obligation. And that is what is meant by saying not only that the "ought" rests upon and expresses the "is," but that it is itself the "is" of action. What we ordi-

narily call an "is" is simply the "is" of fact at rest. If action, or the following out of ideas, is not a fact, with just the same claims to be considered a part of the real world as a stick or a stone, a planet, or an earthworm, then, and then only, have Mr. Salter's remarks about the separation of the "is" and the "ought," the unverifiableness of moral ideas, the attractiveness and authority of moral ideas apart from facts, and the existence of a domain beyond science, any shred of meaning.

Imagine a scene of ceaseless movement; needs, relations, institutions ever moving on. In the midst of this scene appears an intelligence who identifies himself with the wonderful spectacle of action. He finds that its law is his law, because he *is* only as a member sharing in its needs, constituted by its relations and formed by its institutions. This intelligence would know this scene that he may know himself. He puts forth his grasp, his *Begriff*, and arrests the movement. Taking the movement at a certain point and holding it there, intelligence cuts a cross-section through it to see what it is like. It has now mastered the situation, the case "is" thus and so. Then intelligence removes its brake, its abstracting hold, and the scene moves on. That to which intelligence sees it moving is the "ought to be." The "ought to be" is the larger and fuller activity into which it is the destiny and glory of the present fact to pass.

This, then, is the relation of moral theory and practice. Theory is the cross-section of the given state of action in order to know the conduct that should be; practice is the realization of the idea thus gained: it is theory in action.

JOHN DEWEY.

## MORALS IN HISTORY.

MAN is an historical being. There may be moments in which he feels the past of his race to be an oppressive burden, which weighs him down. For this past is not embodied in his case, as in the case of other living beings, unconsciously in his organization; it forces itself into his consciousness, expanding and deepening it, but also how often confusing it. He loses in energy and freshness of direct volition what he gains in freedom and sureness of discursive judgment. This, however, is not the place to develop the theme which has been recently treated by the distinguished German writer, Friedrich Nietzsche, "On the Advantageous and Disadvantageous Bearings of History on Life." Whatever view may be held concerning this question, it seems to me beyond doubt that even the most active minds and the most radical theories of our time cannot, at least to a certain degree, do without the historical method, and this constitutes perhaps one of the most important characteristics which distinguish the progressive movement at the close of our century from that at the close of the last century. The latter was essentially unhistorical, was indeed opposed to history; for us the work has not been in vain which the nineteenth century has devoted to the experience of the past. And so, perhaps, the coming time will also find the way to that which has been for all former centuries only a beautiful dream, or an abandoned commonplace of the schools; to use the past as an instructive object-lesson for the future, so that what Bacon and Hobbes set up as the aim of science in general shall apply also to history, namely, that the end of knowledge is power.

These thoughts may justify our placing an historical observation at the opening of a literary essay, which is offered not simply in the service of scientific contemplation, but which attempts to aid in the practical building up of the future. On the wide ocean of human life it is necessary to make certain

as to what point one has really reached. What has been often gives distinct indications of what can be and ought to be. Upon closer investigation many a doubt might easily be removed as to the right and feasibility of that which the founders of this quarterly review entertain as their object,—doubts which are always rising afresh out of a traditional and inadequate conception of the past. I will here attempt to specify and with the aid of history to remove some of the doubts which have most often been presented to me, and which are liable to weaken confidence in the future of the ethical movement.

## I.

Of all the speculative sciences, ethics has perhaps had the most difficult fight against the disadvantage of necessarily changeable tendencies of thought. Although the palladium of the eighteenth century was highly prized and enthusiastically guarded, it seemed to be compelled to submit to the fate of an old-fashioned article of dress. The word "virtue," once the embodiment of sublime feelings and noble conduct, can now scarcely be heard without provoking an ambiguous smile. Whatever in morals is still useful seems self-evident; and what is not self-evident is thrown overboard as superfluous ballast and as empty subtilty. Morality, it is said, is a product of the undeveloped art of life of former centuries. What these were unable to effect by more vigorous means was put into commandments, which were placed under the protection of the gods, and were repeated to men again and again as pious aspirations, in hopes of moving their hearts and softening their hard judgments. Find a place, therefore, for morals in the nursery and in the pulpit; science, the science which guides the history of nations and determines their future, has nothing to do with it. Morality, others have said, is not a dynamic but only a static element in human society. Its essential contents have remained the same for centuries. Also its efficiency has remained the same, as is seen by the endlessly-repeated complaints of moralists about the corruption of the world and the depravity of man. If mankind has from

the earliest times known what was morally required of it, and yet has continually sinned against these ancient imperatives, evidently no progress can issue from them, much rather must all real progress which has been made owe its origin to other powers, and it does not pay always to keep pouring new water into this vessel already full of holes.

With a different application and for different ends, the representatives of the church's doctrine of the universe are heard to express a similar thought,—that Christian morality cannot be improved upon, and that man is incapable of living up to the Christian ideal. If, with the former critics, the practical significance of morality and of its scientific formulation, ethics is depreciated in order to favor natural science and political economy, here the same thing is done in order to favor ecclesiastical doctrine and biblical tradition. That stability which, on the one side, is brought forward as an objection to morality, and on account of which it is not counted among the moving forces of the world's history, is claimed by the other side as the special excellence of ecclesiastical and religious ethics; and over against it are held up the fluctuations of moral opinions, the confusing diversity of standards, and the uncertainty of all principles based on them. No morality,—so it is preached on this side,—no morality without authority. And what is the distinguishing feature of authority? The absence of discussion, a unified, closed will. If this be once conceded, there can be no philosophical morality independent of religious authority, but only a morality of the philosophers, and a different kind is conceivable for each person. There are almost as many kinds of morality as there are systems. But if even this manifoldness were much less than it is, the truth would still remain of what Schopenhauer, with correct insight, placed as a motto at the beginning of his essay "On the Foundation of Morals:" "To preach morality is easy; to give the rational ground for it is hard."

What first strikes us in these criticisms is a problem which has occupied ethical investigation to a considerable degree, and for a long time has vexed it. When philosophical reflection first attempted to fix the contents of the moral con-

sciousness in conceptions, one thing appeared by the very contents of this consciousness unavoidably required: moral principles must be thought of as secure against the arbitrariness of the individual, as inviolable, emanating from a higher will, founded in the nature of things and of men, unchangeable. To-day we easily penetrate both what was correctly conceived in this thought and also the optical illusion that accompanied it. That the moral standard by no means arises from the mere wish of the individual, that within it is announced a deliberate will, a power which bends the individual, while at the same time it seeks to lift him up, is also for us a psychological fact, which must be explained, but which dare not be explained away. But the independence of moral principles as regards the will of the individual has nothing at all in common with their unchangeableness. A glance at the history of morals, as it to-day lies widely extended before us, shows us the solution of the riddle, it reveals independence and changeableness always and everywhere side by side. So far as we are acquainted with men in social community, the will of the community speaks to the individual concerning his practical conduct with authority. Authority of the family, of the teachers, of public opinion, of priests, of judges; finally, as an inner appropriation of the will of these authorities, the authority of conscience, of practical reason, which naturally exists only in the individual, but through friction with the community becomes filled with a universally valid content. Every human being who is born into an organized community finds in it a ~~common will~~, and certain practical standards were already completed in it; he has not made them, he has not been asked whether he would give his assent to them; he is told: "It has always been so, it shall be so in the future;" and if he seeks to change things he will everywhere strike hard against the surrounding will, which is stronger than his own. Its commands often seem to the individual to be without any reason, to be mere authority, to be a hard fact, to which one must adapt one's self. Their origin is lost in the mysterious darkness of primitive times, or of divine revelation; continuous development has covered it over.



Here is the cause of that optical illusion of which I spoke. What the individual has not seen come into existence seems to him to have existed without a beginning, and that over which no power is granted to him, seems unchangeable. It is science which first extends the individual's circle of experience. The study of history does for him in sociology what the telescope and microscope do in natural science. The conscience of the individual exhibits the moral standard as unchangeable and without beginning; historical investigation shows that they shift and advance continually along with the change of generations and civilizations. It is here as in other departments of knowledge. To the *naïve* consciousness the "earth" seems to lie fixed under foot, as the eternally unchangeable theatre of all that happens there and that passes by like fleeting shadows of clouds; to the eye schooled by science, the earth reveals itself every moment as the result of a long process of change, as the hoary product of time, which is subject incessantly to the transforming influence of the same forces which have made it. And unchangeably, like the "eternal" earth itself, seemed also the races of living beings upon it to propagate their like, species for species, according to the same inviolable law, the same plant springing from the same seed, and the same germ producing the same animal as it did thousands of years ago.

This old biological principle of the constancy and unchangeableness of species and its displacement, or rather transformation by the theory of evolution, offers, perhaps, the best parallel to the old ethical belief in the unchangeableness of moral laws. The modification of species and the development which the biology of our century has shown to be the fundamental law of organized life, dominate also the expressions of life in the social organism. Morality, too, is a product of evolution, and is in a state of continual transformation. We understand this process since we have penetrated the mystery of great effects out of small causes. That commanding will of the community is a phenomenon consisting of an accumulation of elements; and the work-shop where those gigantic energies are made ready, which seem to press

down upon the individual, is still nothing else than the conscience of individuals themselves. For there takes place, quietly but unavoidably, that judgment concerning the worth of what the outside authorities require. In those inner heart-struggles, of the tragedy of which all personal, confidential history is full, the individual will is wrestling with the communal will. Now at first resentful and indignant, and then upon riper experience overcome, although, perhaps, by the inner reasonableness itself of the thing contended against. At another time, perhaps, docile at first, but gradually with even greater surety and confidence, recasting in the fire of one's own enthusiasm the standards and ideals which authority had bequeathed. In these struggles many tears are shed, which fall on hard rock until they finally wear it away. Many sighs are uttered, although not heard; and how often do the conquerors, whose valuations of moral worth will be appreciated only in the future, pay for the victory of their will with the bitterest sacrifice of outward happiness. For in some form or other the authority of the communal will always has the cross ready for those who assume a higher way of thinking and living, and who "reveal to the rabble their inner vision."

Morality is a product of evolution, we said before. But all evolution—so teaches biology—is adaptation of the organic individual to the changeable conditions of its environment. The sum of the ethical principles or ideals, which at any time are current in any nation, presents nothing else, therefore, than the conception of all that is reciprocally required in a practical direction of its members, for the advantage and profit of the community and the individual persons in it. The requirements of social adaptation are raised into the consciousness of the community. What these are can only be determined with regard to the given social conditions taken together. If we suppose the case of a society that has radically erred as to its requirements, the consequence of such a false adaptation would be, as with any other living being, destruction. But it can only be determined by experiences which have been passed through, and by valuations of conduct which

have become generally current through experience and have entered into the general consciousness.

If we reflect upon this point, we easily perceive that full harmony between the practical needs of a time and its ethics, even in the most favorable case, can only be a transitory one. The moral ideas which are prevailing in the general consciousness are always a step behind the times; what to-day is believed and professed by all was yesterday the conviction of a select circle, and the day before yesterday the signal for martyrdom. Under the action of this idea, at first held by a few and now become universal, the times themselves have become something else, and new needs make themselves felt. The masses still swear by the old gospel; only a few thoughtful and finely organized natures feel, under the cover of the old faith, the pulse-beat of the new and try to change their practice to suit these symptoms. This is a characteristic which all great mental crises—the rise of Christianity, the reformation, the eighteenth century—have clearly manifested, and which we in the highest measure see exhibited before our eyes in the socialistic movement of the day.

And what are the conditions which enable the individual will to carry out its own ideals over against the current ones, to establish a new law and transform the general will? None other than those upon which the formation of new organs in general is dependent. The new principles must be of assistance to felt needs; they must be founded in the vital relations of the social body; men must feel that through the new principles fresh energies awaken in them and old injuries are brought to an end. (This foundation in the nature of things and of men, this fruitful quickening energy is what distinguishes the world-historical ideal from the dream of a hot-brained enthusiast; in it must the many, who have eaten their bread with tears and in the still hours have hungered and thirsted after righteousness, find expressed what has moved them in their innermost being, what they have darkly conceived, but have not been able to express, or to bring into currency against the overpowering will of their environment.

Starting with this in sight, one must describe the notion of

the absolute immutability of morality as equally erroneous with the opposite notion, represented by scepticism in all times, which overlooked the constant features in morality in attending to its variable elements. Neither notion can stand the test of a severe biological experiment. Both owe their origin to an essentially unhistorical method. It is easy to bring together from the ethical writings and the history of morals among different peoples a list of quite identical rules of conduct and moral customs, as Buckle did, in order to show that morality has made no progress at all in thousands of years, that what it can call its own possession has been believed in,—to use the formula of the Roman Church,—“*semper ubique, ab omnibus*.” It is equally easy, with Hume and other leading thinkers, to prove from the same sources that such a thing as a common moral basis for the human race does not exist at all,—that here, instead of unity and unchangeableness, the most variegated manifoldness, indeed a chaotic confusion, prevails.

The same holds good if one, leaving the wide historical point of view, directs his gaze to a narrower connection,—the development of Christian morals. Here also the Roman Catholic dogmatist and church historian can, with an appearance of success and justification, resort ever again to the artifice of proving that the whole development of doctrine in his church is already contained, as in a seed, in the gospels; or the Protestant scholar can present the evangelical church congregation of the nineteenth century as a copy of original Christianity. From the point of view of unbiased investigation we must smile over the one as over the other, and yet we must recognize that a little grain of truth lies in both conceptions, that even Christian ethics, as taught in the different confessions to-day, is a product of evolution, which in all changes has retained a certain fundamental type, and we cannot deny the connection with its original form.

A glance at modern biology might best elucidate the matter. We would scarcely attribute even the beginnings of scientific insight to the biologist, who would to-day, on account of the immeasurable fulness of organized forms, see only the

manifoldness and the chaos ; and, on the other hand, we would justly refer the natural philosopher, who would undertake to construct all those varieties of forms perhaps out of one single fundamental form, to speculation concerning the manifoldness of nature. Ever more and more definitely before the eyes of the investigator there arises out of the apparently confusing manifoldness a fundamental type of organic forms of life ; it remains the task of science, while at the same time investigating this unity, which as such nowhere exists but is only imaginary, to attempt to understand the laws and conditions of its highly varied manifestations. Society is the highest organism which we know,—an organism, the cells of which have consciousness. Morality we have defined as the sum of what this organism for the purpose of its preservation and the development of its members requires, raised into the consciousness of the community.

Now, to speak biologically, it is self-evident that certain requirements in every social organism just as typically return as certain fundamental forms in the manifoldness of plant and animal organisms. But this typical regularity as little constitutes the concrete morality of any given culture as that organic fundamental type makes its appearance in any one special living being. It contains nothing further than the general physiological conditions for the existence of organic life in general. But the richness of its morphological structure is in detail modelled and formed by the definite relations of development. And although certain principles recur in the moral systems of all civilized peoples, still it would be blindness to the living reality to regard them therefore simply as identical, without considering how different the position can be, which the same commandment takes in the whole system of life.

## II.

From this point also the question may be settled, whether there is progress in morality. This question is weighted down with numerous misunderstandings due to inexact analysis. I shall, therefore, try at the outset to fix more exactly the possible meaning of the question.

It may be taken to mean, whether there is progress in morality as a system of principles for the practical conduct of man, whether there is a higher construction of moral ideals. This question has sometimes been described as essentially a blunder. Attention is called to the fact that the moral ideals of every time and people, according to the definition given above, are nothing else than a product of a definite stage of development; that they, therefore, may be judged only according to the service which they render to the social body in question, and that a judgment as to their worth irrespective of this concrete connection is irrational. As little as a student of nature would prefer phanerogamic to cryptogamic plants or echinodermata to coelenterata, as little as he would place the coal age above the jurassic period, so little could any one compare the ethics of the Indo-brahmanic culture with that of the Mohammedan or Greek, or both with that of our modern European culture. No one of these great systems of practical conduct and social order can be better than the other; each is exactly as good as the eye of the most far-seeing and the best had attained in the whole of the civilized world to which it owed its origin.

But these reflections hit the mark only in part. They are valid as a warning against hasty analogies between unrelated systems, against thoughtless judgment and condemnation of historical phenomena of morals, before one has scarcely learned their inner cause, their *raison d'être*, and before one has assured one's self what the condemned practice meant under the conditions of life in those times. It would equally be a sign of partiality, if we should refuse to make any relative valuations. Even the biologist does not refuse to do so. The continuous organic development has spread out before him an infinite variety of forms, in which the organic life becomes ever more richly differentiated, integrated towards even greater unity, and on the whole appears always more efficient in function. He, therefore, is quite right in constructing ascending and descending curves, and in gauging the relative perfection of single groups with one another, according to what they from an historical evolutionary point of view may signify; he

will also compare the animal and plant worlds of different periods with one another, and will undoubtedly speak of a progress in nature. This would not be dragging foreign categories into the matter, but only measuring nature by herself, by her own productions.

In just the same manner may the student of ethics proceed. The moral development of mankind itself, which he pursues through the thousands of years of its growth, forces upon his sight an ideal of social moral life, the outlines of which to a certain extent must be indistinct, but which, if he knows how to see and hear, still will express an inward tendency of the whole development, and for that very reason can be used as a standard for measuring the separate facts. We surmise to-day the possibility of a condition in which the supremacy of man over nature—that presupposition of all civilization—will not be bought with extreme slavery and an unjust treatment of the greater part of mankind; a condition in which the necessary action and reaction between individuals and society will be regulated in such a way that the individual can be active with all his best energies in the service of the community, and society will apply its inexhaustible resources to conferring upon all individuals the outward and inward conditions for the unfoldment of their personality. The circle is becoming continually greater of those over whom the strict import of the conception of humanity is extended; over the circle of the family, of the tribe, of believers in the same faith, of cast; this ideal of humanity is stretching also beyond the limits of the great nations, and is awaking a cosmopolitan feeling of universal solidarity among men. At the same time the contents of this conception is deepening; to-day we are well aware that true humanity does not dispense alms but rights, and tries to develop energies where before oppression and weakness reigned. And so the development of humanity is accompanied by an increasing tenderness towards individuals within the limits unchangeably set by the needs of the community. Also more exactly fitted to the ends, that is, more rational, are becoming the means by which we strive to actualize our ideals; the consciousness is continually becoming

clearer, with which all moral principles and judgments are referred to what they signify for the welfare of the race and for its capacity to develop.

Hegel, in his grandiose manner, once tried to delineate with three strokes the inner course of the world's history in saying, "In antiquity and the East one person is free; in the civilization of classic antiquity and of the European Middle Ages a few persons are free; but it is the aim of history that all shall be free." If we interpret the idea of freedom to mean that which alone it can mean in the sense of our present social ethics, the idea of morally completed personality, together with the indispensable outward conditions as the basis of the moral life, we have thereby delineated, in fact, the highest which we can expect from the development of mankind.

Can it be called imposing alien arbitrary standards, when we take into account the individual phases of human culture, their ethical ideals and the practical application of these, what they have contributed to the advancement of that object, or how they are related to it? To me this seems to be as little the case as when the biologist compares the flora and fauna of former periods of the earth with the present forms of organic life, and notes in the former enormous waste of energy and bulk, the relative poverty of forms, the inadequate development of the organic functions in comparison with the later achievements of nature. This judgment as to relative worth is as unavoidable as the perception of the necessity that at that time no higher achievement was possible. It is the same in the history of the moral world.

Many of the moral ideals and forms of life of which history informs us, appear to us to-day as strange and remarkable as the picture of the earth, when, according to the descriptions of palæontologists, the mainland was covered with those gigantic fern forests, which furnish us to-day, in the form of coal, with warmth and light, or was peopled with mammoths. Only to a much greater extent do such survivals of human development affect our existence than those past periods of the earth's history. I do not speak of the East and the scarce remains of uncivilized tribes; Europe also is full of such rarities, and



especially in our century has much which was regarded as buried shown itself, to the astonishment of all, to be thoroughly alive.

We may perfectly understand these things in their remote origin, and in their former utility, without therefore excusing everything in them, that is, without regarding them as legitimate, also for the future. Their historical efficiency, which we are in a position to observe, has brought much to light which in their cradle was not recognizable, has shown up many an error, has made many a means obsolete, has overthrown many a principle. Certainly every advance of evolution must be bought with certain sacrifices. Many great features of the older ideals, many a gain of the past order of life, many characteristics of the former type of man have passed away never to return, or, if at all, can be won back only by a long round-about journey. Throughout the literature of all modern nations is heard a sigh for the lost beauty of ancient Greece, the "kalokagathia" of the human race, physically and ethically developed. Perhaps the poets of coming centuries, with the same yearning which is uttered in Schiller's "Gods of Greece," will sing of the secret mysteries of the Christian faith and of the foreboding awe with which they filled the men of a former time. The poets may allow themselves both these things; but the historian of civilization and students of ethics will also see the other side of the matter, and earnestly compel himself to remember the ground of slavery, delusion, persecution, and narrow-minded inhumanity on which those splendors were reared.

The question, therefore, whether there is progress in moral ideals and principles, is the same as if it were asked, whether there is in mankind any progress in general. Only blindness can deny that there is. Whoever compares life to-day in its tendencies with former periods sees quickly that we are undertaking to solve problems about which men formerly did not think at all, or that we attempt through the unified forces of social organization to achieve what was formerly laid wholly upon the weak shoulders of the individual. But with the greatness of the task assumed, with the mass of those

upon whom it bears, grows also the difficulty of the solution, and this difficulty is both external and internal.

This leads us to another meaning of the question as to the progress of morality. "The moral ideals may advance, but do men become therefore better?" "Through all centuries complaint is heard about the corruption and degradation of men, about the inadequate actualization of moral ideals, about the moral deficit that can in no way be cancelled, which one generation hands over to an other. Is this an illusion? Is progress, also in this sense, taking place?" Here we seem to be confronted by a problem of the solution of which even the boldest statistician must despair. Still if the morality of the individual, the degree of his inward adaptation to the ethical requirements of his times and of his nation, is a quite incommensurable factor, the determination of which, in many cases, would only be successfully attempted by an all-knowing judge, how could it be possible to appraise aright the moral efficiency of whole generations over against each other? A hopeless undertaking indeed!

To be sure, in historical presentations, certain periods are by preference described as times of social corruption and moral decay, while others are honored with epithets of praise for their moral purity and the like, but upon closer observation it becomes clear that this old-fashioned moralizing method can give the ethical student no real advantage in dealing with our problem. Those praised ages of "simplicity and purity" are for the most part periods of very primitive and undeveloped conditions of life, in which only narrow tasks of civilization are to be performed, and the demands upon the individual's capacity for adaptation are very moderate, while the natural instincts and the moral ideals still lie very near together; but he who would turn back with Rousseau's yearning to the idyls of "the good and happy savage," should be reminded that under such circumstances, indeed, certain moral obliquities are apt to be lacking, which especially appear in a highly advanced state of culture, and constitute a favorite theme with historians, who paint pictures of manners; but that in their place, upon closer study, other defects are to be noticed, such

as naturally fitted the total circumstances of that age. For the pressure of the universal will upon the particular is from the beginning of social life unavoidable, and with this coercion begins a certain mutiny and transgression. Finally, it is to be remembered that as a rule in such condemnation of whole ages as morally corrupt, only special nations or classes of people are taken into the account, and that accordingly no inference from such phenomena can be made as to whether there is in the whole system of human civilization a rising or sinking of moral adaptation. While the prevailing Roman life wastes its energy and dignity in wild excesses, new moral ideals and enthusiastic resolutions grow up under its feet in Christianity; while Oriental Christianity is inwardly desolated by dogmatic subtleties, and is exhausted through endless divisions, it collapses beyond rescue before the more simple moral truths of Islam. The same process is continually repeated. The much-complained-of time of the decline of mediæval morality is only the disintegration of the knightly monastic ideal of life and its replacement through new moral conceptions which had grown in the bosom of the citizen class. And a similar process is completing itself before our eyes at present. The Bourgeoisie, with no other object than to retain as well as possible its acquired possessions, and to make the greatest possible use of them for pleasure, beholds with uneasy astonishment and with inadequate comprehension a number of new socialistic notions spring up out of the lap of the proletariat, which undoubtedly, after a proper amount of clashing with the moral forces of the old time, will dissolve the practical view of life of the citizen class in the same way as this once displaced the church-feudal idea.

If one keeps this in mind, the task of making any statement as to the growth of subjective morality in the human race seems almost impossible. At the risk of being accused of extravagant optimism, I should nevertheless like to submit to the consideration of the reader an hypothesis, which may at least claim a certain probability. It might perhaps be allowable to affirm that within any epoch of moral culture, the average man attains an average adaptation to the current

standard, while a relatively much smaller number do not come at all near to the normal moral type, or they show it in some striking distortion, and a still smaller fraction of the whole may be regarded as an excellent embodiment of the prevailing type. Finally, the smallest per cent. will consist of the more than normal men,—as such we may describe those minds, rare in any age, which, anticipating their fellow-men, already represent the moral thoughts of the future.

I renounce every attempt to express these relations in numbers, which could only rest on arbitrary assumptions, and I should simply like to express it as my opinion that, on the whole, these inner relations of morality remain unchanged, although, in accord with what has already been said, quite important shifting may take place at special times and in special stages. For it goes without saying that the relative numerical proportions of these four groups are different in times of progressive development from what they are during retrogressive evolution, in times of strong mental activity, from what they are during quiet periods of rest. But if one includes longer reaches of times or a whole circle of civilization, these differences cancel one another and leave the fundamental relation unchanged, which seems to lie in the essence of moral development.

Nevertheless the class, at all times large, of the *laudatores temporis acti* may possibly in a certain sense be right in thinking that, considered from the highest historical point of view, subjective morality—that is, the conformity of individuals to the standard—relatively declines as the higher elaboration of the moral ideals advances. This sounds at first very paradoxical and not very consoling; morality is said to grow ever finer and better and men worse; what would the out-come be? But one need not let one's self be led astray by this. Looked at in the light, this expresses only a necessary consequence of evolution. In the first place, there is nothing astonishing in the fact that the ideal requirements of man for practice advance more quickly than the capacity of the masses to conform thereto. Every enrichment and advance of the moral ideal which attains historical currency modifies as

quickly the standard of judgment, and much that to-day could still pass as normal must be described to-morrow in the light of new ideal requirements as subnormal. And the more complicated the texture of human society becomes, and the less the ideal forms of practical conduct which arise out of it harmonize with the natural forms, so much the more difficult becomes of course the adaptation,—according to the same biological law by which the disturbances that an organism is exposed to increase in geometrical relation according to the degree of complexity.

But much more important for the clearing up of this paradox is a certain other circumstance. The development of moral ideals is not simply intensive, but at the same time extensive; they do not only suffer an ever finer elaboration and purification, but they require to be applied as the standard to an ever-widening circle of mankind. Every social legislation which binds the individual originally reaches only to the nearest surroundings: blood relations, tribal relations, members of the same caste or station in life. One no more goes to the barbarian and the savage, the slave and the members of the proletariat, the infidel and the heretic, demanding moral worth and ideal development of personality, than one feels one's self under obligations to help him to attain it, or to recognize in him the moral personality. He remains for a long time outside the circle to which moral judgments and duties apply; or these apply to him only in the weakest form in which one is accustomed to apply them, in the association of man with the animal world. The advancing development of moral ideas strives more and more to break through these limitations; to substitute state morality for class morality, international for national, human for confessional morality. But it is clear that with this extension of the social reach of moral demands, the difficulties of really penetrating and controlling the new region embraced increase infinitely. Where formerly perfect discharge of duty seemed to prevail, as long as the moral dictation and judgment were limited to a narrow circle, there are discovered yawning chasms, as soon as the point of view in general has become so much higher. A

moral ideal, which in the smaller circle of a class or of a little community is perhaps able to influence the practical conduct of the majority, appears like a hopeless requirement, when applied to other and much greater relations and groups of men; and these themselves in its light appear backward and undeveloped. The conformity which in the case appeared already complete, seems now suddenly to have been removed into the distance; but the apparent loss of the present is the hope of the future.

Let us take the three thoughts which express the boldest advance in our time of the moral will beyond the established facts: the international unity of peace among civilized races, the overcoming of religious prejudices by means of human ethics, and the social and moral emancipation of the proletariat. From the moment when these thoughts with any definiteness assert themselves as moving ideas, a number of practices and institutions must fall into condemnation, or at least depreciation, although heretofore they have not lacked honorable recognition; but the difficulty of bringing about a moral conformity in those widely-extended circles over which these ideals stretch is so great, that at first and for an indefinite time the reality must remain far behind the model; and, if we nevertheless make it the measure of worth in judging the actual practices, the progress of objective morality, or the moral idea, must have as its consequence, an undeniable retrogression in subjective morality,—that is, a decrease of conformity to the model.

But this need by no means be the last word of historical development: continual progress in human ideals, continually more hopeless dragging behind of achievement and of actual institutions. Intelligence carries illumination into unknown paths which no one as yet has traversed, and it is only natural that this solitary light should make the surrounding darkness blacker, and many dusky larvæ are allured out of their holes, where till then they had been housed undisturbed. But the will finds the means of achieving what is clearly conceived. We have no occasion to be distrustful of the energies of our race. If we could have presented

to a Greek of the best time a picture of the existing moral culture of mankind to-day, and its pursuits of peace, he would have smiled at it as an impossible creation of fancy. There are many in the midst of our civilization who think themselves far superior to that Greek in wisdom, and yet who have no whit more insight than he, when one speaks to them of things still to be aspired after and attained; there are many who regard the insight and power of the last ten years, and the established order of things which at the time is to their satisfaction, to be the highest reach of humanity; and with self-satisfied resignation they "oppose the fist infernal" of denial "to the actively eternal, creative force, in cold disdain."

"*Huc usque*: who will go beyond is a dreamer and a utopian." Who knows? Perhaps these utopians are the true realists? Who has not often had the feeling that what we with pride call "our culture," and what our panegyrists with bold eagerness praise as the ripe growth of centuries, is a childish piece of bungling work; that our grandchildren must look down upon it with the feeling with which an artist or thinker from the height of his creation regards the first sketches in which he tried his strength,—a strange feeling made up of sympathy and aversion.

This, indeed, cannot be proved like a mathematical proposition; it is a belief; but not an irrational or a supernatural belief, rather one that rests upon the analogy of previous evolution.

What makes it still stronger is a circumstance which, in the comparisons of our time and of the difficulties of our civilization with former centuries, is generally overlooked: the increasing influence which our scientific knowledge must exercise, not only upon the industrial but also upon the social instinct. Daily do the indications become more numerous of the disappearance of the fanciful notion that we can make men happier and more nearly perfect only by means of inventions and machinery. The conviction is making rapid strides that even the widest lordship of man over nature must ultimately be a curse to the ruler himself, unless he succeeds

in establishing the more beautiful and important supremacy over man; that is, over the natural forces in his own breast,—the brutality of passion, the hardness of egoism, and the crudity of moral ignorance. But this can be the work only of scientific knowledge and of its increasing application to social ethical problems. Even for the right moral regulation of the individual life, the good-will is impotent if it does not appear joined with rational insight. The attempt to give a moral direction to the social body is miserable quackery, unless ripened historical and philosophical insight has guided the pen in making out such prescriptions. And scarcely a worse delusion can be thought of than that which believes that it can cure the moral and social crimes of our age with old-woman remedies, with the authorities and traditions of past centuries, and which accordingly has contempt for reason and science. Indeed, even for science with her speculations concerning life, an earnest warning is contained here, not to forget what life demands of her. And so these considerations may close with the words of a gifted woman,\* which, with the clear penetration of disinterestedness, express our wishes in the most exact form, and would make the best motto I know of, to place in the front of this Review: "It fares ill with mankind and things will only get better, when our philosophers know more of the world and the world knows more of the philosophers."

FR. JODL.

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\* Marie von Ebner Eschenbach.



## THE ETHICS OF DOUBT—CARDINAL NEWMAN.

THERE are good reasons for what has been called the "Newman worship." We have all been offering our tribute to his memory. All classes of minds have expressed their enthusiasm. The reverence for the man was not limited to those persons who shared his faith. It is a remarkable circumstance that many persons whom Newman would have repudiated, whom he would have looked upon as enemies of society and the human soul, because of the tendency of their views, nevertheless have been able to turn to him for help and stimulus, and to look upon him as one of their great teachers and helpers. We find ourselves going sometimes to the writings of Newman for guidance and help, just as at other times we go to Emerson. And yet it would be difficult to conceive of two men more widely divergent in their elemental convictions. It is true this man is more especially a great authority in one particular church. From this stand-point naturally he would be an aid in that direction only to such persons as sympathize with him in his personal views on religion. But there were also certain universal elements to the man and to his teachings. There was an ethical trend in his character and spirit, which lifted him above any one sect or creed and made him a power to all classes of serious minds. It would almost seem as though the especial influence which is excited upon us at the present day by his thought, comes from his very antagonism to what is the conspicuous feature in the intellectual life of our century,—the prevalence of doubt, and the growth of rationalism.

It has been no mere popular enthusiasm for a great man which has awakened so much regret for this individual. It is true that at the present day the custom is growing of paying tribute to strong qualities of mind and will, whether or not people sympathize with their tendency. We are naturally in awe of giant individuals, of men who display remarkable

courage and daring whether in the church or in the state. A person who combines those elements with large gifts of intellect will usually call forth almost universal admiration. Newman certainly possessed all the gifts and qualities of greatness. He had wonderful intensity of feeling, a powerful insight into human affairs, and an intellect so perfect as to move with almost clockwork correctness at his bidding. A combination of this kind is certainly very rare. The great mind is liable to be cold. The men with powerful feelings are given to running off on a tangent; we can seldom prophesy what will be the next move of an enthusiast. In this case, however, we have all the ardor and intensity of the most daring genius, preserved in equipoise by an almost perfect intellect. If this worship of Newman, as some persons have named it, had sprung from a mere passion for admiring greatness, it would not have existed among so many different classes of minds. Philosophy is not much given to hero-worship.

My own impression is that the universal regard for him is, however, moral rather than intellectual. It has been a commonplace remark at all times that men are disposed especially to esteem those virtues or gifts which are lacking in themselves. It may be equally true that the deep regard of an age may concentrate itself particularly on some one individual who has certain qualities that are rare and unusual at that period. Newman did have one element of character which is noticeably absent among the stronger minds of our century. There have been times in past history when this man would have been one of a thousand. Had he lived in that age, his name would scarcely have come down to us from among that vast number. Perhaps the same reason which would lead us now to single out from the Middle Ages the mind of a Roger Bacon, a Galileo, or a Descartes, likewise induces us to single out from our own century the name of Newman.

Upward of a hundred years ago Goethe had sounded the note of warning as to what would be perhaps the chief menace that would come to our age through rationalism. He expressed it in two sentences in *Wilhelm Meister*. "There are very few who have a great mind and at the same time are dis-

posed to action. Intellect broadens our thought, but tends to weaken the will; action inspires, but it is liable to limit our breadth of view."

There is no doubt that in our day we are witnessing the truth of this prophecy. The tendency is ever on the increase for men who have become broad in their views, as they shake off former convictions, as they enlarge the scope of their knowledge, ~~in~~ the same degree to sit back as it were in a kind of philosophic calm, leaving the world to take its own course and find its own way out of its difficulties. We cannot but observe the fact that the cultured classes with us do not tend to become the leaders in the advance movements of society. We notice with a pang of regret that great reforms have their incipency in the minds of persons with comparatively little education. Men are sometimes almost bitter, if indeed not contemptuous, with reference to the restricted views and teachings of these reformers. People refer to the fact that such men are one-sided, that they are wanting in knowledge of history, that they lack intellectual equipoise. But while people express their criticism, while they lament the want of judgment and breadth of view, it is a noteworthy circumstance that for the most part the men who have the knowledge of history, the judgment of mind, the training of intellect in philosophy, are liable to do little themselves in the cause of reform save by their criticisms. Nothing is more striking than the growing breadth of convictions in our own day. Men are sundering the lines of demarcation between sect and sect, between church and church, between philosophy and philosophy. They are disposed to sympathize a little with almost everything; they look upon these various points of view as a part of the process of evolution. They converse together over the waywardness and weaknesses of men; they tolerate one another's views; they are disposed to think a great deal. But to plunge into the arena of action, and make their breadth of conviction tell for new lines of progress in the world, is the last thing in the world they would do.

When we change our views on religion we seldom change our church. If as rationalists we have come to think that a

certain creed is probably true, it seldom occurs to us as a normal act to go at once and put ourselves in affiliation with the men who are advocating that creed. We may believe in the church as a true institution, or approve of it philosophically; but we do not think of joining it. Just in the same way, on the other hand, we may already be in such an organization and have almost entirely abandoned its teachings; we know that we are in almost complete sympathy with another movement; we wish the latter undertaking success; we may have come to believe that this new movement is destined to have the future. But we rarely assume it is our duty to connect ourselves with such an undertaking; we leave it rather to more restricted minds, to individuals with a more limited horizon, to the men who have prejudices, but are endowed with large enthusiasm. This is the tendency which more than anything else called out the vehement character of Newman. What wonder that he should have been the conspicuously great antagonist of rationalism? We turn to his writings, we who may be broad in our philosophy, but with, perhaps, no intensity of feeling for any special point of view, and then in spite of ourselves, with a lurking sense of shame and contrition for our own weakness of will, for our own lethargy of character, we are stirred into awe for a man who could know just as much as we know, but at the same time could have what we do not possess, the energy of character to see that his life should be made to correspond with his new convictions.

This man has more perhaps than any other brought to our attention the perils of doubt and scepticism. He has not done it merely by what he said, but rather in the contrast between himself who had the faith and the great body of men who think themselves so broad as to have no definite convictions. It is Newman the *man*, rather than the teacher, who calls forth our admiration. He compels us to review once more our reasons for encouraging doubt; he has brought it home to us that there is a certain kind of rationalism which is dangerous to character. No man could have done it so well, unless he had been so conspicuously an antagonist to the whole tendency of scepticism.

This is not a problem of philosophy; it is not merely a question of the growth of intellect. We are coming to recognize it as a practical maxim that if the world had to take its choice, it would be far better to have a society made up of men of high character, even though with limited minds, than on the other hand to have a society made up of people with great intellect, but with a low order of character. From this stand-point we can all sympathize with Newman. It is not simply the question, whether in order to encourage men to greater knowledge and a more perfect understanding of the truths and laws which control the world, we must encourage the investigating disposition of mind, or the tendency to distrust one's own beliefs or first impressions. Undoubtedly this habit may develop scientific genius. At the same time it is equally certain that there is a limit beyond which such scepticism begins to effect the standard of human character. From the broad stand-point of rationalism we may be forced to consider, whether we shall not soon be required in the sphere of ethics to discourage somewhat this universal tendency of doubt and distrust with reference to elemental convictions.

We cannot answer the question outright from the position of intuitionism. There is no categorical imperative which says, "thou shalt," or "thou shalt not disbelieve," "thou shalt," or "thou shalt not encourage scepticism." But if there is an imperative, which tells us in plain words, "thou shalt lay supreme stress on character," then we at least have a clew according to which we are to look for the solution of the difficulty. We are brought to the stand-point of practical utility. Provided that we care more than anything else to develop this higher standard of conduct and motive in the human world, what shall be the rules governing us with reference to doubt and scepticism?

It has been said that Newman was not an antagonist to rationalism. But certainly there is much reason to believe that this antagonism was the chief trend of his mind and disposition. We cannot otherwise account for what seems to be the most remarkable circumstance in his whole career. We know that he was a great thinker,—we appreciate the

fact that he was an enormous reader. He was evidently acquainted with most of the best thought of his day; he was a master in knowledge of the history of the church. We also know that he went through an extraordinary change in his beliefs. But the striking fact is that, whereas he experienced all the agitation which in a certain way was equivalent to a revolution in his convictions, he never apparently went through the experience of doubt with reference to what are considered the elemental facts of natural religion. I do not know that he ever questioned the belief in a God, the inspiration of the Bible, or the immortality of the soul. [Now we know it as a general experience that when a strong mind passes through a violent transformation, it is liable to be thrown prostrate for a time, completely upset with reference to all convictions. A man who has had a positive faith, and then later on has reason to doubt at all, is almost certain in the shock, at least for the time, to doubt everything.]

If this be true, it is difficult to understand why Newman did not go through this experience, unless he was saturated to the very core of his character and intellect with the belief that religious doubt is a sin. From this position only can we appreciate the ardor and enthusiasm which he pours forth, after his conversion, on the subject of implicit faith, of reliance on authority. It would seem as though his new position actually gave to him a reason for his natural distrust of scepticism. How otherwise can we account for so remarkable a paragraph as we find in one of his sermons in his later years, where he bursts forth almost into a pæan of exultation over implicit trust. He is speaking of those who share the same belief as himself, when he says:

"Unless he grievously mismanages himself the difficult thing is for him to doubt. He has received the gift which makes faith easy. It is not without an effort, a miserable effort, that any one who has received the gift unlearns to believe. He does violence to his mind in not exercising it, in withholding his faith. When agitations occur to him, and they may easily do so if he live in the world, they are as odious and unwelcome to him as impure thoughts are to the virtuous. He does certainly shrink from them, he flings them away from him. But why? Not in the first instance because they are dangerous, but because they are cruel and base."

These lines are certainly explicit; they touch the very core of the question. They remind us of his feeling that doubt is an impurity of the mind.

At the same time there is reason to believe that Newman may have been influenced by his nature to this position in regard to the perils of rationalism. There is nothing more trying, more saddening, more overpowering to an intense nature, than to look at the quiet indifference of men. It is even more exasperating in certain respects than crime itself. It suggests to such persons that society is in a condition of retrogression. It has been said that Newman himself was a reversionist. This remark, however, is not fair to the man. He simply went the whole length of his nature, in turning away from that sluggish negligence of mind which he saw rapidly spreading over society.

We can observe only too plainly the danger due to exaggerating the suggestion as to independence in thinking, such as comes from a man like Emerson. There are men who simply revel in constantly expressing new opinions. It is even worse when that influence reaches those minds that are in the sphere of action and reform. Then it makes of the agitator, the would-be helper of society, a dangerous character. He speaks what he thinks to-day in hard words, whatever be the consequences. He has obeyed the dictates of his reason. To-morrow he may think and speak just the contrary. But on one or the other occasion he has thrown out the spark, and the fire which it kindles he cannot stay. Newman would be right in warning a man of that kind against independence of mind.

What, however, is noticeable and somewhat difficult to understand is that this man should have laid so much more stress on the perils of doubt, with regard to the doctrines of theology, than with reference to the practical maxims of ethics. It is in the sphere of conscience that we are in the greatest dilemma. We must encourage men to think for themselves; we know that some minds are under the influence of a certain class of prejudices, that even in the problems of morality there is a kind of bigotry in a misapprehension

of the ideas of duty. It is essential that there should be a clarifying process in the whole sphere of opinions in the science of ethics. And yet at this very point we are startled at the menace which this tendency offers to the preservation of high character. We educate the young in certain lines of thinking; we suggest to them that certain methods of action are right, and that other methods of action are wrong. When, however, they have grown into manhood and womanhood, we encourage them to think for themselves and to form their own judgment with regard to the natural world, to the Bible, and to God. Shall we also encourage them to think for themselves in this sphere of duty? It is an open question whether, from the practical stand-point of expediency, we do not need to develop a feeling in the human mind, that at a certain point doubt on these matters is an impurity of character. )

We know perfectly well how customary it is for multitudes of people as they pass into years of maturity, to throw off the moral impressions given to them in their youth, and to launch out into what is called the life of the world. There is no question that for many such minds the first doubt as to whether a certain class of acts be wrong was the first step in moral decline. There is no doubt that on this point we are in a critical condition at the present day. We have established the criteria by which a man can make up his mind in regard to the laws of the natural world. But we are yet somewhat in the dark as to what shall be the principles by which a person is to determine for himself the true maxims or laws of character when he is launched forth to be his own guide in the years of maturity. ( Within the sphere of natural science there is a method by which individuals know how to make use of the knowledge and investigation of others; there is something here almost like a council of a church. But within the sphere of ethics, as yet we seem to be lacking in any such method. How shall we decide what are the practical maxims that a man is to accept for his daily life and action? Whose experience may he trust? Must it be, as usually is the case, that a man shall lose half his years in mistakes, in order that he may learn through bitter trial what



shall be the principles to live by for the rest of his life? To wait for a decision through individual experiment would be even more hazardous than in the matter of our knowledge about external nature. It is a recognized fact that for a man to be guilty of certain wrong deeds, leaves an almost indelible stain upon his character. It is not merely essential for him that he should discover his mistake; but he is left by this error with inferior will-power and with less refined instincts. When he recognizes the early confusion of his judgment, he not only has to alter the course of his life, but he has the far heavier task before him of recovering the lost purity of his nature. It is therefore profoundly melancholy to think of such an enormous waste in each individual experience, all because we cannot clearly determine the ethics of doubt.

It may seem against the views of the day on rationalism, that we should begin to ask for a principle of external authority in ethics. We say that a man must act from his own inner impulses without being controlled by influences from without, or else he cannot be a man of firm character. But it is equally true that he must not act from momentary impulses. Life is very short, while the laws that control personal action are connected with the facts of all human history. The great majority of men cannot make a complete study of these facts; the science of practical ethics is in certain ways as intricate as that of physics or physiology. We do not mean to assert by this argument that there is need on such matters of a principle of authority, like that of the state, or of an absolute church. It is rather a question for each individual what method he shall adopt, what criteria he may use, in determining for himself the principles of his moral action. We require this knowledge not simply as a gratification for the mind, but as something which we need to use. Society can no more do without it than it can do without the principles of mechanical engineering. A permanently speculative condition of mind on such laws must inevitably unfit men for action. We would shrink in dismay from treating ourselves by our own information when sickness takes possession of our physical organism. We know, however, that

there are certain imperfections that are acting like diseases on every mind and soul. Shall we trust only our own experience in deciding what shall be the methods of removing such imperfections?

Newman put his finger on the sorest spot with reference to our rationalism, when he said :

“Many a man will live and die upon a dogma, no man will be a martyr for a conclusion. A conclusion is an opinion. It is not a thing which is, but which we are quite sure about. It has often been observed that we never say we are sure and certain without implying that we doubt. This logic makes but a sorry rhetoric for the multitude. To most men argument makes a point in hand only more doubtful and considerably less impressive. After all, man is not a reasoning animal; he is a seeing, feeling, contemplating, acting animal. Life is for action. If we insist on proofs for everything we shall never come to action. To act you must assume, and that assumption is faith. No religion has yet been a religion of physics or philosophy. It has ever been synonymous with revelation. It never has been a deduction from what we know; it has ever been an assertion of what we are to believe. It has never lived in a conclusion; it has ever been a message of history or a vision.”

These are various sentences taken from his volume entitled “Grammar of Assent.” There is a sense in which we can all accent these remarks, although we may put a different interpretation on the word “revelation.” It is on this point that he brings out so clearly what is the defect in our rationalism. He is right; we have plenty of belief at the present day, but somehow we have very little of vigorous action influenced by these general beliefs. It is equally true that at the present day enthusiasm is, for the most part, liable to come mainly from those who do not permit themselves to doubt, but who accept some external authority like that of the church. At the same time there is one noticeable exception. It is quite true that men would not die for their belief on questions of natural theology; people do not hold their opinions, obtained in this way, with the same tenacity as those who accept them as divine revelation. But there is another class of beliefs which are to the human race in the nature of dogmas, although they still hold their sway largely from an authority which is human. There are certain elemental beliefs which do control us with tremendous power. A man, for example,

will give up his life for the sake of the members of his family. An individual will die for his friend. Multitudes surrender the world and all that is dear to them, through love of their country. This would continue the same, in all probability, even if there were no law demanding such action by supernatural authority. Within certain limits in the sphere of ethics, we do already accept the judgment of an external council, only we might say that this council is not that of a special religious organization, but that of the traditional authority of all human history.

It is a fair question whether we shall not have to make more of this outside controlling influence within the sphere of ethics. If the moral laws involve the facts of all human history, then it is quite beyond the power of each of us, as we begin life, to go carefully over them all in order to decide upon our course of action. A dogma, according to Newman, is something that has in it the binding nature of an immediate external authority; but it is, perhaps, a second inference which leads one to assume that this must be a supernatural authority. We observe in these special cases that the effect of certain beliefs on the human will is as strong as though they were such dogmas. When men die for their country it is because they believe in their country. Yet if they have such a belief it is not because they have thought it out carefully, but because it has been borne in upon them by the consensus of human opinion all around them; and that opinion has come from a consensus of opinions which has encouraged belief and love of country through all the past ages of history. The chief reason, from a practical standpoint, why we might be led to adopt the position of Newman, would have been that it helped to give a fixity to human character, by finding support in his theory of dogmas. When, however, we separate theology from ethics, we no longer are in need of that intensity of conviction, which would make us die for a belief about the supernatural world. What we are in need of is that strength of conviction which would make us willing to die for a belief with reference to the human world. If we were more and more given to recognizing the

value of this other external authority,—that is, the consensus of all the past voices of history when they speak to us on the moral life,—we might find, more and more, that enthusiasm coming back and firing once more the hearts of the great men of the age, just as the other kind of authority gave hope, fire, and enthusiasm to the purpose of Newman.

Rationalism may be going too far within the sphere of ethics; we may be pushing doubt to a perilous extreme. Scepticism may go so far as, while broadening our minds, to lower the average standard of character. It may be impossible for many of us to take the whole position of this particular man; we may shrink from that degree of surrender in our private judgment. But nevertheless some principle of authority is absolutely essential. We must understand more clearly when it is in the nature of a sin to begin to doubt. We are compelled to feel that, to a certain degree, we must accept the view of Newman. At the present day when all the forces of society put the utmost strain on human character; when even to sustain life a man is so strongly tempted to verge from rectitude; when the standard of purity in personal life is falling low everywhere, we become conscious that if character is to be sustained and strengthened, if its average is to be improved and elevated, this can only be done by entwining the moral maxims into every fibre of the nature of the individual,—so that at last, when there is a disposition to go backward and sink lower, all the higher instincts, purer feelings, everything that is good and true in the man, shall rise and speak, saying, "thou shalt not." Universal doubt would make this impossible. The great council that is represented by the consensus of human opinion through all history must speak with its authority and forbid the man at that moment to distrust what his conscience is saying to him.

Newman's face, as we see it from the portraits of the man in his old age, suggests to us what is lacking in the great majority of the active minds of to-day. There is about it a calm serenity; we see reflected in that countenance a mind that is at one with itself. No agitation is visible, no distress over uncertainty and confusion of thought. Philosophy and re-

ligion appear blended in one, as the soul looks out from those deep-set eyes. A man of the world and a man of the spirit, he was able to reach both these spheres of life. He could do it because he had this one virtue lacking in our rationalism: when he had a belief he put it into action. There was none of that discord which we see written on the faces of men of to-day, showing that their life in the world is not in unison with the life or real convictions of their inner nature. We too may grow into this new spirit, when we are under the influence of such single-mindedness. We may not be required to go the whole length, to surrender our personal thinking; but it will be implied that we have put a check upon this constant habit of speculation, that we have accepted some kind of a principle of authority. When that time comes, we may see the culture of the world once more leading in reforms. Philosophy will go hand in hand with action.

We cannot refrain, in conclusion, from calling attention to the contrast between Newman, the apostle of faith, and the man who has been called the apostle of scepticism or of individualism, Ralph Waldo Emerson. The one has been considered the "greatest American" and the other referred to by a leading weekly journal of London as the "greatest Englishman." At first thought we cannot name two men who would seem to be in more complete antagonism. They could never for a moment have accepted or adopted one another's positions. The one would have said:

"Yet not for all his faith can see  
Would I that cowed monk e'er be."

The other with like energy and firmness would have responded:

"And so ye halve the Truth; for ye in heart,  
At best, are doubters whether it be true,  
The theme discarding, as unmeet for you,  
Statesmen or Sages."

We can but speculate what would have happened if these two men had met face to face and conversed together. They were two men equally calm, alike secure in their position, yet widely remote in their convictions. On second thought, how-

ever, we are led to think of a certain wonderful similarity. Emerson himself was the writer who said: "All ages of belief have been great, all of unbelief have been mean." It would seem as though he himself were a little doubtful of the result of his own doctrine of freedom of opinion. Of course this was not the case. The noticeable fact simply is that this man is to be thought of as the conspicuously exceptional instance, of a truly great intellect given over completely to independence of thought, to the most determined rationalism, but who at the same time by his very genius preserved a unity of conviction throughout his whole career. He likewise had an intensity of feeling that led him to act in accordance with his beliefs. We shall never forget the occasion when, on reading one of his own sermons aloud in the pulpit, he came upon a sentence written in earlier days. We are told that he paused for a moment and then quietly remarked: "This sentence I now no longer believe." There was in him that same appalling sincerity, making the common mind shrink back in dismay, which we find also in Newman. There is even a certain resemblance in the expression of their faces; we notice in both a like spiritual repose. At the same time we are led to suspect that the great apostle of individualism used his liberty far more in his thoughts about God, the supernatural world, theology and the Bible, than he did about the problem of ethics. He was remarkably conservative in his moral character. He may have said, "trust your own will," far more than he said, "trust your own knowledge." Instinctively he appears to have accepted this authority of the consensus of human opinion in the practical rules of morality. His own conduct would seem by its conservatism to raise the voice of warning against being rash in casting aside the traditions of our forefathers as to the elemental principles of right and wrong.

The question simply is, whether Emerson did not put forward too bold a doctrine of ultra-individualism in belief for a man of average intellectual capacity. A mediocre disciple of this great thinker is never a satisfactory individual to meet. Such a mind has all the independence of Emerson; but it

lacks the single-mindedness, the unity of thought, the boldness of intellect, the ardor of feeling, which all went together to make him so great a man. With equal truth it may be said that the mediocre individual, who accepts in its extreme form the doctrine of self-abnegation as regards private judgment, may be quite as unsatisfactory a character. He will be given less to vagaries, be less erratic, go off on fewer tangents than the other; but he may perhaps shrink in stature below the normal condition of a man. We can only discover the solution of the difficulty, as we have intimated, in leaving absolute freedom of personal opinion with reference to beliefs about external nature and the supernatural world, while having some positive criteria for decision in problems within the sphere of morals, and so encouraging a certain degree of conservatism within the domain of ethics. We must have a method by which we can use the experience of others who have worked, suffered, and thought on these subjects; so that we too may be able to have an implicit confidence in certain fixed moral laws, and a trust in the authority of human experience, such as all the scientists place in the work of their fellow-laborers who study the natural world. An ultra-individualism in everything enfeebles the will, just as the complete abnegation of the freedom of thought dwarfs the intellect. In order to have a perfect solution of the difficulty we need to draw both from Emerson and from John Henry Newman.

W. L. SHELDON.

## THE ETHICS OF SOCIALISM.

It is significant that recent constructive works in ethical theory have much to say on questions of economic policy, and especially on the great question of socialism. This is another phase of the thought movement which has forced a recognition of ethical facts as a part of the legitimate data of economic theory, a recognition cordially made in Professor Marshall's new treatise,—the latest restatement of orthodox doctrine. Both are results of the philosophical advance from a narrow and dogmatic individualism to that comprehensive view in which society and the individual are seen as correlative terms, neither of which could exist apart from the other. Thus there is a deeper reason for a serious discussion of socialism in a modern treatise on ethics than would be afforded by the mere fact that socialism has a great popular following, and threatens to become a practical issue. The question may be raised whether the philosophical ground of ethical truth itself does not afford philosophical standing to some sort of socialism also. This view of the problem has evidently pervaded the thinking of Professor Paulsen, whose "*System der Ethik mit Einem Umriss der Staats und Gesellschaftslehre*" was reviewed in the first number of this journal, and it is prominent in the "*Allgemeine Ethik*" of Dr. H. Steinthal.

Out of such an examination of socialism from the ethical side much good should come. Unfortunately, the true nature of the inquiry is not always perceived and remembered. The ethical problems of socialism are not always distinctly marked off from the sociological and economic problems; and too often, therefore, the real core of the ethical problems is not reached. A great deal of recent economic literature, emanating from that extreme left wing of the historical school which takes a curious pride in advertising its ratiocinative limitations, has made a sorry confusion of the "is" and the



"ought"; of what Marshall happily calls the indicative and the imperative moods of thought; and this confusion, unhappily, the ethical writers have not avoided.

The first question that ought to be raised in regard to socialism is the sociological question,—a question of the "is." Is society a product of that universal evolution which brought man himself into existence and conditions all his thoughts and doings? If so, we may be very sure that there are certain general principles, or laws, to which social evolution has conformed in the past, and to which it will go on conforming in the future. Claim, if you like, that conscious motives, deliberately-formed purposes, play an increasingly large part in social affairs,—no clear-headed sociologist will deny it; claim, if you like, that the human will is a free metaphysical entity,—no clear-headed sociologist will care a straw, *qua* sociologist, whether it is or not; the fact will remain that, if deliberate purposes are reasoned purposes, reasoning beings, exposed to like conditions, will tend, in proportion to the accuracy of their reasoning, to reach like conclusions. There will be uniformities among purposes, and social phenomena will conform to law in the indicative mood, varying with the variation of cosmic conditions. Does this, then, prove the antecedent impossibility of socialism? Not in the least. What it does prove is the antecedent absurdity of any scheme of socialism, or any prediction as to a socialistic future, based on such knowledge of social psychology as we possess at present. Any scheme of socialism based on the psychology of the individual is nonsense. And as yet we have almost no psychology but that of the individual. For the construction of the psychology of men in masses, in social groups, in organic relations, scientific ground has been barely broken.

But while we can at present make no general prediction as to a socialistic future, we can predict that conscientious men will antagonize any socialistic propagandism that seems to them ethically wrong. Ethical teachers ought, therefore, to state with all possible distinctness the ethical problems involved in the socialistic propositions now before the public, and give us, if they can, a reasoned solution.

Those problems, I think, may be reduced to two: First, if not all men are converted in thought and feeling to socialism, can a majority have any ethical right to compel a minority to surrender individual initiative and submit to dictation of occupation? Second, what is an ethical distribution of product among the workers that create it?

Not a few students of political science will say that the first question has been affirmatively answered to weariness. I am unable to agree with them. The reasoned answers founded on purely ethical data are negative answers, the most brilliant example being Mill's "Liberty." The affirmative answers are either mere assertions, enlivened by diatribes against natural rights, or they are not strictly ethical. The argument of the long row of great works from Hobbes's "Leviathan" to Mulford's "Nation" is essentially political or essentially theological. The utilitarianism of Bentham might be made the basis of an elaborate and ingenious, if not convincing, argument for the unlimited power of majorities, but Bentham himself, and most of his disciples, have drawn chiefly negative conclusions. The argument from the denial of natural rights is no argument at all. If individuals have no natural rights, majorities have none. Plato and Aristotle alone laid the foundations for a rationalistic argument from purely ethical premises, showing that majorities may rightfully do more than enforce contracts and keep the peace, but the modern restatement and completion of that argument remains to be made.

Many students of economics will say that the second question has been sufficiently answered. Here again I cannot agree. In the distribution of wealth, are ethical requirements satisfied when each receives according to his performance? Not necessarily. Justice may be then satisfied, but ethical requirement may include more than justice, in our modern sense of that word. Men have potential as well as actual abilities. To give them more than they now earn, as a means of developing a greater earning-power for the future, may be an ethical obligation. In the little book by Professor Clark and myself on "The Modern Distributive Process," I

have argued that there is no necessary conflict between the individualistic principle, "to each according to his work," and the communistic principle, "to each according to his needs." Normal needs are of repair or restoration of the energies and utilities expended in useful performance, and of upbuilding and development for future useful performance. In a normal, well-balanced state of things, need and performance must correspond.

But in socialistic literature distribution according to needs easily degenerates into distribution according to desires. Then, with the aid of the minor premise, conveniently assumed for the purpose, that men are equal in desires, the conclusion may be drawn, as by Mr. Edward Bellamy, that socialism cannot stop short of equality of incomes. It is at this point that clean-cut thinking by ethical teachers is wanted. I incline to think that a strong argument could be made in support of the proposition that an ethical distribution of wealth would be one that should afford equality of satisfaction, throughout society, of the desires that are ethically commendable. But is it biologically and psychologically possible for men to be equal in desires that are ethically commendable? Men will never be equal physically. Will they, then, be equal in perception, in reasoning, in imagination, in sympathy? Will they equally find pleasure in the beautiful and the good? Or will deficiency in one set of faculties be exactly balanced by the superiority of some other set? If not, equality of income must inevitably create a class of sybarites and debauchees. There has been no more curious psychological phenomenon in recent times than the wholesale hypnotizing of clever literary people by Mr. Bellamy's dazzling vision. When they come out of the daze and begin to resume their intellectual self-direction, they may be trusted to discover that equality of income and equality of satisfaction of legitimate desires, are two different things.

I have thus very briefly indicated what I think are the essential ethical problems presented by socialism. Is it too much to hope that in the new and broad development that

ethical studies are now undergoing these problems will receive a thorough treatment? Meanwhile, in the belief that English readers will find much that is suggestive in the views of Professors Steinthal and Paulsen, the following *résumé* of their thought is presented.

FRANKLIN H. GIDDINGS.

#### STEINTHAL—THE SOCIAL UTOPIA.\*

With the remark that his view of socialism must not be taken for the ordinary one, Professor Steinthal connects his consideration of the subject with Thomas More's *Utopia*, where "no one steals, and where no one lives in superabundance, but each has what is sufficient for him." All have agreed that socialism consists in a better order of things, wherein society is the only employer of every citizen and employé. It has two general characteristics: first, society pays for the labor of the citizen by providing for his needs; second, there is no money. Dr. Steinthal regards these two characteristics as only external consequences. The ethical kernel of socialism is that ascending and descending prices no longer exist, and that the actual worth of things is much more strictly measured. The price of a product is conditioned by three things: by the material itself (according to the demand and supply), by the procuring of it, and by the labor necessary to prepare it.† Naturally, the condition of prices for manual labor is defined closely enough by demand and supply. If several laborers offer their services at once, the price falls. But a human being becomes degraded, Professor Steinthal thinks, if his power of mechanical labor is regarded and valued only as a thing to be paid for, and his priceless worth as a moral being is thereby forgotten. A man's value can never be paid for. Since this value originates in our idea of it, and has only an ideal character, it can be recompensed in only an ideal way. Price is only an attempt to control a confusion consequent on the struggle for individual rights,—after the abolition of the kind of price now prevailing this lowering of the moral nature will cease. When men are assured of everything they need, then their labor becomes worthy of esteem from an ethical point of view, complete as an offering of individual strength for the sake of the community. This is the essence of Steinthal's thought. Price itself must completely disappear, and what the citizen receives from society as recompense must be regarded not at all as price or wages for his work, but only as the maintenance of his life given to the service of society. The higher value of his labor and personality must find recognition and appreciation, and with this reward he will be satisfied.

Professor Steinthal has no desire to conceal from the reader the criticism that

\* The following *résumé* of the thought of Professors Steinthal and Paulsen has been prepared by Agnes Mathilde Wergeland, Ph.D., Fellow in History in Bryn Mawr College. The matter from Steinthal is the "Excurs über den Socialismus," "Allgemeine Ethik," p. 265; that from Paulsen is the chapter, "Socialismus und Sociale Reform," "System der Ethik," p. 698.

† Professor Steinthal is evidently not familiar with the modern theory which derives value from final degree of utility, instead of from labor, a theory that nullifies many of the familiar socialistic arguments.—F. H. G.

may be made of this exposition of socialism. Where no property exists, there is of course nothing to steal; mine and thine have disappeared, and justice in the ordinary sense of the word is no longer heard of. But although the domain of property in the socialistic world is very limited, yet there are things which each man owns and which can be taken away from him,—e.g., personal property,—and therefore there must be also laws and the power of executing them. Again, as regards philanthropy, men will have no opportunity for showing a beneficent spirit, for the means of doing so do not belong to them individually, but to the community. Nevertheless, the philanthropic feelings of men, in which true philanthropy consists, will endure. Justice in its highest sense will also endure; every person will share in recognition because wages have disappeared. The ideal of union will then find its complete satisfaction; the individual will no longer live as such, but will always be a member of a more or less composite organism. His personal freedom, however, will not be restrained, but bound up in living union with the whole.

But will society then be wise and just and self-sacrificing, as is here represented and demanded? Selfishness can never be destroyed, only subdued. If society undertakes the care of all,—truly a terrible task,—selfishness can show itself only in that body which is charged with the just division of the maintenance of all members. How much deeper a meaning will treachery have when it proceeds from the very corporation which exists for the dispensation of justice! Will it not penetrate to the heart of the whole body? And will not every imprudence of society fatally avenge itself on the community at large? To these questions Steinthal has only the answer that as men have to endure such things in the present world, they can well endure them in socialism. The social world will differ from the world of to-day only in its spiritual characteristics. Everything will be as it is now, every one will work as he works now, but he will breathe a purer moral atmosphere, without the narrowing influence of selfish desires and impulses. Man will not change his nature, but the conditions of society will constantly be growing more moral, and therefore the men who live in them will also grow better. People of the future will live after a more moral fashion than we.

We need have no anxiety for the development of a society whose members care for it and not for themselves. Examples have already existed in the so-called republic of science, surrounded by a world moved by quite opposite motives. The world-renowned professor often has a salary like that of the school-master or the clerk, large enough only to live on. The royalty for his classic work is the money that goes to buy paper and pens. For in the world of market prices the learned work is paid for in the inverse proportion to its difficulty and subtlety. The more valuable it is, the lower is its price, because the less it is in demand. To the scholar, however, recognition of his work is satisfaction enough. Science in the pictured Utopia, in socialism also, will solve her problems. The inventor will experiment then as now, and the means of doing so will be offered to him. The invention will not benefit *him*,—he will no more get rich by it than he does to-day,—but the inner impulse itself will constrain him. The merchant with his world-embracing glance, and the artist with his strivings for the ideal, will find opportunity for the development of their

activity; and every one will devote himself to a vocation in which he finds pleasure and for which he has ability, and, without the need of suffering, will perform what he is able to do.

Socialistic regulation of the world is indeed an ideal whose realization is demanded by an ethical view of life. But the manner in which this ideal is to be realized gives us cause for serious reflection, and therefore Professor Steinthal wishes to make the following remarks :

I. No moral form should be intentionally destroyed. Our world of to-day is drawn through with countless moral threads, strong human motives. That our morality needs to be elevated is certain. But the immoral destroys itself. If this is true, we need only to respond to the ethical demands made on us moment by moment, and allow that to fall away which is perishing of itself. Socialism will then come as the summer comes,—in perfect quiet. It will not be created, but will be born from society. We must not, however, devise in detail the regulation of life according to socialism,—how we shall dress, what we shall eat, etc. Socialism is an ideal; it must be the result of unanimity on the part of all citizens; yes, of all civilized nations. *One* nation governed by the laws of socialism is hardly to be imagined. Without excellent and complete statistics the attempt to bring about a socialistic order of life is madness.

II. Men should guard themselves against apparent results, which, while seeming to draw them nearer to their ideal, in reality remove them from true socialism. This can be developed only from forces which are closely related to it, from our free confederated life, not from the state. The state is not to become socialistic; it is rather, so far as its independent power is concerned, to be entirely done away with, and a free society of citizens—all individuals and all existing unions joined into one great power—will take its place. In such a society of men, in which a judicial power guards against every encroachment and every disturbance, reconciles and repels,—in such a way only does an individual have his full freedom of thought, of action, and of enjoyment.

III. No self-deception! No misunderstanding of the present! No false hope for the future! True, the revolution will be the greatest which history has known; nevertheless, we must admit no contradiction between the present and the future. The future must grow out of the present. We must not be reserved or indifferent to the world around us, but do good as circumstances permit. In the socialistic society there will certainly be more work done than is done at the present time. The working-day will be normal, but it will be calculated for self-sacrificing laborers,—the management of society according to the socialistic ideal will bring with it this state of things. Since very many subordinates are necessary to receive and to distribute the common supply, the other citizens who are engaged in collecting and preparing the material must of necessity be all the more active.

We shall scarcely be happier under the *régime* of socialism than we are to-day; indeed, that is not the reason why it is desirable, but because it is a necessary result of moral development. There will also be no absolute equality,—every one must be differently treated and supported according to his own work and his particular character. The socialist should remember that even now the moral laborer belongs to the service of society; he should ask himself whether,

because of his ideal worth, he regards himself as unpayable, or merely as not sufficiently paid from the point of view of wages. The watchword is to be free in spirit, to scorn trifles, to struggle with necessity as much as possible, and, when strength is denied, to endure it. In the life of socialism, also, there will be necessity and sorrow,—the accidents of nature no one can control. Our power of endurance may not be allowed to sleep; every weakening is an enemy to self-denial, and without self-denial there can be no socialism.

#### F. PAULSEN—SOCIALISM AND SOCIAL REFORM.

After an introduction treating briefly of the history of social-democracy, Professor Paulsen observes, in the first place, that the aim of social democracy is rather indefinite; he then passes to its political programme and characterizes the present party as revolutionary. Its nearest duty is found not in the improvement and reform of existing conditions, but in the propagation of the feeling of their intolerableness and their incapacity for improvement. The literary productions of the party consist of complaints against the present state of affairs, and concerning that which should take the place of this order of things we find only vague generalities and occasionally utopian declamation. Bebel's book, "*Die Frau*," will serve as an example. Perfect freedom in every situation of life is the motto of this production; nothing is said of rights and duties; children are brought up by the public, and everything is so arranged that the pleasure alone of mankind may be increased. There is no compulsion, no authority, and, adds our author, so long as social democracy continues to hold such views, it can hardly complain when it is classed with anarchy. Socialism is not at all anarchical, but the present social-democratic literature is thoroughly anarchical. At bottom it is still tangled in the ideas of abstract natural rights current in the eighteenth century. A complete want of reverence for the past is especially a reproach to this literature. Professor Paulsen, however, does not wish to be busied with these opinions, but with the thought of a new order of society. Every new party is, of course, a revolutionary party which knows sooner what it does not, than what it does, demand. And he especially emphasizes the fact that the transformation of property and society is not a question of right, but of suitability or of teleological necessity; therefore existing conditions can be changed without trampling on right. The right of property, for instance, is created by the state, and when the state thinks proper to annul this right, it can no longer exist. This would naturally mean dissolution of the state and downfall of the people, nevertheless there is no absolute right that can guarantee the existence of property. The present regulation of property has come from its teleological necessity, and therein consists its sacredness. Yet even this very necessity—as has repeatedly happened—may argue for its reformation, and against this there is no absolute interdiction. Even with the present laws, there is no absolute property. Limitation and confiscation may take place at any time in the course of justice. The right of taxation, for example, is an adjunct of the state, which may require as much of the property of the people as seems necessary.

Professor Paulsen adduces further examples, and finally comes to the conclusion that although the justification of private property rests on the ground of adaptation to the end sought, yet the time may come, and perhaps is near, when

for certain kinds of private property this suitability will no longer be so great, or will perhaps entirely cease. This view may be opposed equally by the defenders and by the socialistic critics of property. The last desire a change, not in the name of form, but in the name of natural rights or of justice. They complain especially of the capitalist's theft in comparison with the laborer's small profit from an enterprise in which both are interested. To this Professor Paulsen replies that the products which created the capital are not the result solely of manual labor,—a great host of workers shared in bringing about the result, and especially the sagacity of merchants and the technical skill of managers. Were the victories of Frederick the Great or Napoleon won by the generals or by the soldiers? The organs of government create the wealth of a country by making efficiently active the motive powers of society.

Whence, then, is capital? In every case it is created by laborers, yet not by laborers only. But do we find capital in the hands of those only who are called upon to rule? Did the householders of Berlin form the policy by which Berlin has become the capital of Germany?

The following are the grounds of the complaint against capitalists. The pure capitalist, who is nothing but a capitalist, who is not engaged in praiseworthy charities or who does not otherwise justify his inherited or accidentally-increased property, he is indeed an encumbrance in the household of society, and a regulation of property which shall bring up such unfruitful members aright undoubtedly underlies sound thought in regard to the teleological necessity of such regulation.

With reference to Schäffle's work, "*Die Quintessenz des Socialismus*," Professor Paulsen tests the programme of socialistic society. Schäffle has made an attempt to develop the effects of these principles:

1. Capital, land, and property (as farms) to belong to society.
2. Disposition and direction of products to go from capitalists to an organization of society.
3. Trade to cease.
4. Distribution to take place by assignment to a share in the revenue of labor belonging to society.

Paulsen has little to add, but calls attention to the fact that the extinction of all private property belongs no more to the consequences of this principle than does equality of consumption in the socialistic society. Socialism is really beginning to free itself from this last notion. Socializing of consumption would be harder to bear than the slavish condition of laborers in the old forms of society. It must absolutely be insisted upon that in true socialism the question especially concerns the collective ownership of goods, and has as little to do with the division of property as with the abolition of capital. No capital, no production; even social democrats live by means of the despised capital. The necessity of capitalists, however, is less obvious to them, and that the *rentier* is indispensable to the vital energy of society may well be doubted by others than socialists.

What effect on production and on the shaping of life is to be expected from the realization of a socialistic order?

*First.* Will the perfect organization of labor bring about an increase in the



profit of labor? The lack of organization now certainly produces economic crises; production is a matter of blind speculation, and when a demand no longer exists much property becomes valueless. In a society constructed according to socialism, the need, or active demand, would regulate the amount of production. An economic centre of direction informed as fully as possible by communication with all subordinate places concerning all movements in the province of production and consumption would be in a condition to regulate without too great mistakes the production of what is necessary for consumption. As a result, the present war of competition would cease, and, with it, its attendant consequences,—falsehood, revengeful suspicion, deception everywhere.

*Second.* Would economic undertakings be free from the dependence or chances which perplex the personal life of the property-holder? The fate of a great undertaking would not depend on chance, in whatever hands it might fall, for the direction would always be in the care of experts.

In a socialistic society labor would be the only means of making an income, while the gains from speculation and gambling, as well as actual luxury, could not thrive. Thus would exist the possibility of shortening the average number of working hours, and at the same time of bettering the condition of life. And with this goes the presumption in favor of the participation of members of society in the spiritual life of the people.

This is approximately the gain which socialism promises to the world by the fulfilment of its programme.

We may admit that in this way a higher mode of living becomes possible, but not such as in Bebel's picture of a splendid life that every one leads. According to his view only three hours of work are done daily, and this work is lightened as much as possible by scientific and mechanical inventions, so that it becomes not a burden, but a recreation, and thus, in a short time, an incredible amount of labor is accomplished. Paulsen finds satisfaction in reproducing the whole utopian scheme, but doubts, for his own part, that heaven will come quite down to earth.

An occasional polemic against Lassalle leads Professor Paulsen to mention statistical facts, from which it appears that even if the united resources of a people—in this case the Prussian—were divided at random, the individual would save scarcely more than his bare life.

The question then arises: On the whole, therefore, is a society constructed according to socialistic principles possible? Would it be genuinely vital?

Two main objections may be made:

*First.* The socialistic order of society would put aside or weaken selfish interests in production; therefore production itself would be lessened or destroyed,—for the desire to increase wealth is the chief motive of all economic exertions and of all prominent achievements. If this incitement were removed, only mediocrity would be achieved. Instead of doing excellent work, people would seek to realize as much as possible from the common revenue with the least possible labor,—how much more industrious is he who works on his own account! Personal interest would be replaced by communistic oversight and compulsion; the entire country would be turned into a workhouse, and the consequence would be the impoverishment and destruction of our whole culture.

Socialism meets this objection by pointing out the good influence that socialistic incentives would have on the will, how hate and envy would be laid aside, and how every one would wish to perform his duties for the sake of the welfare of the community. And by means of the influence of a corporate self-confidence and sense of honor, self-seeking impulses may indeed be restrained. Sufficient examples of this have been shown by one body of officers in the service of the state,—those, namely, of Prussia.

But that personal interest as an incentive to activity and ability will in general be done away with, is absurd.

However attractive the sound of equality may be, allotting justice will be measured according to the principle of things done, not according to needs. The measure of labor, and the value created thereby, alone give claim to participation and enjoyment.

*Second.* In a socialistic order of society no one will be free to choose his own calling; every one will have to choose that which society assigns to him, whether with or without his own assent. This same necessity rules in the present world, but is less unbearable because it is a more natural consequence of supply and demand, and does not spring from the will of appointed overseers. Paulsen thinks that in socialism the increased demands on the training and intelligence of teachers and educators will have more influence than at present. In these things, too, the division of labor-profit must not be according to needs, but according to the value of the labor performed; a socialism that does not recognize this is in itself an impossibility.

Will a socialistic order of society come?

Professor Paulsen wishes to answer the question with absolute yes or absolute no, yet either would be presumptuous, for the future, according to his view, evades all calculation. Before us lies indefinite time, and many things may happen that seem to us impossible. Wisdom is modest and reserved with her opinion; only this seems certain: if a socialistic order of society ever exists it will not come at a bound, or by means of a socialistic revolution, but only through a gradual and continuous transformation of the existing order. This view is really that of all thinking socialists. Professor Paulsen does not wish to deny the possibility of an armed uprising of proletarians, but as soon as such an uprising took place, all other parties would unite in opposition. And the spirit of society is as yet too undeveloped to be able to undertake the duties that a socialistic constitution would impose. The examples are very interesting that the author gathers from economic statistics to support his view that an organization of socialistic labor, after the removal of capitalists, is impossible while industrial life is still so far from having taken the form of great capitalistic enterprises.

So long, says Professor Paulsen, as production is separated and scattered, the working out in detail of the plan must be regarded as impossible. His polemic against Bebel and Lassalle brings his thought—here much abbreviated—more vividly to the mind of the reader. A purely economic revolution followed, for example, by productive associations with national credit (Lassalle), will be, according to Paulsen's opinion, as little adapted to bring about a new order of society as a political revolution.

Professor Paulsen's own broader view may be here briefly introduced.

He asks, Is the new order of society now in the process of growth? The question may be answered in the affirmative. The history of civilized nations of Europe shows a movement that may be described as an approach to a socialistic order of society. This movement has two characteristics:

1. It is economic, both through the beginning capitalistic era ("the expropriation of the lesser tradesmen and peasants to non-property holding wage-workers; further, the expropriation of the capitalists themselves by concentration of capital"\*), and also through concentration of productive undertakings. This concentration is caused by decreasing the number of such enterprises, and, at the same time, increasing their extent by removing the direction from proprietors to appointees. Thus the socializing tendency is made prominent.

2. This movement, from the political point of view, is noteworthy on account of the enormous widening of state activity. The modern state is no longer limited in function to the right of carrying on war and making peace; it has control of finance, commerce, education; it cares for health, the management of forests, mining, etc.; in short, it assumes an increasing control of general economic enterprises. And Professor Paulsen thinks that the developments of the future will be in the same direction.

Further unfolding of his opinions gives Professor Paulsen opportunity for many interesting observations concerning great industries, and the beginning of combinations which have as an object the control of the market by monopolies; concerning also state monopoly, domestic economy, and the consequences of the increasing change of private to general economic enterprises. Special attention is called to the solidity and stability of production. But the dangers, also, must not be overlooked,—e. g.; the decline of productivity,—people will not attempt much, will not introduce many new things, slackness and indifference will result,—and also the growing dependence on temporary government. With these evils belongs the development of self-seeking and corruption. These last Professor Paulsen hopes to be able to regard as the illnesses of childhood, which can appear only in ungrown states.

Our author closes with some remarks about a mode of proceeding which government has accepted, or rather will accept, as a protection for laborers against overwork, unsatisfactory pay, and undeserved poverty. The history of this proceeding is undoubtedly known to everybody,—the restrictions of labor, first in England, later in the other industrial states of Europe, except Belgium; the prohibition of the truck system; the demand for a normal working-day; finally, the security of laborers against accident, illness, old age, and unfitness for work, and especially against want of employment. The whole is more a review of what has been done for the cause than a consideration of results,—this entire order of activities, indeed, is but in its beginnings. Professor Paulsen desires only that the coercion adopted by the state shall be educative and lead to a voluntary self-dependence. Naked proletarians can stir up insurrections, but cannot found a new order of things. Security against want of employment is planned, but not yet realized. Although it cannot possibly reach all cases, it is to be considered as one of the most important reforms.

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\* Marx.

Professor Paulsen devotes a few words to the English trade-union, which has contributed so much to the moral and intellectual training of the laborer and to the security of his position. These organizations have been imitated in Germany, but with little result. Grown in the struggle with practical conditions in England, they could not be produced as ready-made institutions in Germany; for to these also applies the rule of growth from living experience.

Finally, the author distinguishes between social democrats, who formerly welcomed oppression and destruction because both lead to the dawn of a new day, and social reformers, who hope that there may be a gradual and peaceful passing of society into a new mode of life, with its chief industries and its world market,—a bettering of all conditions by means of the co-operative influence of legislation with the generous assistance of the upper classes, and with the persistent and energetic strivings of the laborer in the sense of self-help. Has this hope any foundation? No one can foretell the future,—the course of events is dependent on a hundred factors that are not calculable. It is advisable that the state should respond to the just demands of the laboring classes,—should protect the person against property, the laborer against capital. The policy of letting go, as well as the policy of forcible suppression (such as the German socialistic law), leads to internal war.

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## ETHICAL AND KINDRED SOCIETIES IN GREAT BRITAIN.

FIVE years ago a few university men in London became acquainted with the general aims and methods of the American Societies for Ethical Culture, and feeling that there was scope for somewhat similar works in England, they resolved to form an Ethical Society for the purpose of co-operating "in the establishment and exposition of the true principles of social morality." The need for such co-operation had been keenly felt by many who had never attempted to give public or organized expression to views with which they had long been familiar, and the society thus founded now gladly finds itself in sympathy, not only with similar societies that have subsequently come into existence, but also with other and older organizations possessing kindred aims.

While endeavoring briefly to indicate the general characteristics of these societies, we must remind our readers that the freer and more elastic the organization under discussion, the

more difficult it becomes to offer a description that shall be at once comprehensive and correct. There are no dogmas to be defined, and the secret of strength is in the liberal recognition of points of unity rather than in the accentuation of shades of difference.

Speaking therefore broadly, the attitude of the societies towards theology and its exponents may be described as one of non-interference or neutrality. Feeling deeply the historic value of the national creeds, and appreciating the fact that, at least in country places, the churches represent the only spiritual life of the people in the true sense of that phrase, the societies desire rather to be constructive than destructive in their action, for they believe that desirable changes can only be effected by the slow processes of organic growth.

It is nevertheless more than probable that in many societies there may exist a right and left wing, some few members being anxious actively to hasten the inevitable progress of rational thought, while others are more profoundly and hopefully in sympathy with all that is best in our familiar creeds.

With one exception the Ethical Societies in England have none of the characteristics of a church, and they may indeed be fitly described as lecturing and debating societies with or without the addition of what is commonly known as "practical work."

All of them unite in hoping that the study of ethics and of social problems from an ethical stand-point may assist individual members in making their influence felt in the various branches of social, educational, and political works to which they may find themselves called.

It is perhaps characteristic of the English societies that they do not care to retain the services of a single lecturer, but prefer to hear speakers who are independent of each other. Discussions after the lecture are encouraged, and if these have not as yet proved very fruitful, they at least serve to strengthen the sense of fellowship and of freedom.

Under the head of Kindred Societies we include all those who, like the Ethical Societies, are striving by means of social or educational work, to improve and develop character and to

better the conditions of human life,—for example, the Glasgow University Settlement, and the Edinburgh Ethical Club.\*

**THE LONDON ETHICAL SOCIETY.** This, the first English Ethical Society, originated in 1886, and until 1888 its headquarters were at Toynbee Hall. In the autumn of that year arrangements were made for the delivery of the Sunday evening lectures at Essex Hall, Strand, and at the same time the society rented premises near Drury Lane, in order to open a guild for girls and boys, and an experimental kindergarten school. This school will be abandoned at the close of this year, because its experimental character has not been sufficiently maintained, and it is undesirable merely to compete with the national schools. The guilds have met with success, although the numbers are necessarily limited by the smallness of the rooms; recreation and instruction have been combined, and every endeavor has been made to exercise that moral influence which helps to form good citizens, and is entirely independent of creed. The work is carried on chiefly by members of the society; though the assistance of non-members, if duly qualified, is gladly accepted.

The lectures have attracted fair audiences and the membership of the society continues to increase. Among the subjects treated have been: "The Unity of Social and Individual Aims," by Mr. Bryant, D.Sc.; "Conscience," Mr. S. Alexander, M.A.; "Moral Aspect of the Economical Problem," Prof. Edward Caird; "The Kingdom of God upon Earth," B. Bosanquet, M.A.; "Ethics of Buddhism," Prof. J. E. Carpenter; "Ethics of Money Investments," Philip H. Wicksteed, M.A.; "Duty," Prof. W. Wallace; "The Morality of Strife," Prof. H. Sidgwick; "What an Ethical Society can do," Prof. Seeley. The three last-named gentlemen have in turn accepted the post of president of the society for one year.

Several of the lectures have been repeated, by request, in other localities, and by this means the influence of the society may be felt outside its immediate circle.

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\* We hope in future numbers to give more detailed accounts of the work undertaken by such societies, and shall be glad to receive communications from any society that desires to be mentioned.

**THE CAMBRIDGE ETHICAL SOCIETY.** This society was opened in June, 1888, when an interesting address was delivered by the president, Prof. H. Sidgwick, on the "Problems of Practical Ethics." The first public lecture was given by Prof. Seeley, who urged the society not to set itself needlessly in opposition to the works of the Christian churches. This advice has on the whole been followed, the aim of the society as set forth in its circulars being "to promote interest in ethical questions and to afford facilities for their discussion." The society confines itself to the twofold work of providing public lectures in Cambridge on questions of practical ethics, and of promoting subsequent discussions on the subject of the lectures.

Prof. E. Caird has lectured on the "Relation of Religion to Ethics;" Prof. Henry Jones on the "Ethics of Robert Browning;" Mr. Bosanquet on the "Civilization of Christendom," etc. Many of the members belong to the Church of England.

**EAST LONDON ETHICAL SOCIETY.** This society, which has been in existence for about a year, "has for its object the development of good character and the promotion of right conduct on a purely human basis." Its distinctive motto is "give your life a moral purpose."

As its name indicates, it occupies itself with a district of East London where it organizes lectures in a small hall during winter, and in the summer months in Victoria Park. Dr. Stanton Coit has there attracted large audiences, and it seems probable that the society will be of great use to many among the working-classes who are not won by the church services. Fortnightly excursions draw the members of the society together and increase their store of heathful and intelligent interests.

**EDINBURGH ETHICAL CLUB** (limited to forty members). "The object of the club shall be to investigate the fundamental principles of society and their bearing on existing institutions. The club shall be open to all schools of thought." Meetings are held during the winter, at which papers are read, and these are followed by discussion. The above quotation from the rules shows that this club is not identified with any school of thought, nor is it concerned

with the advocacy of any particular movement or theory. It is purely a debating society, the members of which are united by their interest in a particular class of social topics.

**GLASGOW UNIVERSITY SETTLEMENT ASSOCIATION.** The association forms a centre for educational and social work in Glasgow, similar to that carried on at Toynbee Hall, London. Its founders wisely agreed that such a scheme must be developed gradually, and they began by receiving a number of artisan families as guests in their houses, so as to bring themselves into friendly social relations with the neighborhood. An extension of the work naturally followed in due time, and there are now, in connection with the association, both men's and girls' clubs, classes for singing, sewing, home and health management, ambulance and gymnastics, besides a literary society, a Shakespeare reading class, etc.

No work is undertaken on Sunday.

**SOUTH PLACE ETHICAL SOCIETY.** The chapel and institute at South Place, Finsbury, have long been known as centres of progressive thought, and two years ago, when Dr. Stanton Coit, of New York, was appointed lecturer, the present name of the society was adopted so as to express more fully the position of the members.

Dr. Coit has lectured on a variety of topics bearing immediately upon conduct, and in addition to these morning addresses a prolonged and interesting afternoon course has been delivered by specialists on phases of religious development. Forty of these lectures have been published in a volume entitled the "Religions of the World." A new revised hymn-book has also been issued. A Sunday-school supplies a want that has been widely felt; while the formation of an Ethical Class under Dr. Coit, and of a Junior Ethical Union, testify to the increased and active interest felt by the members in their work. A Reading Class, Concerts, and Natural History Rambles are also carried on with success, and valuable assistance has been rendered to different social guilds, especially to the large and important Neighborhood Guild which has been organized by Dr. Coit in Kentish Town.

M. McCALLUM.



## BOOK REVIEWS.

DIE ETHIK DER ALTEN GRIECHEN, dargestellt von Leopold Schmidt. Berlin: Wilhelm Hertz, 1882. 2 vols. 8vo. Pp. 400, 494.

This book is one of those monuments of industry which at present Germany alone seems capable of producing. The author has ransacked the whole of pagan Greek literature, and apparently extracted from it everything having any bearing upon ethics, theoretical or practical. What he has found he has classified and made the material for certain general conclusions. The titles of the books and chapters of the work will show his arrangement:

*Introduction.*—On the Sources of our Knowledge of Greek Ethics. *Book I.*—General Ethical Notions of the Ancient Greeks. Chapter I. The Religious Implications of Morality. Chapter II. The Motives of Ethical Goodness. Chapter III. The Causes of Deviation from the Good. Chapter IV. The Terminology of Good and Evil. *Book II.*—The Different Spheres of Duty, according to Greek Notions. Chapter I. Man in Relation to the Gods. Chapter II. Man in Relation to Natural Environment. Chapter III. Man in Relation to the Dead. Chapter IV. Man in Relation to the Family. Chapter V. Man in Relation to the State. Chapter VI. Man in Relation to his Fellows. Chapter VII. The Relation of Guest-Friendship. Chapter VIII. Friendship and Enmity. Chapter IX. Man and his Belongings. Chapter X. Man in Relation to Himself.

This arrangement shows that the work aims at classifying the facts of Greek ethics rather than at recording their history and inner connection, or reducing them to fundamental principles. Whether such an aim can, under any circumstances, lead to the best result may be fairly doubted. In the present case it certainly has not, and for the reason that the historical element has been too much neglected. No account of Greek ethics can be satisfactory which does not fully recognize that Greek ethical ideals, theories, and practices were very different in the different epochs of Greek history, and even in the same epoch among different portions of the race. The ethics of Homer's time were not the ethics of Aristotle's, still less those of Lucian's, while at any given date there was a wide difference between the ethics of Athens, Sparta, Corinth, Ephesus, Sybaris. It follows that to quote Homer and Xenophon on the same page, as witnesses to the same facts, is to give an entirely false impression, and to ignore the most conspicuous thing about the Greek people,—namely, their rapid advance in civilization. As well might we quote together Cædmon, Langlande, Chaucer, Carlyle, and Emerson as witnesses to the same facts with reference to the English people.

Any one who wishes to present the ethical views and practices of the Greeks must not only follow the historian step by step, but he must also, at every step, carefully distinguish between practice and theory, and show how the two interacted. The theories of Pythagoras, Plato, and Aristotle, for example, play an important part in Greek ethics; but they cannot be quoted as embodying the facts of Greek life. This also the author of the present work has failed fully to recognize.

This suggests the question whether it is at all possible to treat the ethics of a race or a people as a single and distinct subject, whether they must not rather be viewed as a series of phases of one side of life,—phases determined by manifold

causes, which in each case must be carefully investigated. The answer does not seem doubtful. To take a single example: no one will deny that the ethics of Epicurus played an important part in the world for at least five hundred years. Now, this system has none of the "religious implications" which the author seems to say underlie all Greek ethics; nay, it has not even their political implications. The truth is, we cannot treat Greek ethics, any more than English or French ethics, as a whole, and it is only the remoteness of the Greeks that makes us think we can. We must, then, regard the author's method as erroneous, and no less misleading than would be a method which in art should disregard the difference of conditions under which were produced the reliefs from Mycenæ and the Hermes of Praxiteles.

But when we have made these deductions from the value of the book, we still find in it very much that is worthy of praise. It is a perfect storehouse of facts in regard to Greek ethics, facts classified under certain non-ethical rubrics. It is an excellent *Vorarbeit* for a history or for a philosophy of Greek ethics. Again, it calls attention to many important facts in connection with ethical institutions. For example, it points out that when, in the process of ethical development, a people is passing from a lower to a higher and more comprehensive form of organization, it is very likely to show a rebellious spirit towards the lower, and for a time to abandon itself to an exaggerated and anarchic individualism. When, however, it has reached the higher organization, it returns to the lower, readopts it, and imparts to it a new significance. Thus each narrower institution becomes transformed in the light of the next wider, and of all above it. Thus, the rise of the Church was for a time prejudicial to the State; but when the Church was fully organized, states sprang up in its bosom with new and loftier aims than had been known to any of those existing previously. Does the same principle explain our present anarchic individualism?

THOMAS DAVIDSON.

ESSAYS ON EDUCATIONAL REFORMERS. By Robert Herbert Quick, M.A. (Trin. Coll., Camb.), etc. London: Longman, Green & Co., 1890.

This is to all intents a new book, though a considerable part of the substance of it appeared as far back as 1868. It is a book which ought to be read with attention not only (as it doubtless will) by all who are interested in education, but also by all who are interested in ethics, or indeed in human life. It is not merely a record of the vagaries of human opinion and human practice with regard to education, but a continuous history of the development of ideas, treated with constant reference to the great aims of life. Written by a man who is not a mere theorist, still less a mere student of the theories of others, but who has had in addition the advantage of long and varied experience as a teacher, it is as full of wisdom and practical insight as of speculative suggestiveness. The style of the book is clear and interesting, though occasionally a little diffuse, and is often illumined by happy quotations from the writer's favorite authors,—one of whom is evidently Carlyle.

As an indication of the spirit in which the work is done, the following extract will perhaps serve as well as any other. After stating that the aim of a true teacher must be to hold up an ideal for the life of his pupils; and that, for this end, he must constantly say of himself, "For their sakes I sanctify myself, that

they also may be sanctified," Mr. Quick proceeds thus: "Are we prepared to look upon our calling in this light? I believe that the school-teachers of this country need not fear comparison with any other body of men in point of morality and religious earnestness; but I dare say many have found, as I have, that the occupation is a very *narrowing* one, that the teacher soon gets to work in a groove, and from having his thoughts so much occupied with routine work, especially with small fault-findings and small corrections, he is apt to settle down insensibly into a kind of moral and intellectual stagnation,—Philistinism, as Matthew Arnold has taught us to call it,—in which he cares as little for high aims and general principles as his most commonplace pupils. Thus it happens sometimes, that a man who sets out with the notion of developing all the powers of his pupils' minds, thinks, in the end, of nothing but getting them to work out equations, and do Latin exercises without false concords; and the clergyman even who began with a strong sense of his responsibility, and a confident hope of influencing the boys' belief and character, at length is quite content if they conform to discipline, and give him no trouble out of school-hours. We may say of a really good teacher what Wordsworth says of the poet; in his work he must neither

'. . . lack that first great gift, the vital soul,  
Nor general truths, which are themselves a sort  
Of elements and agents, under-powers,  
Subordinate helpers of the living mind.'

But the 'vital soul' is too often crushed by excessive routine labor, and then, when general truths, both moral and intellectual, have ceased to interest us, our own education stops, and we become incapable of fulfilling the highest and most important part of our duty in educating others." Doubtless the crushing influence of "excessive routine labor"—especially in such a country as England, hag-ridden by examinations, and the curse of prizes and honors—must count for much. But absence of the "vital soul," and ignorance of the "general truths," are still more terrible evils; and we may perhaps hope that these, at least, will be in some degree removed by the diffusion of such works as that of Mr. Quick, works at once full of inspiring ideas, and "rich in saving common sense."

Where all is excellent, it is needless to call attention to particular parts. Perhaps the essays on Rousseau, Pestalozzi, Froebel, and Herbert Spencer, will be found especially interesting and instructive. What Mr. Quick says about the last named, in particular, ought to command the attention of English readers. The writer seems to have been somewhat nettled by the tone of Mr. Spencer's book on education. "When the man who has no practical acquaintance with education," he says, "lays down the law *ex cathedra*, garnished with sarcasms at all that is now going on, the school-master" is apt to be "offended by the assumed tone of authority." But notwithstanding this attitude of offence, the strictures of Mr. Quick on the Spencerian theories seem to the present reviewer to be on the whole both fair and effective. Indeed, considering the authority of Mr. Spencer's name, and the great popularity which his works enjoy, I am inclined to think that Mr. Quick might with advantage have criticised his views even more freely than he has done. This essay, however, is one of those that have been reprinted from the edition of 1868, when Mr. Spencer was less famous than he has since become.

Mr. Quick's work makes no pretence to completeness. It is a little disappointing to find that there is hardly any reference to Herbart in it; and, among recent English books, one cannot but regret that Mrs. Bryant's admirable work on "Educational Ends" receives no notice. Mr. Quick quotes, at one point, with approval, Professor Seeley's remark that "good books are in German." In these circumstances it is all the more desirable that we should do what we can to diffuse the knowledge of the few good books that we possess in English, among which that of Mrs. Bryant, and that of Mr. Quick himself, must undoubtedly take an honorable place.

JOHN S. MACKENZIE.

OWENS COLLEGE, MANCHESTER.

**A STRIKE OF MILLIONAIRES AGAINST MINERS; OR, THE STORY OF SPRING VALLEY.** By Henry D. Lloyd. Chicago: Belford-Clarke Company, Publishers. 1890.

The history of the Spring Valley strikes is a valuable and interesting contribution to existing literature on the labor question. It illustrates exceedingly well the complexity of the problem and the utter hopelessness of any simple and universal remedy for the ills of the body social. The whole development of Spring Valley, the method of managing the business about which the city grew up, is a striking commentary at once upon our industrial conditions and upon the ethical standards which prevail in our society.

The reviewer has no other means of judging of the truth of the story here told than the reports in the papers at the time, and a general knowledge of the conditions in and about Spring Valley. A group of men saw what they considered a fine opportunity to develop a new coal-mining centre in Northern Illinois. They made a deal with certain prominent railroads by which they secured considerable advantages in shipping coal. They bought an immense coal-field, and then began to boom a town upon it in order to get miners and to increase the general value of the property. They offered what were immense inducements to the mining population of Illinois and other States in order to get them to remove to Spring Valley. Thousands of laborers flocked thither, and for a time all went well. Wages were high, laborers eager and abundant, output large, and profits satisfactory. But a turn soon came. Whether because the speculation did not turn out well, or because the original promoters, having made immense profits, had turned the enterprise over to other people at such a price as prevented them from making anything out of it, or because the promoters, having made a handsome profit, were afraid that a continuance in the previous policy might lead to a loss in the future, and a consequent reduction in the whole mass of profit, or for some other similar reason, a change in the methods of the scheme was made.

The laborers felt that they were not fairly treated. A strike was the result. The struggle was long and bitter, and finally ended with the defeat of the strikers. All sorts of charges were made on both sides,—much truth, probably, in most of them. The result was some loss of property, or at least failure to make expected profits, and a horrible amount of suffering on the part of helpless women and children, and, perhaps, one ought to say of helpless men also. Mr. Lloyd's account makes one's blood boil; and I presume that there is much truth in what he says. It may all be true. If so, what of it?

It shows that under our present industrial system a set of men may start an enterprise, boom it, persuade thousands of people to embark their little all in it,—laborers on the one hand, and small capitalists on the other,—work the scheme for all that there is in it, bring it to a point where any further movement will bring sure ruin to all parties in it, and then withdraw and let the parties most interested in it fight it out among themselves.

It shows that public sentiment sustains a man, or set of men, in closing down their business when they see they cannot conduct it at a profit,—no matter how much profit they have previously made out of it; and no matter how much suffering such stoppage of the works may cause. It shows what cruel things corporations will do in defending their own interests, and how coolly stockholders will look upon cruelty perpetrated by the management of corporations in which they are interested: how absolutely false, therefore, is the assumption that employers under modern conditions—where they are employers through a corporate medium—will be guided in their acts by those kind and humane sentiments of regard for their fellow-men which the Church is continually trying to develop in society,—in a word, that the old saying about corporations having no bowels of compassion is strictly true. It is safe to say that no prominent individual employer in this country would treat his men as the Spring Valley corporation treated the miners, no matter how plain he appeared to himself to be in the right on all disputed points.

The story emphasizes again the fact so strongly proven by all economic history that the mining industry is a peculiar one; that the mining population is also a peculiar one; and that special laws and special efforts are necessary to regulate the former and protect the latter, a fact which our legislatures have not hitherto sufficiently regarded. It shows, also, how every great abuse in our industry is at some point connected with our railroad policy, and that no thorough-going reform, in any direction, can be permanently achieved until our railroad problem is solved.

This account proves also how quickly the great public forgets, and how deaf is the public ear to the cry of suffering and wrong; and emphasizes, therefore, the necessity of introducing such restrictions into our so-called system of free competition as shall prevent the possibility of such experiments as that in Spring Valley,—an experiment which could never have been tried if the railroads had not taken part as interested parties in the deal; if the miners had been more intelligent; if the company had not owned the houses in which the miners lived, and had not been allowed to plunder them by the system of company stores; if the real owners of the mines, viz., the stockholders, had been in personal contact with the miners in Spring Valley; if both parties had been compelled to arbitrate; if the mining industry were under proper restrictions in certain directions.

The story shows, finally, that there is little use in appealing to the sense of justice in the community to help right a wrong in a case so complicated that one cannot ascertain on which side justice lies,—at least clearly enough to carry public sentiment with one. Our way out of such difficulties lies not in preaching righteousness, though that may of course do no harm, but in trying to shape law and industry so that such cases shall not arise.

EDMUND J. JAMES.

# INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS.

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## SOCIAL EQUALITY.\*

THE problem of which I propose to speak is the old dispute between Dives and Lazarus. Lazarus presumably was a better man than Dives. How could Dives justify himself for living in purple and fine linen, while Lazarus was lying at the gates with the dogs licking his sores? The problem is one of all ages and takes many forms. When the old Puritan saw a man going to the gallows, "There," he said, "but for the grace of God, goes John Bradford." When the rich man, entering his club, sees some wretched tatterdemalion, slouching on the pavement, there, he may say, lies Sir Gorgius Midas, but for—what? I am here and he there, he may say, because I was the son of a successful stock-jobber and he the son of some deserted mother at the work-house. That is the cause, but is it a reason? Suppose, as is likely enough, that Lazarus is as good a man as Midas, ought they not to change places or to share their property equally? A question certainly to be asked and if possible to be answered.

It is often answered, and is most simply answered, by saying that all men ought to be equal. Dives should be cut up and distributed in equal shares between Lazarus and his brethren. The dogma which embodies this claim is one which is easily refuted in some of the senses which it may bear, though in

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\* A lecture delivered to the Ethical Societies of London and Cambridge, 1890.

spite of such refutations it has become an essential part of the most genuine creed of mankind. The man of science says with perfect truth that, so far from men being born equal, some are born with the capacity of becoming Shakespeares and Newtons and others with scarcely the power of rising above Sally, the chimpanzee. The answer would be conclusive, if anybody demanded that we should all be just six feet high, with brains weighing sixty ounces, neither more nor less. It is also true and, I conceive, more relevant, that, as the man of science will again say, all improvement has come through little groups of men superior to their neighbors, through races or through classes, which by elevating themselves on the shoulders of others, have gained leisure and means for superior cultivation.

But equality may be demanded as facilitating this process by removing the artificial advantages of wealth. It may be taken as a demand for a fair start, not as a demand that the prizes shall be distributed irrespectively of individual worth. The great merit of Napoleon, the heir of the revolution, was, according to Carlyle, that he proposed to open a career to talent. And, whether the demand is rightly or wrongly expressed, we must, I think, admit that the real force with which we have to reckon is the demand for justice and for equality as somehow implied by justice. It is easy to browbeat a poor man who wants bread and cheese for himself and his family, by calling his demands materialistic and advising him to turn his mind to the future state, where he will have the best of Dives. It is equally easy to ascribe the demands to mere envy and selfishness, or to those evil-minded "agitators" who, for their own wicked purposes, induce men to prefer a guinea to a pound wages. But, after all, there is something in the demand for fair play and for the means of leading decent lives which requires a better answer. It is easy, again, to say that all socialists are Utopian. Make every man equal to-day and the old inequalities will reappear to-morrow. Pitch such a one over London Bridge, it was said, with nothing on but his breeches and he will turn up at Woolwich with his pockets full of gold. It is as idle to try for a dead level, when you

work with such heterogeneous materials, as to persuade a homogeneous fluid to stand at anything but a dead level. But surely it may be urged that this is as much a reason for declining to believe that equal conditions of life will produce mere monotony as for insisting that equality in any state is impossible. The present system is a plan for keeping the scum at the surface. One of the few lessons which I have learnt from life and not found already in copy-books is the enormous difficulty which a man of the respectable classes finds in completely ruining himself even by vice, extravagance, and folly ; whereas there are plenty of honest people who, in spite of economy and prudence, can scarcely keep outside of the work-house. Admitting the appeal to justice, it is again often urged that justice is opposed to the demand for equality. Property is sacred, it is said, because a man has (or ought to have) a right to what he has made, either by labor or by a course of fair dealings with other men. I am not about to discuss the ultimate ground on which the claim to private property is justified, and, as I think, satisfactorily established. A man has a right, we say, to all that he has fairly earned. Has he, then, a right to inherit what his father has earned ? A man has had the advantage of all that a rich father can do for him in education, and so forth. Why should he also have the father's fortune without earning it ? Are the merits of making money so great that they are transmissible to posterity ? Should a man who has been so good as to become rich, be blessed even to the third and fourth generation ? Why, as a matter of pure justice, should not all fortunes be applied to public uses on the death of the man who made them ? Such a law, however impolitic, would not be incompatible with the moral principle to which an appeal is made. There are, of course, innumerable other ways in which laws may favor an equality of property without breaking any of the fundamental principle. What, for example, is the just method of distributing taxation ? A rich man can not only pay more money than a poor man in proportion to his income, but he can with equal ease pay a greater proportion. To double the income of a laborer may be to raise him from starvation to comfort. To double



the income of a millionaire may simply be to encumber him with wealth by which he is unable to increase his own pleasure. There is a limit beyond which it is exceedingly difficult to find ways of spending money on one's own enjoyment—though I have never been able to fix it precisely. On this ground, such plans as a graduated income-tax are, it would seem, compatible with the plea of justice; and, within certain limits, we do, in fact, approve of various taxes on the ground, real or supposed, that they tend to shift burdens from the poor to the rich and so far to equalize wealth. In fact, this appeal to justice is a tacit concession of the principle. If we justify property on the ground that it is fair that a man should keep what he has earned by his own labor, it seems to follow that it is unjust that he should have anything not earned by his labor. In other words, the answer teaches the ordinary first principle from which socialism starts, and which, in some socialist theories, it definitely tries to embody.

All that I have tried to do so far is to show that the bare doctrine of equality, which is in some way connected with the demand for justice, is not of necessity either unjust or impracticable. It may be used to cover claims which are unjust, to sanction bare confiscation, to take away motives for industry, and, briefly, may be a demand of the drones to have an equal share of the honey. From the bare abstract principle of equality between men, we can, in my own opinion, deduce nothing; and I do not think that the principle can itself be established. That is why it is made a first principle, or in other words, one which is not to be discussed. The French revolutionists treated it in this way as *à priori* and self-evident. No school was in more deadly opposition to such *à priori* truths than the school of Bentham and the utilitarians. Yet Bentham's famous doctrine, that in calculating happiness each man is to count for one and nobody for more than one, seems to be simply the old principle in a new disguise. James Mill applied the doctrine to politics. J. S. Mill again applied it with still more thoroughness, especially in his doctrine of representation and of the equality of the sexes. Accordingly various moralists have urged that this was an inconsistency in utilitarian doctrine, implying

that they too could make *à priori* first principles when they wanted them. It has become a sort of orthodox dogma with radicals, who do not always trouble themselves about a philosophical basis, and is applied with undoubting confidence to many practical political problems. "One man, one vote" is not simply the formulation of a demand, but seems to intimate a logical ground for the demand. If, in politics, one man is rightfully entitled to one vote, is it not also true that in economics one man should have a right to one income, or that money, like political power, should be distributed into precisely equal shares? Yet why are we to take for granted the equality of men in the sense required for such deductions? Since men are not equally qualified for political power, it would seem better *primâ facie* that each man should have the share of power and wealth which corresponds to his powers of using or perhaps to his powers of enjoying. Why should he not say,—“To each man according to his deserts?” One practical reason of course is the extreme difficulty of saying what are the deserts and how they are to be ascertained. Undoubtedly equality is the shortest and simplest way, but if we take it merely as the most convenient assumption it loses its attractive appearance of abstract justice or *à priori* self-certainty. Do a common laborer and Mr. Gladstone deserve the same share of voting power? If not, how many votes should Mr. Gladstone possess to give him his just influence? To ask such questions is to show that answering is impossible, though political theorists have now and then tried to put together some ostensible pretext for an answer.

What, let us ask, is the true relation between justice and equality? A judge, to take the typical case, is perfectly just when he ascertains the facts by logical inferences from the evidence and then applies the law in the spirit of a scientific reasoner. Given the facts, what is the rule under which they come? To answer that question, generally speaking, is his whole duty. In other words, he has to *excludé* all irrelevant considerations, such as his own private interests or affections. The parties are to be to him merely A and B, and he has to work out the result as an arithmetician works out a sum. Among

the irrelevant considerations are frequently some moral aspects of the case. A judge, for example, decides a will to be valid or invalid without asking whether the testator acted justly or unjustly in a moral sense, but simply whether his action was legal or illegal. He cannot go behind the law, even from motives of benevolence or general maxims of justice, without being an unjust judge. Cases may arise, indeed, as I must say in passing, in which this is hardly true. A law may be so flagrantly unjust that a virtuous judge would refuse to administer it. One striking case was that of the fugitive slave law in the United States, where a man had to choose between acting legally and outraging humanity. So we consider a parent unjust who does not leave his fortune equally among his children. Unless there should by some special reason to the contrary, we shall hold him to be unfair for making distinctions out of mere preference of one child to another. Yet in the case of primogeniture our opinion would have to be modified. Supposing, for example, a state of society in which primogeniture was generally recognized as desirable for public interests, we could hardly call a man unjust for leaving his estates to his eldest son. If, in such a state, a man breaks the general rule, our judgment of his conduct would be determined perhaps by considering whether he was before or behind his age, whether he was acting from a keener perception of the evils of inequality or actuated by spite or regardless of the public interests which he believed to be concerned. A parent treats his children equally in his will in regard to money, but he does not, unless he is a fool, give the same training or the same opening to all his children, whether they are stupid or clever, industrious or idle. But what I wish to insist upon is that justice implies essentially indifference to irrelevant considerations, and therefore, in many cases, equality in the treatment of the persons concerned. A judge has to decide without reference to bribes and not be biased by the position of an accused person. In that sense he treats the men equally, but of course he does not give equal treatment to the criminal and innocent, to the rightful and wrongful claimant.

The equality implied in justice is therefore to be under-

stood as an exclusion of the irrelevant, and thus supposes an understanding as to what is irrelevant. It is not a mere abstract assertion of equality, but the assertion that, in a given concrete case, a certain rule is to be applied without considering anything outside of the rule. An ideally perfect rule would contain within itself a sufficient indication of what is to be relevant. All men of full age, sound mind, and so forth, are to be treated in such and such a way. Then all cases falling within the rule are to be decided on the same principles, and in that sense equally. But the problem remains, what considerations should be taken into account by the rule itself. Let us put the canon of equality in a different shape, namely, that there should always be a sufficient reason for any difference in the treatment of our fellows. This rule does not imply that I should act in all cases as though all men were equal in character or mind, but that my action should in all cases be justified by some appropriate consideration. It does not prove that every man should have a vote, but that if one man has a vote and another has not, there should be some adequate reason for the difference. It does not prove that every man should work eight hours a day and have a shilling an hour, but that differences of hours or of pay and, equally, uniformity of hours and pay, should have some sufficient justification. This is a deeper principle which in some cases justifies and in others does not justify the rule of equality. The rule of equality follows from it under certain conditions and has gained credit because, in point of fact, those conditions have often been satisfied.

The revolutionary demand for equality was, historically speaking, a protest against arbitrary inequality. It was a protest against the existence of privileges accompanied by no duties. When the rich man could only answer the question "What have you done to justify your position?" by the famous phrase of Beaumarchais, "I took the trouble to be born," he was obviously in a false position. The demand for a society founded upon reason, in this sense that a sufficient reason should be given for all differences, was, it seems to me, perfectly right; and, moreover, was enough to condemn the

then established system. But when this demand has been so constructed as to twist a logical rule, applicable to all scientific reasoning, into a dogmatic assertion that certain concrete beings were in fact equal and to infer that they should have equal rights, it ceased to be logical at all and has been a fruitful parent of many fallacies. Reasonable beings require a sufficient reason for all differences of conduct, for the difference between their treatment of a man and a monkey or a white man and a black, as well as for differences between treatment of rich and poor or wise men and fools; and there must, as the same principle implies, be also a sufficient reason for treating all members of a given class equally. We have to consider whether, for any given purpose, the differences between human beings and animals, Englishmen and negroes, men and women, are or are not of importance for our purpose. When the differences are irrelevant we neglect them or admit their claim to equality of treatment. But the question as to relevance is not to be taken for granted either way. It would be a very convenient but a very unjustifiable assumption in many cases, as it might save an astronomer trouble if he assumed that every star was equal to every other star.

The application of this is, I think, obvious. The *à priori* assumption of the equality of men is, in some sense, easily refuted. But the refutation does not entitle us to assume that arbitrary inequality, inequality for which no adequate ground can be assigned, is therefore justifiable. It merely shows that the problem is more complex than has been assumed at first sight. "All men ought to be equal." If you mean equal in natural capacity or character, it is enough to say that what is impossible cannot be. If you propose that the industrious and idle, the good and bad, the wise and foolish, should share equally in social advantages, the reply is equally obvious, that such a scheme, if possible, would be injurious to the qualities on which human welfare depends. If you say that men should be rewarded solely according to their intrinsic merits, we must ask, do you mean to abstract from the adventitious advantages of education, social surroundings, and so forth, or to take men as they actually are, whatever the circumstances to which their

development is owing? To ask what a man would have been had he been in a different position from his youth, is to ask for an impossible solution, and one, moreover, of no practical bearing. I shall not employ a drunkard if I am in want of a butler, whether he has become a drunkard under overpowering temptation or become a drunkard from inherited dipsomania. But if, on the other hand, I take the man for what he is, without asking how he has come to be what he is, I leave the source at least of all the vast inequalities of which we complain. The difficulty, which I will not try to develop further, underlies, as I think, the really vital difference of method by which different schools attempt to answer the appeal for social justice.

The school of so-called individualists finds, in fact, that equality in their sense is incompatible with the varied differences due to the complete growth of the social structure. They look upon men simply as so many independent units of varying qualities, no doubt, but still capable of being considered for political and social purposes as equal. They ask virtually what justice would demand, if we had before us a crowd of independent applicants for the good things of the world, and the simplest answer is to distribute the good things equally. If it is replied that the idle and the industrious should not be upon the same footing, they are ready to agree, perhaps, that men should be rewarded according to their services to society, however difficult it may be to arrange the proportions. But it soon appears that the various classes into which society is actually divided imply differences, not due to the individual and his intrinsic merits but to the varying surroundings in which he is placed. To do justice, then, it becomes necessary to get rid of these differences. The extreme case is that of the family. Every one probably owes more to his mother and to his early domestic environment than to any other of the circumstances which have influenced his development. If you and I started as perfectly equal babies, and you have become a saint and I a sinner, the divergence probably began when our mothers watched our cradles and was made certain before we had left their knees. Consequently the more thor-

ough-going designers of Utopia have proposed to abolish this awkward difference. Men must be different at their birth; but we might conceivably arrange public nurseries which should place them all under approximately equal conditions. Then any differences would result from a man's intrinsic qualities and he might be said to be rewarded simply according to his own merits.

The plan may be tempting but has its disadvantages. There are injustices, if we call all inequality injustice, which we can only attribute to nature or the unknown power which makes men and monkeys, Shakespeares and Stephens. And one result is that the character and conduct of human beings depends to a great extent upon circumstances, which are accidental in the sense that they are circumstances other than the original endowment of the individual. In this sense, maternal love, for example, is unjust. The mother loves her child because it is her own, not because it is better (though of course it is better) than other children. So, as Adam Smith, I think, observed, we are more moved by our neighbor's suffering from a corn on his great toe than by the starvation of millions in China. In other words, the affections, which are the great moving forces of society, are unjust in so far as they cause us to be infinitely more interested in our own little circle than in the remoter members of humanity known to us only by report. Without discussing the "justice" of this arrangement, we shall have, I think, to admit that it is inevitable. For I, at least, hold that the vague and vast organism of humanity depends for its cohesion upon the affinities and attractions and not *vice versa*. My interests are strongest where my power of action is greatest. The love of mothers for children is a force of essential value and therefore to be cultivated rather than repressed, for no force known to us could replace it. And what is pre-eminently true in this case is, of course, true to a degree in others. Burke stated this with admirable force in his attack upon the revolutionists who expounded the opposite principle of abstract equality. "To be attached to the subdivision, to love the little platoon we belong to in society, is the first principle," he says, "the germ, as it were,

of public affections. It is the first link in the series by which we proceed towards a love to our country and mankind." The assertion that they desired to invert this order, to destroy every social link in so far as it tended to produce inequalities, was the pith of his great indictment against the French "meta-physical" revolutionists. They had perverted the general logical precept of the sufficient reason for all inequalities by converting it into an assuming of the equality of concrete units. They fell into the fallacy of which I have spoken; and many radicals, utilitarians, and others have followed them. They assumed that all the varieties of human character, or all those due to the influence of the social environment, through whose structure and inherited instincts every full-grown man has been moulded, might be safely disregarded for the purpose of political and social construction. They have spoken, in brief, as if men were the equal and homogeneous atoms of physical inquiry and social problems capable of solution by a simple rearrangement of the atoms in different orders, instead of remembering that they are dealing with a complex organism, in which not only the whole order but every constituent atom is also a complex structure of indefinitely varying qualities. In the recognition of this truth lies, as I believe, the true secret of any satisfactory method of treatment.

Does this fact justify inequality in general? Or does not the principle of equality still remain as essentially implied in the Utopia which we all desire to construct? We have to take it for granted that to each man the first and primary moving instinct is and must be the love of the little "platoon" of which he is a member; that the problem is, not to destroy all these minor attractions, to obliterate the structure and replace society by a vast multitude of independent atoms, each supposed to aim directly at the good of the whole, but so to harmonize and develop or restrain the smaller interests of families, of groups and associations, that they may spontaneously co-operate towards the general welfare. It is a long and difficult task to which we have to apply ourselves; a task not to be effected by the demonstration or application of a single abstract dogma, but to be worked out gradually by the co-operation of many



classes and of many generations. If it is fairly solved in the course of a thousand years or so, I for one shall be very fairly satisfied. But distant as the realization may be, we may or rather ought to consider seriously the end to which we should be working. The conception implies a distinction of primary importance towards any clear treatment of the problem. We have, that is, two different, though not altogether distinct, provinces of what I may, perhaps, call organic and functional morality. We may take the existing order for granted, and ask what is then our duty; or we may ask how far the structure itself requires modification, and, if so, what kind of modification. A man who assumes the existence of the present structure may act justly or unjustly within the limits so prescribed. He must generally be guided in a number of cases by some principle of equality. The judge should endeavor to give the same law to rich and poor; the parent should not make arbitrary distinctions between his children; the statesman should try to distribute his burdens without favoring one particular class, and so forth. A man who, in such a sense, acts justly may be described as up to the level of his age and its accepted established moral ideas, and is, therefore, entitled at least to the negative praise of not being corrupt or dishonest. He fulfils accurately the functions imposed upon him, and is not governed by what Bentham called the sinister interests which would prevent them from being effectually discharged for the welfare of the community. But the problem which we have to consider is the deeper and more difficult one of organic justice; and our question is what justice means in this case, or what are the irrelevant considerations to be excluded from our motives of conduct.

Between these two classes of justice there are distinctions which it is necessary to state briefly. Justice, as we generally use the word, implies that the unjust man deserves to be hanged or, at least, is responsible for his actions. What "responsibility" precisely implies is, of course, a debatable question. I only need assume that, in any case, it implies that somebody is guilty of wrong doing for which he should receive an appropriate penalty. But, on organic questions it is

not the individual but the race which is responsible, and we require a reform, not a penalty. An impatient temper leads us to generalize too hastily from the case of the individual to that of the country. We bestow the blame for all the wrongs of an oppressed nation, for example, upon the nation which oppresses. But, in simple point of fact, the oppressed nation generally deserves (if the word can be fairly used) to share the blame. The trodden worm would not have been trodden upon if it had been a bit of a viper. Whatever the duty of turning the second cheek, it is clearly not a national duty. If we admire a Tell or Robert Bruce for resisting oppressors, we implicitly condemn those who submitted to oppressors. If a nation is divided or wanting in courage, public spirit, and independence, it will be trampled down, and though we may most rightfully blame the trampers, it is idle to exonerate the trampled. It is easy, in the same way, to make the rich solely responsible for all the misery of the poor. The man who has got the booty, is naturally regarded as the robber. But, speaking scientifically, that is, with the desire to state the plain facts, we must admit that if the poor are those who have gone to the wall in the struggle for wealth, then, whatever unjust weapons have been used in that struggle, the improvidence and vice and idleness have certainly been among the main causes of defeat. Here, as before, the question is not who is to be punished? We can only settle that when dealing with individual cases. It is the question, what is the cause of certain evils, and here we must resist the temptation of supposing that the class which in some sense appears to profit by them, or, at least, to be exempt from them, has, therefore, any more to do with bringing them about than the class which suffers from them.

The reflection may put us in mind of what seems to be a general law. The ultimate cause of the adoption of institutions and rules of conduct is often the fact of their utility to the race; but it is only at a later period that their utility becomes the conscious or avowed reason for maintaining them. The political fabric has been clearly built up, in great part, by purely selfish ambition. Nations have been formed by ener-

getic rulers, who had no eye for anything beyond the gratification of their own ambition, although they were clear-headed enough to see that their own ambition could best secure its objects by taking the side of the stronger social forces and by giving substantial benefits to others. The same holds good pre-eminently of industrial relations. We all know how Adam Smith, sharing the philosophical optimism of his time, showed how the pursuit of his own welfare by each man tended by a kind of preordained harmony to contribute to the welfare of all. Since his time, we have ceased to be so optimistic and have recognized the fact that the building up of modern industrial systems has involved much injury to large classes. And yet, we may, I think, in great measure adopt his view. The fact that each man was rogue enough to think first of himself and of his own wife and family is not a proof or a presumption that he did not flourish because, in point of fact, he was contributing (quite unintentionally, perhaps) to the comforts of mankind in general. What we have to reflect is that, while the bare existence of certain institutions gives a strong presumption of their utility, there is also a probability that when the utility becomes a conscious aim or a consciously adopted criterion of their advantage, they will require a corresponding modification intended to secure the advantages at a minimum cost of evil.

Premising these remarks as to the meaning of organic justice, we can now come to the question of equality. Justice in its ordinary sense may be regarded from one point of view as the first condition of the efficiency of the social organ. In saying that a judge is just, we imply that he is so far efficiently discharging his part in society—the due application of the law—without reference to irrelevant considerations. He is a machine which rightly parts the sheep and goats—taking the legal definition of goats and sheep—instead of putting some goats into the sheep-fold, and *vice versa*. That is, he secures the accurate application of the purely legal rule. Organic justice involves an application of the same principle because it equally depends upon the exclusion of irrelevant considerations. It implies such a distribution of functions and of main-

tenance as may secure the greatest possible efficiency of society towards some end in itself good. Society of course may be organized with great efficiency for bad or doubtful ends. A purely military organization, however admirable for its purpose, may imply a sacrifice of the highest welfare of the nation. Assuming, however, the goodness of the end, the greatest efficiency is of course desirable. We may, for our purposes, assume that the efficiency of a nation regarded as a society for the production of wealth is a desirable end. There are, of course, many other purposes which must not be sacrificed to the production of wealth. But power of producing wealth, meaning roughly whatever contributes to the physical support and comfort of the nation, is undoubtedly a necessary condition of all other happiness. If we all starve we can have neither art nor science nor morality. What I mean, therefore, is that a nation is so far better as it is able to raise all necessary supplies with the least expenditure of labor, leaving aside the question how far the superfluous forces should be devoted to raising comparative luxuries, or to some purely religious or moral or intellectual purposes. The perfect industrial organization is, I shall assume, compatible with or rather a condition of a perfect organization of other kinds. In the most general terms we have to consider what are the principles of social organization, which of course implies a certain balance between the various organs and a thorough nutrition of all, while yet we may for a moment confine our attention to the purely industrial or economic part of the question. How, if at all, does the principle of equality or of social justice enter the problem?

We may assume in the first place, from this point of view, that one most obvious condition is the absence of all purely useless structures, whether of the kind which we call "survivals" or such as may be called parasitic growths. The organ which has ceased to discharge corresponding functions is simply a drag upon the vital forces. When a class, such as the old French aristocracy, ceases to perform duties while retaining privileges, it will be removed,—too probably, as in that case, it will be removed by violent and mischievous methods,

—if the society is to grow in vigor. The individuals, as I have said, may or may not deserve punishment, for they are not personally responsible for the general order of things; but they are not unlikely to incur severe penalties, and what we should really hope is that they may be in some way absorbed by judicious medical treatment, instead of extirpated by the knife. At the other end of the scale we have the parasitic class of the beggars or thieves. They, too, are not personally responsible for the conditions into which they are born. But they are not only to be pitied individually but to be regarded in the mass as involving social disease and danger. More words upon that topic are quite superfluous, but I may just recall the truth that the two evils are directly connected. We hear it often said, and often denied, that the rich are growing richer and the poor poorer. So far, however, as it is true, it is one version of the very obvious fact that where there are many careless rich people, there will be the best chance for the beggars. The thoughtless expenditure of the rich without due responsibilities provides the steady stream of so-called charity,—the charity which, as Shakespeare (or somebody else) observes, is twice cursed, which curses him that gives and him that receives; which is to the rich man as a mere drug to still his conscience and offer a spurious receipt in full for his neglect of social duties, and to the poor man an encouragement to live without self-respect, without providence, a mere hanger-on and dead-weight upon society, and a standing injury and source of temptation to his honest neighbors.

Briefly, a wholesome social condition implies that every social organ discharges a useful function; it renders some service to the community which is equivalent to the support which it derives; brain and stomach each get their due share of supply; and there is a thorough reciprocity between all the different members of the body. But what kind of equality should be desired in order to secure this desirable organic balance? We have to do, I may remark, with the case of a homogeneous race. By this I mean not only that there is no reason to suppose that there is any difference between the innate qualities of rich and poor, but that there is the strong-

est reason for believing in an equality; that is to say, more definitely, that if you took a thousand poor babies and a thousand rich babies, and subjected them to the same conditions, they would show great individual differences, but no difference traceable to the mere difference of class origin. I therefore may leave aside such problems as might arise in the Southern States of America, or even in British India, where two different races are in presence; or again the case of the sexes, where we cannot assume as self-evident that the organic differences are irrelevant to political or social ends. So far as we are concerned, we may take it for granted that the differences which emerge are not due to any causes antecedent to and overriding the differences due to different social positions. If we can say justly (as has been said) that a poor man is generally more charitable in proportion to his means, or again that he is, as a rule, a greater liar or a greater drunkard than the rich man, the difference is not due to a difference of breed, but to the education (in the widest sense) which each has received. So long as that difference remains, we must take account of it for purposes of obtaining the maximum efficiency. We must not make the poor man a professor of mathematics, or even manager of a railway, because he has talents, which if trained, would have qualified him for the post; but we may and must assume that an equal training would do as much for the poor man as for the rich; and the question is, how far it is desirable or possible to secure such equality.

Now, from the point of view of securing a maximum efficiency, it seems to be a clearly desirable end that the only qualities which should indisputably help to determine a man's position in life should also be those which determine his fitness for working in it efficiently. In Utopia, it should be the rule that each man shall do what he can do best. If one man is a game-keeper and another a prime minister, it should be because one has the gifts of a game-keeper and the other the gifts of a prime minister: whereas in the actual state, as we all know, the game-keeper often becomes the prime minister, while the potential prime minister is limited to looking after

poachers. But I also urge that we must take into account the actual and not the potential qualities at any given moment. The inequality may be obviated by raising the grade of culture in all classes, but we must not assume that there is an actual equality where, in fact, there is the widest possible difference. In short, I assert that it is our duty to try to make men equal; though I deny that we are clearly justified in assuming an equality. By making them equal, I do not of course mean that we should try to make them all alike. I recognize with Mill and every sensible writer on the subject, that such a consummation represents rather a danger than an advantage. I wish to see individuality strengthened not crushed, to encourage men to develop the widest possible diversity of tastes, talents, and pursuits, and to attain unity of opinion, not by a calm assumption that this or that creed is true, but by encouraging the sharpest and freest collision of opinions. The equality of which I speak is that which would result, if the distinction into organs were not of such a nature as to make one class more favorable than another to the full development of whatever character and talents a man may possess. In other words, the distribution into classes would correspond purely and simply to the telling off of each man to the duties which he is best fitted to discharge. The position into which he is born, the class surroundings which determine his development, must not carry with them any disqualification for his acquiring the necessary aptitude for any other position. It was, I think, Fourier who argued that a man ought to be paid more highly for being a chimney-sweep than for being a prime minister, because the duties of a sweep are the most disagreeable,—a position which some prime ministers may perhaps see reason to doubt. My suggestion is that in Utopia every human being would be so placed as to be capable of preparing himself for any other position and should then go to the work for which he is best fitted. The equality as thus defined would, I submit, leave no room for a sense of injustice, because the qualities which determine a man's position would be the qualities for which he deserves the position, desert in this sense being measurable by fitness.

Discontent with class distinctions must arise so long as a man feels that his position in a class limits and cramps his capacities below the level of happier fortunes. Discontent is not altogether a bad thing, for it is often an *alias* for hope; remove all discontent and you remove all guarantee for improvement. But discontent is of the malignant variety when it is allied with a sense of injustice; that is, of restrictions imposed upon one class for no assignable reason. The only sufficient reason for classes is the efficient discharge of social functions. The difference between the positions of men in social strata supply some of the most effective motives for the struggle of life; and the effort of men to rise into the wealthy or the powerful class is not likely to cease so long as men are men; but they take an unworthy form so long as the ambition is simply to attain privileges unconnected with or disproportioned to the duties involved, and therefore generate hatred to the social structure. If a class could be simply an organ for the discharge of certain functions, and each man in the whole body politic able to fit himself for that class, the injustice and therefore the malignant variety of discontent would disappear. Of course, I am speaking only of justice. I do not attempt to define the proper ends of society or regard justice in itself as a sufficient guarantee for all desirable results. Such justice may exist even in a savage tribe or a low social type. There may be a just distribution of food among a shipwrecked crew, but the attainment of such justice would not satisfy all their wants. The abolition of misery, the elevation of a degraded class to a higher stage is a good thing in itself, unless it can be shown to involve some counterbalancing evil. I only argue that the ideal society would have this, among other attributes, and therefore that to secure such equality is a legitimate object of aspiration.

I am speaking of "Utopia." The time is indefinitely distant when a man will choose to be a sweep or a prime minister according to his aptitudes, and be equally able to learn his trade whether he is the son of a prime minister or a sweep. I only try to indicate the goal to which our efforts should be directed. But the goal, thus defined, implies methods different



from that of some advocates of equality. They propose at once to assume the non-existence of a disagreeable difficulty and to take men as equal in a sense in which they are not in fact equal. To me the problem appears to be, not the instant introduction of a new system, but a necessarily long and very gradual process of education directed towards the distant goal of making men equal in the desirable sense; and that problem, I add, is in the main a moral problem. It is idle to make institutions without making the qualities by which they must be worked. I do not say—far from it—that we are not to propose what may roughly be called external changes: new regulations and new forms of association, and so forth. On the contrary, I believe, as I have intimated, that this method corresponds to the normal order of development. The new institution protects and stimulates the germs of the moral instincts by which it must be worked. But, I also hold that no mere rearrangement does any permanent good unless it calls forth a corresponding moral change, and, moreover, that the moral change, however slow and imperceptible, does incomparably more than any external change.

If we assume our present institutions to be permanent, a slight improvement in moral qualities, a growth of sobriety, of chastity, of prudence and intellectual culture would make an almost indefinite improvement in the condition of the masses. If, for example, Englishmen ceased to drink, every English home might be made reasonably comfortable. The two kinds of change imply each other; but it is the most characteristic error of the designers of Utopias to suppose a mere change of regulations without sufficiently attending to the moral implication. To attain equality, as I have tried to define the word, would imply vast moral changes, and therefore a long and difficult elaboration. We have not simply to make men happy, as they now count happiness, but to alter their views of happiness. The good old copy-books tell us that happiness is as common in poor men's huts as in rich men's palaces. We are apt to reply that the statement is a mockery and a lie. But it points to the consummation which in some simple social states has been partly realized and which in some dis-

tant future may come to be an expression of facts. It is conceivable surely that rich men may some day find that there are modes of occupation which are more interesting as well as more useful than accumulation of luxuries or the keeping of horses for the turf; that, in place of propitiating fate by supporting the institution of beggary, there is an indefinite field for public-spirited energy, in the way not of throwing crumbs to Lazarus, but of promoting national culture of mind, of spirit, and of body; that benevolence does not mean simple self-sacrifice, except to the selfish, but the pursuit of a noble and most interesting career; that men's duty to their children is not to enable them to lead idle lives, but to fit them for playing a manly part in the great game of life; and that their relations to those whom they employ is not that of persons exploiting the energies of inferior animals, but of leaders of industry with a common interest in the prosperity of their occupation. People, no doubt, will hardly pursue business from motives of pure benevolence to others, and I do not think it desirable that they should. But the recognition that the pursuit of an honorable business is useful to others may, nevertheless, guide their energies, make the mere scramble for wealth disreputable and induce them to labor for solid and permanent advantages. Such moral changes are, I conceive, necessary conditions of the equality of which I have spoken; they must be brought about to some extent, if the industrial organism is to free itself from the injustice necessarily implied in a mere blind struggle for personal comfort.

Moreover, however distant the final consummation may be, there are, I think, many indications of an approximation. Nothing is more characteristic of modern society than the enormous development of the power of association for particular purposes. In former days, a society had to form an independent organ, a corporation, a college, and so forth, to discharge any particular function, and the resulting organ was so distinct as to absorb the whole life of its members. The work of the fellow was absorbed in the corporate life of his corporation and he had no distinct personal interests. Now we are all members of societies by the dozen, and society is

constantly acquiring the art of forming associations for any purpose, temporary or permanent, which imply no deep structural division and unite people of all classes and positions. As the profounder lines are obliterated, the tendency to form separate castes, defended by personal privileges, and holding themselves apart from other classes, rapidly diminishes; and the corresponding prejudices are in process of diminution. But I can only hint at this principle.

A correlative moral change in the poor is, of course, equally essential. America is described by Mr. Lowell in the noblest panegyric ever made upon his own country, as "She that lifts up the manhood of the poor." She has taken some rather queer methods of securing that object lately, yet, however imperfect the result, every American traveller will, I believe, sympathize with what Mr. Bryce has recently said in his great book. America is still the land of hope,—the land where the poor man's horizon is not bounded by a vista of inevitable dependence on charity; where—in spite of some superficially grotesque results—every man can speak to every other without the oppressive sense of condescension; where a civil word from a poor man is not always a covert request for a gratuity and a tacit confession of dependence. "Alas," says Wordsworth, in one of his pregnant phrases, "the gratitude of men has oftener left me mourning" than their cold-heartedness; because, I presume, it is a painful proof of the rarity of kindness. When one man can only receive a gift and another can only bestow it as a payment on account of a long accumulation of the arrears of class injustice, the relations hardly admit of genuine gratitude on either side. What grates most painfully upon me, and, I suppose upon most of us, is the "servility" of man; the acceptance of a beggar's code of morals as natural and proper for any one in a shabby coat. The more prominent evil just now, according to conservatives and pessimists, is the correlative one of the beggar on horseback; of the man who has found out that he can squeeze more out of his masters, and uses his power even without considering whether it is wise to drain your milch cow too exhaustively.

A hope of better things is encouraged by schemes for arbi-

tration and conciliation between employers and employed. But we require a moral change if arbitration is to imply something more than a truce between natural enemies, and conciliation to be something different from that employed by Hood's butcher, when, after hauling a sheep by main force into the slaughter-house, he exclaimed, "There, I've conciliated *him*!" The only principle on which arbitration can proceed is that the profits should be divided in such a way as to be a sufficient inducement to all persons concerned to give their money or their labor, mental or physical, to promote the prosperity of the business at large. But the reconciliation can only be complete when the capitalist is capable of employing his riches with enough public spirit and generosity to disarm mere envy by his obvious utility, and the poor man justifies his increased wages by his desire to secure permanent benefits and a better standard of life. In Utopia, the question will still be, what plan shall be a sufficient inducement to the men who co-operate as employers or laborers, but the inducement will appeal to better motives and the positions be so far equalized that each will be most tolerable to the man best fitted for it.

Here a vast series of problems opens about which I can only suggest the briefest hint. The principle I now urge is the old one, namely, that the usual mark of a quack remedy is the neglect of the moral aspect of a question. We want a state of opinion in which the poor are not objects to be slobbered over, but men to help in a manly struggle for moral as well as material elevation. A great deal is said, for example, about the evils of competition. It is remarkable indeed that few proposals for improvement even, so far as I can discover, tend to get rid of competition. Co-operation, as tradesmen will tell us, is not an abolition of competition, but a competition of groups instead of units. Co-operative societies, I imagine, like all sensible people, buy in the cheapest and sell in the dearest market. They compete with tradesmen or with manufacturers and they compete on the old terms. "Profit sharing" is simply a plan by which workmen may take a direct share in the competition carried on by their masters. I do not men-

tion this as any objection to such schemes, for I do not think that competition is an evil. I do not doubt the vast utility of schemes which tend to increase the intelligence and prudence of workmen and give them an insight into the conditions of successful business. Competition is no doubt bad so far as it means cheating or gambling. But competition is, it seems to me, inevitable so long as we are forced to apply the experimental method in practical life, and I fail to see what other method is available. Competition means that thousands of people all over the world are trying to find out how they can supply me more economically and efficiently the wants of other people, and that is a state of things to which I do not altogether object. Equality in my sense implies that every one should be allowed to compete for every place that he can fill. The cry is merely, as it seems to me, an evasion of the fundamental difficulty. That difficulty is not that people compete but that there are too many competitors; not that a man's seat at the table has to be decided by fair trial of his abilities, but that there is not room enough to seat everybody. Malthus brought to the front the great stumbling-block in the way of Utopian optimism. His theory was stated too absolutely and his view of the remedy was undoubtedly crude. But he hit the real difficulty, and every sensible observer of social evils admits that the great obstacle to social improvement is that social residuum, the parasitic class, which multiplies so as to keep down the standard of living and turns to bad purposes the increased power of man over nature. We have abolished pestilence and famine in their grimmest shape; if we have not abolished war, it no longer involves usurpation or slavery, or the permanent desolation of the conquered; but one result is just this, that great masses can be regularly kept alive at the lowest stage of existence without being periodically swept away by a "black death" or a horde of brutal invaders. If we choose to turn our advantages to account in this way, no nostrums will put an end to poverty; and the evil can only be met,—as I venture to assume,—by an elevation of the moral level involving all that is implied in spreading civilization downward.

The difficulty shows itself in discussions of the proper sphere of government. Upon that vast and most puzzling topic I will only permit myself one remark. In former times the great aim of reformers was the limitation of the powers of government. They came to regard it as a kind of boggy or extra-natural force which acted to oppress the poor in order to maintain certain personal privileges. Some, like Godwin of the "Political Justice," held that the millennium implied the abolition of government and the institution of anarchy. The early utilitarians held that government might be reformed by placing power in the hands of the subjects, who would use it only for their own interests, but still retained the prejudices engendered in their long struggle against authority, and held that its functions should still be gradually restricted on pain of developing a worse tyranny than the old. The government has been handed over to the people as they desired, but with the natural result that the new authorities not only use it to support their interests but retain the conviction of its extra-natural, or perhaps supernatural, efficacy. It is regarded as an omnipotent body which can not only say (as it can) that whatever it pleases shall be legal, but that whatever is made a law in the juridical sense shall at once become a law of nature. Even their individualist opponents, who profess to follow Mr. Herbert Spencer, seem often to regard the power of government, not as one result of evolution, but as something external which can constrain and limit evolution. It corresponds to a kind of outside pressure which interferes arbitrarily with the so-called natural course of development, and should therefore be abolished. To me, on the contrary, it seems that government is simply one of the social organs with powers strictly limited by its relation to others and by the nature of the sentiment upon which it rests. There are obvious reasons, in the centralization of vast industrial interests, the "integration," as Mr. Spencer calls it, which is the correlative of differentiation, in the growing solidarity of different classes and countries, in the consequent growth of natural monopolies, which give a solid reason for believing that the functions of the central government may require expansion. To decide by any *à priori*

principle what should be the limits of this expansion is, to my mind, hopeless. The problem is one to be worked out by experiment,—that is, by many generations and by repeated blundering. A fool, said Erasmus Darwin, is a man who never makes an experiment; an experiment is a new mode of action which fails in its object ninety-nine times out of a hundred; therefore wise men make more blunders, though they also make more discoveries than fools. Now experiments in government and social organization are as necessary to improvement as any other kind of experiment, and probably still more liable to failure. One thing, however, is again obvious. The simple remedy of throwing everything upon government, of allowing it to settle the rate of wages, the hours of labor, the prices of commodities, and so forth, requires for success a moral and intellectual change which it is impossible to overestimate. I will not repeat the familiar arguments which, to my mind, justify this statement. It is enough to say that there is no ground in the bare proposal for putting all manner of industrial regulations into the hands of government, for supposing that it would not drag down every one into pauperism instead of raising everybody to comfort. I often read essays of which the weakness seems to be that while they purpose to establish equality they give no real reason for holding that it would not be an equality of beggary. If every one is to be supported, idle or not, the natural conclusion is universal pauperism. If people are to be forced to work by government, or their numbers to be somehow restricted by government, you throw a stress upon the powers of government which, I will not say, it is impossible that it should bear, but which, to speak in the most moderate terms, implies a complete reconstruction of the intelligence, morality, and conceptions of happiness of human beings. Your government would have to be omniscient and purely benevolent as well as omnipotent, and I confess that I cannot see in the experience of those countries where the people have the most direct influence upon the government, any promise that this state of things will be realized just yet.

Thus I return to my conclusion,—to my platitude, if you

will. Professor Fawcett used to say that he could lay down no rules for the sphere of government influence, except this rule, that no interference would do good unless it helped people to help themselves. I think that the doctrine was characteristic of his good sense, and I fully subscribe to it. I heartily agree that equality in the sense I have given is a most desirable ideal; I agree that we should do all that in us lies to promote it; I only say that our aims should be always in consistence with the principle that such equality is only possible and desirable in so far as the lowest classes are lifted to a higher standard morally as well as physically. Of course that implies approval of every variety of new institutions and laws, of co-operation, of profit sharing, of boards of conciliation, of educational and other bodies for carrying light into darkness and elevating popular standards of life: but always with the express condition that no such institution is really useful except as it tends to foster a genuine spirit of independence and to supply the moral improvement without which no outward change is worth a button. This is a truism, you may say. Yet when I read the proposals to get rid of poverty by summarily ordering people to be equal, or to extirpate pauperism by spending a million upon certain institutions for out-door relief, I cannot help thinking that it is a truism which requires to be enforced. The old political economy, you say, is obsolete; meaning perhaps that you do not mean to be bothered with its assertions; but the old economists had their merits. They were among the first who realized the vast importance of deeper social questions; they were the first who tried to treat them scientifically; they were not (I hope) the last who dared to speak unpleasant truths simply because they believed them and believed in their importance. Perhaps, indeed, they rather enjoyed the practice a little too much and indulged in it a little too ostentatiously. Yet I am sure that on the whole it was a very useful practice and one which is now scarcely as common as it should be. People are more anxious to pick holes in their statement of economic laws than to insist upon the essential fact that after all there are laws, not "laws" made by Parliament but laws of nature, which do and will determine



the production and distribution of wealth, and the recognition of which is as important to human welfare as the recognition of physiological laws to the bodily health. Holding this faith, the old economists were never tired of asserting what is the fundamental truth of so-called "individualism," that after all we may say about the social development, the essential condition of all social improvement is not that we should have this or that system of regulations, but that the individual should be manly, self-respecting, doing his duty as well as getting his pay, and deeply convinced that nothing will do any permanent good which does not imply the elevation of the individual in his standards of honesty, independence, and good conduct. We can only say to Lazarus: "You are probably past praying for, and all we can do is to save you from starving by any means which do not encourage other people to fall into your weaknesses; but we recognize the right of your class for any and every possible help that can be given towards making men of them and putting them on their legs by teaching them to stand upright."

LESLIE STEPHEN.

## THE RELIGIOUS ELEMENT IN ETHICAL CODES.

THE assumptions we here make are such as will be readily admitted. The first is that man is a moral being. No matter what account may be given of the origin of the idea of moral distinction and obligation, it will be allowed that it exists among men in the earliest period at which we can begin to trace a human development. In its earliest stages it is no doubt rudimentary; nevertheless, it exists and grows. It is even possible that it may be found in the lower animals; but whether this be so or not, conscience is a human possession. Looking at the history of the race as a whole we may call it a necessary factor in human life, with a varied history and changing fortunes like all other elements of human life, playing its part according to its surroundings, but never failing to make itself felt. It is only by such a survey of its past that its present value in the world can be properly estimated.

The second assumption is that man is a religious being. It is possible that here and there a tribe may be found without recognizable religious conceptions. This is by no means proved,—the reports of passing travellers must be received with great caution; but if it should be proved it would not practically affect our assumption; the immense majority of men have recognized the presence and power of some supernatural agency in their lives, and all our great civilizations have been built up on the foundation of religion. And by religion I here mean the belief in and practical recognition of some sort of personal agency and influence in life distinct from human activity proper. We are not called on here to account for the origin of religion. It is enough that we can recognize it everywhere as a constantly changing yet ever present element of life, whose practical value for us cannot be estimated without a knowledge of the part it has played in the past.

Finally, we assume that social life, some sort of social organization, is the condition of all human progress, the foundation on which government, morality, religion, science, and art have been reared. Men are everywhere found living in communities, or, at any rate, we know of no advance in civilization under any other condition. Among all the lines of human progress a close connection must exist, since they all flow from the combined thought and action of the community,—each represents the total force of society acting on a particular point. This is not the less true because, as appears to be the fact, each particular branch of human effort is conducted mainly by some special circle, which on its own line is in advance of the rest of the community; any such special circle nevertheless draws its material and its inspiration from the instinct, feeling, thought, and effort of the whole society. The life of the world has actually been a communal life. History shows that advance has been in inverse proportion to isolation, that it has been great in proportion as the barriers between individuals, tribes, and nations have been broken down, and free play given to human effort of all kinds, whose largest development is possible as it seems only under the stimulation of social needs and the capacities of social combinations. If this has been the law in the past, we can only assume that it will be the law in the future. And if we find that certain general tendencies have persistently prevailed in human life up to the present day we may take it as a rational principle of practical belief and action that such tendencies will continue to exist and may be lawfully accepted as a basis for our scheme of life.

With these assumptions, then, we may proceed to inquire into the actual historical relations which have existed between ethics and religion so far as these can be made out with reasonable clearness from the material at our disposal.

## I.

Between all paths of human progress, as has been said, there must be an intimate relation; but certain characteristics of early social organization make the connection between

religion and ethics in primitive stages of human life peculiarly close and effective. I do not mean here to go back to the very earliest traceable form of society. The social principles of the lowest savage life cannot be said to be well understood ; while many facts have been collected, there is still a good deal of uncertainty about the ideas of the undeveloped races. And, as we may assume a general social-moral progress, it will not affect our investigation if we begin at a point where some definiteness of moral-religious conception is discernible.

One of the earliest stadia of life is that which is known as the clan-constitution of society, a condition in which a comparatively small collection of individuals and households is the unit of organization and action. This is a recognizable phase of society, whatever be its relation to family life. There is good reason in fact to believe that the clan preceded the family as the unit of organized life. There must indeed have been from the beginning some sort of union like that which we call the family, some sort of cohabitation of parents and children, or at least of mother and children. Recent researches, as is well known, have made it probable that the matriarchal form of society was earlier than the patriarchal ; the mother was at first the head of the household, the father being a subordinate and often an indefinite and unimportant element. In such a state of things that tender and refined affection which we regard as the essence of family life could have no existence. But, in addition, there are many facts going to prove that the family had not at this time a real unitary character, since in all important questions of conduct it was the relation of the man to the clan and not to the family that determined his position. The family must be looked on as a unit destined to exert a profound influence but slow of growth, remaining a long time in a crude form. Clan-life meets us in all parts of the world, in the village-community of India and Russia, in the petty tribes of the Arabian desert and of North America, in the rude societies of Africa and Polynesia. Two facts of great importance for all succeeding human history appear on the surface of these primitive societies.

The first of these facts relates to the moral attitude of the

clansman. His ethical ideas are determined by the ideas of the community,—that is, by the customs which have grown up in the course of generations through the interplay of moral-social forces. This point of view indeed is not peculiar to early society,—we find it in all stages of life up to our own time; but in the primitive period it is especially definite and effective, going so far as practically to exclude individual judgment. The man knew no interests outside of his community. His clansmen were his friends and helpers in hunting and in war, and all the world beside was his enemy. His feeling for his clansmen was instinctive rather than rational,—it was like that of the child for the persons whom it sees daily and on whom it depends for its comfort. He has lived himself into relations with his clan-surroundings; he has neither intellectual nor moral force sufficient to project himself out of this area, and adjust himself to and find peace and comfort in a wider sphere of relations. His whole life depends on his being in harmony with his fellow-tribesmen. The basis of conduct for him is the combined action of the community. Any moral question under such circumstances will be decided by its relation to the communal life. It is right and meritorious to take the property of a hostile tribe, while to take what belonged to one of his own tribesmen is a crime. The term “steal” is thus defined by the conditions of society as appropriating the property of a fellow-clansman. Homicide is lawful if the victim is an alien, the right to kill in such a case being modified only by fear of the consequences which the slaughter may entail on the clan through the revenge of the enemy; but the slaying of a fellow-tribesman is looked on as a wrong done to the whole community, and it is by the whole community that the punishment is inflicted. This communal form of execution prevailed among the old Israelites in certain cases as late as the seventh century B.C.; a man convicted of idolatry is to be brought to a public place and there “the hand of the witnesses shall be first upon him to put him to death and afterward the hand of all the people” (Deut. xvii. 7). The blood of a kinsman—that is, of a clansman—was sacred, but no other blood. The same principle

held in regard to the obligation of truthfulness, the right to enslave men, and generally of all moral questions. The man's outlook did not reach beyond the circle in which he felt that his personality was bound up. There is a close similarity between this conception of ethics and that of a modern gang of thieves. There is honor among thieves,—their controlling principle of organization is that it is dishonorable for one member to betray the gang or to act solely in his own interests. Each is required to subordinate himself entirely to the life of his community. Individual vengeance is not permitted; punishment is inflicted on a recreant member by the whole body. It is lawful and honorable for a member to appropriate the property of an alien; it is a crime to appropriate the property of one's fellow-thief. In both these cases the ethical code is determined by the exigencies of a closed community, and in both conscience is communal and not individual. They differ in that the modern clan is in one sense arbitrary and artificial in its constitution, its members having voluntarily associated themselves for the purpose of gaining a livelihood by appropriating the property of others, while the ancient clan grew up through natural conditions of blood kinship and contiguity, and gained a livelihood, partly at the expense of others, but partly also by the proper use of their own natural resources; and with this difference is closely connected the other, that the conscience of the modern clan is the product of a conscious isolation from a well-advanced body of existing ethical thought, while the conscience of the earlier community is a free development out of generally prevalent conditions of ancient life. I have chosen this parallel as a peculiarly strong illustration of how not only the ethical code but also the tone and constitution of conscience depends on the social conditions. Other illustrations, in some respects more precise, may sometimes be found in the ethical life of certain small natural communities, as a Highland clan of the present time, an English parish, an American rural settlement, a large family consisting of numerous households living in a modern city.

In all these cases the point with which we are here con-

cerned is the communal character of the ethical code and of the conscience. The individual has certain moral rules and moral principles, but these come to him by inheritance, are determined outside of himself, do not impose on him the necessity of personal moral decision or of grappling with moral problems. He accepts the law which is laid down for him by his community. His conscience is at peace so long as he has the approbation of his fellow-clansmen. It is not correct to say that conscience abdicates its throne, since at this period it had not yet assumed royal authority,—that is, there is no sign that in the earlier stages of human life it had assumed more definite shape or played a more important part. It is not autonomous or autocratic ; it recognizes a power above itself resident in a body of thought which has grown up unconsciously through a long period of free interplay of human instincts and desires. Two characteristics of such a conscience are clearly visible ; the first is that it is under effective control, in such a way that the destructive or disorganizing impulses of the individual are held in check by the combined thought and impulse of the community, and a free and peaceful life is maintained, which allows the individual to strive comparatively untrammelled for the attainment of his ideals ; the second is that this control of the individual by the general conscience is substantially unconscious, being not attended by a distinct formulation of moral principles and a voluntary recognition of something accepted by the intellect as the highest attainable.

It must be repeated that this early posture of conscience is not to be understood either in an absolute way or as something altogether peculiar to primeval life. It is not to be taken as absolutely excluding individualism in the formulation of moral judgments, since all life, so far as its springs are visible to us, necessarily arises out of individualism. Nor, on the other hand, is the ethical dependence on the authority of the community confined to early stages of history, but appears to some extent everywhere and always. All that is meant to be affirmed is that this relative depression of individual judgment is especially prominent and controlling in a certain stage of society.

The second characteristic fact in the clan period relates to the religious constitution of the society, and particularly to the position which the deity therein occupies. Our purpose does not lead us to inquire into the specific origin of men's ideas of supernatural agency, or into the genealogy of the earliest deities; no matter whence the deity came, it is certain that at the time with which we are dealing he is well developed and firmly established. Now it is a well-defined peculiarity of this early social constitution that the deity is regarded as a member of the clan. He is not a far-off god who intervenes only in extraordinary emergencies, and pronounces his decisions in an impersonal manner from a majestic, unapproachable throne. He is not a friend of humanity who distributes his favors and disfavours with an impartial eye to the general human good. He is not a spiritual power who manifests himself in the production of fine ethical tones and impulses. He is not merely an ally who may be expected to lend help against enemies and confer benefits with moderate promptness and fulness. He is more than this,—he is a fellow-clansman, sharing the blood and nature of his brethren, personally and keenly interested in all that concerns them, not different from them in his general ideas of life. His conceptions of right and wrong are theirs, for he has grown up with them and has taken part in the establishment of the ethical life. He, like every other member of the clan, is interested in the maintenance of what is held to be good order, and, as the most powerful member, is the most efficient guardian of order. Thus he comes to stand for the right. In process of time it is identified with his will and regarded as his ordination. The ethical code was thus necessarily religious in its whole extent,—both its material and its sanctions were inseparably connected with the person and conduct of the clan deity. He occupied the position of a resident chieftain, and the sense of his perpetual presence gave a human warmth and vividness to the ethical life, which was naturally dimmed in later times when the deity left his position as blood-kinsman and retired to some comparatively isolated divine community of his own.



For the proof that the god occupied this position in early times I must refer to the books (of Spencer, Tylor, Lubbock, Lang, Frazer, W. Robertson Smith, and others) in which the facts are collected. Totemism, which involves this conception of the deity, belongs indeed in its cruder form to an earlier stage of life than the one we are considering; but it survives in modified shape in the clan-organization, and definitely colors religious ideas. The original beast or plant or stone, which is the ancestor or kinsman of the clan, becomes in process of time a well-shaped deity who then takes his proper part in the social life. Thus the Greek *Lukaïos*, who was probably originally a wolf-god, was in later times identified with *Zeus* or with *Apollo*, and assumed more or less the moral qualities of those deities; and the similar Roman god *Lupercus*, who in the legend was associated with the founders of the city, changed his character according to advances in Roman religious conceptions. The idea of blood-kinship underlies also, we may suppose, those ancient feasts in which the gods were supposed to share; *Livy's* description of a *lectisternium* (v. 13) held on a very serious occasion makes the impression that the people regarded this communal eating as a pledge of divine friendship, and in the Hebrew ritual legislation (*Lev. xxi. 6*) the fire-offerings presented to *Jehovah* are called the "bread of God," an expression which must originally have implied that the deity partook of the offering as a friend and fellow-clansman. Among Semitic peoples many proper names describe the deity as the father, brother, or sister of the worshipper. Such facts as these are found in so many parts of the world that we seem to be warranted in assuming a phase of society in which the deity was a blood-kinsman and a member of the clan.

The two characteristics above mentioned are commonly found together; they belong to the same stadium of social development. The communal conception of ethics belongs in general to a condition of society in which the deity is regarded as united by the closest ties to the members of the community. On the one hand ethical law and authority reside in the whole society as the unit of life, and on the other hand,

the god, as the natural head of the community, controls the sanctions of the ethical code, and becomes the centre of the ethical life. The coexistence of these two facts is not accidental; both issue naturally out of the social conditions. Both mean depression of individuality and reliance on external authority. In this period the ethical code is comparatively unformed, the social isolation is great, and man's relation to the deity is conceived as humanly close and warm.

## II.

Accepting the social condition just described as a fair starting-point in the history of religious ethical development, let us inquire into the conditions which have modified man's succeeding history. It is in man's history that his ethical religious endowments and capabilities are revealed; what he is we can know only from what he does; it is in the phenomena of life, as Aristotle points out, that we must seek the law of ethical progress. Man was cast forth into the world as a moral infant, ignorant of his surroundings and of his possibilities; it was by slow degrees that he came to know something of the powers of his own soul, and of the nature of the great system of things which his own thought construed, and which yet forced itself on him as a determining influence in his life. Let us now ask briefly what the conditions have been that have tended to modify the two characteristics above described.

I. Let us begin with the moral side of human life, the code and the conscience. We have seen that crudeness of code and childish dependence of conscience coexist,—they belong to the early period with which we began. History shows that in general these two features of life have been similarly modified in the progress of civilization; moral rules and principles have become clearer, broader, and higher, and conscience has more and more thrown off the bonds of external authority and learned to rely on itself. These are obvious and generally recognized facts, but it will be proper to look for a moment at their history.

The ethical progress of the world has been in proportion to

the destruction of isolation and the tightening of the bonds that have united man with man. In early life isolation of clan from clan, of tribe from tribe, of nation from nation, of continent from continent was the rule. For the old Hebrews and Greeks a foreign language was a "stammering tongue;" for all primitive tribes a stranger was an enemy; foreign customs and ideas were looked on not with scientific curiosity as new developments of human life, but with suspicion as things alien, incomprehensible, and presumably dangerous. Lack of experience produced deficiency in sympathy. The absence of material resources shut men up in their own narrow surroundings; there were no great world-roads, no quick methods of travelling, few mechanical means of taking men out of their little areas and forcing them into contact with their fellows far and near. Under such circumstances the moral code was an accommodation to a limited set of moral conditions.

The political history of the world presents a series of movements that shattered the older organizations and created larger social unities. The kingdom of David meant the crushing of the little Canaanite nationalities, and the Assyrian and Babylonian empires practically broke down the barriers that separated the various Semitic peoples from one another. Persia inherited this Semitic area and added to it Asia Minor and Egypt, and the Greek and Roman conquests made a unit of the whole civilized world except China and India. At a later time Islam repeated this history in Asia and Africa, welding together politically and religiously nations of diverse character in a way that proved wonderfully effective, so that in Bagdad, Damascus, Jerusalem, Cairo, and Cordova the traveller encountered the same philosophic, artistic, and literary culture, and felt at home in all the Moslem world. Europe had next to go through the same process, first by wars and military conquests, and then by the surer agencies of commerce; alongside of Charlemagne were the Crusades and the Hanseatic League, and the era of Napoleon was also that of steam. A long step has been taken towards making the world a social unit. It has become a natural and necessary thing for men to interest themselves in the affairs of all the peoples of the

earth, barbarous as well as civilized ; a man now begins life with a tolerably distinct consciousness of the unity of the world, the sense that all its parts cohere and have a single aim. This feeling of unity is social, not political,—it regards the various areas of the world not as governmental masses but as human communities engaged in the working out of life, the problems being substantially the same everywhere. This feeling of comradeship, though no doubt greater now than ever before, may be traced through many past periods of human history, in the writings, for example, of men who have travelled and set down their impressions of what they saw with more or less of curiosity and sympathy and a feeling of brotherhood for foreign peoples. We have the diary of an Egyptian officer who travelled in Western Asia in the fourteenth century, B.C., curiously like the stories told by modern tourists in Europe ; and then from Herodotus to Marco Polo, Father Huc, Busbequius, and the host of modern travellers who have penetrated into all the regions of the earth. Interest in human life for its own sake has steadily increased. This interest shows itself, further, not only in the study of foreign nationalities, but no less in the attitude of men one towards another in the smaller communities. Residents in any comparatively small area are bound together by a thousand ties, feel that the well-being of each is inseparably connected with the well-being of all, have an intelligent and keen regard each for the affairs of his fellows, have, that is, a genuine sentiment of living unity. And this sentiment is coming to be less and less reflective and more and more instinctive,—it is born with us and is strengthened by all the experiences of our lives. We have almost reached the point of looking on a stranger as a friend rather than as an enemy. Delicacy of moral sensibility has advanced hand in hand with social union ; men are more tenderly regardful of their fellows now than ever before. I am speaking here of the moral code and the conscience, not of the regeneration of the soul. This latter point, closely allied with the others, must yet be kept apart from them. Whether the human race has been undergoing a gradual sanctification, a fundamental purification of

nature, is a question that may fairly admit of discussion ; but to treat it at length would take us too far from our present line of thought. All that I mean to say now is that the generally recognized ethical code has become broader, higher, and clearer in the successive ages of human history, and that this growth is parallel to that of social combination of sympathies. And it seems evident that the relation between these two lines of advance is not merely one of coexistence,—each has constantly acted on the other, and it is particularly obvious that the moral code has been colored by the social relations. An instance in point is the law of international copyright ; so long as merely abstract principles of justice were appealed to, plausible arguments were made in this country on both sides and no conclusion was arrived at ; now that an approach has been made by us to such a law it appears that the real determining consideration is the closeness of relation that has sprung up between our publishers and authors and those of England and the continent ; as soon as we feel ourselves to be in the circle of the nations, we make an international law.

It is equally clear that all this progress has been accompanied by a growth in independence of the individual conscience. It is true that the members of society have become more closely welded together, and public opinion in moral as in other questions is now more influential than ever before. But we know that the man on his rational, conscientious side now counts for far more than he did in the early periods of human life. A growth of individuality is a well-marked social-political fact in history ; it has been treated at length by modern writers, its great historical turning-points described, and search made for its sources. Some writers dwell on the splendid outburst of physical discovery and mechanical invention during the past century ; others are disposed to find the roots of this phase of modern life largely in the commercial and military activity of the Middle Age ; to some it has seemed that Christianity has created individualism by ascribing priceless worth to the human soul and representing the salvation of each soul as the most cherished object of the divine love ; still others, going behind all separate institutions,

look to the interfusion of Græco-Roman and Semitic thought for the solution of the question. In all these answers there are elements of truth ; but their variety, the difficulty that attends the attempt to fix the beginning in any one historical era, indicates that these explanations are partial, and that the real answer is to be found in a wider survey of history. These great events are stadia in human progress,—the movement has been going on from the beginning, not unbroken or unchecked, but still on the whole a continuous advance. Stand where we will, we see that man is more master of himself than in some preceding period. Society becomes stronger, juster, more providential, and at the same time the individual becomes spiritually higher and more self-possessed ; conscience tends to be common but not communal. The individual man is more conscious of his fellows, but thereby comes to a truer consciousness of himself. In the sphere of ethics reflection takes the place of instinct, and at the same time instinct grows into larger, more symmetrical proportions and becomes more and more controlling. In a word, conscience tends to become autonomous. But the full bearing of this fact cannot be understood till we have looked at the other side of our question, the growth of religion and the way in which it has entered into man's moral life.

2. There was a time, as we have seen, when religion and ethics were practically identical because the personal object of religious worship was literally a member of the community out of which moral usages and ideas sprang. This state of things was not permanent ; it was acted on by two sets of causes, the one tending to perpetuate it, the other tending to set it aside ; the interplay of these two sets of forces is the history of practical ethics. In the first group belong all those institutions and tendencies which may be called conservative, their object being, consciously or unconsciously, to maintain the existing order of things in the interest of some supposed good ; such are certain forms of government, art, and religion. We must here confine ourselves to an examination of the religious forces, and these we may most conveniently consider in the form in which they manifest them-

selves in two great institutions, which practically sum up the religious thought and activity of the world,—the priesthood and sacred books.

The priesthood is a very old institution, but in accordance with our plan, we are not now concerned with its earliest history; it is enough to note that at a certain stage of human life there came into existence groups of men who were believed to stand in a very close relation with the deity and were recognized as the authorized expounders of his will and the intermediaries between him and men. So far as regards influence on religious-ethical life the details of sacerdotal constitution are unimportant; the priestly class, defined as the group of persons who act as mediators between man and God, is found everywhere, exists still, and has played an important part in the development of ethical thought. In the nature of the case its influence has been both good and bad. Its authority has been mediate and immediate, representative and personal; it has stood on the one hand for an idea, and on the other hand it has exerted a human, individual influence. So far as the *personnel* of the priesthood is concerned it has been on the whole neither better nor worse than that of other classes of men. Priests the world over have been fairly good men, according to the current standards of morality; in spite of their seclusion, they have never been able to withdraw themselves wholly from the ethical atmosphere of their time or from its deeper-lying ethical instincts and impulses. They have their peculiar temptations, as is true of all classes of men; they are often ignorant, selfish, impure, brutal, or ambitious, as is the common lot of man, but on the whole they face the problems of life bravely, and often use well their peculiar opportunities for giving moral and religious sympathy, support, and impetus. For this reason we have to consider them here not in their personal but in their representative character,—it is the priesthood as the bearer of an idea that we are dealing with. This idea is the presence and power of the deity in the community; the priest stands for religion and especially for organized religion. The sacerdotal class is withdrawn from the common pursuits of life, and has leisure

to reflect on its abstracter problems. Thus it tends to devote itself to speculation, to poetical, mystical, mythical lines of thought, and to the increase of its own power. Any such comparatively isolated group of men will develop both noble and ignoble characteristics, it will become both benevolent and selfish. And all sacerdotal class-characteristics will work together for the perfecting of the priestly organization,—speculation will endeavor to elaborate a system, pure religious feeling will strive to make religion a controlling power, and selfish ambition will attempt to build up a dominant priestly organization. The outcome of all this will be an effort to maintain the existing domain of religion and to extend it as far as possible, and among other things it will desire not to lose its hold on ethics. A central principle of priestly faith is that the will of the deity is the source of right, a principle which has lasted throughout history and has been sometimes helpful, sometimes hurtful in its influence. It has been a conservative, controlling power in times of disorder, in savage tribes, in the half-anarchy of medieval feudalism, in the barbarism of American frontier life ; it has preserved and held up established principles of ethics at moments when human passion has tried to break down all barriers. On the other hand, a priesthood acts hurtfully on ethics in two ways : it coerces morals in the supposed interests of religion and it perpetuates outgrown moral customs and ideas. The first of these modes of procedure is of a sort not peculiar to the priestly class but common to all human organizations. The second has had a wide and important influence on the ethical history of the race. Not merely here and there, but everywhere and always religious customs which grew naturally out of a certain phase of society have been maintained and invested with authority, after the moral sense of the community had passed beyond them, through that organization of the religious life which has been under the control of priests. Hence has arisen in life a moral conflict of a very peculiar sort between antagonistic authorities,—reverence for the deified past and regard for the living present. Not that this is the only species of ethical schism in life ; there is, for example, the struggle between religion



and the state, of which we have an exposition in the "Antigone" of Sophocles. But in the case of ethics and religion the strife has been sharper,—it is a fraternal war; the right must be by all tradition the will of the deity as set forth by his representatives, and yet the right must be the rule of existing usage. In such cases the moral advantage is generally with the later custom, and the priesthood lends itself to the support of immorality; but it must be observed that such discordances with the common ethical feeling are practised under a sort of protest and are only skin-deep,—they injure many individuals and retard without stopping the moral growth of society. An instance in point is the licentious worship of the Canaanitish religion, adopted and practised for centuries by the Israelites, sanctioned by the popular religion, abhorred and denounced by the higher moral feeling of the time as expressed by the prophets. Here a large part of the priesthood put itself on the side of what was morally bad; but the history shows that the bad yielded gradually to the steadily increasing pressure of the general moral sense. We may take this record as giving a fair history of the ethical element in the orgiastic religious ceremonies of Greece, Rome, and other parts of the world. A subtler form of immorality shows itself in the conflict between faith and scepticism which inevitably rises in a growing society. The priest has to guard his own faith and that of his people. It sometimes happens that he himself doubts and knows that they doubt, and his worldly interests incline him to crush the doubts,—whence much intellectual and moral sophistry. Such seem to be the principal ethical elements of priestly influence; on the theoretical side the identification of right with the will of the deity; on the practical side, the upholding of the general moral standard, but also the perpetuation of worn-out ethical creeds and the debauching of the conscience by crushing rational thought.

The influence of sacred books is akin to that of the priesthood; they are indeed as a rule largely the work of priests. They have a certain ethical-religious coloring peculiar to themselves, but the main direction of their ethical power is substantially the same as that described above. What is peculiar

to a canon is that it commonly takes its ethical-religious material not from any one class but from the whole body of moral-religious thinkers, and that it precipitates and petrifies thought into an enduring, authoritative mass. It is the verbal incarnation of the deity. It has a fixedness and an authority that do not belong to the fleeting utterances of living priests and prophets. It has also the flexibility which pertains to all human speech. With these characteristics its moral-religious influences connect themselves; it is an eternal, unchanging standard of truth which nevertheless permits itself to be interpreted in various ways. In point of fact sacred books have arisen in comparatively early stages of social development, in those periods of genial, unfettered enthusiasm which precede the times of reflection and philosophy. They thus (with the exception of the Buddhist books) embody the idea that the deity dwells with the people, enters into their life, and is the source of all their ideas and laws. So far as they base moral life on something outside of and alien to man, they strike at the independence of the conscience. So far as they perpetuate an ethical code which belongs to some one period of development they raise a barrier to moral progress. So far as they create the temptation to bring their utterances into accord with later thought, they produce intellectual and moral disingenuousness. On the other hand, since they are in the main the work of morally pure and advanced minds, they offer a standard of life which must for a long time be higher than that of the mass of men, and they maintain a firm and vigorous moral rule in the midst of the vagaries of individual thought and the upturnings of social life. The illustrations of these principles furnished by the history of the Bible and the Koran are too familiar to need mention.

The educational power of these two institutions has been enormous. Taking their rise in the young manhood of the race, commending themselves by their real nobleness of character, and recognized as having divine authority, they have had the effect, along with the vast good they have done, of entailing on later generations relatively crude moral concep-

tions. As far as we are concerned, our whole world has felt their power. Greece and Rome, it is true, had no sacred books; but no sooner had the one fashioned its literature, art, and philosophy, and the other worked out its social organization than both hastened to ally themselves with another race, whose priests and sacred books they accepted as the divinely given guides of the moral-religious life. If we except China and India the whole civilized world professes to-day to draw its ethical-religious nourishment from Semitic books whose composition began almost three thousand years ago. The general result of this feature of modern society is, as has been pointed out, the partial perpetuation of relatively crude forms of moral life.

3. So far we have been looking at those elements of social life which tend to maintain the old communal form of religion. Let us now examine the opposite set of influences, those whose aim has been to establish different relations between ethics and religion,—not to divorce the two, but to define the sphere of each, to recognize the human origin of the moral code, and to develop the conscience in a human way.

The whole education of the race has tended to this result, for human progress has been in the direction of recognizing law in phenomena, and that is equivalent to recognizing the independence of the human conscience. The dominion of law in the moral and physical spheres means a knowable and definable sequence of phenomena; and this, in conjunction with the consciousness of freedom, forces on man the conviction that it is his part to discover and accommodate himself to moral principles. The discovery of these principles constitutes the development of the ethical code; the accommodation to them constitutes the growth of conscience. But man cannot do this without acquiring the consciousness of moral creative power and independence. That such a consciousness has come to a section of the race is matter of fact; and on looking back through the records of history we can see, even in the small space of time that is known to us, that there has been in the main an advance in this regard. The cause must be sought in man's instinct of reflection, the

necessity that is laid on him to observe the sequences of phenomena and to discover the laws by which they are controlled.

This tendency in human life is illustrated by certain movements of thought the object of which has been to isolate ethics from religion,—that is, to treat it as a purely human fact. The first of these movements in order of time is that which is identified with the name of Confucius. Whether he stands alone, or, as is more likely, represents the outcome of a considerable period of thought, he gave shape to a system of practical ethics which he deliberately kept apart from supernatural agencies,—a system which has maintained itself alongside of and over against popular ancestor-worship, the official State religion and the Chinese form of Buddhism, and was and is the creed of educated Chinese. Confucianism is an attempt to isolate the purely human side of morals, and there is no reason to refer its rise to anything else than the conviction that human moral life has its basis and its safeguards in human nature. The system is eminently of the earth, earthy; it regards social intercourse as the end of life; its ideal is a community permeated by prudent and intelligent kindness, and the reward it offers is social happiness. A very different conception of life is offered by Buddhism, the next of these movements in chronological order. Not the enjoyment of social life but its annihilation is the Buddhist ideal,—a suicidal scheme for the destruction of passion and will. Nevertheless this deace of will, which it makes happiness, Buddhism practically identifies with moral perfection, hopes to attain it only by moral training, and reaches about the same ethical standards as Confucianism, only with the deep sense of self-annihilation. The Chinese virtuous sage accommodates himself to his fellows in the interests of the general well-being and in order to fashion himself into a perfect social instrument; the Buddhist saint conforms to his moral ideal in order to lift himself into the sphere of what he conceives to be the final stage of human development. Though their theoretical conceptions of the functions of the human will are so different, the two agree in finding the secret of happiness in conformity

to the moral law and in drawing the rules of right conduct from purely human observation of the structure of society. The Greek philosophers, from Socrates on, approach the subject from a different point of view, their controlling aim being to give scientific unity to the world ; but, whether they regarded phenomena as copies of originals in the divine mind, or studied ethical principles in relation to man's soul and surroundings, it was from the observation of human life that they derived their ethical standards, and it was in man's own convictions that they placed the foundation of moral obligation. The same practical result was reached by the Arabian thinkers of Bagdad and Cordova, who for four centuries worked out their own scheme of life under the guidance of Aristotle,—a scheme which came partly through the Jews and partly at first hand to the medieval Christian theologians, and powerfully influenced European thought till it blended with the Humanist revival of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries; through all this long period under much obscuratation of philosophical and theological dogmas we can see a steady effort to grasp the purely human side of ethics, to find both the material and the obligation of the moral code in the structure of man's mind and in his relation to his fellows. These are the great historical movements; there must have been many smaller ones, there must indeed have been fainter attempts of this sort throughout history. We cannot here go into an analysis of these movements; we note their existence as a finger-board of progress. They occupy a very large space in the moral-intellectual life of the world. The traditional view, that the substance and sanctions of ethical law are of supernatural origin has maintained itself, though with constantly lessening distinctness; the other side of the question, namely, that man is the author of his own ethical life, has been urged by a succession of serious thinkers whose names are inseparably connected with great forward movements of human thought. What is the actual historical outcome of this apparent schism in the mind of man ?

## III.

I can only indicate in the briefest way the results to which our survey of the facts points.

In the first place, there is the steady advance of society in moral elevation and in moral authority. Compare the public moral judgment of to-day with that of the times of David, Jeremiah, Socrates, Clement of Alexandria, George Buchanan; there can be no doubt on which side the advantage lies. So as to the authority of the public conscience; there is no man in the civilized world, not outlawed, from the Emperor of Japan to an American ward-politician, who doesn't feel that there is a master over him flourishing a visible ethical whip. This may seem to be a mere extension of the clan-morality above described. But it is more than this, different not only in extent of authority but also in ethical attitude and tone. It is a development of the old system, but a development into something much higher. It is more thoroughgoing and complete in its ethical survey, taking account of nicer moral points, in accordance with the growth in the moral law. Then, the old communality has become practical universality, and that means that man is looked on, not as a member of a tribe, but as a human being having his own independent rights. And this again involves the transformation of the old blood-kinship point of view into an ethical one; society has now come largely to judge all men's actions by the highest recognized moral standard. And finally, a point that must be especially insisted on is that society has come to be an efficient moral guide and support. It has worked out great ideals which have become the heritage of a small but controlling section of the race. It offers great rewards for well-doing and inflicts terrible punishment for ill-doing. The individual is not a moral orphan in the world; society stands to him in place of a parent, with all of a parent's power, and none of a parent's weaknesses. This, at least, represents the goal, as ethical history shows, towards which the race has been moving. But what will be the result, it may be asked, if a man is cut off from society? That is a state of things that we are not called

on to consider. A few unfortunates are buried, wrecked, or outlawed; they must depend on such moral and religious support as remains to them in their inheritance of the common human feeling. But the mass of men belong to society, and our scheme of human life must be based on the perfection of human relations.

In the next place, religion has moved away from the conception of the tribal god. The Jews before the beginning of our era gave up the national name of the deity, Jehovah, and took instead some universal term, as "God" or "The Holy One." A similar step was taken by the Greek philosophers as early as Socrates. The tendency of thought has been against anthropomorphism in the idea of God, and against the supposition of divine infraction of natural law. This tendency is visible throughout the history of the church. At the present day, for example, it is a widespread view in orthodox theological circles that the person of Christ is at the same time wholly divine and wholly human. It seems but a step from this position to the wider view that the world is at once wholly divine and wholly natural. This latter conception means, of course, the absolute dominion of natural law in the moral world. It means that moral law is divine, that God manifests himself in the struggles of man's conscience, that the moral nature of God is known to us only through the moral nature of man. This is the position held to-day by a large and increasing number of moral-religious thinkers who are intensely interested in the solution of the moral problems of life. For such persons God enters into all human experiences in a living way, a blood-kinsman like the old clan deity, but unlike him standing not in physical isolation and mere fleshly comradeship,—standing rather in closest spiritual union with man, sharing his spiritual struggles and urging him with profoundest sympathy to ceaseless moral-spiritual endeavor.

Thus the end to which human moral history points is a conscience absolutely independent and yet absolutely dependent,—independent in that it refuses to recognize any other authority than its own ideals, dependent in that it receives its ideals from the life of man which is the highest revelation of

God. This is an attitude which, experience seems to me to show, promises the greatest moral strength and happiness. To some it may seem to cut away the foundations of moral life; but there are many to whom it will appear to furnish the truest moral stability in resting on the divine self-manifestation in human experience.

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## THE RIGHT FINAL AIM OF LIFE.

WHAT is the right final aim of life? To answer a question correctly, we must understand it completely. But the meaning of this question does not seem to be immediately clear. We must therefore analyze it. We have to ask, (1) "What is meant by 'final aim'?" (2) "What is meant by 'final aim of life'?" and (3) "What is meant by 'the right final aim of life'?"

We will begin by considering the first question.

1. The whole of those consequences of an action which are foreseen and willed by the agent are together called the "intention" of that action. As a rule, not all these consequences are directly desired, but only a portion of them; and this portion of the intended consequences is called the "aim" of the action. The causes which have to be put in operation in order to the attainment of this aim are called the "means." They too are willed (but not directly), because the aim is attainable only through them; and thus, if an aim can only be realized through a long chain of causes and effects, every member of this chain may itself, in its turn, become a relative aim, in so far as it is conceived and willed and realized by means of causes other than itself; whereas the ultimate aim, which is not subservient as a means to anything further, is called the final aim. An action which achieves its final aim is successful; one which misses it is unsuccessful. The certainty of attaining the final aim would be enough by itself to



determine the agent to the action; while the latter would not be attempted if failure in the final aim were foreseen. The idea of the consequences aimed at in an action is called the reason or motive of that action, while the feeling excited by this idea is known as the motive impulse.

Let us take an example. A man once sent on board a ship a box which he had insured for a large sum. In the box he had placed a machine with a clock-work movement, so arranged as after a certain interval to produce a violent explosion and thereby to sink the ship. He intended, after the catastrophe should have taken place, to claim the considerable sum for which the box, thus lost with the ship, had been insured. All these anticipated consequences—the conveyance of the box on board the ship, the movement of the clock-work, the explosion, the foundering of the ship, the receipt of the insurance money—together formed the man's *intention*; but it was only the last member in this series of consequences that he directly desired; only this, in other words, was his *aim*, or his final aim, while all the rest were only means. His action would have been *successful*, if he had received the insurance money.

In this case it was not difficult to say what was the final aim of the action. But let us take another example. An author prepares and publishes a work on political economy. The consequences which he anticipates are these: his work contributes to the instruction of mankind; it co-operates with the forces which are making for a reform of social arrangements; it brings to the author the respect and recognition of many minds, while it makes him the object of hatred and persecution on the part of certain influential circles; and he acquires the consciousness of having done his duty, and having proved himself a useful member of human society. Now in such a case is it always possible, even for the man himself, to say what was, strictly speaking, his final aim or his ruling motive impulse? The ordinary case is that several motive impulses act in combination; and the person is often not in a position to know which was the strongest, or whether this or that motive would by itself have been strong enough to de-

termine him to the act in question. In the example before us, the publication of a work of reforming tendency, there may perhaps have been a joint operation of the feeling of duty, the love of man, ambition, and the wish to be blameless before the tribunal of conscience; these motives in combination were stronger than the fear of having to suffer persecution, and so the person resolved to perform the action. Would he have done it none the less supposing he had foreseen that it would bring him no honor or reputation? This may often appear to him very doubtful. The feelings which men experience *after* the performance of an action often afford them revelations as to the motives which in reality impelled them to such action; and these discoveries are sometimes far from flattering. One imagined that benevolence and the feeling of duty inspired one's act; but the overpowering vexation which follows it when all external recognition is denied, reveals to one subsequently that ambition was the ruling motive.

The question, what is the final aim of an action, cannot, therefore, be answered by direct self-observation, but the answer is a matter of judgment, on which one may be mistaken. For the most part, people do not reflect upon their final aims; and if they do, it is often impossible for them to reach an assured conclusion.

We have considered what is meant by a final aim, and have seen that the determination of the final aim is often a matter of uncertain supposition, and that in many cases several aims are pursued together.

2. We have now to answer the second question. What is the final aim of life?

By many persons this question is taken to mean: What was the aim of God in the creation of mankind? In that case, the question starts from the unprovable assumption that mankind was the creation of a Being that thinks and wills. And if we choose to ask what aim Nature has in producing mankind, then we should be creating Nature herself into a being that thinks and wills, and so starting once more from an unprovable assumption. We cannot speak of aims unless we have in mind an intelligent Being that sets aims before it;

for an aim is an effect previously conceived and willed. If we disregard this intellectual aspect of an aim there remains to us only the simple causal connection with reference to which we may speak of causes and effects and a co-operation of different causes in the production of a particular effect, but not of means and aims. But to make unjustified assumption is not in accordance with the ethic of belief. The question as thus stated must therefore be dismissed.

What then can be the import of the question about the final aim of life, if it is not to have a transcendental meaning? If it is to mean "What final aim predominates in the life of mankind," in other words, "What motive-impulse rules in the life of mankind?" this question would start from the erroneous presupposition that one definite motive-impulse does rule in the life of mankind. There are very many different impulses in every human mind, and action is determined now by one, and now by another. Moreover it is by no means the case that a single definite motive-impulse is active through a whole lifetime with especial intensity, so that all others are dwarfed by it. This does occur in some cases; there are people whose ruling impulse from early youth to extreme old age is the love of science, and others in whom ambition plays the same leading part; while in many cases it is only from a certain epoch, from early manhood or from middle life, and in consequence of personal experiences that a single motive, such as the reformer's benevolence or the business man's love of gain, attains a peculiar intensity. But there are many people in whom one simply cannot perceive that any one motive in particular is far superior in force to all others through a lengthened period of time.

It appears that the question about the final aim of life, whatever meaning we put upon it, always contains unjustifiable assumptions. How are we then to judge of our third and principal question?

### 3. What is the right final aim of life?

Many persons understand this question in the same transcendental sense as the former; they understand by the right final aim of life that which God or Nature intended by the

creation of mankind, and they assume as self-evident that to pursue this aim is the right course for mankind. But even if we could make the assumption of a transcendental aim, it would not follow that we are to regard the advancement of it as a moral command. Let us suppose that the complete realization of that aim was antagonistic to our moral ideas; in that case we should assent to the very opposite moral command, namely, so far as lay in our power to frustrate the realization of such an aim; and we could only erect into an Imperative the idea of making that aim our own, if it appears to us to be good, if, that is to say, we should have esteemed a corresponding course of action to be right even though we had *not* regarded it as the advancement of the transcendental aim.

What do we understand by "right"? From an ethical point of view we may distinguish between two meanings of this word, one which it has in thought below the scientific level, the other which it has in scientific thought. If any one has not arrived at the point of bringing his moral convictions into systematic connection, he calls everything right which he instinctively approves, and everything wrong which he instinctively disapproves. But when one's reflection upon the province of good and evil has led him to the recognition of a supreme standard, then he will accept as right only what conforms to this standard. He now offers and demands justification for ethical judgments, while the others abide by mere feeling. The standard furnishes the ultimate major premise of all ethical ratiocination and the ultimate basis of all ethical demonstration.

The standard which appears at the present day to be obtaining ever wider recognition is that of the greatest possible happiness of all mankind, and it is this that we shall take as a point of departure for our further considerations. We do not attempt to set forth the experiences and reflections which may be expected to determine mankind to its acceptance; all that is necessary has been said on this point by Hume, Bain, Sidgwick, Höffding, and others. At best, therefore, the explanations on which we are entering can have the force of proof only for those who admit that it is more desirable than

anything else that the happiness of all should be increased so far as may be possible.

Let us now return to our question. "What is the right final aim of life?" It is clear from what has been said that the transcendental meaning which may be put upon this question in no way concerns us, we are occupied solely with its empirical import. It contains the assumption that in the life of every person a final aim ought to rule, and it asks what this is. But we have seen that if we take the words in their strict meaning, it is not the case that in the life of any person a single final aim has sole supremacy. If we start from our standard of right, our question implies the judgment that it would be in accordance with the happiness of all, *if* one and the same final aim *were* always pursued. As every final aim presupposes a motive-impulse and as every particular motive-impulse has the power of erecting a final aim, the latter judgment amounts to this: "It is in accordance with the happiness of mankind that all action should be determined by one and the same motive-impulse and never by any other." But this assumption is in the sharpest contradiction with our experience. Researches into the importance of the appetites in the animal world have shown us that they are a part of the organization no less necessary to life than the sense, the muscles, or the bones; they are properties which have been developed in consequence of their utility in the struggle for existence. To attempt to eradicate any one of these impulses would be to attempt to eradicate one of the factors which preserve the life of the race.

But certain as this is, it is no less certain that it is not in harmony with the happiness of the world to let all our impulses have a free course. Since thinking beings have existed at all, they have recognized that a certain control and regulation of the desires is necessary.

Now impulse can be restricted and subdued only by impulse. Some thinkers have recommended that they should be subjected to reasonable self-love, others to conscience, others again to universal benevolence. By this subjection

of impulses to a controlling impulse it is not understood that the rest should be eradicated and never realize themselves at all, but only that they should never be permitted to lead to their corresponding action, except when this is consistent with the impulse which is by rights the ruling one. Thus for example, those who think the guidance should be intrusted to conscience have generally said, "One need not do everything *from* conscience, but one should do nothing against conscience." So it appears as if this inquiry into the right final aim of life had simply meant, as a rule, what motive-impulse ought to play the leading part in the life of mankind. This is then a question of soul-culture. It presupposes—what of course would still have to be proved—that it is in accordance with the ethical standard to develop one and the same motive-impulse in all individuals in a particularly high degree, and it asks the question what impulse this is.

We therefore ask, *what* motive-impulse is it most in accordance with the happiness of mankind to develop into predominant force? So far as we are aware, only two impulses have been suggested to the culture of which this favorable influence is ascribed; one is universal benevolence, and the other the desire of obtaining the reward of an approving conscience. Those who represented self-love as the supreme controlling motive started in every case, we believe, from the assumption—long since proved to be erroneous—that *in fact* all human action was egoistic; and they did not teach that this ought to be so, or that it would be desirable to begin developing egoism into a ruling power. Moreover, it has been proved by Sidgwick, Stephen, and others, that there is not a complete harmony between private and general happiness, and that, therefore, one who should continually endeavor after his own greatest possible happiness would sometimes injure the general happiness. And those who recommended the love of right for its own sake as the ruling motive did not allege that this would be most in conformity with the general happiness. We, therefore, confine ourselves to a comparison of the value of the two first-named impulses, and we ask, "Would it be most in conformity with the greatest possible happiness of all,

if the supreme motive in human life were benevolence, or, in other words, the desire for the greatest possible happiness of all? Or would it be most in conformity with the greatest possible happiness of all if the wish to attain the joys of conscience and to avoid its pains were the regulator of human life?

It will probably be the general opinion that the happiness of mankind would be most effectually advanced if it were directly desired; and the assertion that more might be contributed to its realization by the endeavor after another end, will be thought paradoxical. If you want to hit a target, it is said, you should aim directly at it. When we contemplate the lives of the greatest benefactors of humanity, we seem to find in each particular case that their controlling aim, the object of their enthusiasm, was something that extended beyond their own personality; it was the welfare of their fellow-men, or some great cause which was a principal condition of that welfare. The consciousness of serving the cause of good in the world sustained and gladdened them on their frequently arduous path; but it is not probable that the desire of obtaining such gladness was their principal motive. "Life," cries the great abolitionist, Wendell Phillips, "what a weariness it is, with its drudgery of education, its little cares of to-day, all to be lived over again to-morrow; its rising, eating, and lying down,—only to continue the monotonous routine! Let us thank God that He has inspired any one to awaken us from being these dull and rotting weeds, revealed to us the joy of self-devotion, taught us how we intensify this life by laying it a willing offering on the altar of some *great cause!*" The following incident is told of Abraham Lincoln: "One day Lincoln was riding along a country road, when he noticed near by a pig making great efforts, but in vain, to get out of the mud into which it had sunk. Lincoln rode on a mile or two, then turned round, rode back, took planks and boards, and lifted the unfortunate animal out. The exploit becoming known in the neighborhood, a friend remarked to Lincoln the next day, 'You must be a very unselfish man, Mr. Lincoln, to have helped that pig out of the mud.' 'Unselfish,' replied Lincoln; 'why, I did it for my

own sake, not the pig's!" Perhaps we may doubt whether Lincoln did not rescue the pig *partly* for the pig's own sake, for good men generally have sympathy with suffering animals, and even good children help a caught bird out of the snare without thinking of themselves in doing it. But in any case, this much seems to be certain, that in respect of his interference on behalf of an oppressed and ill-treated class of his fellow-men, Lincoln would not have said, "I did it for my own sake, not for the slave's."

If the greatest possible happiness of mankind is the standard of value of all things, if it is desirable that all our actions should be in conformity with the general happiness, then we must continually bear in mind the consequences which our action will have for the life and happiness of others, and the general happiness must thus become the centre of our interest. But psychologically speaking, it is hardly possible that it can obtain this position in our consciousness without at once becoming our principal aim,—in other words, without the love of man being developed into our ruling motive-impulse.

But it has been asserted that a more accurate consideration of moral action shows that the general welfare is not its final aim. It has been said, "Benevolence and the moral impulse are not the same, and the moral appeal proper is to the moral feelings. The moral feeling exhorts us to act rightly, to do deeds, the expected consequences of which would be for the general good; but benevolence would fain realize schemes for the public good, and it fails of its object when the result is not forthcoming. When I, to my own danger, do something which I think would further the general interest, but the actual unforeseen consequences of which are different, my benevolence gives me pain, my conscience gives me joy." "Conscience is directed on something within me, benevolence on something without me."\* This can hardly be a correct

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\* "A Student's Manual of Ethical Philosophy. Adapted from the German of G. von Gizycki," by Stanton Coit, London, 1889, p. 82. "Moralphilosophie, gemeinverständlich dargestellt von Georg von Gizycki," Leipzig, 1888, p. 118. The author of this book has, as the present paper shows, altered his view upon an important question of moral philosophy.



account of the matter. Might we not just as well say, "If some one enters upon an undertaking, after mature deliberation, with the view of procuring for himself a legitimate pecuniary profit, and in consequence of circumstances that could not be foreseen the enterprise miscarries to his pecuniary loss, in this case he will not be angry with himself but will be satisfied with his own conduct, because he has done all that lay in his power and has no error to reproach himself with; and from this it follows that the true aim of his action was not to improve his financial position, but to obtain his own self-approval!" If it is untrue to say that in this case the agent's desire was directed, not to something outside him (pecuniary profit) but to something within him (self-approval), it is no less untrue to make the corresponding assertion in the former case of which we spoke. "Conscience" before the action and "conscience" after the action are not identical states of mind. The conscience of a benevolent person urges him to help his neighbor, to do him good, and therefore to attain an objective goal,—and thus he does all in his power to assist him. Now let us suppose that the service which he rendered to the other person turns out to the latter's detriment in consequence of unforeseen circumstances, what will be the agent's state of mind? In the degree in which he had a personal interest in the other's prosperity he will feel pain. But if, in looking back upon his own conduct, he is unable to perceive that he committed any culpable error, or that he could have foreseen the mischief which has resulted; and if, on the contrary, he is conscious of having acted after mature deliberation and to the best of his knowledge and conscience, then the contemplation of his own moral condition at the time in question will afford him, in so far as he is rational, no ground of pain; rather he will recognize it to have been good, and this recognition will be attended by a certain satisfaction. In this case, as in the case of the person who has failed in a business enterprise through no fault of his own, the agent, in so far as his mind has been educated in the way which we should approve, will find comfort in the consciousness that he has nothing to reproach himself with. But this desirable condition of mind is by no means invariably

present. Those who have not trained themselves to regulate their feelings in accordance with the precept, "Only be vexed so far as is of use," often feel a predominance of pain at the thought of an action on account of which they do not deserve to feel pain at all.

It has been said, "If men were to take for their final aim the advancement of the general welfare, their action would be a moral failure in each particular case in which it does not reach this aim." A failure it would undoubtedly be; but it is still a moral action (in the sense of a good action) in so far as the agent in acting was in a morally good condition, that is, if he desired to do right, and had done all in his power to ascertain what was right. An action is moral (good) or not moral according to its own nature, not according to what happens after it; and it would be irrational to regret it if it was moral.

But then we are reminded to how many failures we are liable if we take for our aim the advancement of the general happiness, how uncertain is the issue of our enterprises, how often the best intentions are thwarted by accident, or by the hostile intentions of others, how often a man's life is brought to a close before he has been able to realize his plans.

"Our wills and fates do so contrary run  
That our devices still are overthrown;  
Our thoughts are ours, their ends none of our own."

The choice of that aim is not wise, it has been said, for its attainment can be frustrated by external circumstances. We need, if we are to be preserved from despondency and despair, an aim, the attainment of which depends on ourselves alone. Not external achievements, but the attainment of the peace of conscience ought to be our final aim.

To this we answer as follows: "External achievements" is an ambiguous phrase. What is its meaning here? The happiness or misery, the life or death of our brothers! It is not wise, we are told, to take their welfare for our aim. But the ambiguous word "wise" is not the true ethical term. Is it *right*, is it *for the common interest*, to set our desires upon the

welfare of mankind? That is the question with which we are concerned. Doubtless we are exposed to many failures in our endeavor after the general welfare as in all our endeavors. But surely it does not follow from this that we ought to abandon that endeavor? Rather we should seek to educate ourselves by all our failures, that so far as possible we may avoid them in future. What failures have been experienced in the endeavor after a knowledge of the laws of nature! And we must not exaggerate the uncertainty of the issue of our benevolent efforts; we must not make the exception into the rule. Have not centuries of the experience of mankind bequeathed a rich store of knowledge with respect to the consequences of action having reference to the welfare of humanity? If these consequences really remained forever a subject of doubt, then *the greatest possible happiness of mankind* could no more be the ethical standard than it could be the ethical aim; and we have started from the assumption that it is the standard. It is said, "How often is man's life brought to a close before he has been able to realize his plans." But this only leads up to the poet's exhortation:

"Zwischen haut und morgen  
Liegt eine lange Frist;  
Lerne schnell besorgen,  
Da du noch munter bist."

"Long is the space that severs  
To-morrow from to-day;  
Learn to labor quickly,  
Waking while you may."

And to say that any one who is to be preserved from despondency and despair needs an aim, the attainment of which depends on himself alone, is to say what is not true. Let us recall the innumerable patriots who have fought for the freedom and welfare of their people, let us think of their steadfastness in battle, in prison, on the scaffold. We could hardly say of them that their aim was not to help their people, but to obtain the joys of conscience. The glad consciousness of devoting their lives to a great cause sustained them under all the blows

of fate; but they dedicated their lives to that cause, and not to an anticipated joy.

It has been said that the happiness of mankind is no fitting aim for the poor. "Will not the poor and weak, the ill and neglected say, It is very well for you who are rich and powerful, for you who are princes and statesmen; but we, how little can we do, how poor and weak we are in this matter compared with you. Such an aim cannot make us enthusiastic to do right. Is not the moral teacher able to offer men something which we as well as the richest and most powerful can attain?" But in reality, every one, whatever his position, can act in the way which, according to his best convictions, conduces in the given circumstances to the welfare of mankind. This is what the moral teacher commends to the poor as well as to the rich. And the poor man knows as well as the rich that in our moral judgment of a person everything turns on his character, not on the consequences of his action, and that the poor man may have a better character than the rich; he knows that even the rich man—just like himself—can do for the general welfare no more than *his best*. Whoever observes with attention the struggles of the working-class towards the introduction of juster social arrangements will recognize how powerfully the idea of advancing the welfare of their brothers is capable of inspiring even "the poor." Auguste Comte seemed to believe that there was no class of men among whom so great a sense of comradeship is to be found as among the working-class.

It is further objected: "We find that certain psychological laws of the emotions and will would make universal happiness an impracticable aim. The notion of it, on account of its abstractness, would require a high degree of rationalization in a man in order to take hold of his imagination and stir his enthusiasm. To obtain the vaguest sort of a conception of it is difficult even for minds specially trained to abstract thinking. And perhaps still more difficult to grasp is the truth of the ethical generalization that the essence of virtue is the purpose, and the essence of duty the obligation, to increase universal happiness as far as it is in one's power." \*

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\* Stanton Coit, "Final Aim of Moral Action." *Mind*, July, 1886, p. 330.

To this we must reply that to make the general welfare the final aim of action demands no higher degree of development of the understanding than to make it the standard of action ; and we start from the presupposition that it is the standard. If the abstract idea of "universal happiness" has power to stimulate but a few, yet innumerable minds are inspired with enthusiasm by the detailed idea of the concrete things which that conception represents. Undoubtedly the reading of Bellamy's "Looking Backward" has made an epoch in the lives of many thousands ; the image of a happier order of society which this writer has depicted as possible, has fired their souls and incited them to be active to the best of their powers in bringing about its realization.

At times, but happily not often, we hear the assertion that there is no motive-impulse which *directly* determines us to advance the general welfare. He who is completely destitute of such an impulse can obviously not be determined to action for the common interest by an appeal to his benevolence ; but in a civilized society there will be but few men and women who are really devoid of all love of man. The lecturer of the South Place Ethical Society in London says : " But if any one asks, ' Why should I love my fellow-men ? ' we must answer, ' Stop ! that is blasphemy against humanity, and we will not tolerate it without protesting against such degenerate scepticism. ' The love of man, as we see and feel in our own experience, is something ultimate, something inviolable. Love knows no motive beyond itself, and permits no doubt that it is its own justification. " And he says further that a good man will choose the path of duty, " not because it will be his own greatest happiness, but because it will contribute to the happiness and virtue of mankind, which he loves directly more than himself, and to devote himself to which he therefore does not esteem a sacrifice. The self makes no claims when it loses itself in surrender to the universal welfare, any more than when it loses itself in devotion to one person. " \*

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\* " Die Ethische Bewegung in der Religion. " Stanton Coit, Leipzig, 1890.

One often hears the objection that benevolence is too weak a motive. But is there any emotional force which guarantees the pursuit of the general welfare, and which is stronger on the average than benevolence? In many persons benevolence is not weak, and it may in all cases be strengthened by nurture, education, and social arrangements. The love of man is a motive which has continuously increased in strength throughout the progress of civilization, and we may hope that it will always develop itself with increasing power. "The love of all men, simply as human beings," it has been said, "is psychologically the latest developed of all the motives of right action." But "*right* action" is, in so far as our standard is accepted, that action which is conformable to the happiness of all men; and it has not been shown that any motive except "the love of all men" leads to such action as this.

It is further objected: "The general welfare is ill adapted to become the final aim of conduct, because its full realization is so far removed in time. An immediate increase of happiness cannot be made the moral aim; since the immediate effect of right action is often a general increase of pain. Restraint implies pain, and duty demands of us often a discipline and restraint of others as well as of ourselves. 'Universal Happiness' can mean only the happiness which will pervade society when perfect righteousness has triumphed, together with whatever happiness the advance towards moral victory may admit of. Nothing else can properly be understood under universal happiness. Certainly the mere fragment of desirable consciousness which the advance towards moral victory may admit of could not deserve that name. Therefore to aim at universal happiness would be the same as aiming at the final triumph of justice and joy on earth. Now in proportion as the realization of an object is seen to be distant, its power over the imagination and emotions is weakened. But so far as merely human calculations are to be relied upon, the kingdom of heaven is not near at hand."

This objection starts from the wholly groundless assumption that any one whose ruling motive is the general love of

man, and who, therefore, desires to promote the general welfare, must necessarily anticipate a "full realization" of it. But just as the ethical standard is not "universal happiness" but the *greatest possible* universal happiness, that is, the greatest possible excess of pleasure over pain in the world, so the final aim corresponding to this standard is not the realization of universal happiness but the *greatest possible promotion* of happiness in the world. The case in which universal happiness can be promoted by an intensification of present pain is only an exceptional case; the rule is that it is promoted by a diminution of pain. No one doubts that whoever discovers and applies successful means of annihilating sources of great pain, such for example as infectious diseases, is thereby promoting the general welfare in a higher degree. No abolitionist doubted that the welfare of mankind would be increased by the destruction of slavery. And even if the social reformer acknowledges that the new order of things for which he is fighting is not imminent in the near future, yet as long as he is certain that his activity is accelerating its approach, the idea of the future will exercise a great power on his "imagination and emotions."

The same unfounded assumption is at the root of the following objection: "If the attainment of universal happiness be the ultimate aim of conduct, three hypotheses must be assumed which have no other foundation than the need of having an aim which is unconditionally attainable. First, it must be assumed that somehow or other universal happiness will triumph in the world, and, secondly, that the human race is immortal; and, thirdly, as a ground of justification for these two hypotheses, it must be assumed that history and human existence are under the control of an intelligent moral author of nature." But as the true ethical final aim is not the realization of something impossible—unmixed happiness in the world—but only the greatest possible amount of happiness, we do not require this "extra-experimental faith."

None of the arguments which we have examined, in opposition to our proposed final aim, appeared to constitute a decisive case against it. Let us now consider the final aim

which appears as its rival, and let us ask, Would it be in conformity with the greatest possible happiness of mankind if the desire to obtain the joy of conscience and to escape its pain were our ruling motive-impulse?

If we are to answer this question in the affirmative, we must, it would seem, start in the first instance from the pre-supposition that peace of conscience can only follow upon such action as is in conformity with the greatest possible happiness of mankind; for if in any one case the sanction of conscience were to reward an action of general injurious tendency, then it would be incumbent on the man to choose this action, supposing that he desired to obtain the sanction of conscience. Now in what cases does the approval of conscience really take place? In all in which the agent believes that he has acted rightly. But his opinions about what is right usually depend in great part upon his education and his social environment. A Fuegian has different moral opinions from an Englishman. It is rarely the case that a precise induction from a man's particular moral judgment would give the result that their underlying principle was the greatest possible welfare of mankind; in most cases the basis of the greater part of them would be seen to be the supposed welfare of a limited circle,—for example, of a man's own race or of his own class or of his own nation.

And, therefore, he who would determine an agent to act in conformity with the welfare of mankind will not be able to say to him, "Endeavor to secure the sanction of conscience," but he will seek to cultivate his conscience so as in future only to approve what conforms to the universal welfare; and he will only be able to attain this result when he succeeds in determining him to acknowledge the general well-being as the supreme standard of right, and to make its advancement his ruling aim. "Strive after the general well-being," not "Strive after the peace of your own conscience," will therefore be his advice. We almost all stand in great need of a generalization of our conscience,—of an elevation above class prejudices by the express reminder that what we are concerned with is the well-being of all mankind, not merely that of the



so-called cultivated class, or of the rich, or of men as contrasted with women, or of those who belong to one's own people, or of human beings now alive. It is only when we make that objective aim our supreme purpose that we insure to reason and wisdom and goodness the requisite influence upon our action; it is only then that we can be sure of an advance in our ethical views. Especially in our own time, in which in a greater degree than ever before the inadequacy of many traditional arrangements is being acknowledged through wide circles, and a new order of things is in preparation, conscience requires a compass; and if mankind are to pursue the direction which the compass of the universal welfare indicates, then they must take this aim for their own personal aim. Many men arrive at self-complacency far too easily; the constant reference to the standard of right is essential if they are to obey the injunction of Thomas à Kempis: "Do not be joyful except when you have done a good action." If they take for their supreme purpose the subjective aim which we mentioned, and regard the inner results of action, the peace of conscience, as the sole decisive matter and as what stamps an action as a success, then, supposing that their well-aimed enterprises miscarry, they will hardly draw all the necessary lessons from this experience: with many of them there might easily arise a certain disregard of external success,—of the real influence of their actions on the welfare of their fellow-men,—in other words, a certain indifference to the well-being of humanity; they will easily forget that it is their duty to bend all the powers of their understanding to ascertain the actual external consequences of their action as regards the general welfare.

Writers who regard the inward moral sanction as the right aim of life have attempted to anticipate the objections which we have urged by expressing the "ultimate rule of right" in the formula, "Let thy final aim in life be thine own peace of mind in doing what in thy best judgment tends towards universal happiness,"\* or "Seek peace of conscience in devoting thyself to the welfare of mankind."† But this is not a single

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\* Coit. *Mind*, July, 1886, p. 338.

† Gizycki, l. c., p. 84.

but a double injunction ; it implies an impracticable combination of two distinct final aims. Either the one or the other must abdicate the supremacy to its rival. If we are to insist upon man's finding peace of conscience then he must do whatever in fact affords him the approval of his conscience, however little it may justify itself by the standard of the general well-being ! And so they may torture their enemies, beat their children to death, shoot their friends in a duel, "exploit" their workmen and treat them like slaves ! How can one justify the limitation that only *such* gladness of conscience is to be sought for as attends upon action conformable to the general welfare ? By saying that it is not *every* joy of conscience the aspiration after which conforms to the general welfare ? But this reply could only be assented to by one who prefers to take for his supreme final aim, *not* the peace of his own conscience but the general welfare. If every human being possessed a normal conscience such as infallibly sanctioned action for the general interest, then the injunction which we are criticising would really be no double injunction, but a single one, the second clause of which would simply indicate the means to the end prescribed by the first ; but precisely in proportion as actual consciences fall short of that ideal, the dethroning of the general happiness from the position of ruling aim would bring to pass an injury to the general happiness.

It is right, frequently, to recall the sanction of conscience both to others and to one's self ; but it is hardly the case that one ought to make it one's ruling aim. In proportion as a man has a benevolent heart he will find happiness in the service of man. And so Garrison said when he looked back on five and twenty years of his battle against slavery : "I have been compensated in this cause a million times over. In the darkest hour, in the greatest peril, I have felt just at that moment that it was everything to be in such a cause." And if we cannot find happiness in the position to which the path of duty has brought us, we shall at least find comfort in it. Perhaps we all need this reference to the inward consequences of our action, by means of which virtue is its own reward and

vice its own punishment; for benevolence and the sense of duty are often not strong enough to conquer powerful impulses of self-love; we must invoke the aid of *ethical* self-love in order to insure the victory to the forces which make for good. But our ruling aim ought to be the advancement of the universal happiness of mankind.

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## THE MORAL PHILOSOPHER AND THE MORAL LIFE.\*

THE main purpose of this paper is to show that there is no such thing possible as an ethical philosophy dogmatically made up in advance. We all help to determine the content of ethical philosophy so far as we contribute to the race's moral life. In other words, there can be no final Truth in Ethics any more than in Physics, until the last man has had his experience and said his say. In the one case as in the other, however, the hypotheses which we now make while waiting, and the acts to which they prompt us, are among the indispensable conditions which determine what that "say" shall be.

First of all, what is the position of him who seeks an ethical philosophy? To begin with, he must be distinguished from all those who are satisfied to be ethical sceptics. He *will* not be a sceptic; therefore so far from ethical scepticism being one possible *fruit* of ethical philosophizing it can only be regarded as that residual alternative to all philosophy which, from the outset, menaces every would-be philosopher who may give up the quest discouraged, and renounce his original aim. That aim is to find an account of the moral relations that obtain among things, which will weave them into the unity of a stable system, and make of the world what one may call a

\* Address read before the Philosophical Club of Yale University, February 9, 1891.

genuine *universe* from the ethical point of view. So far as the world resists reduction to the form of unity, so far as ethical propositions seem unstable, so far as the philosopher fail of his ideal. The subject-matter of his study is the ideals he finds existing in the world; the purpose which guides him is this ideal of his own, of getting them into a certain form. This ideal is thus a factor in ethical philosophy whose legitimate presence must never be overlooked; it is a positive contribution which the philosopher himself necessarily makes to the problem. But it is his only positive contribution. At the outset of his inquiry he ought to have no other ideals. Were he interested peculiarly in the triumph of any one kind of good, he would *pro tanto* cease to be a judicial investigator, and become an advocate for some limited element of the case.—Whatever obscurity may attach to these remarks will be dispelled as we proceed and see more and more of their concrete application.

There are three questions in ethics which must be kept apart. Let them be called respectively the *psychological* question, the *metaphysical* question, and the *casuistic* question. The psychological question asks after the historical *origin* of our moral ideas and judgments; the metaphysical question asks what the very *meaning* of the words good, ill, and obligation are; the casuistic question asks what is the *measure* of the various goods and ills which men recognize, so that the philosopher may settle the true order of human obligations.

# I.

The psychological question is for most disputants the only question. When your ordinary doctor of divinity has proved to his own satisfaction that an altogether unique faculty called conscience must be postulated to tell us what is right and what is wrong; or when your Popular-Science enthusiast has proclaimed that "apriorism" is an exploded superstition, and that our moral judgments have gradually resulted from the teaching of the environment, each of these persons thinks that ethics is settled and nothing more is to be said. The familiar pair of names, Intuitionist and Evolutionist, so

commonly used now to connote all possible differences in ethical opinion, really refer to the psychological question alone. The discussion of this question hinges so much upon particular details that it is impossible to enter upon it at all within the limits of this paper. I will therefore only express dogmatically my own belief, which is this, that the Benthams, the Mills, and the Bains have done a lasting service in taking so many of our human ideals and showing how they must have arisen from the association with acts of simple bodily pleasures and reliefs from pain. Association with many remote pleasures will unquestionably make a thing significant of goodness in our minds; and the more vaguely the goodness is conceived of, the more mysterious will its source appear to be. But it is surely impossible to explain all our sentiments and preferences in this simple way. The more minutely psychology studies human nature, the more clearly it finds there traces of secondary affections, relating the impressions of the environment with each other and with our impulses in quite different ways from those mere associations of coexistence and succession which are practically all that pure empiricism can admit. Take the love of drunkenness; take bashfulness, the terror of high places, the tendency to sea-sickness, to faint at the sight of blood, the susceptibility to musical sounds; take the emotion of the comical, the passion for poetry, for mathematics, or for metaphysics, no one of these things can be wholly explained by either association or utility. They go with other things that can be so explained, no doubt; and some of them are prophetic of future utilities, since there is nothing in us for which some use may not be found. But their origin is in incidental complications to our cerebral structure, a structure whose original features arose with no reference to the perception of such discords and harmonies as these. Well, a vast number of our moral perceptions also are certainly of this secondary and brain-born kind. They deal with directly felt fitnesses between things, and often fly in the teeth of all the prepossessions of habit and presumptions of utility. The moment you get beyond the coarser and more commonplace moral maxims, the Decalogues and poor Richard's Almanacs,

you fall into schemes and positions which to the eye of common-sense are fantastic and over-strained. The sense for abstract justice which some persons have is as eccentric a variation, from the natural-history point of view, as is the passion for music or for the higher philosophical consistencies which consumes the soul of others. The feeling of the inward dignity of certain spiritual attitudes, as peace, serenity, simplicity, veracity; and of the essential vulgarity of others, as querulousness, anxiety, egoistic fussiness, etc.; are quite inexplicable except by an innate preference of the more ideal attitude for its own pure sake. (The nobler thing *tastes* better, and that is all that we can say. "Experience" of consequences may truly teach us what things are *wicked*, but what have consequences to do with what is *mean and vulgar*?) If a man has shot his wife's paramour, by reason of what subtle repugnancy in things is it that we are so disgusted when we hear that the wife and the husband have made it up and are living comfortably together again? Or if the hypothesis were offered us of a world in which Messrs. Fourier's and Bellamy's and Morris's Utopias should all be outdone and millions kept permanently happy on the one simple condition that a certain lost soul on the far-off edge of things should lead a life of lonely torture, what except a specific and independent sort of emotion can it be which would make us immediately feel, even though an impulse arose within us to clutch at the happiness so offered, how hideous a thing would be its enjoyment when deliberately accepted as the fruit of such a bargain? To what, once more, but subtle brain-born feelings of discord can be due all these recent protests against the entire race-tradition of retributive justice?—I refer to Tolstoi with his ideas of non-resistance, to Mr. Bellamy with his substitution of oblivion for repentance (in his novel of Dr. Heidenhain's Process), to M. Guyau with his radical condemnation of the punitive ideal. All these subtleties of the moral sensibility go as much beyond what can be ciphered out from the "laws of the association" as the delicacies of sentiment possible between a pair of young lovers go beyond such precepts of the "Etiquette to be observed during Engagement" as are printed in manuals of social form.

No! Purely inward forces are certainly at work here. All the higher, more penetrating ideals are revolutionary. They present themselves far less in the guise of effects of past experience than in that of probable causes of future experience, factors to which the environment and the lessons it has so far taught us must learn to bend.

This is all I can say of the psychological question now. In the last chapter of a recent work\* I have sought to prove in a general way the existence in our thought of relations which do not merely repeat the couplings of experience. Our ideals have certainly many sources. They are not all explicable as signifying corporeal pleasures to be gained, and pains to be escaped. And for having so constantly perceived this psychological fact, we must applaud the intuitionist school. Whether or no such applause must be extended to that school's other characteristics will appear as we take the following questions up.

The next one in order is the metaphysical question, of what we mean by the words obligation, good, and ill.

## II.

First of all, it appears that such words can have no application or relevancy in a world in which no sentient life exists. Imagine an absolutely material world, containing only physical and chemical facts, and existing from eternity without a God, without even an interested spectator. Would there be any sense in saying of that world that one of its states is better than another? Or if there were two such worlds possible, would there be any rhyme or reason in calling one good and the other bad? good or bad positively, I mean, and apart from the fact that one might relate itself better than the other to the philosopher's private interests? But we must leave these private interests out of the account, for the philosopher is a *mental* fact, and we are asking whether goods and evils and obligations exist in physical facts *per se*. Surely there is no *status* for good and evil to exist in, in a purely

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\* The "Principles of Psychology," New York, H. Holt & Co., 1890.

insentient world. How can one physical fact, considered simply as a physical fact, be "better" than another? Betterness is not a physical relation. In its mere material capacity, a thing can no more be good or bad than it can be pleasant or painful. Good for what? Good for the production of another physical fact, do you say? But what in a purely physical universe demands the production of that other fact? Physical facts simply *are* or are *not*; and neither when present or absent, can they be supposed to make demands. If they do, they can only do so by having *desires*, and then they have ceased to be purely physical facts and have become facts of conscious sensibility. Goodness, badness, and obligation must be *realized* somewhere in order really to exist; and the first step in Ethical Philosophy is to see that no merely inorganic "nature of things" can realize them. Neither moral relations nor the moral law can swing *in vacuo*. Their only habitat can be a mind which feels them; and no world composed of merely physical facts can possibly be a world to which ethical propositions apply.

The moment one sentient being, however, is made a part of the universe, there is a chance for goods and evils really to exist. Moral relations now have their *status*, in that being's consciousness. So far as he *feels* anything to be good, he *makes* it good. It *is* good, for him; and being good for him, is absolutely good, for he is the sole creator of values in that universe, and outside of his opinion things have no moral character at all.

In such a universe as that it would of course be absurd to raise the question of whether the solitary thinker's judgments of good and ill are *true* or not. Truth supposes a standard outside of the thinker to which he must conform. But here the thinker is a sort of divinity, subject to no higher judge. Let us call the supposed universe which he inhabits a *moral solitude*. In such a moral solitude it is clear that there can be no outward *obligation*, and that the only trouble the God-like thinker is likely to have will be over the consistency of his own several ideals with each other. Some of these will no doubt be more pungent and appealing than the rest, their



goodness will have a profounder, more penetrating taste ; they will return to haunt him with more obstinate regrets if violated. So the thinkers will have to order his life with them as its chief determinants, or else remain inwardly discordant and unhappy. Into whatever equilibrium he may settle, though, and however he may straighten out his system, it will be a *right* system ; for beyond the facts of his own subjectivity there is nothing moral in the world.

If now we introduce a second thinker with *his* likes and dislikes into the universe, the ethical situation becomes much more complex, and several possibilities are immediately seen to obtain.

One of these is that the thinkers may ignore each other's attitude about good and evil altogether, and each continue to indulge his own preferences, indifferent to what the other may feel or do. In such a case we have a world with twice as much of the ethical *quality* in it as our moral solitude, only it is without ethical unity. The same object is good or bad there, according as you measure it by the view which this one or that one of the thinkers takes. Nor can you find any possible ground in such a world for saying that one thinker's opinion is more correct than the other's or that either has the *truer* moral sense. Such a world, in short, is not a moral universe but a moral dualism. Not only is there no single point of view within it from which the values of things can be unequivocally judged, but there is not even a demand for such a point of view, since the two thinkers are supposed indifferent to each other's thoughts and acts. Multiply the thinkers into a pluralism, and we find realized for us in the ethical sphere something like that world which the antique sceptics conceived of, in which individual minds are the measures of all and in which no one "objective" truth, but only a multitude of "subjective" opinions, can be found.

But this is the kind of world with which the philosopher, so long as he holds to the hope of a philosophy, will not put up. Among the various ideals represented, there must be, he thinks, some which have the more truth or authority, and to these the others *ought* to yield, so that system and subor-

dination may reign. Here in the word "ought" the notion of *obligation* comes emphatically into view, and the next thing in order must be to make its meaning clear.

Since the outcome of the discussion so far has been to show us that nothing can be good or right, except so far as some consciousness feels it to be good, or thinks it to be right, we perceive on the very threshold that the real superiority and authority which are postulated by the philosopher to reside in some of the opinions and the really inferior character which he supposes must belong to others, cannot be explained by any abstract moral "nature of things" existing antecedently to the concrete thinkers themselves with their ideals. Like the positive attributes good and bad, the comparative ones better and worse, must be realized to be real. If one ideal judgment be objectively better than another, that betterness must be "made flesh" by being lodged and concreted in some one's actual perception. It cannot float in the atmosphere, for it is not a sort of meteorological phenomenon, like the aurora borealis or the zodiacal light. Its *esse* is *percepti*, like the *esse* of the ideals themselves between which it obtains. The philosopher, therefore, who seeks to know which ideal *ought* to have supreme weight and which one *ought* to be subordinated, must trace the *ought* itself to the *de facto* constitution of some existing consciousness, behind which, as one of the data of the universe, he, as a purely ethical philosopher, is unable to go. This consciousness must make the one ideal right by feeling it to be right, the other wrong by feeling it to be wrong.—But what particular consciousness in the universe can enjoy this prerogative of obliging others to conform to a rule which it lays down?

If one of the thinkers were obviously divine, while all the rest were human, there would probably be no practical dispute about the matter. The divine thought would be the model, to which the others should conform. But still the theoretic question would remain, What is the ground of the obligation, even here?

In our first essays at answering this question, there is an

inevitable tendency to slip into an assumption which ordinary men follow when they are disputing with each other about questions of good and bad. They imagine an abstract moral order in which the objective truth resides, and each tries to prove that this pre-existing order is more accurately reflected in his own ideas than in those of his adversary. It is because one disputant is backed by this overarching abstract order that we think the other should submit. Even so, when it is a question no longer of two finite thinkers, but of God and ourselves, we follow our usual habit, and imagine a sort of *de jure* relation, which antedates and overarches the mere facts, and would make it right that we *should* conform our thoughts to God's thoughts, even though we made no claim to that effect, and though we preferred *de facto* to go on thinking for ourselves.

But the moment we take a steady look at the question, we see not only that without a claim actually made by some concrete person there can be no obligation, but that there is some obligation wherever there is a claim. Claim and obligation are, in other words, coextensive terms; they cover each other exactly. Our ordinary attitude, of regarding ourselves as subject to an overarching system of moral relations, true "in themselves," is, therefore, either an out-and-out superstition, or else it must be treated as a merely provisional abstraction from that real thinker in whose actual demand upon us to think as he does, our obligation must be ultimately based. In a theistic ethical philosophy that thinker in question is, of course, the Deity to whom the existence of the universe is due.

I know well how hard it is for those who are accustomed to what I have called the superstitious view, to realize that every *de facto* claim creates in so far forth an obligation. We inveterately think that something which we call the "validity" of the claim is what gives to it its obligatory character, and that this validity is something outside of the claim's mere existence as a matter of fact. It rains down upon the claim, we think, from some sublime dimension of Being, which the moral law inhabits, much as upon the steel of the compass-needle

the influence of the Pole rains down from out of the starry heavens. But again, how *can* such an inorganic abstract character of imperativeness, additional to the imperativeness which is *in* the claim itself, *exist*? Take any demand, however slight, which any creature, however weak, may make. Ought it not, for its own sole sake, to be satisfied? If not, prove why not? The only possible kind of proof you could adduce would be the exhibition of another creature who should make a demand that ran the other way. The only possible reason there can be why any phenomenon ought to exist is that such a phenomenon actually is desired. Any ~~desire is~~ imperative to the extent of its amount; it makes *itself* valid, by the fact that it exists at all. Some desires, truly enough, are small desires; they are put forward by insignificant persons, and we customarily make light of the obligations which they bring. But the fact that such personal demands as these impose small obligations does not keep the largest obligations from being personal demands.

If we must talk impersonally, to be sure we can say that "the universe" requires, exacts, or makes obligatory such or such an action, whenever it expresses itself through the desires of such or such a creature. But it is better not to talk about the universe in this personified way, unless we believe in a universal or divine consciousness which actually exists. If there be such a consciousness, then its demands carry the *most* of obligation simply because they are the greatest in amount. But it is even then not *abstractly* right that we should respect them. It is only *concretely* right, or right after the fact, and by virtue of the fact, that they are actually made. Suppose we do not respect them, as seems largely to be the case in this queer world. That *ought* not to be, we say, that is *wrong*. But in what way is this wrongness made more acceptable to our ~~intellects~~ when we imagine it to consist rather in the laceration of an *à priori* ideal order than in the disappointment of a living personal God? Do we, perhaps, think that we cover God and protect him and make his impotence over us less ultimate, when we back him up with their *à priori* blanket from which he may draw some warmth of further appeal?

But the only force of appeal to *us*, which either a living God or an abstract ideal order can wield, is found in the "everlasting ruby vaults" of our own human hearts, as they happen to beat responsive and not irresponsible to the claim. So far as they do feel it when made by a living consciousness, it is life answering to life. A claim thus livingly acknowledged is acknowledged with a solidity and fulness which no thought of an "ideal" backing can render more complete; while if, on the other hand, the heart's response is withheld, the stubborn phenomenon is there of an impotence in the claims which the universe embodies, which no talk about an eternal nature of things can gloze over or dispel. An ineffective *a priori* order is as impotent a thing as an ineffective God; and in the eye of philosophy, it is as hard a thing to explain.

We may now consider that what we distinguished as the "metaphysical question" in ethical philosophy is sufficiently answered, and that we have learned what the words good, bad, and obligation severally mean. They mean no absolute natures, independent of personal support. They are objects of feeling and desire, which have no foothold or anchorage in Being apart from the existence of actually living minds.

Wherever such minds exist, with judgments of good and ill and demands upon each other, there is an ethical world in its essential features. Were all other things, gods and men and starry heavens blotted out from this solar system, and were there left but one rock with two loving souls upon it, that rock would have as thoroughly moral a constitution as any possible world which the eternities and immensities can harbor. It would be a tragic constitution, because the rock's inhabitants would die. But while they lived, there would be real good things and real bad things in the universe, there would be obligations, claims, and expectations; obediences, refusals, and disappointments; compunctions and longings for harmony to come again, and inward peace of conscience when it was restored; there would, in short, be a moral life, whose active energy would have no limit but the intensity of interest in each other with which the hero and heroine might be endowed.

We, on this terrestrial globe, so far as the visible facts go, are just like the inhabitants of such a rock. (Whether a God exist, or whether no God exist, in yon blue heaven above us bent, we form at any rate an ethical republic here below.) And the first reflection which this leads to is that ethics have as genuine and real a foothold in a universe where the highest consciousness is human as in a universe where there is a God as well. "The religion of humanity" affords a basis for ethics as well as Theism does. Whether the purely human system can gratify the philosopher's demand as well as the other, is a different question which we ourselves must answer ere we close.

### III.

The last fundamental question in Ethics was, it will be remembered, the *casuistic* question. Here we are, in a world where the existence of a divine Thinker has been and perhaps always will be doubted by some of the lookers on, and where, in spite of the presence of a large number of ideals, in which human beings agree, there are a mass of others about which no general consensus obtains. It is hardly necessary to present a literary picture of this, for the facts are too well known. The wars of the flesh and the spirit in each man, the concupiscences of different individuals pursuing the same unsharable material or social prizes, the ideals which contrast so, according to races, circumstances, temperaments, philosophical beliefs, etc., all form a jungle of apparently inextricable confusion with no obvious Ariadne's thread to lead one out. Yet the philosopher, just because he is a philosopher, adds his own peculiar ideal to the confusion (with which if he were willing to be a sceptic he would be passably content), and insists that over all these individual opinions there is a system of truth which he can discover if he only takes sufficient pains.

We stand ourselves at present in the place of that philosopher, and must not fail to realize all the features that the situation comports. In the first place we will not be sceptics, we hold to it that there is a truth to be ascertained. But, in the second place we have just gained the insight that that truth cannot be a self-proclaiming set of laws, or an abstract "moral

reason," but can only exist in act, or in the shape of an opinion held by some thinker really to be found. There is, however, no visible thinker invested with authority. Shall we then simply proclaim our *own* ideals as the lawgiving ones? No, for if we are true philosophers, we must throw our own spontaneous ideals, even the dearest, impartially in with that total mass of ideals which are fairly to be judged. But how, then, can we as philosophers ever find a test? How avoid complete moral scepticism on the one hand; and on the other escape bringing a wayward personal standard of our own along with us, on which we simply pin our faith?

The dilemma is a hard one, nor does it grow a bit more easy as we revolve it in our minds. The entire undertaking of the philosopher obliges him to seek an impartial test. That test, however, must be incarnated in the demand of some actually existent person; and how can he pick out the person save by an act in which his own sympathies and prepossessions are implied?

One method indeed presents itself, and has as a matter of history been taken by the more serious ethical schools. If the heap of things demanded proved on inspection less chaotic than at first they seemed, if they furnished their own relative test and measure, then the casuistic problem would be solved. (If it were found that all goods *quâ* goods contained a common essence, then the *amount* of this essence involved in any one good would show its rank in the scale of goodness, and order could be quickly made. For this essence would be *the* good upon which all thinkers were agreed, the relatively objective and universal good that the philosopher seeks. Even his own private ideals would be measured by their share of it, and find their rightful place among the rest.

Various essences of good have thus been found and proposed as bases of the ethical system. Thus, to be a mean between two extremes; to be recognized by a special intuitive faculty; to make the agent happy for the moment; to make others as well as him happy in the long run; to add to his perfection or dignity; to harm no one; to follow from reason or flow from universal law; to be in accordance with the will

of God; to promote the survival of the human species on this planet; are so many tests, each of which has been maintained by somebody to constitute the essence of all good things or actions so far as they are good.

No one of the measures that have been actually proposed has, however, given general satisfaction. Some are obviously not universally present in all cases,—*e.g.*, the character of harming no one, or that of following a universal law; for the best course is often cruel; and many acts are reckoned good on the sole condition that they be exceptions, and serve *not* as examples of a universal law. Other characters, such as following the will of God, are unascertainable and vague. Others again, like survival, are quite indeterminate in their consequences, and leave us in the lurch where we most need their help. A philosopher of the Sioux Nation, for example, will be quite certain to use the survival-criterion in a different way from ourselves. The best, on the whole, of these marks and measures of goodness seems to be the capacity to bring happiness. But in order not to break down fatally, this test must be taken to cover innumerable acts and impulses that never *aim* at happiness; so that, after all, in seeking for an universal principle we inevitably are carried onward to the *most* universal principle, that the essence of good is simply to satisfy demand. The demand may be for anything under the sun. There is really no more ground for supposing that all our demands can be accounted for by one universal underlying kind of motive than there is ground for supposing that all physical phenomena are cases of a single law. The elementary forces in ethics are probably as plural as those of physics are. The various ideals have no common character apart from the fact that they are ideals. No single abstract principle can be so used as to yield to the philosopher anything like a scientifically accurate and genuinely useful casuistic scale.

A look at another peculiarity of the ethical universe, as we find it, will still farther show us the philosopher's perplexities. As a purely theoretic problem, namely, the casuistic question would hardly ever come up at all. If the ethical philosopher were only asking after the best imaginable system of goods



he would indeed have an easy task. For all demands as such are *primâ facie* respectable, and the best simply imaginary world would be one in which *every* demand was gratified as soon as made. Such a world would, however, have to have a physical constitution entirely different from that of the one which we inhabit. It would need not only a space, but a time "of  $n$ -dimensions," to include all the acts and experiences, incompatible with one another here below, which would then go on in conjunction, such as spending our money yet growing rich; taking our holiday yet getting ahead with our work; shooting and fishing yet doing no hurt to the beasts; gaining no end of experience yet keeping our youthful freshness of heart, and the like. There can be no question that such a system of things, however brought about, would be the absolutely ideal system, and that if a philosopher could create universes *à priori*, and provide all the mechanical conditions, that is the sort of universe which he should unhesitatingly create.

But this world of ours is made on an entirely different pattern and the casuistic question there is most tragically practical. The actually possible in this world is vastly narrower than all that is demanded; and there is always a *pinch* between the ideal and the actual which can only be got through by leaving part of the ideal behind. There is hardly a good which we can imagine except as competing for the possession of the same bit of space and time with some other imagined good. Every end of desire that presents itself appears exclusive of some other end of desire. Shall a man drink and smoke, *or* keep his nerves in condition?—he cannot do both. Shall he follow his fancy for Amelia, *or* for Henrietta?—both cannot be the choice of his heart. Shall he have the dear old Republican party, *or* a spirit of unsophistication in public affairs?—he cannot have both, etc. So that the ethical philosopher's demand for the right scale of subordination in ideals is the fruit of an altogether *practical* need. (Some part of the ideal must be *butchered*, and he needs to know *which* part. It is a tragic situation, and no mere speculative conundrum, with which he has to deal.

Now *we* are blinded to the real difficulty of the philosopher's task by the fact that we are born into a society whose ideals are largely ordered already. If we follow the ideal which is conventionally highest, the others which we butcher either die and do not return to haunt us, or if they come back and accuse us of murder, every one applauds us for turning to them a deaf ear. In other words, our environment encourages us not to be philosophers but partisans. The philosopher, however, cannot, so long as he clings to his own ideal of objectivity rule out any ideal from being heard. He is confident, and rightly confident, that the simple taking counsel of his own intuitive preferences would be certain to end in a mutilation of the fulness of the truth. The poet Heine is said to have written "Bunsen" in the place of "Gott" in his copy of that author's work, entitled "God in History," so as to make it read "Bunsen in der Geschichte." Now, with no disrespect to the good and learned Baron, is it not safe to say that any single philosopher, however wide his sympathies, must be just such a Bunsen in der Geschichte of the moral world, so soon as he attempts to put his own ideas of order into that howling mob of desires, each struggling to get breathing-room for the ideal to which it clings? The very best of men must not only be insensible, but be ludicrously and peculiarly insensible to many goods. As a militant, fighting free-handed that the goods to which he is sensible may not be submerged and lost from out of life, the philosopher, like every other human being, is in a natural position. But think of Zeno and of Epicurus, think of Calvin and of Paley, think of Kant and Schopenhauer, of Herbert Spencer and John Henry Newman, no longer as one-sided champions of special ideals, but as school-masters deciding what all must think; and what more grotesque topic could a satirist wish for on which to exercise his pen? The fabled attempt of Mrs. Partington to arrest the rising tide of the North Atlantic with her broom was a reasonable spectacle compared with their effort to substitute the content of their clean-shaven systems for that exuberant mass of goods with which all human nature is in travail, and groaning to

bring to the light of day. Think, furthermore, of such individual moralists, no longer as mere school-masters, but as Pontiffs armed with the temporal power, and having authority, in every concrete case of conflict, to order which good shall be butchered and which shall be suffered to survive; and the notion really turns one pale. All one's slumbering revolutionary instincts waken at the thought of any single moralist wielding such powers of life and death. Better chaos forever than an order based on any closet-philosopher's rule, even though he were the most enlightened possible member of his tribe. No! if the philosopher is to keep his judicial position, he must never become one of the parties to the fray.

What can he do, then, it will now be asked, except to fall back on scepticism and give up the notion of being a philosopher at all?

But do we not already see a perfectly definite path of escape which is open to him just because he is a philosopher, and not the champion of one particular ideal? Since every good which is demanded is *eo ipso* really good, must not the guiding principle for ethical *philosophy* (since all demands conjointly cannot be satisfied in this poor world) be simply to satisfy at all times *as many demands as we can*? That act must be the best act, accordingly, which makes for the *best whole*, in the sense of awakening the least sum of dissatisfactions. In the casuistic scale, therefore, those ideals must be written highest which *prevail at the least cost*, or by whose realization the least possible number of other ideals are destroyed. Since victory and defeat there must be, the victory to be philosophically prayed for is that of the more inclusive side, of the side which even in the hour of triumph will to some degree do justice to the ideals in which the vanquished party's interests lay. The course of history is nothing but the story of men's struggles from generation to generation, to find the more and more inclusive order. *Invent some manner* of realizing your own ideals which will also satisfy the alien demands,—that and that only is the path of peace! Fol-

lowing this path, society has shaken into one sort of relative equilibrium after another by a series of social discoveries quite analogous to those of science. Polyandry and polygamy and slavery, private warfare and liberty to kill, judicial torture and arbitrary royal power have slowly succumbed to actually aroused complaints; and though *some one's* ideals are unquestionably the worse off for each improvement, yet a vastly greater total number of them find shelter in our civilized society than in the older savage ways. So far then, and up to date, the casuistic scale is made for the philosopher already far better than he can ever make it for himself. An experiment of the most searching kind has proved that the laws and usages of the land are what yield the maximum of satisfaction to the thinkers taken all together. The *presumption* in cases of conflict must always be in favor of the conventionally recognized good; the philosopher must be a conservative, and in the construction of his casuistic scale, must put the things most in accordance with the customs of the community on top.

And yet, if he be a true philosopher, he must see that there is nothing final in any actually given equilibrium of human ideals, but that, as our present laws and customs have fought and conquered other past ones, so they will in their turn be overthrown by any newly-discovered order, which will hush up the complaints which they still give rise to, without producing others louder still. "Rules are made for man, not man for rules,"—that one sentence is enough to immortalize Green's Prolegomena to Ethics. And although a man always risks much when he breaks away from established rules and strives to realize a larger ideal whole than they permit of, yet the philosopher must allow that it is at all times open to any one to make the experiment, provided he fear not to stake his life and character upon the throw. The pinch is always here. Pent in under every system of moral rules are innumerable persons whom it weighs upon and goods which it represses; and these are always rumbling and grumbling in the background and ready for any issue by which they may get free. See the abuses which the institution of private property covers, so that even to-day it is shamelessly asserted among us that

one of the prime functions of the general government is to help individual citizens to grow rich. See the unnamed and unnamable sorrows which the tyranny, on the whole so beneficent, of the marriage-institution brings to so many, both of the married and the unwed. See the wholesale loss of opportunity under our *régime* of so-called equality and industrialism, with the drummer and the counter-jumper in the saddle, for so many faculties and graces which could flourish in the feudal world. See our kindness for the humble and the outcast, how it wars with that stern weeding-out which until now has been the condition of every perfection in the breed. See everywhere the struggle and the squeeze; and everlastingly the problem how to make them less. The anarchists, nihilists, and free-lovers; the socialists and single tax men; the free-traders and civil service reformers, the prohibitionists and antivivisectionists; the radical Darwinians with their idea of the suppression of the weak,—these and all the conservative sentiments of society arrayed against them, are simply deciding through actual experiment by what sort of conduct the maximum amount of good can be gained and kept in this world. These experiments are to be judged, not *à priori*, but by actually finding after the fact of their making, how much more outcry or how much appeasement comes about. What closet-solutions can possibly anticipate the result of trials made on such a scale? Or what can any superficial theorist's judgment be worth, in a world where every one of thousands of ideals has its special champion already provided in the shape of some genius expressly born to feel it, and to fight to death in its behalf? The pure philosopher can only follow the windings of the spectacle, confident that the line of least resistance will always be towards the richer and the more inclusive arrangement, and that by one tack after another some approach to the kingdom of heaven is incessantly made.

#### I V.

All this amounts to saying that, so far as the casuistic question goes, ethical science is just like physical science, and

instead of being deducible all at once from abstract principles, must simply bide its time, and be ready to revise its conclusions from day to day. The *presumption* of course, in both sciences, always is that the vulgarly accepted opinions are true; the true casuistic order is that which public opinion believes in; and surely it would be folly quite as great, in most of us, to strike out independently and aim at originality in ethics as in physics. Every now and then, however, some one is born with the right to be original, and his revolutionary thought or action may bear prosperous fruit. He may replace old "laws of nature" by better ones; he may, by breaking old moral rules in a certain place, bring in a total condition of things more ideal than would have followed had the rules been kept.

On the whole, then, we must conclude that no philosophy of ethics is possible in the old-fashioned absolute sense of the term. Everywhere the ethical philosopher must wait on facts. The thinkers who create the ideals come he knows not whence; their sensibilities are evolved he knows not how; and the question as to which of two conflicting ideals will give the best universe then and there, can be answered by him only through the aid of the experience of other men. I said some time ago, in treating of the "first" question, that the intuitional moralists deserve credit for keeping most clearly to the psychological facts. They do much to spoil this merit on the whole, however, by mixing with it that dogmatic temper which, by absolute distinctions and unconditional "thou shalt nots," changes a growing, elastic, and continuous life into a superstitious system of relics and dead bones. In point of fact, there are no absolute evils, and there are no non-moral goods; and the *highest* ethical life—however few may be called to bear its burdens—consists at all times in the breaking of rules which have grown too narrow for the actual case. There is but one unconditional commandment, which is that thou shalt seek incessantly, with fear and trembling, so to vote and to act as to bring about the very largest total universe of good which thou canst see. Abstract rules indeed can help; but they help the

less in proportion as our intuitions are more piercing, and our vocation is the stronger for the moral life. For every real dilemma is in literal strictness a unique situation; and the exact combination of ideals realized and ideals disappointed which each decision creates is always a universe without a precedent, and for which no adequate previous rule exists. The philosopher then, *quâ* philosopher, is no better able to determine the best universe in the concrete emergency than other men. He sees, indeed, somewhat better than most men what the question always is—not a question of this good or that good simply taken, but of the two total universes with which these goods respectively belong. He knows that he must vote always for the richer universe, for the good which seems most organizable, most fit to enter into complex combinations, most apt to be a member of a more inclusive whole. But which particular universe this is, he cannot know for certain in advance, he only knows that if he makes a bad mistake the cries of the wounded will soon inform him of the fact. In all this the philosopher is just like the rest of us non-philosophers, so far as we are just and sympathetic instinctively, and so far as we are open to the voice of complaint. His function is in fact indistinguishable from that of the best kind of statesman at the present day. His books upon ethics, therefore, so far as they truly touch the moral life, must more and more ally themselves with a literature which is confessedly tentative and suggestive rather than dogmatic,—I mean with novels and dramas of the deeper sort, with sermons, with books on statecraft and philanthropy, and social and economical reform. Treated in this way ethical treatises may be voluminous and luminous as well; but they never can be *final*, except in their abstractest and vaguest features; and they must more and more abandon the old-fashioned, clear-cut, and would-be “scientific” form.)

## V.

The chief of all the reasons why concrete ethics cannot be final is that they have to wait on metaphysical and theological beliefs. I said some time back that real ethical relations

existed in a purely human world. They would exist even in what we called a moral solitude if the thinker had various ideals which took hold of him in turn. His self of one day would make demands on his self of another, and some of the demands might be urgent and tyrannical while others were gentle and easily put aside. We call the tyrannical demands *imperatives*. If we ignore these we do not hear the last of it. The good which we have wounded returns to plague us with interminable corps of consequential damages, compunctions, and regrets. (Obligation can thus exist inside a single thinker's consciousness; and perfect peace can abide with him only so far as he lives according to some sort of a casuistic scale which keeps his more imperative goods on top.) It is the nature of these goods to be cruel to their rivals. Nothing shall avail when weighed in the balance against them. They call out all the mercilessness in our disposition, and do not easily forgive us if we are so soft-hearted as to shrink from sacrifice in their behalf.

The deepest difference, practically, in the moral life of man is the difference between the easy-going and the strenuous mood. When in the easy-going mood the shrinking from present ill is our ruling consideration. The strenuous mood, on the contrary, makes us quite indifferent to present ill, if only the greater ideal be attained. The capacity for the strenuous mood probably lies slumbering in every man, but it has more difficulty in some, than in others, in waking up. It needs the wilder passions to arouse it, the big fears, loves, and indignations; or else the deeply penetrating appeal of some one of the higher fidelities, like justice, truth or freedom. High relief is a necessity of its vision, and a world where all the mountains are brought down and all the valleys are exalted is no congenial place for its habitation. This is why in a solitary thinker this mood might slumber on forever without waking. His various ideals, known to him to be mere preferences of his own, are too nearly of the same denominational value: he can play fast or loose with them at will. (This too is why, in a merely human world without a God, the appeal to our moral energy falls short of its maximal stimulating



power. Life, to be sure, is even in such a world a genuinely ethical symphony; but it is played in the compass of a couple of poor octaves, and the infinite scale of values fails to open up. Many of us, indeed—like Sir James Stephen in those eloquent “Essays by a Barrister,”—would openly laugh at the very idea of the strenuous mood being awakened in us by those claims of Remote Posterity which constitute the last appeal of the religion of humanity. We do not love these men of the future keenly enough; and we love them perhaps the less the more we hear of their evolutionized perfection, their high average longevity and education, their freedom from war and crime, their relative immunity from pain and zymotic disease, and all their other negative superiorities. This is all too finite, we say, we see too well the vacuum beyond. It lacks the note of infinitude and mystery, and may all be dealt with in the don't-care mood. No need of agonizing ourselves or making others agonize for these good creatures just at present.

When, however, we believe that a God is there, and that he is one of the claimants, the infinite perspective opens out. The scale of the symphony is incalculably prolonged. The more imperative ideals now begin to speak with an altogether new objectivity and significance, and to utter the infinitely penetrating, shattering, tragically challenging note of appeal. They ring out like the call of Victor Hugo's Alpine eagle, “qui parle au précipice et que le gouffre entend,” and the strenuous mood awakens at the sound. It saith among the trumpets, ha, ha; it smelleth the battle afar off, the thunder of the captains and the shouting. Its blood is up; and cruelty to the lesser claims, so far from being a deterrent element, does but add to the stern joy with which it leaps to answer to the greater. All through history, in the periodical conflicts of puritanism with the don't-care temper, we see the antagonism of the strenuous and genial moods, and the contrast between the ethics of infinite and mysterious obligation from on high, and those of prudence and the satisfaction of merely finite need.

The capacity of the strenuous mood lies so deep down among our natural human possibilities that even if there

were no metaphysical or traditional grounds for believing in a God, men would postulate one simply as a pretext for living hard, and getting out of the game of existence its keenest possibilities of zest. Our attitude towards concrete evils is entirely different in a world where we believe there are none but finite demanders, from what it is in one where we joyously face tragedy for an infinite demander's sake. Every sort of energy and endurance, of courage and capacity for handling life's evils is set free in those who have religious faith. For this reason the strenuous type of character will on the battlefield of human history always outwear the easy-going type and religion will drive irreligion to the wall.

It would seem too—and this is my final conclusion—that the stable and systematic moral universe for which the ethical philosopher asks is fully possible only in a world where there is a divine thinker with all-enveloping demands. If such a thinker existed, *his* way of subordinating the demands to each other would be the finally valid casuistic scale; *his* claims would be the most appealing; *his* ideal universe would be the most inclusive realizable whole. If he now exist, then actualized in *his* thought already must be that ethical philosophy which we seek after as the pattern which our own must evermore approach.\* In the interests of our own ideal of systematically unified moral truth, therefore, we, as would-be philosophers, must postulate a divine thinker, and pray for the victory of the religious cause. Meanwhile, exactly what the thought of the infinite thinker may be is hidden from us even were we sure of his existence; so that our postulation of him after all serves only to let loose in us the strenuous mood. But this is what it does in all men, even those who have no interest in philosophy. The ethical philosopher, therefore, whenever he ventures to say which course of action is the best is on no essentially different level from the common

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\* All this is set forth with great freshness and force in the work of my colleague, Professor Josiah Royce: "The Religious Aspect of Philosophy." Boston, 1885.

man. "See I have set before thee this day life and good, and death and evil, therefore, choose life that thou and thy seed may live,"—when this challenge comes to us, it is simply our character and total personal genius that are on trial; and if we invoke any so-called philosophy, our choice and use of that also are but revelations of our individual aptitude or incapacity for moral life. From this unsparing practical ordeal no professor's lectures and no array of books can save us. The solving word for the learned and the unlearned man alike lies, in the last resort, in the dumb willingness and unwillingnesses of their interiors, and nowhere else. It is not in heaven, neither is it beyond the sea. But the word is very nigh unto thee, in thy mouth and in thy heart that thou mayest do it.

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## ANOTHER VIEW OF THE ETHICS OF LAND-TENURE.

THE well-written essay by Professor Clark, in the first number of this review, on the ethics of land-tenure, is of special interest, on account of the contrast between his views and those of Mr. George, the most prominent of the opponents of the present system of land-tenure. Before, however, judging of the right and wrong of our present system of land-tenure, as presented by these writers, it is necessary to analyze the position of each to see upon what kind of an economic system they base their doctrines. It is plain that they have economic worlds in mind, which are radically different from one another, and naturally the ethical judgments which they make respecting these worlds are very different.

It seems to me that both Professor Clark and Mr. George are seeking for an ethical judgment rather than for the ethical principle upon which judgments should be based. The real question is to find the ethical principle upon which the ethical judgment should rest. To do this successfully the

economic parts of the controversy should be separated from the ethical and discussed by themselves. The method of reasoning upon ethical problems has not been so thoroughly discussed as the method of reasoning fitted for economic problems, yet it seems to me that as they are nearly related sciences the method of procedure must be quite similar.

In order to consider the ethical problem clearly it must be isolated from other problems. We must have a case where no other consideration influences our judgment. In stating the evils of our land laws as strongly as Mr. George does, there is no opportunity offered for discussing ethical feelings by themselves. With the facts as he puts them, not merely the moral feelings would revolt against our present system of land-tenure, but also our economic and political judgments as well. He thinks our whole civilization is at stake; that there is no other remedy for our present evils but a radical change in our system of land-tenure; that if this one evil were removed, all other evils would disappear of themselves; that no progress can be made without the change he advocates, and that there is no other remedy but the one he has in mind.

Under such a combination of circumstances we cannot measure moral considerations separately. So many different considerations come in to influence our judgment, that these different feelings are commingled in a common result. To illustrate, let us take the case of the late war. How can we judge of the strength of the moral feeling which prompted men to free the slaves when so many other issues were involved in the war. Many advocated the war on account of a desire to hold the Union together; in the Western States the people desired to have the Mississippi River as an outlet for their goods to the ocean; some wanted a Southern market for manufactures, and many other considerations might be mentioned, which led people to desire to continue the war until the end. All of these considerations, to a greater or less degree, influenced each individual. How, then, can we determine under such complicated circumstances what was the influence of any one motive in the common result that led to the con-

tinuation of the war until the end? Is it not clear that we can find no definite measure of the strength of any of these motives?

It thus seems to me that in a case like that presented by Mr. George, he does not give us the proper background from which we can determine what is the moral principle which we should use in considering such cases. We must test our principle in some other case where circumstances have isolated it from other causes, and in this way allow its measurement.

Professor Clark, I think, errs in the opposite direction to Mr. George. He makes the economic conditions that justify our present system of land-tenure so prominent that the reader will at least be uncertain whether any moral principle is involved. According to the economic data he presents, rent in the economic sense, if not wholly disregarded, at least receives no emphasis. Land seems to be a form of capital, its value like other property being due to the labor put upon it. He also contends that the landless man has no grievance unless it be in his lack of wealth. He even claims our land system instead of lowering wages really raises them. No one will deny that there is much truth in the position he takes; yet if he is entirely in the right, land-tenure is wholly an economic problem and involves no moral principle.

For these reasons I think that neither Mr. George nor Professor Clark proceed on the proper plan to bring out clearly the ethical principles that apply to land-tenures. To do this we must first correlate the economic facts so that they will show the need of an application of the moral law, and then we must look for an ethical principle that will satisfy our moral feelings. The economic principles must be discussed by themselves and then accepted as data when the discussion turns upon ethical principles.

#### THE ECONOMIC DATA.

In bringing together the economic data that are needed as a basis of the discussion of the facts of land-tenure, we need, first of all, a clear idea of what is meant by unearned increment or surplus value. The unearned increment is that

which comes to individuals or to classes, not from industrial qualities which they use in production, but from the lack of supply of some needed article. If a producer could sell an article for a dollar, at the usual rate of interest and wages, and the lack of supply was so great as to regularly give him a dollar and a quarter for the article, the twenty-five cents are unearned. Although the case of land is not the only example where there is an unearned increment, because the price of food is always more than its cost of production on the best land, yet it is the best example, and hence is the one in common use as an illustration. On account of differences in soil, farms have different degrees of fertility, and hence the return for the labor employed upon them is greater in some fields than in others. With the increase in the demand for food, coming through the increase in population, poorer lands are brought into use, and, as a result, a continually higher price must be paid for food, giving to the owners of the better soil a price far above the cost of production.

By thinking in a more general way we get at the idea of surplus value. If the value of all the produce of the industry of a given society is greater to the people as consumers than its cost was to them as producers, the difference between the cost and value is the surplus value. There could be, for example, no rent of land, if we did not estimate the value of all wheat produced more highly than we estimate the pain and trouble of producing it. The problem of distribution then is, who shall get this surplus value.\*

There are two causes which give rise to an economic surplus, in as far as it comes from an unequal distribution, one of which is subjective, and the other objective. The objective cause lies in the differences in the return obtained from various instruments of production used by men, and of these differences, the differences in land forms the best and clearest example. The subjective cause lies in the difference in the urgency of wants that different classes of laborers supply.

To illustrate my meaning here will require more space than

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\* See the writer's "Stability of Prices," Sections 4 and 5.

that showing the objective cause, because it is not so fully understood. Our wants vary greatly in intensity; some objects being necessities are, for personal consumption, valued much more highly than others that are merely comforts or luxuries. Besides this, the first part of any commodity supplied to us is estimated much more highly than any subsequent part.\* As our wants become more fully supplied, the pleasure we derive from the commodity gradually decreases until we no longer derive any pleasure from its consumption. As an outcome of this law of consumption, the increased production of any article always leads to the lowering of its price, and those who produce for an overstocked market must always sell their goods at a continually lowering price. Kansas farmers, for example, get a low price for their wheat, because the additional supply which they bring upon the overstocked market must be used to supply those wants which are less intense than a more limited amount of wheat would supply, and so long as our wants are quite fully supplied, the price of wheat will be so low that many farmers can scarcely make a living.

As a result of the division of labor society is divided into two parts,—men with economic instincts and those who lack these instincts. Those who save or have faculties needed to organize our great industries become capitalists and employers, while the laboring classes having their industrial qualities less fully developed must follow manual occupations. The laboring classes are thus in a highly developed social organism dependent upon the higher classes. They get work, not by the direct utilization of natural forces, as is the case in a simpler social organism, but by supplying the wants of the higher classes. With every increase in population a greater economy of labor and natural forces must be made, in order to supply the increased demand for food and other commodities, and, as a result, the laborers become more dependent upon the higher classes, who have the industrial

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\* See the article by Professor Böhm-Bawerk in vol. i., No. 3, of the "Annals of the American Academy."

qualities needed to increase production as rapidly as population increases. A growing nation can continue progressive only by placing its industries more completely under the control of the intelligent classes, yet out of this increased control grow the evils of distribution. The laborers now get their living, not as before direct from nature, but by supplying the wants of the higher classes. In any society where the laborers are increasing more rapidly than the employing classes, the additional laborers get work only by supplying the less intense wants of the higher classes who control and organize industrial forces. There will thus be a constant tendency towards a lower rate of wages, because some of the laborers will be engaged in producing articles which supply wants of the higher classes of so little value to them that only a low rate of wages can be paid. No one will give more for an article than the pleasure he gets from it, and wages must fall when the public are so well supplied with commodities that the consumption of quantities will give them but little pleasure.\*

An increase in the number of laborers, therefore, in any occupation, tends to lower the wages of laborers, because these additional laborers bring upon the market an additional supply of goods, which must be used to supply the wants of consumers less intense than the wants supplied by the previous laborers who are producing the same commodities. Suppose, for example, an additional one hundred men should wish to get work of an employer, who already had one hundred men and one hundred thousand dollars capital. He must now save another one hundred thousand dollars in order to employ them. With the return which he obtained from the first one hundred thousand dollars he saved he supplied his most intense wants, and if he is to employ and save another hundred thousand dollars, he would only do it to supply his less intense wants,—such as are not already supplied. He will not supply these less intense wants unless the men will work for less wages. The additional one hundred

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\* Compare with chapter viii. in the writer's "Economic Basis of Protection."



men, therefore, will be compelled to work for lower wages, and as these laborers are working for lower wages, the wages of the first one hundred men will also be reduced by a like amount. Competition brings all wages down to a level.

The present evils of distribution come thus from two distinct sources and not from one as Mr. George supposes. The man without land is usually the man without economic instincts, and in this way the two phases of the problem are really united in one, yet we do wrong to so confuse the two sources of unequal distribution of wealth, in a way that would make it appear that all of our present evils come from one cause. Unless these causes are counteracted by other tendencies, with every increase of that part of population with undeveloped economic instincts, a greater part of the whole agricultural production goes into the hands of the landed classes. In working also for their employers having capital and intelligence, the new laborers will supply the less urgent wants of these employers, and thus they must work for less to get the higher classes to save the additional capital and to use the additional intelligence needed to manage larger and more complicated businesses. The surplus value, or as it is often called the unearned increment, is due to the combination of these two causes, and it increases when there is an increase of differences in men and in land. Make the differences between the higher and lower classes in society greater than they now are, and the surplus will grow; make the differences in the fertility of land greater than they now are, and for this reason also the surplus will grow.

It must not, however, be inferred that the whole surplus is greater because it comes from two sources than if it comes from one. The social conditions that increase the one, decrease the other. Differences in land are prominent in the early stages of social development when differences in men are small. The gradual increase in intelligence reduces the differences in land by making poor land better land, but at the same time through the more rapid progress of the higher classes differences in men increase. The two causes acting at

the same time do not make matters worse. The changes in their relative importance merely changes the direction of the distribution of the surplus. It is, therefore, a popular error to suppose that the rent of land absorbs the whole of this surplus. According to the Ricardian theory of distribution, this would be so, but this theory gives an undue emphasis to land as an economic factor. It regards all the produce as being distributed into interest, wages, or rent, and hence as interest and wages are kept down by competition, it is argued that all of the surplus will go to the landlords as rent. The surplus, however, may be absorbed in many ways, of which I shall mention a few. Our railroads are now getting a large share of this surplus. As the owners of farms are separated from the market of their produce by long distances, they must make use of our railroad system to transport their grain. Any increase in the rates of transportation, therefore, will act as a reduction of rent, and if the railroad system of our country has its stock largely watered, it will reduce the value and rent of lands, and in this way a large portion of the surplus will go to the owners of railroads, rather than to the owners of land.

The same general reasoning will show that trusts take their profits from this surplus. If the price of the articles which farmers buy is raised through a combination of the producers of these articles, there will be correspondingly lower profits upon farms, and as a result, lower rents. Every trust, or combination, therefore, tends to transfer a considerable share of the surplus or unearned increment from the owners of land to the owners of other monopolies.

In addition to this we have another portion absorbed by the waste of trade, especially in the retail trade. Retail prices are much further separated from wholesale prices than they were in former times. We cannot here enter into a detailed discussion of the causes of this change, but from our previous reasoning it is plain that if retail prices rise or the waste of trade is increased, a portion of the surplus is absorbed in this way, and that the whole amount going to other classes is reduced to a like amount. The increase of taxation acts in a

like manner.\* The government thus secures a share of the increase of productive power of the nation, which goes to increase the surplus so long as the social conditions are such that competition tends to keep wages at a minimum. I call attention to these different forms the surplus may take because of the theory of Mr. George, which supposes that we can secure all the surplus if we would only seize the rent of land. We might in this way get only a small portion of it. The rent of agricultural land seems to decrease, relatively at least, with the advance in civilization, and hence a larger portion of the surplus is absorbed in other ways.

I have used the term surplus so as to avoid a statement that would lead to the wrong inference, that the landlords as a class get all the other classes lose. I have stated as clearly as possible the tendency through which wages are kept at a minimum, so that we can clearly see where the moral problem lies, and also that we may have a hypothetical case in which this problem is isolated from the other problems. I do not mean, however, to assert that these tendencies act unimpeded, and that the results are as detrimental to society as these premises alone would indicate. On the contrary, I regard the conclusions of Mr. George, and others who reason as he does, as being very defective. There are many opposing tendencies which keep by far the greater part of the increase of produce from going out of the hands of the workmen. While these opposing tendencies prevent the situation from being as bad as Mr. George represents, yet they are not strong enough to prevent the growth of that surplus which creates a moral problem demanding solution.

If no surplus goes to the monopolies or to privileged classes, then there is no ethical problem involved, in land tenures. If some of it goes in this way, then the ethical problem is the same as if all of the produce of industry above a minimum of wages went to increase the surplus. To measure the amount of the surplus is an economic problem that does not concern us at present. We want merely to discover

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\* See the writer's "Principles of Rational Taxation."

the ethical principle upon which we should act, when economic causes to any degree create a surplus and lower the wages of the less fortunate parts of society, who lack the intelligence and perhaps the power to utilize the natural forces about them.

#### THE ETHICAL PRINCIPLE.

We now have the economic facts that lie at the basis of the ethical problem of land-tenures. What ethical principles should we accept to bring our actions into harmony with the moral law? The first principle that we must face is involved in the doctrine advocated by Professor Clark, that each workman under a perfect competitive law gets what he produces, and thus that the ethical standard of wages is the standard that society tends to realize in fact. He measures the earnings of each man by what society would lose, if he were to stop working and continue eating. This amount gauges his value and tends under natural law to gauge his pay.\*

At first glance this doctrine seems just, yet it will not stand a careful analysis. Beneath the surface lie hidden certain economic facts, to which we have already called attention, and when their bearing is seen, the ethical correctness of this doctrine is at least an open question.

To illustrate, suppose that the land of a country was of four grades, and that upon the best land each workman could raise 400 bushels of wheat; on the second class 375 bushels; on the third class 350 bushels; while on the poorest land only 325 bushels could be obtained for a year's work. So long as only the best land was in use, each laborer would get all he produced, 400 bushels; but as soon as the second class of land is brought into use, the laborer on the best land no longer gets all he produces. He is paid only the value of 375 bushels, the amount earned by each laborer on the second grade of land. Now a laborer is worth to society the value of 375 bushels of wheat, and where the third grade of land comes into use the value of a laborer sinks to that of 350

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\* See Professor Clark's article on the "Law of Wages and Interest," in the "Annals of the American Academy," vol. i., No. 1.

bushels, and finally when the poorest land comes into use, the labor of a workman is worth to society no more than 325 bushels of wheat. Upon this plan of estimating the value of a workman to society, his value depends not on the value of what he creates, but on what is created by the least efficient workman with whom he has to compete. Nor are the workmen as a class valued at what they as a class add to the wealth of society. While four workmen—one on each grade of land—produce 1450 bushels, they get but 1300 bushels. Surely this method does not give to each man his whole product. These laborers take 1300 bushels from the social store, but would any one say that they put only this amount in it? Or to put the case in another way, some one takes out the 150 bushels that the laborers do not get, and what has he put in the social store to make an equivalent for it?

When the second grade of land is brought into cultivation, and the laborer on the best land finds he no longer gets the 400 bushels to which he was formerly entitled, has he not a moral right to complain that the burden arising from a social change is put entirely upon his shoulders, which society ought to distribute among all its members? Society has grown, and from this growth there follow certain advantages and certain disadvantages. In the advantages he does not share, or at most to a less degree than the other classes, while he is made to bear the disadvantage that the use of less productive land brings.

The defect of the reasoning of Professor Clark comes from overlooking one of the two agents by which wealth is created. If all wealth was produced by labor alone, then the value of a workman to society would be a just measure of the claim that each workman has upon the wealth that society has to distribute. But nature helps in the production of wealth as well as man, and at the end of each productive period society has to distribute the wealth produced by men, plus the wealth produced by nature. To illustrate, in the case of land, the poorest land means the land where nature does the least to aid man to produce food. The

measure of the differences in soil is the difference in the aid of nature in production. If on the poorest land a man can raise 325 bushels of wheat, while on the best he can raise 400 bushels, the aid of nature on the best land is greater than that given to the poorest land by the equivalent of 75 bushels. In our former illustration the four men aided by nature produced 1450 bushels of wheat, of which 150 bushels is due to the greater aid that nature gave on the better land. And if society measured the value of each man by what that man produces who is aided the least by nature,—the economic measure of value of workmen,—then there is a surplus in the social storehouse equal to the greater aid that nature gives to all the better land and other productive agents. The difference between the better coal and iron mines, water-powers, and other natural resources, and the poorest of these in use, is due to nature, and a value equal to the sum of them all would remain in the social store after the just claims of all workers are settled, if we are to decide that the claims of each workman are equal to what society would lose if he stopped working and continued eating.

In short, it seems to me that the doctrine of Professor Clark, if carried out logically, would deny that the laborers have any right to share in the natural resources of the country.\* With every increase of the number of workmen, some of them work under conditions where they get less aid from nature, and if the value of each man is fixed by what society would lose if he ceased to work, then the value of all the laborers is equal to what they could produce, if all of them worked on as poor land or with as poor instruments of production as the few laborers use that are at the margin of cultivation. All the increase of wealth due to fertile fields or productive mines would be taken gradually from workmen with the growth of population, and given to more favored persons whose shares are not reduced by the use of poorer land. These privileged classes would then enjoy all the

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\* See the writer's "Economic Basis of Protection," chap. vii.

advantages due to better natural resources or to more productive instruments of other kinds. When it is said that the workingman under these conditions gets all he is worth to society, the term "society," if analyzed, means only the more favored classes who are contrasted with the workmen. They pay each laborer only the utility of the last laborer to them, and get the whole produce of the nation minus this amount.

After each producer has obtained from the social store a value equal to what he has produced, according to the standard of Professor Clark, the store would not be empty. It would still contain the wealth due to superior natural resources and to superior productive instruments. We thus have a surplus that society must in some way dispose of. To whom it shall go depends upon the laws and usages of each nation. Our present laws allow a large part of it to go to the owners of natural resources. This disposition I believe to be a wise one,—not that it gives ideal justice, but because it gives greater prosperity and security than any other disposition would give. Rent is obtained by owners of land, not as a right based on economic considerations, but as a premium given by society to secure progress out of a fund to which its claim is superior to that of any individual.

While the good of the whole society must rank higher than that of classes or of individuals, yet it is morally wrong to overlook or disguise the injury to the few that is bound up in the welfare of the many. The growth of society in wealth and numbers is the best indication of prosperity, but this increase of wealth and numbers often makes the man without wealth and land less productive, because he must use poorer land or less productive instruments. His share of the common stock is thus reduced to the advantage of those who have better land or other natural resources. He perhaps gets all he is "worth" to society, but he certainly gets but little of the increase of wealth due to the aid of nature or to superior instruments of production.

In a case of this kind I take it that our moral instincts, if not clouded by other considerations, would recognize the

right of the workman to compensation, and as he has lost through social changes that add to the wealth and prosperity of society, he should look to society and not to individuals for a remedy. His loss is not a robbery by individuals. There is no particular field to which he has a special claim. He has lost nothing that he could properly seize wherever he finds it, as he could in the case of a theft. To what bushel of grain or pound of cotton or iron has he a legal or moral right superior to the present possessor? His loss is not of that kind. It is due to social changes, and society and not individuals should right his wrongs.

So much, it seems to me, is due to those who have lost through those industrial changes that have brought social progress, and nothing short of a full recompense will give complete justice; yet in giving justice society has certain rights that must not be lost sight of. While society must return the value to the injured classes, it can justly choose the concrete form in which the return shall be made. His right is to a given value, a certain quantity of wealth, but not to specific goods. The claim rests on a loss of general well-being, and not on a loss of money or of particular commodities. Society should put the claimant on a par with his former condition of prosperity, but it can assume what part of his former expenses it will, or it can improve his productive power, so as to allow him to increase his income to his former figure. If a laborer loses twenty dollars a year by a social change, he is restored to his former condition, if the state pays twenty dollars of his school bills, or if it improves his sanitary condition so that he pays less doctor bills to that amount. He would also be put on his former footing, if the streets were improved so that he could live in places with lower rent, or if the cost of transportation was reduced so that he could get his food and fuel more cheaply.

In short, the state may settle the claims against it that arise from evils connected with industrial changes by any of the hundred ways at its command, and it has the right to decide which way it will take. The principle I wish to bring out may be stated thus: *if social changes take from the laborer*



*by making him worth less to society, state activity should be increased enough to compensate him.* Through the activity of the state and that of the individual the latter must have his wants as well supplied as before the change. The direction of the state activity, however, must be controlled by the general welfare of society, and not be determined by the will of those classes for whose benefit the state is acting.

After the state has settled its accounts with those who have lost through the changes due to social progress, it must look to the holders of the unearned increment, and to those who have special gains from other sources, for funds to pay these claims against it. The expense of the increased state activity through which the injured classes are to be restored to their former condition should be borne by those who have profited from the prosperity of society. The position of the state in this matter is similar to that of a city in a suit for damage because of a defective sidewalk. The injured citizen has no action against the owner of the adjacent property, whose duty it was to keep the sidewalk in repair. He must sue the city, and then the city must look for compensation to the owner of the property. The state has always made use of the right to put special taxes on those who have special advantages, and it would only be a further extension of a well-organized principle, if the cost of improving the condition of the lower classes was placed upon those whose incomes grow because of social progress.

While I admit the justice of a more extended use of this principle, yet, in its application, we should proceed with extreme caution, because so many other elements come in to complicate the solution. The need of making special assessments upon those who gain most by the progress of society depends upon the incidence of taxation. We must first know who will bear a tax before we discuss who ought to bear it. A full discussion of this complicated subject would carry us back into the field of economics and away from the purpose of this essay. It is, however, a crude economic theory that asserts that all taxes on commodities fall upon laborers, and that there is no way of reaching the unearned increment but

by direct taxes on land. To tax the sources from which the unearned income arises may have the same effect as to tax the land itself. If all the benefit of improved production goes to landlords, it would seem that the state, by taking in any form a part of these results of improved productions, would reduce the share of the landlords and not that of the other classes. Be this as it may, it serves to illustrate the difficulties of a solution, and why economists cannot accept so simple a theory of taxation, as Mr. George and his friends would have them do.

The discussion of land-tenure involves two classes of problems,—the economic and the moral. The moral principle is simple, and the confusion we find comes solely from a commingling of economic and moral data. Get the economic data once clearly before a person, and his ethical judgment would be quickly made. The economic data, however, are difficult and complicated, and no discussion upon them is worthy of attention that is not the result of careful study. The trouble in the discussion comes from crude economic theories, through which the economic principles are made to seem as simple as the ethical principles really are.

It is not difficult to see that there is a surplus or unearned increment. It is still more easy to see that those who lose by social changes accompanying progress deserve a compensation. But when we seek to discover how this surplus is distributed and who enjoy it, or how taxes can be levied so as to fall upon the holders of this surplus, we strike a difficult problem.

The present evils from which the lower classes suffer are not due to land-tenures, but to the passive policy of the state through which these classes have been neglected. Had the state done its duty in elevating those classes deficient in industrial qualities, there would have been no bad results from the free sale of land. We want a low price of food and not a large public revenue from land. When our farmers become more intelligent and our laborers better consumers, its price will be so low that the unearned increment will be unworthy of notice, and no one will care to disturb land-tenures to secure so small a sum.

The knowledge of a surplus and the acknowledgment of the right of laborers to compensation for the evils from which they suffer, do not, therefore, involve any reversal of the present policy of the state either as to the lines of its activity or of taxation. State activity must, however, be extended to new fields and made more efficient within its present limits. We must also become more conscientious in fulfilling our duties to the lower classes, and more earnest in our endeavor to make their lives worth living. It should also make us more willing to bear our share of the burden of taxation that must accompany any earnest effort for social reform. With the increase of our knowledge of the incidence of taxation, we can place its burden more completely upon those who profit by the increase of rent and other forms of unearned revenue; yet we must wait for the development of sound economic doctrine before taking many steps in this direction. By acting on crude economic theories we would probably check the progress of society, and especially of the working classes, more than we should by raising taxes according to our present methods.

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## MORAL TALES.

OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, in a recent number of his talks "Over the Tea-cups," quotes the words of Rogers, the poet: "When I hear a new book talked about or have it pressed upon me, I read an old one." Some such tendency to resist the interference of the outside world with our literary studies must have been experienced by many of us and perhaps of late years more especially. Mr. Gladstone cautions us all against the errors of "Robert Elsmere," and straightway we are implored on all sides to read the book. Cardinal Manning and the Archbishop of Canterbury appeal to us in the railway station advertisements to read "Looking Backward." A few

months ago, "In Darkest Africa" was *the* book of all others; and now we are given a week to read, mark, learn, inwardly digest, and promise subscriptions to General Booth's scheme for rescuing the submerged tenth. Book after book, on the most difficult social problems, is thrust upon us, carelessly written, lightly read, ignorantly discussed. Like the Athenians of old, we are expected to spend our time in nothing else, but either to tell or to hear some new thing. In sheer self-defence against the encroachments upon our time and peace by this "stormy people, sad and ever untrew," we entrench ourselves in our libraries and surround ourselves with the books which have slowly and gradually conquered our affections and reason, and have stood the test of generations. No momentary wave of sentiment gives them a false value, no sense of duty either to Mrs. Grundy or the masses compels us to look through them; they are friends to whom we have grown attached unconsciously, and whose wisdom and force and helpfulness we have never appreciated, at their full value, until contrasted with the noisy pretentiousness of the new acquaintances thrust upon us.

Now that the Roman Catholic and English churches, our Ethical Societies and our agitators are teaching us all that our spiritual life is dependent on our material surroundings, that food and clothing and physical well-being are necessary for our soul's redemption, that the well-nurtured slave is a higher being than the hungry freeman, that liberty must be surrendered for social comfort, it may not be unprofitable to take a glance at the old ideals which moved our grandfathers and grandmothers in the eighteenth century; which broke down the barriers between class and class, which established the independence of America, which wrought the French Revolution and made it an agent for good, instead of the destruction of France, which secured the abolition of slavery and won for us religious toleration. We are turning aside from the old paths, and it is only becoming that we should take an affectionate farewell of our mistaken forefathers who valued so highly the freedom we prize so little.

In looking back at the ethics of the eighteenth century, I

have no intention of unearthing any learned literature on morals or philosophy. All that I propose to do is to pass in review those books which, read in childhood, have left an indelible impression on my mind; and those who do not sympathize with me in my rebellion against the spirit of the decade, may, nevertheless, not be unwilling to consider with me the effect produced on children by moral tales or stories with a purpose.

A theory prevails that children dislike stories with a moral, written with the direct purpose of improving them; both children and grown-up people maintain this proposition. And yet, paradoxical as it may seem, children's verbal evidence is of little worth in deciding the question. Children dislike stories which they know are meant to do them good; that is to say, a child dislikes a story which is given him to read in order that he personally may be improved. We are most of us willing to acknowledge ourselves miserable sinners in general, but we are inclined to resent a particular application of our confession. Children are quick to recognize their weak and wicked selves in fiction and to absorb the moral teaching of a story, if they are left to themselves, but indignation and contempt are aroused when the resemblance is found for them and the moral pointed out by others. In this they are only like their elders. How many readers of "Romola" have followed the course of Tito's career with a sympathetic terror, which at least has warned them against themselves, who would yet have sacrificed truth and honor, rather than that others should see in them the taint which makes them recognize in Tito a coward and a brother. Let the moral be true and it will be accepted. Children are intensely interested in conduct and especially awake to all that affects their relations with their elders. But they demand truth. The people in their fiction must be real people, not puppets. The good little girl who dies young and goes to Heaven is suffered to depart without a pang or any desire to follow. Moral precepts which apply to children only, and which have evidently no weight with their elders, are either skipped or derided. The author who writes down to them is despised and rejected;

but the writers who can meet them without condescension, and, while confining themselves to subjects within a child's comprehension or experience, will yet speak to them with the honesty and justice due from one rational being to another, may have as many moral purposes as they like. Few children's books survive for any length of time, which have not the stamp of sincerity upon them, and which do not also, so far as their moral argument is concerned, appeal as much to the old as to the young. I do not assert that children like these books, or that their artistic taste is not frequently disgusted with the inartistic setting of the moral; but I do venture to say that they are found to read such books over and over again, and to reflect on them, and that, either consciously or unconsciously, they are attracted by the *moral* aspect of the stories, and only repelled by the unnaturalness of the people chosen to illustrate them. A good example of this may be found in looking through Mrs. Trimmer's tales. Most of these tales, her "Stories of Good and Bad Girls," in the "Charity-School Spelling Book," her "Instructive Tales," her "Exemplary Story of the Two Farmers," all written for the benefit and improvement of the lower classes, and generally appealing to the hope of Heaven and the fear of hell as effective motives, are all forgotten, popular as they were in their day. But one of her books is still a favorite with those children who come across it in their grandmother's book-shelves. "History of the Robins" was written to make children realize that birds and insects, tabbies and terriers, have feelings as well as themselves. Mrs. Trimmer's object was therefore to make her robins as much like real boys and girls as she possibly could, in order to attract the sympathy of her young readers; "a fellow-feeling makes us wondrous kind." And another not uninteresting fact about the story is that as Mrs. Trimmer did not believe in a future life for birds, the robins are brought up on strictly ethical lines. The robins were not hatched sinful through the fall of Adam and Eve and they had no prospect of Heaven; all the cobwebs of sectarian religion are swept away and we have a morality having its origin in human nature. Over and over again we find

that the moral tale survives and the sectarian religious tale is forgotten.

The most important tendency of the last century was that which aimed at the recognition of the dignity of man. It would not be correct to say that consciously this tendency was towards democracy, if by that we mean government by the people. It displayed itself in England rather in protests against the interference of government with the liberty of the demos. Adam Smith's "*Wealth of Nations*," to any one who has ears to hear, is resonant with sympathy for the working classes. If by socialism we mean state interference, England has always been a socialistic country. In the days of Adam Smith it was a socialist oligarchy, which nothing could have overthrown, but the sturdy, bracing individualism, which, curiously enough, received the breath of life anew from Jean Jacques Rousseau. The equality of all men in the sight of God, the universal brotherhood of man, once accepted as a faith, seemed to our eighteenth century reformers to demand as a consequence the freedom of the individual, the recognition of the rights of man. This individualism, this respect for man, gradually but effectively, with little material revolution but with a considerable spiritual evolution, has removed the socialism of an oligarchy, and has cleared the way for what is evidently going to be a socialist democracy. That is a purgatory through which the demos must pass.

This democratic individualism shows itself in all the moral tales which have lived, but most of all in that well-known book, "*Sandford and Merton*" by Thomas Day, the forerunner of Maria Edgeworth. Day was deeply impressed by the writings of Rousseau. Locke had done much in England to set people thinking about education, and Rousseau's most practical ideas were derived from Locke. The essence of Rousseau's teaching has been well expressed by John Morley. "*Emilius*," he says, "was the first expression of that democratic tendency in education, which political and other circumstances gradually made general alike in England, France, and Germany; a tendency, that is, to look on education as a process concerning others besides the rich and the

well-born. As has often been remarked, Ascham, Miller, Locke, Fénelon, busy themselves about the education of young gentlemen and gentlewomen. The rest of the world are supposed to be sufficiently provided for by the education of circumstance. Rousseau enforced the production of a natural self-sufficing man as the object of education, and showed, or did his best to show, the capacity of the young for that simple and natural cultivation. This easily and directly led people to reflect that such a capacity was not confined to the children of the rich, nor the hope of producing a natural and self-sufficing man, narrowed to those who had every external motive placed around them for being neither natural nor self-sufficing. The training of the young soul to virtue was surrounded with something of the awful holiness of a sacrament; and those who labored in this sanctified field were exhorted to a constancy of devotion and were promised a fullness of recompense, that raised them from the rank of drudges to a place of highest honor among the ministers of nature."

What was nothing more than an ideal to Rousseau, was real to Thomas Day. "Sandford and Merton" expressed Day's deepest convictions on some of the most serious problems which men are ever called upon to solve. And in this fact lay the power of the book, which, written for the child, appealed to the man. The style is stilted, the workmanship inartistic, but the absolute sincerity of the writer and the truth of his convictions make the book a great one.

Many may only be acquainted with it through Mr. Burmand's parody. There must be vitality in a book which it is worth while to caricature a century after its publication. More than that. He is a great man who can be sublime even when glaringly ridiculous. The original "Sandford and Merton" is infinitely more funny and unconsciously absurd than any skit published upon it. To caricature Sandford and Merton is to "gild refined gold, to paint the lily;" in short, "is wasteful and ridiculous excess." Mark Twain's version of the story of the Ill-Natured Boy is a just criticism of the moral stories introduced by Day in the course of his book. Day's characters in these stories and his facts were invented



to prove his case and are untrue to nature. Harry Sandford is an objectionable little prig, and his smile must have been more irritating than even the university smile to which Mr. Rudyard Kipling has recently referred. Tommy Merton's confessions are couched in language too deliciously absurd for any professional humorist to hope to surpass him. And yet the book was a force in its day and long afterwards, and interests children still, unless they have been spoilt by listening to the literary criticism of their elders. The interest will be found to centre itself on Mr. Barlow's treatment of Tommy Merton and the arguments between the two. Thomas Day had a prejudice in favor of the poor, which considerably biased his statements of fact, and his arguments are directed against the rich, but the creed which had been given him by Rousseau was one which could be preached to rich and poor alike. The freeman must be superior to circumstances. The rich were to be shown that riches were often a greater curse than what was called poverty. And in "Sandford and Merton," and in many other moral tales of the eighteenth century, we find that the pity for the poor expressed by children of the rich is treated in the abstract as ill-founded and closely akin to contempt, arising not so much from sympathy as from an ignorance of what it is that makes life worth living. I must content myself with but two instances of Tommy's democratic training.

#### THE FIRST DAY AT MR. BARLOW'S.

The day after Tommy came to Mr. Barlow's, the good clergyman took his two pupils into the garden, as soon as breakfast was over, and taking a spade into his own hand, and giving Harry a hoe, they both began to work with great eagerness. "Everybody that eats," said Mr. Barlow, "ought to assist in procuring food; and therefore little Harry and I begin our daily work. This is my bed, and that is his; we work every day, and he that raises the most will deserve to fare the best. Now, Tommy, if you choose to join us, I will mark you out at once a piece of ground, which you shall have to yourself, and all the produce shall be your own." "No, indeed," said Tommy very sulkily, "I am a gentleman, and don't choose to slave like a ploughboy." "Just as you please, Mr. Gentleman," said Mr. Barlow; "but Harry and I, who are not above being useful, will attend to our work."

In about two hours, Mr. Barlow said it was time to leave off. He took Harry by the hand, and led him into a very pleasant summer-house, where they

sat down; and Mr. Barlow, taking out a plate of very fine ripe cherries, divided them between Harry and himself.

Tommy had followed, expecting to receive his share. When he saw them both eating without taking any notice of him, he could no longer restrain his passion, but burst into a violent fit of sobbing and crying.

"What is the matter?" asked Mr. Barlow, very coolly. Tommy looked at him very sulkily, but returned no answer. "Oh, sir! if you don't choose to give me an answer, you may be silent; nobody is obliged to speak here." Tommy became more disconcerted at this; and unable to conceal his anger, he ran out of the summer-house, and wandered very disconsolately about the garden, surprised and vexed to find himself in a place where nobody felt any concern whether he was pleased or not. . . .

Mr. Barlow and Harry went to dinner. Tommy, who had been skulking about all day, uneasy and very much mortified, now came in, and, being very hungry, was going to sit down to the table with the others; but Mr. Barlow stopped him and said, "No, sir; though you are too much of a gentleman to work, we, who are not so proud, do not choose to work for the idle." Upon this Tommy retired into a corner, crying as if his heart would break, but more from grief than passion, as he began to perceive that nobody minded his ill-temper.

But little Harry, who could not bear to see his friend so unhappy, looked up half crying in Mr. Barlow's face and said, "Pray, sir, may I do as I please with my dinner?" "Yes, to be sure, my boy," answered Mr. Barlow. "Why, then," said Harry, getting up, "I will give it to poor Tommy, who wants it more than I do." Saying this, he gave it to his friend as he sat in the corner; and Tommy took it, and thanked him, without ever turning his eyes from the ground. "I see," said Mr. Barlow, "that though certain gentlemen are too proud to be of any use themselves, they are not above taking the bread that other people have been working hard for." At this, Tommy cried still more bitterly than before.

The next day, Mr. Barlow and Harry again went to work; but they had scarcely begun, when Tommy came to them, and begged that he might have a hoe, too. Mr. Barlow gave him one; but as he had never before learned to handle such an implement, he was very awkward in the use of it, and hit himself several strokes upon the legs. Mr. Barlow then laid down his own spade, and showed him how to hold and use the hoe; and, in a short time, Tommy became very expert, and worked with the greatest pleasure. When their task was done, they all three retired to the summer-house; and Tommy felt the greatest joy imaginable when the fruit was produced, and he was invited to take his share. It seemed to him the most delicious fruit he had ever tasted, because working in the air had given him an appetite.

#### A CONVERSATION ON SLAVES.

"But pray, sir," said Harry, "tell me, why does one man behave so cruelly to another, and why should one person be the servant of another, and bear so much ill-treatment?"

"As to that," said Tommy, "some folks are born gentlemen, and then they must command others, and some are born servants, and then they must do as they

are bid. I remember, before I came hither, there were a great many black men and women, and my mother said they were only born to wait upon me; and I used to beat them, and kick them, and throw things at them, whenever I was angry; and they never dared strike me again, because they were slaves."

"And pray, young gentleman," said Mr. Barlow, "how came these people to be slaves?"

Tommy.—Because my father bought them with his money. Mr. Barlow.—So these people who are bought with money are slaves, are they? T.—Yes. Mr. B.—And those who buy them have a right to kick them and beat them, and do as they please with them? T.—Yes. Mr. B.—Then if I were to sell you to Farmer Sandford, he would have a right to do what he pleased with you? No, sir, said Tommy, somewhat warmly; you would have no right to sell me nor he to buy me. Mr. B.—Then it is not a person's being bought or sold that gives another a right to use him ill; but one person's having a right to sell another, and the man who buys having a right to purchase? T.—Yes, sir. Mr. B.—And what right have the people who sold the poor negroes to your father, to sell them, or what right has your father to buy them? Here Tommy seemed to be a good deal puzzled; but at length he said, "They are brought from a country that is a great way off, in ships, and so they become slaves." "Then," said Mr. Barlow, "if I take you to another country, in a ship, I shall have a right to sell you?" T.—No, but you won't, sir, because I was born a gentleman. Mr. B.—What do you mean by that, Tommy? "Why," said Tommy, a little confused, "it is to have a fine house, and fine clothes, and a coach, and a great deal of money, as my papa has." Mr. B.—Then if you were no longer to have a fine house, nor fine clothes, nor a great deal of money, somebody that had all these things might make you a slave, and use you ill, and beat you, and insult you, and do whatever he liked with you? T.—No, sir, that would not be right either, that anybody should use me ill. Mr. B.—Then one person should not use another ill? T.—No, sir. Mr. B.—To make a slave of anybody, is to use him ill, is it not? T.—I think so. Mr. B.—Then no one ought to make a slave of you? T.—No, indeed, sir. Mr. B.—But if no one should use another ill, and making a slave is using him ill, neither ought you to make a slave of any one else. T.—Indeed, sir, I think not; and, for the future, I never will use our black William ill; nor pinch him, nor kick him, as I used to do. Mr. B.—Then you will do very wisely.

Both the lessons would go home to a child, and both are so severe that most children would prefer to learn them at second hand than to have them administered directly in personal experience. Even against their will they absorb the teaching, for that which is rational abides with us if *we* are rational, whether we like it or not. I have little hesitation, extravagant as the assertion may seem, in saying that "Sandford and Merton" paved the way for the Reform Bill of 1832, and for the abolition of slavery.

Children of seven or eight seem often better able to understand the spirit in which an old book was written, than older people who read the book with preconceived ideas. The old-fashioned style, too, is no hinderance to the child, to whom all styles are new. Many of the lessons in these moral tales would, by grown-up people nowadays, reading them for the first time, be supposed to aim at convincing the rich that the poor were quite as happy as themselves, and therefore needed no pity or assistance from them. Take, for instance, the story of the little philosopher in "Evenings at Home."

### THE LITTLE PHILOSOPHER.

Mr. L. was one morning riding by himself, when, dismounting to gather a plant in the hedge, his horse got loose and galloped away before him. He followed, calling the horse by his name, which stopped, but on his approach set off again. At length a little boy in a neighboring field, seeing the affair, ran across where the road made a turn, and getting before the horse, took him by the bridle, and held him till his owner came up. Mr. L. looked at the boy, and admired his ruddy, cheerful countenance. Thank you, my good lad! (said he), you have caught my horse very cleverly. What shall I give you for your trouble? (putting his hand into his pocket.) I want nothing, sir, said the boy. Mr. L.—Don't you? So much the better for you. Few men can say as much. But, pray, what were you doing in the field? B.—I was rooting up weeds, and tending the sheep that are feeding on the turnips. Mr. L.—And do you like this employment? B.—Yes, very well, this fine weather. Mr. L.—But had you not rather play? B.—This is not hard work; it is almost as good as play. Mr. L.—Who set you to work? B.—My daddy, sir? Mr. L.—Where does he live? B.—Just by, among the trees there. Mr. L.—What is his name? B.—Thomas Hurdle. Mr. L.—And what is yours? B.—Peter, sir. Mr. L.—How old are you? B.—I shall be eight at Michaelmas. Mr. L.—How long have you been out in this field? B.—Ever since six in the morning. Mr. L.—And are you not hungry? B.—Yes,—I shall go to my dinner soon. Mr. L.—If you had sixpence now, what would you do with it? B.—I don't know. I never had so much in my life. Mr. L.—Have you no playthings? B.—Playthings? What are those? Mr. L.—Such as balls, nine-pins, marbles, tops, and wooden-horses. B.—No, sir; but our Tom makes foot-balls to kick in the cold weather, and we set traps for birds, and then I have a jumping-pole and a pair of stilts to walk through the dirt with; and I have a hoop, but it is broke. Mr. L.—And do you want nothing else? B.—No. I have hardly time for these; for I always ride the horses to field, and bring up the cows, and run to the town of errands, and that is as good as play, you know. Mr. L.—Well, but you could buy apples or gingerbread at the town, I suppose, if you had money? B.—Oh, I can get apples at home; and as for gingerbread, I don't mind it much, for my mammy gives me a pie now and then, and that is as good. Mr. L.—Would you

not like a knife to cut sticks? B.—I have one,—here it is,—brother Tom gave it me. Mr. L.—Your shoes are full of holes,—don't you want a better pair? B.—I have a better pair for Sundays. Mr. L.—But these let in water. B.—Oh, I don't care for that. Mr. L.—Your hat is all torn, too. B.—I have a better at home, but I had as lieve have none at all, for it hurts my head. Mr. L.—What do you do when it rains? B.—If it rains very hard, I get under the hedge till it is over. Mr. L.—What do you do when you are hungry before it is time to go home? B.—I sometimes eat a raw turnip. Mr. L.—But if there are none? B.—Then I do as well as I can; I work on and never think of it. Mr. L.—Are you not dry sometimes, this hot weather? B.—Yes, but there is water enough. Mr. L.—Why, my little fellow, you are quite a philosopher. B.—Sir? Mr. L.—I say, you are a philosopher, but I am sure you do not know what that means. B.—No, sir,—no home, I hope. Mr. L.—No, no! (*laughing.*) Well, my boy, you seem to want nothing at all, so I shall not give you money to make you want anything. But were you ever at school? B.—No, sir, but daddy says I shall go after harvest. Mr. L.—You will want books then. B.—Yes, the boys have all a spelling-book and a Testament. Mr. L.—Well, then, I will give you them,—tell your daddy so, and that it is because I thought you a very good contented little boy. So now go to your sheep again. B.—I will, sir, thank you. Mr. L.—Good-bye, Peter. B.—Good-bye, sir.

The moral really drawn by a child is not that the working classes should be content with their lot, but that he himself should be ashamed of his discontent with his.

There are many reasons why women should be more susceptible to class distinctions than men, and none of our great women writers have been levellers. I need but refer to the novels of Jane Austen, Charlotte Brontë, Mrs. Gaskell, and George Eliot in proof of this proposition. Maria Edgeworth was no exception to the rule. Her theories on the education of girls corresponded closely with those expressed by Mrs. Barbauld in a dialogue in "*Evenings at Home.*"

#### ON THINGS TO BE LEARNED.

##### BETWEEN MAMMA AND KITTY.

M.—Because, my dear, it is the purpose of all education to fit persons for the station in which they are hereafter to live; and you know that there are very great differences in that respect, both among men and women.

K.—Are there? I thought all *ladies* lived alike.

M.—It is usual to call all well-educated women, who have no occasion to work for their livelihood, *ladies*; but if you will think a little, you must see that they live very differently from each other, for their fathers and husbands are in very different ranks and situations in the world, you know.

K.—Yes, I know that some are lords, and some are squires, and some are clergymen, and some are merchants, and some are doctors, and some are shop-keepers.

M.—Well; and do you think the wives and daughters of these persons can have just the same things to do, and the same duties to perform? You know how I spend my time. I have to go to market and provide for the family, to look after the servants, to help in taking care of you children, and in teaching you, to see that your clothes are in proper condition, and assist in making and mending for myself and you and your papa. All this is my necessary duty; and besides this, I must go out a visiting to keep up our acquaintance; this I call partly business and partly amusement. Then when I am tired and have done all that I think is necessary, I may amuse myself with reading, or in any other proper way. Now a great many of these employments do not belong to Lady Wealthy, or Mrs. Rich, who keep housekeepers and governesses, and servants of all kinds, to do everything for them. It is very proper, therefore, for them to pay more attention to music, drawing, ornamental work, and any other elegant manner of passing their time and making themselves agreeable.

K.—And shall I have all the same things to do, mamma, that you have?

M.—It is impossible, my dear, to foresee what your future station will be; but you have no reason to expect that if you have a family you will have fewer duties to perform than I have. This is the way of life for which your education should prepare you; and everything will be useful and important for you to learn, in proportion as it will make you fit for this.

But recognizing and accepting, without even the least desire to obliterate class distinctions, Maria Edgeworth was yet the most truly democratic of our moral writers. She had the same moral standard for every class. Her heroines in all stations of life are always "gentle but firm." Simple Susan is as self-respecting and as truly a gentlewoman as Rosamond. Her heroes in humble stations are always "perfectly respectful" and quite independent. They never flaunt their independence in people's faces, but it is always there. Maria Edgeworth was the pupil of Thomas Day, but she received his teachings through many modifying channels. Not only her father but her favorite aunt, Mrs. Ruxton, Mrs. Honora Edgeworth, Mrs. Elizabeth Edgeworth, who each had a share in her education, had all been influenced by the sincerity and logical power of Thomas Day. Miss Edgeworth had, when a girl, spent her holidays for some time at Day's own house. Her stepmother tells us that "the lofty nature of his mind, his romantic character, his metaphysical inquiries and eloquent discussions took her into another world. The icy strength of his

system came at the right moment for annealing her principles. His mixture of speculative misanthropy and real benevolence appeared in all his conduct. . . . His excellent library was open to her and he directed her studies. His severe reasoning and uncompromising truth of mind awakened all her powers, and the questions he put to her and the working out of the answers, the necessity of perfect accuracy in all her words, suited the natural truth of her mind ; and though such strictness was not always agreeable, she even then perceived its advantages, and in after-life was grateful for it." Jean Jacques Rousseau and Maria Edgeworth would seem as far apart as the poles, but the influence of the illustrious sentimentalist, working through channels of common sense, kindness, culture, and wit, can be clearly traced in the stories which, despite their aggressively didactic titles, have always been among the best loved of children's books. Miss Edgeworth possessed what no other writer of moral tales possessed, a keen sense of humor and of the relative proportions of things. That her great literary and intellectual power was directed into ethical lines was due to her father, and, on the whole, I think we may not only forgive him for having spoilt the artist, but may also be grateful to him for training the teacher. Had it been otherwise she would have taken a higher place in literature, but would never have been so dear a friend.

Miss C. M. Younge, speaking with kindly disapproval of the system adopted in the stories known as "*Elements of Morality*," translated from the German by Mary Wollstonecraft, points out that it regards morality as coming first and religion as the means of becoming moral. Such a criticism might be made of Maria Edgeworth's books, whether tales or novels. She is, more than any writer of the time, a free-thinker. The exercise of reason she regards as a first duty, and throughout all her works, touching as she does constantly on moral problems, I do not know of one passage in which she subordinates the claims of reason to those of dogmatic religion ; not one in which she refuses to follow an argument to its logical conclusion ; and not one in which she has recourse to biblical or religious teaching to enforce her ethical theory ; it is

always left to be judged on its own merits. "Miss Edgeworth," said Robert Hall, the celebrated Baptist minister, "does not attack religion or inveigh against it, but makes it appear unnecessary by exhibiting perfect virtue without it. No books ever produced so bad an effect on my own mind as hers. I did not expect any irreligion there; I was off my guard; their moral character beguiled me; I read volume after volume with eagerness, and the evil effects of them I experienced for weeks." She herself, in a letter written late in life, says somewhat quaintly of an acquaintance, "She is not literary; she is very religious—what would be called Very Good, and yet she suited me and I grew very fond of her and she of me." How far her morality affected her religious views, or what were her religious views, I cannot say; but in her writings Maria Edgeworth is as creedless as Shakespeare.

Dr. Aiken and his sister, Mrs. Barbauld, took up much the same ground in the ethical dialogues in "Evenings at Home." Their writings were pervaded by a strong religious spirit, but very striking—when we remember that they wrote in the days of religious tests and many years before the Roman Catholic Emancipation Bill—is the unaggressive and yet open declaration of the right to think independently in religion, which we find in the—

#### DIALOGUE ON DIFFERENCE AND AGREEMENT.

##### ON SUNDAY MORNING.

It was Sunday morning. All the bells were ringing for church, and the streets were filled with people moving in all directions.

Here, numbers of well-dressed persons, and a long train of charity children were thronging in at the wide doors of a large handsome church. There a smaller number, almost equally gay in dress, were entering an elegant meeting-house. Up one alley, a Roman Catholic congregation was turning into their retired chapel, every one crossing himself with a finger dipped in holy water as he went in. The opposite side of the street was covered with a train of Quakers, distinguished by their plain and neat attire and sedate aspect, who walked without ceremony into a room as plain as themselves, and took their seats, the men on one side and the women on the other, in silence. A spacious building was filled with an overflowing crowd of Methodists, most of them meanly habited, but decent and serious in demeanor; while a small society of Baptists in the neighborhood quietly occupied their humble place of assembly.



Presently the different services began. The churches resounded with the solemn organ, and with the indistinct murmurs of a large body of people following the minister in responsive prayers. From the meetings were heard the slow psalm, and the single voice of the leader of their devotions. The Roman Catholic chapel was enlivened by strains of music, the tinkling of a small bell, and a perpetual change of service and ceremonial. A profound silence and unvarying look and posture announced the self-recollection and mental devotion of the Quakers.

Mr. Ambrose led his son Edwin round all these different assemblies as a spectator. Edwin viewed everything with great attention, and was often impatient to inquire of his father the meaning of what he saw; but Mr. Ambrose would not suffer him to disturb any of the congregation, even by a whisper. When they had gone through the whole, Edwin found a great number of questions to put to his father, who explained everything to him in the best manner he could. At length says Edwin, "But why cannot all these people agree to go to the same place, and worship God the same way?" "And why should they agree?" replied his father. "Do not you see that people differ in a hundred other things? Do they all dress alike, and eat and drink alike, and keep the same hours, and use the same diversions?" "Ay, but those are things in which they have a right to do as they please." "And they have a right, too, to worship God as they please. It is their own business, and concerns none but themselves." "But has not God ordered particular ways of worshipping him?" "He has directed the mind and spirit with which he is to be worshipped, but not the particular form and manner. That is left for every one to choose, according as suits his temper and opinions. All these people like their own way best, and why should they leave it for the choice of another? Religion is one of the things in which *mankind were made to differ*."

The several congregations now began to be dismissed, and the street was again overspread with persons of all the different sects, going promiscuously to their respective homes. It chanced that a poor man fell down in the street in a fit of apoplexy, and lay for dead. His wife and children stood round him crying and lamenting in the bitterest distress. The beholders immediately flocked round, and, with looks and expressions of the warmest compassion, gave their help. A Churchman raised the man from the ground by lifting him under the arms, while a Dissenter held his head and wiped his face with his handkerchief. A Roman Catholic lady took out her smelling-bottle and assiduously applied it to his nose. A Methodist ran for a doctor. A Quaker supported and comforted the woman, and a Baptist took care of the children.

Edwin and his father were among the spectators. "Here (said Mr. Ambrose) is a thing in which *mankind were made to agree*."

The only time when we are absolutely free to think our own thoughts is in early childhood, when, fortunately, people imagine we have no thoughts to think. When I reflect on the infinitesimal impression left on me then or since by any sermon or ethical discourse and in my tranquil enjoyment and endur-

ing memory of Maria Edgeworth's "Parent's Assistant," Rosamond, and Frank, I cannot but give my verdict, with regard to the moral education of children, in favor of the voluntary consumption of moral tales.

CLARA E. COLLET.

LONDON.

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## SCHOOL OF APPLIED ETHICS—SUMMER SESSION.

BEGINNING early in July, and continuing six weeks, there will be held at some convenient summer resort in New England or New York, a School for the discussion of Ethics and other subjects of a kindred nature. The matter to be presented has been selected with regard to the wants of clergymen, teachers, journalists, philanthropists, and others, who are now seeking careful information upon the great themes of Ethical Sociology. It is believed that many collegiate and general students will also be attracted by the program.

Speakers and subjects will be, so far as arranged, as follows:

I.—Department of Economics, in charge of Professor H. C. Adams, Ph.D., of the University of Michigan. Professor Adams will deliver eighteen lectures, three during each of the six weeks, on the History of Industrial Society in England and America, beginning with the Middle Ages, and tracing genetically the gradual rise of those conditions in the labor world which cause so much anxiety and discussion to-day.

Along with this main course will be presented: 1. Three lectures by President E. Benj. Andrews; one on the Evils of Our Present Industrial System, one on Socialism as a Remedy, and one on The Better Way. 2. Three lectures by Professor Frank W. Taussig, Ph.D.; one on Distributive and Credit Co-operation, one on Productive Co-operation and Profit Sharing, and one on Working-Men's Insurance. 3. Three lectures by Hon. Carroll D. Wright, on Factory Legislation. 4. Three lectures by Professor J. B. Clark, Ph.D., on agrarian questions, discussing Rent and Tenure, and considering the Agrarian element in the Farmers' Alliance Movement. 5. Three lectures by Albert Shaw, Ph.D.; one on the Housing

of the Poor in Paris, one on the Housing of the Poor in London, and one on General Booth's Scheme for Relieving Poverty. The first two of these lectures will have especial reference to the question of Rapid Transit Facilities in Cities. 6. Three lectures by Professor E. J. James, Ph.D., on Labor and Industrial Legislation in Europe.

In addition to the above, two lectures are expected from Mr. Henry D. Lloyd, of Chicago, giving chapters in the industrial history of the United States.

If there is sufficient demand for it, special instruction in the Principles of Economics will be provided.

II.—Department of the History of Religions, in charge of Professor C. H. Toy, D.D., of Harvard University.

Professor Toy will offer a general course of eighteen lectures, extending through the six weeks, treating the history, aims, and method of the science of History of Religions, and illustrating its principles by studies in the laws of religious progress, with examples drawn from the chief ancient religions. Among the topics will be the Classification of Religions, Conceptions of the Deity, Religion and Superstition, Sacrifice and the Priesthood, the Idea of Sin, Religion and Philosophy, Religion and Ethics, Sacred Books, Religious Reformers and Founders.

The provisional scheme for the special courses is as follows: *Buddhism*, Professor M. Bloomfield, Johns Hopkins University; *The Babylonian-Assyrian Religion*, Professor M. Jastrow, University of Pennsylvania; *Mazdeism*, (not yet provided for); *Islam*, Professor G. F. Moore, Andover Theological Seminary; *The Greek Religion* (not yet provided for); *The Old Norse Religion*, Professor G. L. Kittredge, Harvard University.

It is hoped also to arrange a set of Sunday evening lectures, in which the positions of various religious bodies, Catholic, Protestant, and Jewish, will be expounded by prominent members of these bodies.

III.—Department of Ethics, in charge of Professor Felix Adler, Ph.D., of New York.

Professor Adler will offer a general course of eighteen lectures, extending through the six weeks, on the System of

Applied Ethics, including a brief survey of the various schemes of classification adopted in ancient and modern ethical systems, the discussion of the relation of religious to moral instruction, of the development of the conscience in the child, etc. The Scheme of Duties treated will embrace Personal Ethics, Social Ethics in general, the Ethics of the Family, the Ethics of the Professions, the Ethics of Politics, the Ethics of Friendship, the Ethics of Religious Association. The Scheme of Duties will be treated with special reference to the moral instruction of children.

The provisional program for the special courses in this department is as follows: Introduction to an Ethical Theory, three lectures by W. M. Salter; The Treatment of the Criminal by the State, three lectures by Dr. Charlton T. Lewis; Ethics and Jurisprudence; The Ethical Ideal of the State; History of Temperance Legislation. The names of special lecturers not given will be announced later.

**TERMS.**—The tuition for the entire school, including all the lectures in the three departments, will be \$10. Notice of the place determined upon will be published at an early date. For fuller information in reference either to the instruction or to arrangements for boarding, and the like, application should be made to the Dean of the Summer School of Applied Ethics, Professor H. C. Adams, 1602 Chestnut Street, Philadelphia, Pa.

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## BOOK REVIEWS.

**"IN DARKEST ENGLAND" ON THE WRONG TRACK.** By B. Bosanquet, M. A., formerly Fellow of University College, Oxford, London: Swan Sonnenschein and Co. Pp. vi., 72.

Of all the writings on the subject of General Booth's social scheme which have come under the notice of the present reviewer, this one seems the soundest and the most careful. Its tone is on the whole sympathetic towards the Salvation Army and its leader; it contains no references to "Corybantic" Christianity or reflections upon the character of the general; and yet, with the exception of a few comparatively unimportant details, it is absolutely condemnatory of the proposed social scheme. The grounds of this condemnation, indeed, have been already indicated in other criticisms of the scheme—notably in that by Mr. C. S. Loch—but Mr. Bosanquet's work is distinguished from that of most others by the

exactness of his statements of the principles upon which he proceeds, and by the total exclusion of all irrelevant matter.

It would ill beseem any writer in an ethical journal to cast a slight upon the efforts of such workers as General Booth; and I feel sure also that this was no part of the aim of Mr. Bosanquet. General Booth's scheme is one of the many signs which meet us at the present time of the awakening of the social conscience to the needs of the poor and degraded classes in our large towns; and if it has served in any measure, as we cannot doubt that it has, to call attention to their needs among those who have hitherto been apt to ignore them, we may well hope that, whatever the ultimate results of the scheme itself may be, General Booth's efforts will at least not have been in vain. It is true, indeed, that it is much easier for the rich to part with their money in aid of such gigantic schemes, than it is for them to undertake the personal trouble and discomfort which is involved in some other schemes of social improvement,—*e.g.*, in the work of a Charity Organization Society; and it is to be feared that the interest which is taken in the former is in too many cases but an effort to quiet the conscience without fulfilling a laborious duty. But it would surely be too cynical to suppose that this is the whole significance of such interest. The present reviewer, at least, cannot but believe that it is to some extent a sign of a general awakening of the national conscience of England, and that from this awakening the best results are to be hoped. Let us not, then, spare our commendations to all those who, like the leader of the Salvation Army, are making strenuous efforts to keep that conscience from falling asleep.

So far all is well. The first necessity is that we should be aware of the evil, and should bestir ourselves to deal with it; but the second necessity is that we should wisely consider the method by which it is to be dealt with. To this point I cannot but agree with Mr. Bosanquet in thinking that General Booth has not paid sufficient attention. As it has been repeatedly urged, the only true charity is that which is educative, that which helps men to help themselves. Every other kind of help is degrading to the recipient of it, and still more degrading to those who are just on the margin of independence, who are still struggling bravely to help themselves, but whom even a faint hope of external relief may easily lead to relax in their efforts. I am well aware that the insistence on this truth is frequently stigmatized as "Individualism;" and that is a name which is as repugnant to me as it can well be to any one. I believe that the hope of the present time lies, to a very large extent, in the direction of socialism. But the more heartily we recognize this, the more entirely does it behoove us to be on our guard against those hasty applications of "socialistic" principles which are likely only to aggravate our evils. It seems clear that there can be no reform of society which is not primarily and mainly a reform of character; and the fundamental and fatal objection to such a scheme as that of General Booth—the objection which is admirably insisted on throughout the whole of Mr. Bosanquet's book—is that, in many of its details at least, it seems to be calculated to weaken character rather than to strengthen it. If this is true, I cannot but think that the scheme stands condemned. That this is true, is more than can be shown in such a review as this. I can only urge all readers to procure Mr. Bosanquet's address, and then judge for themselves.

J. S. MACKENZIE.

# INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS.

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JULY, 1891.

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## THE MODERN CONCEPTION OF THE SCIENCE OF RELIGION.\*

THE science of religion is one of the earliest and one of the latest of the sciences. It is one of the earliest: for philosophy is the child of religion, and its first efforts are spent in the endeavor to find some kind of *rationale* for the religious consciousness. On the other hand, it is one of the latest: and that for a twofold reason. It is not till quite modern times that the necessary data of the science, the facts to be explained, have become fully accessible; and even so far as they were accessible before, the ideas and principles by which it is possible to explain them had not been discovered, or, at least, had not been appreciated in their universal bearing. For, in the development of human thought there is always a double process, by which the ideas are brought to the facts, and the facts to the ideas; or, rather, these are two factors in one process, the warp and the woof, which are continually being woven together into the web of man's intellectual life. The growing curiosity which leads men to investigate relations of the world or of human life, hitherto neglected or even regarded as unworthy of notice, is the result of the development of man's spirit, and of the half-unconscious action of the new ideas which that development brings with it; and, on the

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\* The Introductory Lecture to the Gifford Course, St. Andrews, 1890-91.

other hand, these new ideas, as we become more definitely aware of them, not only give new interest to the facts, but enable us to explain them. This is a view of our intellectual progress which at once avoids the false empiricism that sees nothing in growing knowledge but an accumulation of objective materials, and the narrow *a priori* philosophy which regards truth as born, like Athena, from our brains, without the marriage of the soul with the world. It is undoubtedly in and through experience that all our knowledge comes, and looking inward without looking outward is a process which has never brought any fruit to the intelligence of man. *Nihil in intellectu quod non prius in sensu*. But, on the other hand, the world with which experience makes us acquainted is not something foreign to the intelligence, so that in seeking to understand *it* we must needs lose *ourselves*. On the contrary, it is just in the effort to understand the world that the intelligence grows and comes into possession of itself; and, conversely, its understanding of the world is conditioned by its own growth. The world cannot answer unless the mind question it, and the nature of its questions is at every step determined by the stage of development which it has itself attained. Hence it seems at one time to be utterly blind to facts which at a subsequent time become its central interest, just because it has then reached the point in its life at which these facts are the nutriment it needs for further growth. At this point, therefore, it feels constrained to ask a question which it has never asked before, and to collect eagerly the materials for an answer; and the same impulse also brings to more explicit consciousness the ideas by means of which the facts may be made intelligible. Thus, even in the most empirical process of science we have no mere importing into the mind of an external matter alien to its own nature, but the satisfaction of impulses arising out of that nature, which therefore leads in the end to a growing consciousness of itself. It would, indeed, be strange if it were otherwise. We can take into our bodies only what the nature of these bodies enables us to assimilate,—only what they can use to build themselves up into their matured structure. It would be strange if our *minds* were receptacles of

all kinds of matter, without reference to any need or constitution of their own. The mind, indeed, is in one point different from the body, as it has a *universal* appetite and can assimilate all kinds of materials of knowledge; for, in a sense, there is nothing alien to it. But it can do so only in its own way and in its own time, and it refuses or even repels any information which does not answer its own questions, and so contribute to its own development.

What is it, then, which has awakened the new modern interest in the science of religion, and has given rise to the persistent attempts which are now being made to investigate the facts of religious history in all times and places? What is it that has made us carry our eyes beyond the Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments, which are directly connected with our own religious life, and beyond the classical mythology, which is immediately bound up with our literary culture,—that has set to our scholars the task of analyzing the Sacred Books of all nations, and seeking for the keys of all the mythologies? What is it that has raised the folk-lore, which was formerly left to children and old women, into an object of keen scientific curiosity, and made an army of careful observers record with such perseverance the crudest superstitions of savages, and their most wayward fancies about the constitution of the universe and the powers that rule over it? The folk-lore has not ceased to be childish, and, though it may carry in it some elements of genuine imagination, some hints at a poetic idealization of nature, which men will not willingly let die, it is not for these grains of gold that we turn over the infinite heaps of sand. Nothing can be more coarse and repulsive than are many of the superstitious customs of savages; nothing can be more absurd and irrational than most of their ideas as to the constitution of the natural and the spiritual world. No civilized being could possibly look to such a source, either for moral guidance or intellectual light. What lends them their interest must therefore be their bearing on some new question which we are forced to ask, their value as giving further definition or illustration of some principle which we seek to verify. I do not, of course, mean that every



one who feels the impulse to investigate in this new branch of inquiry is conscious of the full meaning of what he is doing. The spirit of the time enlists many servants to whom it does not communicate the purpose of the orders it gives them. Hundreds feel the pressure of a new desire, the stimulus of a new curiosity, for one who asks himself distinctly what it is that he wants, or why he seeks to fill his mind with facts which to a previous age would have seemed intellectual lumber, as useless to remember as the scandal of a village or the advertisements of a daily paper. But the *δαίμων* that thus possesses men is not a meaningless impulse, like a taste for collecting books whose value is their errata. It is a spiritual need, an intellectual and even a practical want of man's spirit, which has been awakened by its past growth, and the satisfaction of which is necessary to its further growth. Yet undoubtedly it is well for us not only to obey the spirit of the time, but also to ask what it means, to try to understand the interest which such inquiries awaken in us, and to estimate the good that can come to us by discovering the answer to them. For this, if we can attain it, will tend to give method and direction to our efforts after such answer, and it may to some extent prevent us from wandering into paths that lead to nothing, or attaching too much or too little importance to particular results.

A full answer to this question must be postponed till we get a little further in our investigations. But, in the mean time, it is possible to indicate generally one or two points which lie almost on the surface. First of all, we may observe that the idea of the *unity of mankind* has within the last century become not merely a dogma, but an almost instinctive presupposition of all civilized men, and that, at the same time, it has been freed from the theological reservations and saving clauses with which it was formerly encumbered even among the Christian nations, which had, in a sense, accepted it as a truth. We know now, in a way in which it was never known before, that humanity is a genus which has no proper species,—i.e., that the divisions between men are as nothing in comparison with the fundamental fact of self-consciousness which unites them all to each other. Ancient society was

built on the principle of natural kinship, and therefore on a principle which carried with it tribal or national exclusiveness, even where it did not set up further barriers between the members of the society by immovable divisions of family from family, rank from rank, and caste from caste. The artificial unity of the Roman empire, however, with its equal justice and its rigid conception of the rights of the individual person, did much *negatively* to break down these walls of separation between Greek and barbarian, Jew and Gentile, patrician and plebeian, master and slave. And Christianity sought *positively* to knit men together by a spiritual bond of fellowship, of which all men were regarded as capable. And if this doctrine hid its levelling power in the very excess of an idealism, which treated all such distinctions as indifferent, and *therefore* allowed them to subsist; yet, by reducing them to the category of mere relative differences of worldly position, which a few years must terminate, and by disregarding them in the order of the church, it spread through all the nations which it reached, a consciousness of the infinite value of each individual soul and of the comparative unimportance of the things that in this world divide one man from, or set him above, another,—a consciousness which in the long run must be fatal to all absolute claims of superiority. The belief that the best which man has it in him to do or to be, springs out of that which is common to all, and therefore that the highest good is open to all, is fatal to all systems of privilege, and it is equally fatal to all national exclusiveness. In the slow progress of humanity, indeed, there is always a long way between the premises and the conclusion, between the germinating of an idea in the religious life and its manifestation as a transforming social principle; and it may work for a long time unconsciously as such a principle before it is explicitly recognized in its universal meaning. Yet, though a thousand years are as one day in the secular process of development, which is the manifestation of the divine spirit in man, the days and the years come to an end, and the fruit follows by an inevitable necessity upon the seed. The application of this idea to the case before us it is not difficult to see. The hyper-idealism

of early Christianity refused to question the justice of slavery in private life and of despotism in the state. It declared that the powers that be are ordained of God, without asking how they had been established or how they exercised their authority. And the mediæval church was inclined in its asceticism rather to emphasize than to criticise the division between the spiritual and the secular orders, though it soon found itself forced by an inevitable logic to insist that the powers of the latter should be used in such a way as not to interfere with the higher interests of the former. But this claim inevitably grew into the demand of Hildebrand that the world should be subjected to the church. The Reformation brought with it a better solution of the difficulty, for it led to the denial of the division between world and church as anything more than a distinction of outward order, and to the assertion that the divine principle could be realized, and ought to be realized, in the life of the laity as much as in that of the clergy, in the state as much as in the church. In this way the theological limit to the realization of the divine principle in man was broken down. The new wine of Christian cosmopolitanism burst through the old bottles of spiritual and secular exclusiveness. The divine right of priests in the church and of a royal or noble class in the world was set aside for the divine right of humanity. And the idea of a unity in men deeper than all racial and social distinctions, deeper than all distinctions of culture or even of religion, became for the first time a living force. As usual, the first expression of this truth was extremely one-sided. The cosmopolitanism of the last century carried the abstract assertion of the equality of men to the paradox that civilization itself is a moral disadvantage, and that the genuine voice of humanity is to be heard only from the natural man, "the noble savage." But the irrational consequences of a theory which treats the unity of human nature as the negation of all the different forms in which it has been or can be realized must not hide from us the immense gain for man's intellectual and moral life which lies in the recognition of that unity. Looking at it in the former respect, with which we are more directly concerned,

we see that it furnished the intellectual key to a problem which the increasing intercourse of mankind, since the discovery of the New World, had been pressing upon men's minds with ever greater insistence.† The conviction that God has formed of one blood all the nations that dwell upon the earth—interpreted as meaning that, as regards that which is deepest and most important in human nature, men are essentially equal—supplied for the first time a point of view from which human life in all its heights and depths, and in the whole range of its history, could be brought within the sphere of science. It swept away at once the literary prejudices which caused classical models to be regarded as the only humane letters, and the religious prejudices which consecrated the history of the chosen people and of the early Christian church as the only sacred history. Above all, it set to science the problem how, out of our common humanity, we can explain the almost infinitely diversified forms of culture, literary, social, and religious, which we meet with in different times and in different parts of the world. If we are not to count anything human alien to us, we must be able to understand every such form, not merely in the sense of gathering together the facts regarding it, and observing their general character, or even of discovering the laws of their co-existence and succession, but in the sense of throwing ourselves into them, realizing the states of mind in which they arose, the process of thought and feeling by which they grew, and the connection of the results to which they developed, with our own life and thought. In other words, this principle makes us conscious that we have not solved the scientific problem suggested by the lives of other men till we are able to live them over again, to reproduce their movement in living imagination, and to repeat in conscious thought the unconscious logic of their growth. It is this desire for a living picture, still more for a *rationale*, of human life in all its forms, which prompts our minute research into even the most trivial point of custom and observance, of myth and doctrine, in ancient and modern nations, which makes our anthropologists at once so greedy of facts and so eagerly anxious to penetrate through the mere facts to the

principle that explains their genesis. We want not only to believe in the unity of man, the identity of the spirit of humanity in all times and places, but to *see* it; and we cannot see it aright unless we both *feel* and *think* it, unless both by imagination and reason we can realize how, under the conditions, we might ourselves have developed into such ways of thinking and living. It is this impulse to realize and revivify the facts,—to make the past into a living present, while yet we understand its inner meaning in a way in which the present can never be understood by those who live in it,—it is this that characterizes the modern scientific spirit and differentiates it so completely from a mere casual and external curiosity. It is manifest that such an impulse can never be satisfied with any mere empirical collection of information, which still leaves us on the outside of that which we are observing, or, indeed, with anything short of a real appreciation, both sympathetic and intuitive, of the nature of the process by which the one spirit of man manifests itself in all this difference of forms, and through them all is continually advancing to a fuller realization and a deeper comprehension of itself.

And this leads me finally to point out that it is not merely the bare idea of the unity of man which now furnishes the guiding principle of science in this department, but the idea of that unity *as manifesting itself in an organic process of development*, first, in particular societies, and, secondly, in the life of humanity as a whole. This also is an idea which has gradually been gaining ground ever since the beginning of the Christian era, but which has for the first time taken an effective form, as an instrument of science, in the present day. The favorite idea of the ancient world, an idea presented in early Greek philosophy, was that of a cycle of changes in which genesis *from* the original unity and return *to* it, or, as we should say, differentiation and integration, are not united, but follow each other. This idea seems to be adopted even by Aristotle. Among the Romans the constant march of the state through campaign after campaign, century after century, to the empire of the world, suggested to Livy the conception of a process of outward growth, which, however, seemed to him

to be accompanied by inward decay ; for the power and wealth which patriotism and discipline had won had, in his opinion, proved in the end fatal to the virtues which gave rise to them. Among the Jews prophecy,—in so far as it was not a mere arbitrary anticipation, but a foresight based upon insight,—implied a discernment of seeds of good and evil in the present which must necessarily ripen to a harvest of greater good and evil in the future ; and, in this sense, prophecy is just development read forward. And when Christ spoke of his own ethical doctrine as a fulfilment of that which potentially or in germ was contained in the law, and at the same time represented that doctrine as itself only a grain of mustard-seed which was one day to grow into the greatest of all trees, still more when he spoke of the corn of wheat that was to multiply by dying, he gave a clearer expression to the idea of development than it had ever before received, and even perhaps than it has received till quite recent times. By St. Paul the idea was caught up and presented in a more imposing though less suggestive form, under the guise of a great providential world-drama in which the whole history of the Jews is viewed as a long legal preparation for the new era of the Gospel ; and the same idea appears in St. Augustine's " *City of God*," only with the additional thought that another act of the same drama is found in the history of the Romans, by whom a universal empire was gradually built up to provide a peaceful sphere for the operations of the universal Church. This conception of the two " *preparations for the Gospel*,"—the outward and the inward preparations,—and of the union of the Holy Roman Empire and the Catholic Church as the result of their coalescence, furnished the guiding principle of what we may call the mediæval philosophy of history ; and, as such, it is presented to us in the great poem of Dante. But for a deeper and less spectacular expression of that connection between the different phases of the life of individuals, of nations, and of humanity, which we call development, we have to wait till a much later time. The intuitive genius of Vico discerned the importance of the idea at the dawn of the modern period ; but the full perception of its value as a key to the history of man and of

the world was reserved for the end of last and the beginning of this century. It was then that Lessing, Kant, and Herder gave that decisive impulse under which the principle of development was carried into biology by Goethe, Schelling, and many eminent scientific men, while Hegel made it the leading idea of his philosophy, subjected it to a more penetrating analysis than it had ever before received, and applied it with wonderful insight and grasp to the political, the artistic, the religious, and the philosophical history of man. After these we need only refer to the names of Lamarck and Comte in France, of Darwin and Spencer in England, and of Von Hartmann and Wundt in Germany, as writers who have done much to throw light on various aspects of the idea and to give it new applications. We may, indeed, say without much exaggeration that the thought of almost all the great speculative or scientific writers of the present day has been governed and guided by the principle of development, if not directly devoted to its illustration.

It is by its aid, and by its aid only, that the other idea of which we have already spoken—the idea of the unity of mankind—can be made fully intelligible and applicable to the facts of history. In other words, the unity of mankind must for our purpose be interpreted as involving not only the identity of human nature in all its various manifestations in all nations and countries, but also as implying that in their *co-existence* these manifestations can be connected together as different correlated phases of one life, and that in their *succession* they can be shown to be the necessary stages of its evolution. This, and no less than this, is the ideal set before us by the conception of development,—the great watchword of science in our time. In fact, this corollary cannot now be disjoined from the principle of the unity of man itself. For if it be true that we can find light in the history of man only as we throw ourselves into it and live it over again in ourselves, it is only by the aid of the idea of evolution that we can bridge over the gulf between ourselves and the men of an earlier and simpler stage of culture. Without the aid of this idea our sympathies will not stretch far enough. It is indeed comparatively easy

for us to recognize the identity of a common nature, through the differences of language and custom that separate us from nations like the modern Germans or French, who stand, on the whole, on the same level of civilization and are embraced in the same general spirit of the time with ourselves. With a further stretch of effort we can reach back to those previous stages of culture that still survive in a recognizable form in our own lives. We can make ourselves citizens of Rome or Athens, because in literature and philosophy, in politics and legal institutions, Rome and Athens still live with us as easily distinguishable influences. And our religion still preserves so much of its Jewish root that it is not very difficult for us to realize in some measure the spirit of the prophets and psalmists of Israel. But when we have to widen our view and extend the same living sympathy—the sympathy out of which alone true knowledge can spring—to early India and Egypt, to the primitive civilizations of Babylon and Mexico and Peru,—still more, when we have to include in our idea of humanity the lives of utterly uncivilized races and to realize the first obscure beginnings of religion and morality, nay, even to reproduce the dawn of unconscious reason in the formation of language,—the line seems to be stretched to the breaking-point. And it must needs break if it were not for the help of the idea of evolution, which has at once created a new interest in the earliest vestiges of human life, and has supplied the key for their explanation. This idea, in fact, is the most potent instrument for bringing back difference to identity which has ever been put into the hands of science, and, without it, it would be impossible to hope for a real understanding of the facts of the history of man, a problem which in its complexity and difficulty includes and transcends the complexities and difficulties of all the other sciences.

To sum up what has been said. We have seen that the studies usually embraced under the name of anthropology, and of which the science of religion is one of the most important, have risen into a prominence and attracted an attention unprecedented in any previous time, not only because the extension of our knowledge of the world's inhabitants and of



their history has supplied the materials for it, but because the progress of man's intelligence has brought with it certain ideas, which at once excite our interest in such inquiries, and furnish us with a guide in undertaking them,—a means of solving the difficulties which arise in the course of them. These ideas are the ideas of the unity of man, of the organic connection of life between the different parts of the human family and between the different stages in the secular development of man's spirit, to which all the various forms of culture in all the nations of the world ultimately serve as contributions. These ideas we do not put forward as dogmas,—for, indeed, there are many difficulties, both in their analysis and their verification, on which we have as yet said nothing,—but we point to them as indicating the problems with which at the present time it has become necessary for science to deal, the questions which by its own development the human spirit is required to answer. This necessity lies in the fact that it is only through a deepened consciousness of the world that the human spirit can solve its own problem. Especially is this true in the region of anthropology. For the inner life of the individual is deep and full, just in proportion to the width of his relations to other men and things, and the consciousness of what he is in himself as a spiritual being is possible only through a comprehension of the position of the individual life in the great secular process by which the intellectual and moral life of humanity has grown and is growing. Hence the highest practical as well as speculative interests of men are connected with the new extension of science which has given fresh interest and meaning to the whole history of the race.

Now, these remarks have special application to the history of religion. Without as yet attempting to define religion, or to give any precise account of its characteristics, we may go so far as to say that in a man's religion we have expressed his ultimate attitude to the universe, the summed-up meaning and purport of his whole consciousness of things. How and how far he rises above the parts to the whole, how and how far he gathers his scattered consciousness of the world and of himself to a unity, how and how far he makes anything like a

final return upon himself from all his fortunes and experiences of things, is shown more clearly in his religion than in any other expression of his inner life. Whatever else religion may be, it undoubtedly is the sphere in which man's spiritual experience reaches the utmost concentration, in which, if at all, man takes up a definite attitude towards his whole natural and spiritual environment. In short, it is the highest form of his consciousness of himself in his relation to all other things and beings, so that if we want a brief abstract and epitome of the man, we must seek for it here or nowhere. But just for this reason the problem presented by the history of religion contains in an intensified form all the difficulties which we find in all the other aspects of man's life. All the complexity and diversity, all the opposition and conflict, which makes it so hard to find a principle of law and order in the life of man as a physical, moral, and intellectual being, reach their extreme form in his religious history. Hence those who sought to found their definition of religion on some quality common to all religions have found it hard to come to any result whatever; for in his religious life man has sounded the whole gamut of possible forms of consciousness from the highest inspiration to the lowest superstition. Thus, to take a few instances, there are religions of terror and religions of love, religions of hope and religions of despair, religions in which the gods seem to be worshipped mainly as beings who can help or hinder man's effort after his own finite ends, and religions in which he is called on to make absolute surrender of all such ends, and even to merge his very life in the infinite. Whatever element be named as essential to religion, it seems easy to oppose a negative instance to it. Thus Kant tells us that "without a belief in a future life no religion can be conceived to exist." But, to mention only the most obvious facts, the early Jewish religion was without such a belief; and, if it has formed a part of most religions, yet there are many in which it was by no means a prominent or important part. The religions of classical antiquity were for the most part centred in the domestic or the national life, and the immortality thought of by their votaries was the immortality of the

family or the state. On the other hand, there have been nations, such as the Egyptians, for which the concerns of the other world and the future life seemed altogether to dwarf the interests of the present. The Egyptian lived among tombs whose size and splendor reduced into insignificance the dwellings of the living, and the most characteristic features of his mythology were representations of the death and resurrection of nature in winter and summer, as types symbolizing the death and resurrection of man. Again, in its attitude towards *nature*, religion has passed through every phase which it is possible to conceive, from that of the Vedic hymns, in which the "bright ones," the heavens and the earth, the sun and the moon, with the various elemental powers of storm and wind, are the only distinctly-recognized divinities, to the religion of the Jew, which abhors any mingling of the creature with the Creator, and treats nature not as the manifestation of God, but rather as a weapon in his hand, which he has made, and which he breaks in pieces when he has done with it; or, finally, to the religion of the Buddhist, which treats the whole objective world as an illusion, from which it is the highest aim of the devotee to free himself. Again, the religious view of *man himself* and his relation to the divine being passes through a similar series of kaleidoscopic changes in the course of the history of religion. Sometimes, as in Greece, he is the one finite being, whose form is transferable to the divine, and the gods are above all regarded as the powers that preside over the life of the family or the state. Sometimes, on the other hand, man seems to seek his gods as far as possible from himself, and to find divinity in plants, in animals, in almost anything and everything rather than in humanity. Nay, anthropologists have found good evidence of a state of civilization, in which men could think of kinship as a sacred bond only when they regarded it as a participation in the blood of a *zoomorphic* or *phytomorphic* god or totem. Again, it would seem to be essential to all religion to hold to the objective reality of God as apart from the religious sentiment of his worshippers, and in some forms of religion He is even treated as a purely external power, with whom no inward

relation is possible. Yet we find at least one great religion,—that of Buddha—which begins with the negation of all the objective gods of earlier Hindooism, or the reduction of them to parts in the great illusion of outward existence, and which at last finds the divine only in the self-negating process of the finite mind, and the *Nirvana* which is supposed to be its result. Finally, even within the compass of the one religion, we find something analogous to all these forms. For Christianity, in the course of its history, passes through phases which recall the opposite forms of polytheism and monotheism, of pantheism and dualism. We find it at one time united with the ascetic morality of the cloister, which carries the negation of nature to the verge of self-annihilation, and at another time associated with an ethics which idealizes the natural desires and affections, and a poetry which finds God in nature. These variations are so great that it cannot seem wonderful if some are inclined to deny that there is any unity beneath them, or that the succession of religions is anything but the play of the wayward fancy of man in a region which is outside of the sphere of reason and experience. Yet even so, the problem of their change would form part of the general problem of human history. Even if religion were a madness of humanity, an illusory form of consciousness destined ultimately to disappear, there must be a method in it which we are interested to discover. We cannot suppose any great province of the life of rational beings to lie outside of the general development of reason. Even atheism or agnosticism involves a definite attitude towards the ultimate problem of human life, and if it is the highest attitude possible to man, it must show itself to be the last term, or one of the elements in the last term, in which the whole process of development is summed up. For the modern ideas of the organic unity and the organic evolution of man, which are the presuppositions underlying all our investigation into the history of humanity, inevitably compel us to seek for the one principle of life which masks itself in all these various forms, and which through them all is striving towards the full realization of itself.

EDWARD CAIRD.

## THE FUNCTIONS OF ETHICAL THEORY.

Two questions may be asked in regard to our subject: First, why is it that any disturbance in ethical speculation at once brings men up in arms about the consequences? Second, why is there such a tendency even in speculative ethics to bring its theories into harmony and sympathy with "practical" problems?

The preliminary answer to this question is the distinction between *science* and *art*. We shall not enter into this exhaustively. We shall dwell upon it only long enough to establish some comprehensive conceptions and principles by which to determine the subject of our discussion. The sequel of this is to be not only the functions actually exercised by various ethical theories in their isolation, but a statement of their relation to each other as distinct attitudes of mind towards the same problem.

A science assumes facts and endeavors to reduce them to some form of unity. In some cases it seeks classification; in others it seeks uniformity of connection between phenomena. In regard to the relations of *objects*, its method and aim is classification by resemblances; in regard to *events*, it is explanation by causes. In both we proceed *regressively*; in one to find *genera*, in the other to find *antecedents*. The aim is to explain a fact by showing the derivation of its content or qualities, or the cause of its existence. An art, on the other hand, assumes ideas or conceptions, truths or principles, and endeavors to realize an end. It looks forward instead of backward, *progressively* to ends or consequences, not to causes. The aim of science is to find causes; the aim of art to produce ends by means of these causes. Science may also find principles which may be more than causes in the physical sense; art will apply them. Achievement, therefore, not explanation, is the object of art. But it may be divided, as by Greek thinkers, into *productive* (ποιητική) and *practical* (πρακτική)

art; the former aiming to leave behind its activity some material result, and the latter to terminate in action without a material result, and so often spoken of as action for its own sake. There is a result connected with it, but it is moral, spiritual, or intellectual compared with the material effect of productive art. But the common characteristic of both the "productive" and the "practical" arts is that of directing thought and effort to an unrealized end, some object which is not yet a fact, except in so far as it is an idea in consciousness. It is this direction of thought to an end rather than the direction of it towards antecedent causes that is to be emphasized, because it draws the line of distinction between science and art. But the difference between the ends of the "productive" and the "practical" arts gives rise to the question: "To which of the two spheres does ethics belong, and how are both its methods and its theories affected by the answer?"

Aristotle placed it among the "practical" arts, but treated it, like many other philosophers of his age and race, as a science, and among thinkers of the present day it is universally spoken of as a science and seldom treated as an art. The fact is that every consideration of its scope and aim shows it to be both a science and an art. As a science it endeavors to explain something; as an art, to realize something. This combination of functions complicates every problem in connection with it, and in the sequel it will be seen to explain why life and conduct are so sensitive to changes of speculative views entertained respecting them. It is, in this complex nature of its functions, quite different from most, if not all, the other sciences, although they are not excluded from an important relation to the arts. This marked difference is clearly expressed in the fact that the names of the physical, mathematical, and even metaphysical sciences, if such be possible, are not used to denote the corresponding art to which they contribute from their results. We never think of physics as an art. The same can be said of chemistry, geology, botany, zoology, biology, anthropology, sociology, mathematics, psychology, theology, etc. We regard them only as occupied with the establishment of general

causes or general truths. Mechanics, perhaps, will be the art corresponding to physics; mining to chemistry and geology; engineering to mathematics and physics; architecture to mathematics, physics, and æsthetics. The truth here indicated is well enough known, but we are not always conscious of its importance for the way in which the mind acts when a scientific theory undergoes a change. Moreover, the single application of the terms helps to keep perfectly clear and distinct the difference between the theoretical and practical aspects of the various subjects investigated.

But in contrast with this, when we come to the term "ethics" we find that it has to do duty for both a science and an art. It must be apparent at once that this double denotation is likely to lead to confusion of thought. It does so perpetually. But perhaps this confusion would be very slight and easily corrected were it not for a still more important fact than any we have yet emphasized. The difference between the object of the other sciences and the object of the arts to which they contribute is so great that a tendency to confusion is easily detected or evaded. As sciences they are occupied solely with *antecedents*; their corresponding arts are occupied with *consequences*; the former with causes, the latter with ends. But ethics, both as a science and an art, is occupied solely with *ends*, and never with the investigation of causes. This fact, no doubt, explains why the same term was so readily adopted to denominate the two spheres, the theoretical and the practical, and it has a very wide-reaching significance for the perpetual complication of conceptions and functions belonging to the ethical problem. Instead of being clear and distinct as between the sciences and arts generally, they are fused together in common conceptions and formulas. The same subject-matter is viewed from the stand-point of both a science and an art. This subject-matter is the *summum bonum*, or the highest good. As a science ethics endeavors to ascertain what the *summum bonum* is; as an art to realize it. As a science it aims to *explain* something; as an art, to *effect* it. Its complications are thus twofold. It not only combines the functions of a science and an art, but combines

them upon the same subject-matter, so that the mind is never assured in regard to which direction its thought must be turned when called to consider ethical formulas and principles.

But what we have said is only a most general statement of what the functions of ethics are. We have not intimated their ramifications, nor the manner in which they determine the character and influence of ethical theories. This is the topic which demands our special attention, and to that we give our immediate consideration. The elucidation can be effected, however, only by some further remarks, defining a little more technically the functions of an ethical theory, or such as are generally demanded of it.

As usually treated by writers, ethics investigates both the *origin* and the *nature* of moral faculties, data, ideas, principles, etc. Mr. Sidgwick justly remarks that the origin of "moral faculty" seems hardly a proper function of ethics, but it has actually been discussed at great length and with considerable interest under that title rather than as a question of psychology or natural history, and hence without deciding for or against the legitimacy of its treatment under ethics we have only to observe that wherever it is discussed it is conducted as a science of causes or history. Ethics, then, as occupied with the origin of "moral faculty," is historical and etiological in its method, and to that extent identifies its object with the method and aims of the physical sciences. We know without comment what confusion has crept into ethical theory rather surreptitiously by the inferences from the origin of "moral faculty" and ideas to their contents and validity. But as we are not specially concerned with this feature of the problem, we may dismiss it from our view, and confine ourselves to the scientific function of ethics as applied to the *nature* of moral facts and principles. In reference to this field, ethics may be a science in two distinct relations; that is, scientifically it endeavors to determine two distinct facts. *First*, it aims to show the general conception which will reduce the multiplex phenomena and the various motives *actually* governing human conduct to unity, to a comprehensive principle. Some men seek fame, some wealth, some



honor, some righteousness, etc. But are these ends distinct from each other and ultimate? If they can be reduced to a single comprehensive end, say happiness, perfection, duty, conformity to law, etc., a scientific function is fulfilled in explaining them. But this method only explains these phenomena as facts, or reduces to unity what is actually practised; it does not imply any judgment of their value or of the moral quality attaching to the principle thus comprehensively formulated. It does not pronounce upon the character of the conduct which it merely explains. In this function of its application ethics is classificatory, not legislative. It is content with making actual human conduct intelligible, whether it be ideal or not. *Second*, it aims to show the end that ought *ideally* to govern conduct. The distinction between its two scientific functions, as we have recognized them, is here the common one, that between explaining what *is* and indicating what *ought to be*. The importance of this is too familiar to require comment, but we must remark how it indicates the transition from the purely explanatory to the purely legislative functions of ethical conceptions. Ethical theory is expected to supply both of these desiderata, and often as well the genesis of moral phenomena. Its complications are therefore manifest. But its two scientific functions as just defined require further consideration in order to make us more clearly appreciate what has actually been undertaken by various ethical theories.

To illustrate both aspects of the question we may start with the assertion of many writers on ethics, that pleasure is the comprehensive end sought by all men, or by the majority of mankind. But a further question may be proposed: Is it the ideal end of conduct? We do not intend to answer this question *pro* or *con* at present. We are concerned only with the possibility of entertaining it. Some actually deny that it is the ideal or imperative end of conduct. Whether they are consistent or successful in maintaining their denial is a matter of no concern at present. But to them it appears admissible enough, perhaps, that all men *do* seek pleasure as their ultimate end, but with them the question is whether this end

*ought* to be pursued. They can admit that it actually explains the conduct of men as it is, but may insist upon knowing whether it is ideal. And again, they may deny the fact that all men are moved exclusively by pleasure and indicate some other motive, but not because they mean to imply by this denial the illegitimacy of all conduct so motivated, but only that the motive of pleasure does not explain all the facts. On the other hand again, they may admit that it is both the actual motive of all conduct, and that as a uniform concomitant of all healthy action it has a legitimate place to consideration in all moral theories, but that owing to its indefiniteness and ambiguity we require to specify a certain quantity or quality of pleasure as the ideal and imperative end of conduct, and which may be superior to that which is actually pursued. In all such cases, however, the implication is that the *supreme* object of ethics as a science is to determine the ideal as contrasted with the actual. In this latter function of ethical theory both its object and its method are distinct from those of the other sciences. In the first of the two objects it is at one with the methods and aims of the physical sciences, barring the investigation of causes,—namely, the classification and deduction of facts. It simply explains actual conduct without any reference to the distinction between moral and immoral. But in the second function it is dealing with ideals, and must either regard the actual and the ideal as identical, in which case there is no necessity for ethics as a legislative art, because in that assumption nothing is left unrealized which it is the business of ethics to urge as imperative; or it must posit some new conception over and above those actually representing the aims of conduct, or having that differential about it which will mark the contrast between morality and immorality. It is possible even that this ideal conception may be a modification of actual ends, effected by specifying a particular quantity or quality of their characteristics, but indicating that the whole extent of their ideal nature is not yet realized. It is thus not only explaining conduct, but explaining what it ought to be.

But it is to be remarked that, in these its scientific functions,

ethical theory has no other desire than to present a general truth. It is not designed to produce any practical result, to achieve an end, to appeal to a motive which does or ought to act with men as a predominant inclination to volition in a given way, but it is designed as in the other sciences, to establish a principle to which particular phenomena may be reduced, or to which certain modes of action can or ought to be adjusted. As a science it does not enjoin ideal ends; it merely settles that they are ideal, and that they fulfil the demands made upon a theory to supply a consistent and satisfactory principle in answer to certain questions. This end may be pleasure, perfection, duty, law of reason, or anything else we please. It is the function of pure science to furnish truth, not stimulus to action. Astronomy, for instance, is concerned with the explanation of stellar and planetary, or cosmological phenomena, and when it enunciates a truth or a theory it does not care whether the result conforms to any desired or desirable object of human life or not, and as science does not care how it affects action. When Newton proposed gravitation he intended to explain certain phenomena, and did not stop to consider whether his conception related to conduct either actual or ideal. He was occupied solely with determining the truth, and the same is true of every scientific hypothesis involving general causes and general principles. As a pure science ethics need not do more. But, as we have already remarked, ethics seeks the *end* of action as its general principle, and so besides the mere truth about the explanatory function of this conception its subject-matter is at once complicated with the matter of consequences in conduct, and hence its formula cannot be enunciated without revealing a *practical* relation of the science involved in its theoretical principle. Nevertheless we must not ignore the fact that *as* a science ethics need not consider whether its conclusions are practical or not. All that can be rationally expected of it under this limitation is that it be true, that it explain facts, that it be consistent, and that it be complete. If its conclusions are true it will satisfy scientific demands, although the theory may be as useless for practical ends

as the theory of fluxions may be for the organization of a government.

But this is only a paradoxical way of stating the distinction between theoretical and practical interests. It is true that all theories have some relation to "practical" affairs, but they do not have to consult this relation as a primary condition of their truth. But the fact that ethics, even as a science, does not look to causes and antecedents, but to *ends*, which describe the whole sphere of the "practical," gives its theories a closer relation to that sphere than those of other sciences, and explains the fact that, from the very dawn of speculation about the subject, the human mind has persisted in thinking of it as a "practical" science, or "practical" philosophy, an expression which is a self-contradiction in its strictest meaning. But the superficial contradiction of mere usage cannot be urged with any seriousness when we take into account the real meaning intended to be conveyed by it. Being a theory about the "practical," it was natural to expect of any truth thus represented that something "practical" should come out of it. Hence at this point ethics, as a science, shows its contact with a field quite distinct and insensibly passes over into it, complicating all its problems in this relation and by the easy transition of the mind from one to the other.

We have said that as a pure science ethics does not have a "practical" object in view, although its subject-matter is the "practical" field. But it is quite otherwise when we come to consider it as an art. The aim of an art, as we have shown, is to realize an end, and in formulating its principles it does not suffice that they are true speculatively or theoretically. They must appeal to the inclinations of those who are in pursuit of an end. Its formulas must not only satisfy scientific curiosity, but they must represent a conception which appeals to the will. This important function we shall designate *motive efficiency*, in distinction from explanatory power. When we demand of an ethical theory that it have motive efficiency, we do not mean that the theory *per se* have this power, but that the principle which it recognizes as the fundamental ethical

norm have this efficacy. This is what is meant, consciously or unconsciously, when general opinion demands that ethics, or ethical theory, be "practical." Ethics, therefore, as an art aims at motive efficiency. It does not refuse the services of its scientific functions, but endeavors to formulate those truths in such a way that they will carry with them a predominant inclination to act with regard to given ends. But the subject-matter of ethics, both as a science and an art, being the same, its formulas will be charged with the double function of explanatory and motive efficacy. If the highest ideal cannot be made efficacious some condescension must be made to proximate ideals, or mental and moral forces actually operating, to secure as much conformity to desirable ends as is possible and practical. That is, even the highest theoretical ideals, to become "practical," must make some concessions to the motive agencies existing below them. Two demands are, therefore, made upon ethical theories: first, that they be true; second, that they be "practical,"—that is, have motive efficiency. But these two qualities do not uniformly imply each other. They are so different in their nature that a theory may be true and yet exercise no influence upon the will; or it may represent the motive efficient of conduct and yet not completely satisfy the conscience. Thus, it may be true that moral distinctions are irresolvable and founded in the nature of things, but the recognition of this fact has no practical influence as a stimulus to action. It does not express a motive to volition. On the other hand, pleasure and pain may be the only motives to which we can appeal for regulating conduct in those who are governed by fear or personal interest, but such conduct does not attain the full measure of merit that consciousness accords to complete morality. It represents only external morality without its proper condition and correlate, moral character. It is this contingency of connection between conduct and character that introduces so many complications into ethical theory, by multiplying the means for realizing an ideal end when that ideal remains constant. The theory endeavors, of course, to recognize all the data that will be of service to ethics as an art, but its motive

efficiency will depend, not upon the truth of these data, but upon the extent to which they are actual forces in human conduct. Hence in so far as it is designed to realize the comprehensive ideal of the science, or such proximate ideals as are practical and possible, it must be occupied with the means available for that object, and these may be far below the best which the pure theory would sanction as meeting its just demands. But nevertheless they are necessary elements of ethical theory so far as it is at all related to practical problems. The fact merely proves that ethics, besides being explanatory of facts and ideal ends, must adjust itself, as an art, to the conditions of human nature, although it is not necessary on that account to relax its sympathy with the ideal. But the necessity of concession for practical efficiency shows how wide a field of thought is covered by it, and that, in addition to presenting scientific truth and ideals, it must divide its motive efficiency, or the principles which it gives that quality, into two distinct forms corresponding to the variable relation between conduct and character. Hence as an art ethics exercises two functions, although both have the common characteristic of motive efficiency, as the two scientific or theoretical functions have the common quality of explanatory power. The first of these functions is its aim to supply the basal motive for determining conduct with reference to some ideal where there is no inclination to seek it voluntarily. This defines the sphere of politics, government, or legislation, or compulsory morality, so to speak. It, of course, reaches no farther than external conduct, and is the employment of force to prevent evil and to indirectly develop better social habits and laws. The motive to which force appeals is that which explains the actual conduct of men, and so this practical function corresponds to the first of the theoretical functions which we have discussed. Its object is either to extend the area of positive law, or to extend positive morality in its objective features into positive law. But in any case the end is given or assumed, and the question is wholly about the nature and the merits of the means to realize it. The second of the practical functions is the aim to supply a fundamental

motive for determining conduct voluntarily, and so to employ reason as opposed to force for realizing an end. This is an aim to reach both internal and external morality, with the consent of the will, and the sphere occupied by this effort is sometimes called "private ethics" in contrast with politics. In it an ultimate or proximate ideal is proposed with a view to its finding a predominant inclination to realize it when known. This corresponds to the second of the theoretical functions of the science, based upon the same datum, the ideal. But the source of confusion comes precisely from this identity. The ideal, on the one hand, is supposed to explain what it is which will satisfy the demand for a better than actual conduct, and on the other, to supply motive efficiency for its own attainment. If it does not meet with such an inclination the ideal remains an ideal, and progress is left no resources save an adjustment of existing motives and forces to realize the best that the circumstances allow. Ethical theory, therefore, if it become "practical" at all, must make some concessions to data lower than its ideal.

In order to illustrate these various functions and their complications, and to explain the tendency to harmonize ethical theory with "practical" considerations as far as possible, we may have recourse to three of the chief ethical theories,—the theological, utilitarian, and what we shall call the moralistic, or Moralism, as opposed to Utilitarianism, and so representing what is sometimes called Formalism. These three points of view cover the general field in which scientific and practical functions of ethical theories are concerned, and it will be our purpose to show what the intellectual development has been from one to the other. We shall examine them as phases of thought without confining ourselves to the views of any particular age or philosopher.

The theological theory was first advanced to explain the existence of positive law, not the rational grounds of positive morality. It was a reference of actual customs to the will of divine beings and reflected the conceptions of arbitrary power which prevailed in that age. The modern form of the theory is quite different, even when it does exalt the influence of

divine will in determining moral distinctions. But the point in common is the idea of authority which invokes the fear of power in order to obtain obedience to a given rule of conduct. While the theological theory was designed and is still designed to explain the origin of moral law, at first the fact of its enactment or existence, and afterwards the source of its ethical qualities, the chief purpose was to obtain a ground for obedience. This fact implies that the theory was serving a double function,—that of explaining something, and that of insuring or encouraging a special line of action. In regard to its explanatory power it was quite natural, as it still is, where the mind resorts at once to the absolute for an explanation of all things, to refer moral facts to the divine. As long as his existence is undisputed and his relation to the phenomena assumed, the reference of moral law, positive or rational, to the will or nature of God is scientific enough. Few would question the ultimate reference of all facts to the Absolute, when it is once granted to exist. But in regard to the usefulness of such a conclusion there might be some dispute after its truth has been admitted. Scientifically useful it might be; that is, it may indicate the metaphysical source or the efficient cause of certain facts and thus satisfy intellectual curiosity, but this was not the main purpose for which the theory was advanced. As we have said, it was intended to invoke authority for certain lines of conduct. In ancient times it appealed to the motive of fear, in modern times to both fear and respect. When a sovereign power enforces its laws it is a sufficient, or at least a very efficient, motive for obedience to know that these laws are commands of that power. Hence where the existence of the divine is admitted and the fear or respect for its authority well established, the theological theory has great motive efficiency in addition to the explanatory power which may be claimed for it.

But it is important to remark that the integrity of these two functions is absolutely conditioned upon the truthfulness of the divine existence. A scientific theory which is not explaining absolutely new phenomena is expected to prove the connection between known laws or causes and the facts to be



explained. In other words, it appeals to admitted principles. The theological theory conforms to this requirement where there is no dispute about its ultimate postulate, but if the divine existence be questioned, both the explanatory and motive efficiency of the theory are destroyed or kept in suspense until the problem of metaphysics and theology is solved. That is, the ethical controversy is shifted to a new field. Now, scepticism usually attacks the theory by disputing its postulate, and not by disputing the relation of moral law to the Absolute, if that postulate be admitted. Hence, its assault tells most against the motive efficiency of the theory without directly impeaching its explanatory power. It tacitly grants that this relation of moral law may be admitted, if God's existence be proved, or it leaves entirely open the question of that relation, so that the interest of the problem is to save the effect upon practical morals and to ignore the scientific aspect of it. If scepticism did not come in to disturb the stability of the one condition upon which the motive efficiency of the theory rested it would remain forever a purely scientific question, whether or not the moral law had the relation to the absolute claimed for it. The general interest in it would be very slight in this case, as it would be limited to those curious minds which delight to revel in metaphysical quiddities. Ethics would then be and remain a branch of theology. But its vulnerable point is the perennially disputed question about the divine existence, and scepticism, by showing that this assumption requires proof, suspends all practical influence upon conduct, issuing from the motives of fear or respect, until that all-important truth is established. In the mean time morality may be turned into Pandemonic confusion: not, perhaps, because any such consequence is a necessary one from the doubt of the divine, but because the belief in it had been charged with undue responsibilities, making morality the victim of any change in regard to the theory. But, in challenging the security of the belief in divine existence, scepticism at once undermines the motive efficiency of the theological theory, wherever it has exercised that influence, without necessarily assaulting its scientific conception, and conse-

quently has inculcated the impression, consciously or unconsciously, that moral laws are without any authority, or that their obligatory nature has been mistaken. In any case, however, as a reaction against the idea of authority, it relaxes the respect which the human mind has felt for tradition, and moral rules appear to be left without adequate ground or support.

Whenever scepticism has in any degree succeeded both in discrediting the theological theory and in arousing solicitude for the integrity of moral laws, the reconstructive effort has taken one of two directions, which in Greek parlance were Epicureanism and Platonism, and in modern thought Utilitarianism and Moralism or Rationalism. All schools interested in preserving social order and scientific truth agreed that there were facts needing explanation and that some reason must be assigned as a ground of action. To omit the reconstructive effort of Greek thought, which we have not space to consider, the transition from the theological to the utilitarian point of view is a passage from the idea of a *formal* or an *efficient* to that of a *final* cause for conduct, from an antecedent ground or authority to an ultimate *end* of action.

The utilitarian end, of course, is pleasure in some form. Its chief significance for the functions of ethical theory, however, is the identification of the object of ethics as a science with its object as an art. The end to be sought is conceived, both as the datum to explain something,—namely, the ground of moral law,—and as the object to be realized by it. In the theological view, ethics appeared only as a science not distinctly occupied with any end. Its motive efficiency came less from the merits of a practical object to be accomplished than from the necessity of obeying formal laws or submitting to authority. But the utilitarian position imports a new point of view into the problem, and, if it retains any scientific conceptions at all, it fuses them with the idea of ethics as an art, so that the theoretical and practical functions of this position become merely the obverse and reverse sides of the same fact, and this may explain some of the confusion into which many moralists have been pushed by misunderstanding the terms of the case. A theoretical question is generally assumed to

demand the formal or efficient instead of the final cause of phenomena, and hence, when the problem is shifted to the last field, the prepossessions of the former are likely to exert an influence for creating friction between two different points of view. The method of reconciliation is simple, and that is to show that two distinct problems are evoked by the separate objects of thought. But, dropping the matter of reconciliation, the chief interest at present concerns the functions exercised by Utilitarianism as an ethical theory.

The end, pleasure, to which it appeals must be a datum which either explains certain phenomena or may act as a motive efficient for realizing the object of ethics, or it must do both of these. Now, pleasure undoubtedly explains much if not all of actual conduct. Those who maintain that all men are governed by that motive, perhaps by that motive alone, must regard it as the conception which reduces to unity the manifold phenomena of conduct. It is thus a principle which exercises explanatory power. It shows what common end men seek in the manifold varieties of action they exhibit. Scientific curiosity is therefore in a measure satisfied. But does it, in explaining actual conduct, explain all that a theory of ethics must explain? If so, why is it that mankind, philosophers and laymen alike, are always demanding some ideal conduct better than the actual as the proper aim or attainment of morals? This only implies that however the notion of pleasure may explain actual conduct, it does not express the content of that which is above or beyond the real; that is, it does not express the ideal at which ethics practically aims or seeks to know scientifically, unless the ideal and the actual are identical. But this would only be to say that the ideal was actually realized, and if so, it is absurd for ethics to seek for something beyond the realized ideal. Its functions as a theory would be exhausted in explaining actual facts by reducing them to the unity of this one realized end. It would then have no function as an art to recommend the attainment of another and higher object than the actually realized. Utilitarianism, as a theory, is therefore in a dilemma. If pleasure does not explain actual

conduct, the theory founded upon it fails in explanatory power. On the other hand, if it does explain all men's actions, it satisfies the demand for the ideal only by making that ideal coincide with the actual. But this would be to abandon the postulate upon which all ethics is founded,—namely, the obligation to seek a better than really is. If the ideal and the actual are the same, no duties whatever can exist, and Utilitarianism fails again in explanatory power by not giving an end which *ought* to be realized.

But the fact is that the refutation of Utilitarianism is not so simple. The theory is by no means so absurd as this dilemma would imply. Its advocates do not appeal to simple unqualified pleasure as the explanation of all mysteries in the problem. It may explain all or the most of actual conduct, or it may not: I do not care to decide which it does. But utilitarians respond to the demand for an ideal by setting up differences of quantity or of quality in pleasure as determining the difference between right and wrong. In this way they hope to point out an ideal which is not always realized, and I for my part grant that the conception of such a difference conforms to the demand made upon an ethical theory. Whether quantity or quality of pleasure is the true ideal I do not care to determine. But the distinction implied by the "greatest pleasure" as opposed to a lesser, or a "higher kind of pleasure" as opposed to a lower, does express the difference between what is actually done and what ought to be done, whether it exhausts that difference or not; and hence it accords Utilitarianism that explanatory power which a theory of the ideal must possess in order to be ethical at all. In referring actual conduct to pleasure it exercises the function of a classificatory science, reducing facts to unity. But, since it does not fulfil the proper functions of ethics in this process, it must satisfy the demands of a moral science by telling what the ideal is; which it does by asserting that this datum is the greatest quantity or the highest quality of pleasure. In so far, at least, as these notions coincide with, or imply what is not actually realized, they supply an ideal and exercise explanatory power beyond that which systematizes

the actual. So much may be conceded; and we find, therefore, two important functions exhibited by Utilitarianism; but we may still ask whether it fully explains the quality of *virtue* attaching to conduct approved as right. Does the pursuit of pleasure, of any quantity or quality, imply that characteristic of merit which is given to conduct under the inspiration of duty or Kant's imperative? Does it explain the source of those qualities of will and conduct which we describe as good or moral? If not, the theory of Utilitarianism, even in its modified and improved form, does not supply all the demands of the problem; that is, does not explain everything. But whether it is defective or not is a matter which can be postponed for the moment, and we shall now turn to the consideration of its motive efficiency as a theory.

We must keep clear the distinction between the motive efficiency of a theory, and the motive efficiency of any particular datum of consciousness, which may be an element recognized by the theory. The motive-power of a theory depends upon its recognizing some principle which tends to bring about conduct not yet realized; that is, ideal ends. The motive-power may be entirely distinct from the end itself, and perhaps in the case of the ideal end it may be the very weakness of the ideal in competition with actual influences that makes it necessary to obtain another motive efficient for obtaining that end. Hence the motive efficacy of a theory will be proportioned to the admission of principles qualified to stimulate the will beyond the mere recognition of an ideal which scientifically explains what ought to be. If the ideal have all the motive-power required for its own realization, no other motive agency needs to be appealed to. But if it had this efficiency as a fact the actual would coincide with it, and there would be no need of any explanatory principle other than the classificatory, and ethics as a moral science would not exist. At best it would only be a form of history. Undoubtedly the ideal should have motive efficiency, and in many cases it may have this power. When it does the ideal will be realized, and there will be no need of extrinsic motivation for attaining the end. But when it does not exercise an

influence for effecting its own realization, the theory of ethics cannot get beyond supplying explanatory demands, unless it find a motive efficient other than the ideal for directing conduct to that end. Now, if we turn to the theological theory, we shall discover that it conformed precisely to this condition or conception of the case. The power which the theory exercised over human conduct came from the way in which it utilized the motives of fear or respect for the divine authority, while the ideal end to be attained might indeed be something quite different. The motive efficiency of the theory did not, or need not, consist solely in its explanatory datum, but in the recognition of a force having more power to overcome the competition of lower agencies than the ideal; and even if it did not produce ideally moral conduct in all respects, it did more than the bare cognition of the ideal seemed able to do. But all this motive efficiency was completely annihilated when the assumption of the divine existence was put in the crucible of scepticism, and we were left either to prove that assumption and reduce ethics to a dependence upon theology, or to construct some other theory or ground of conduct. This attempt, as we have seen, has been made by Utilitarianism, and we have to inquire whether it supplies the motive efficiency of the theory which it supplants.

In so far as Utilitarianism uses pleasure as a mere explanation of actual conduct it cannot be said to possess motive efficiency at all, because in this feature of its function it is not dealing with an ideal end which it is desirable to make imperative. In this limited conception pleasure is not conceived as an end to be attained, but as a conception to which actual facts can be reduced. Motive efficiency in morals must attach to principles aiming to realize the ideal, not to explain the actual. It is true that pleasure, when it explains actual conduct, has also been the motive efficient in producing this conduct; but if it represents a force in human nature which inevitably determines action, it cannot be said to represent the ideal, because this does not inevitably produce action in conformity with itself. Morals refer to what is not done as well as to what is, and its imperatives imply that the end

represented by them may or may not be realized, according as the will decides. Two possible conceptions—that of pleasure as an actual motive and as an ideal end—are thus at the basis of the ethical principle, so that when pleasure is conceived as the necessary determinant of action it cannot, as Kant has remarked, be an object of obligation at all; for its necessity excludes the idea of alternatives of choice which is the condition of moral conduct. Hence it cannot be used as the free motive efficient for realizing an ideal end beyond itself. Consequently Utilitarianism can have no motive-power as a theory, but only explanatory efficacy, unless it either recognizes an ideal which is more than unqualified pleasure, or some principle other than pleasure to induce action with reference to this ideal end. As we have shown, it does recognize at least a proximate ideal when it distinguishes between quantity or quality of pleasure. But precisely because this difference of quantity or quality is an ideal, it is something which is not uniformly realized, and we find it quite a general fact of experience that it is the weakness of the ideal in competition with lower impulses that prevents its attainment. Whenever this is the case Utilitarianism contains no principle having motive efficiency to substitute for the impotency of motive-power in the ideal. We found that the theological view did possess this characteristic, but in default of the security of its first postulate we have been obliged to look elsewhere for a determinant to do its work.

Now, it is the theory of Moralism which supplies this want. Its fundamental principle is duty, obligation, the categorical imperative, or a state of consciousness, which may act as a force of inhibition upon inclinations stronger than the ideal, and as an impulse to achieve the highest good or ideal, recognized by the mind as binding. We must be careful to remark, however, that this motivation may be employed to realize the end adopted by Utilitarianism, and does not require the setting up of some other end than happiness, although such as are not satisfied with that view are privileged to choose another. What this different end may be, or whether it is legitimate or not, it is not necessary to determine. It is

all the same whether we hold that happiness or something else is the ideal. For in any case the ideal requires additional motive help for its realization, or there is no use for ethics at all. Hence Utilitarianism cannot dispense with the principles of obligation, as is clearly admitted by Mill. That is to say, Moralism has, or recognizes, a motive efficient which the utilitarian must admit. The theory is, therefore, not *necessarily* in conflict with that view, and can be so only when it insists upon an end other than pleasure as the ideal. But such a difference does not alter its motive efficiency, as designed to enforce conduct which inclination is not strong enough to realize. But while the categorical imperative may supplement the defective motive efficiency of Utilitarianism, and thus give Moralism a merit which its competitor does not possess, the question arises whether Moralism exercises any explanatory power; that is, does it explain any facts, or does the principle which it invokes determine any qualities that are the object of moral judgment? Does Moralism show how the character of conduct is affected by its principle, as Utilitarianism attempts to show by the criterion of pleasure?

This question can be clearly answered. If pleasure without qualification be the highest good and men always seek it, moral imperatives will be superfluous as motives for inducing the pursuit of such an end. Ethics would be as unnecessary as it is to tell men to eat or to breathe. They seek the good instinctively, and while we might call their conduct good, it would not be with any feeling that such approval acted in a way to encourage it, or indicated any moral interest in it. The *instinctive* pursuit of an end is not a virtue. We may be glad to see it, but we cannot expect to affect it by our approbation. But if we add to such an invariable pursuit of pleasure the rational consciousness of its value as an end and make it an obligation to seek it, the obedience of such an imperative takes on a new character, or the pursuit of pleasure would have a new merit of another kind. The imperative might not be necessary so far as external consequences are concerned, but consciousness is so qualified that it may even transfigure an instinct by subordinating its end to rational supervision



and control. It will give merit and virtue to conduct which instinct, valuable as it is, cannot do. If this be true where the ideal is always sought, by supposition, how much more is it true where it has not force enough of its own power to obtain realization? As a fact no utilitarian holds that the ideal is always sought, and so he sets up pleasure in some qualified form or amount as the ideal. If this be not actually sought, and if it be weaker in motive-power than some other lower inclinations, obedience to an imperative representing the ideal gives conduct a quality which it would not have in following the lower, and which it does not have in seeking a personal interest, however this interest may coincide with duty. Conduct from the sentiment of duty is testimony to the strength of character, no matter what end is its object, and hence it determines a merit which no motive of personal or even extra-personal pleasure can possess. It is not necessary even that the end at which it aims shall be realized. The good will is sufficient to decide the merit of the act and the agent, absolutely considered. If the action miscarries in its effects, the only want requiring to be supplied is knowledge. The element insuring stability of character is secured in the respect for the categorical imperative, which, in addition to acting as a motive efficient to realize the ideal, be it pleasure or anything else, also explains what it is that constitutes strictly moral action and moral character, at least of the highest type. Such a conclusion vindicates for Moralism theoretical as well as practical value, explanatory as well as motive efficiency,—theoretical value in that it satisfies our curiosity about the principle which constitutes the peculiar quality of moral conduct and character, and practical value in that it supplies a supplementary motive to realize an ideal unequal to the motivation expected of it.

That the sentiment of duty, or some such principle, is the basis of virtue is virtually admitted by Bentham in a remarkable passage directly contradicting the main thesis of his doctrine. In this passage he says that virtue is of the nature of a struggle against inclination. It will not do to say that pleasure determines good conduct and then reverse this judg-

ment by admitting that virtue can be attained only by resistance to that impulse. But Bentham here unconsciously makes a concession to common sense and to Moralism. I do not think it true that there must always be a struggle with inclination in order that the conduct may be virtuous; but there must always be that which a struggle implies,—namely, respect for a law of duty,—and this it is which determines morality, whether the end be utilitarian or not.

With this conclusion it will be observed by any ordinary reader how the various theories of ethics may be made complementary of each other, each supplying a datum not developed by the others. But I cannot take the space to point out in detail the extent to which such a reconciliation can be carried. I must leave that work to the judgment of the reader. The chief consideration to be noted, as a conclusion of what has been said of the functions of ethical theory, is the tendency to the predominance of "practical" interests exhibited in the whole history of its discussions. By this tendency, I mean the disposition to throw the importance of ethical theory upon its recognition of a principle having motive efficiency rather than merely scientific or explanatory power. We have seen that the theological theory retained no scientific interest after it lost its motive efficiency. Nobody cared anything about the metaphysical grounds of morality when the fear or respect for divine authority ceased to sustain the moral and social order. The great want came to be, not so much a scientific explanation of the source of moral law, as a mode of inducing or compelling conformity to it, as believed by a part of the community, and perhaps admitted by the majority or all of it. The theory was expected not only to indicate the origin of moral law, but also to specify some invulnerable truth which could not be ignored in conduct. It might be an end which was to move us by fear or respect; but in either case it was to be a reason affecting the will rather than the intellect.

Similar observations apply to Utilitarianism. In so far as it merely explained actual conduct by scientifically reducing it to the unity of a single principle, the uniformity of hedonistic motivation, it excited little interest and as little contro-

versy, because it was assumed by its opponents to be too true that men were solely moved by pleasure as a fact. Hence it might explain something, But this was not what was demanded of an ethical theory: it must present a principle for moving the realization of the ideal. Hence it was when Utilitarianism set up the greatest quantity or the best quality of pleasure, both as indicating the ideal and as offering a compensating factor for the sacrifice of lower inclinations, that it excited any profound interest. This interest on the part of its advocates lay in the belief that a principle had been found which would influence the will more effectively than the motive of duty, which had to take the risk of defeat in competition with the inclinations. On the other hand, Moralism felt an interest in the principle, because it supposed and supposes that its motive efficiency is not in favor of virtue or of higher ideals involving a sacrifice. A complication arises in this way between the two theories. They both possess motive efficiency of a different kind. Utilitarianism, where duty and interest can be made in any way to coincide, recognizes a motive efficient which may induce good behavior when an abstract appeal to duty may fail. On the other hand, where the ideal of Utilitarianism is weaker than lower inclinations and cannot be reconciled with personal interest, no motive efficient but that of Moralism can avail against desire. What the two theories may explain in these cases is of little import compared with the factor which is wanted to affect the will. Hence the main interest in theoretic ethical discussion turns upon the principle which tends to move the will in the right direction rather than that which merely satisfies the intellect. A completely satisfactory theory would be one with both factors. But the existing theories combine them in different degrees, and controversy prevails precisely in proportion to the predominance of one mental instinct over another. The influence of "practical" interests, however, has always succeeded in giving the preference to those which have concentrated attention upon the element of motive efficiency.

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## THE MORALITY OF NATIONS.

WE are all willing enough to acknowledge that we are under some sort of moral law. Our life is regulated by a "Do this," "Abstain from that" above and beyond that limited circle of duties sanctioned by the law of the land. But it seems to be a moot point whether there are any laws of politics like the laws of ethics—whether there is such a thing as a morality of nations as well as a morality of individuals.

Of course, in one sense of the term, there is no question about it. The citizens of a state, or members of a race, have in all cases certain characteristics—more or less strongly marked—which are exemplified in all or most members of the race or nation. These are traits of national or racial character, and lead to different nations regulating their own affairs in ways of their own, and holding themselves differently towards their neighbors. In this way we have as a fact a national character, not very distinctly traced perhaps, but still there in its broad features. Perhaps we might call it a national morality,—traits of moral character which distinguish one race from another and develop from generation to generation in connection with their surroundings.

But it is a further question than this that raises doubt in many minds. Can we say of the state or nation, as we do of the individual, that it *ought* to do or abstain from anything? Is there anywhere to be found a moral code for nations corresponding to the moral law to which the individual conscience bows? This is the question which I purpose to consider here: comparing national with individual morality, and asking in what sense states may be said to be under moral obligation—to have duties to their citizens or to other states. And I shall endeavor to carry out the discussion without entering into any question as to the philosophical basis of ethics or of politics.

Behind the fictitious personality which is ascribed to a state or nation there is a more concrete reality than the will of emperor or cabinet or popular majority. The state (it may indeed be said) is nothing but the people who make it, or those who serve or guide it. And this, at least, is true: that the state is nothing without the people or apart from them. It *is* the people, but the people in certain relations to one another, with a common history, common traditions, and a common national character which has grown out of these and will determine the conduct of the people when they act together and for common ends. The state is the people, but the people organized for certain purposes. It is not enough to say that the action of a state is but the decision of a king or prime minister or of a majority in Parliament. The decision or the action is not an individual or personal one: it is representative of the nation. It may have been induced by selfish motives; king or minister or parliamentary majority may play for its own hand; but still the action concerns the relation of the state as a whole to its citizens or to other states. And if it has escaped this worst but common fault,—if the nation's representative has acted for national and not for personal ends,—can we say that, in this case, the action done by a nation's representative for national ends is to be judged in the same way as if it were a merely personal or individual action?

The state, accordingly, is not merely a collection of individuals. It is these individuals organized in a definite way. We may expect, therefore, to find that the principles of state-action and the principles of individual action are not the same. At least it is clear that the state moves in a different region, so to speak, from that in which individuals move. The state may, or rather always does, act by means of individuals. There is no other agency known to us. But individuals, acting as and for the state, have a different function from that which belongs to them as individuals. Men have a duty first to other individuals, secondly and at the same time to that organized social body which we call the state. The state also has a twofold activity, first, in relation to its own citizens, secondly, in relation to other states. In one region of its activity

the state and the individual bear a relation to one another which may be imperfectly apprehended as a reciprocal relation. The individual has duties to the state and perhaps rights against it in turn; while the state, within certain limits, controls the action of the individual: educating him perhaps, laying down laws for his social and industrial behavior, and compelling him to contribute of his property, and even to sacrifice his liberty of action and risk his life, in defence of her integrity and the objects which she holds worthy of a nation's endeavor. In this region the functions of the state and of the individual are reciprocal, not identical. In the other region of its activity, the work of the state has at most only an analogy with the work of the individual. Its relations, diplomatic or military, with other states may be compared with the relations of one individual to another. But the two sets of relations are certainly not the same.

The regions covered by individual and by national activity must, therefore, be admitted to be distinct. But it may still be maintained that they are—or ought to be—regulated by the same ethical principles. It is here that conflict of opinion enters. On the one hand, it is often assumed or asserted that national and individual morality are the same; on the other hand, they are sometimes contrasted in such a way as to suggest the conclusion that they have nothing in common with one another, and that national morality, in any sense of the word which involves moral obligation, does not exist. The latter view is apparently that maintained by her Britannic Majesty's ambassador at Paris in an address on "National and Individual Morality Compared," delivered to the students at Glasgow on November 9, 1888. Lord Lytton is familiar both with government and with diplomacy; his authority regarding the practice of government is undoubtedly great; and his arguments on this point must be allowed to be weighty. With the other view—the view that the same moral laws hold of the statesman acting for the nation, and of the individual in his private life—we are more familiar. Many politicians are in the habit of appealing in a comprehensive and perplexing way to moral first principles.

And these appeals—crude as the principles on which they rest may be—argue at least a readiness on the part of the people to judge the state by the moral law of the individual. On this point, the judgment of the people seems unanimously to contradict the experience of diplomatists of all ages. On the one side, we have all plain men declaring that the state ought to be moral as they are moral ; on the other, those who are in the secret asserting that in this sense no state ever was, or could afford to be, moral. Between two such combatants, fighting with different weapons, how can the conflict be brought to an issue ? Fortunately we have not far to go for a fairly precise statement of the plain man's case. " We maintain," says the *London Spectator* of 5th October, 1889, that a state " can, and occasionally does, commit all the crimes possible to a corporation ; . . . above all, a state can murder and it can steal ; and it commits the first crime when it executes any one knowing the execution to be unjust, and the second when it orders one man or one class to pay special taxes in order to benefit another." The state, it is held, can commit the same crimes as an individual, but only some of them. From others it has an immunity. Some crimes, it is acknowledged, cannot be committed by a corporation, or consequently by the state. We only need to look at the decalogue to see what some of them are. The state can hardly be said to be guilty of breaking the fifth commandment or the seventh. The most that can be said against it is that it gives its citizens undue liberty of doing so if they are so minded. But the state can steal, we are told, and it can murder.

In what sense can it be said that honesty is a duty of national as well as of individual morality ? Can the state be properly said to be guilty of theft ? There is a confusion, surely, at the very outset in saying that the state can commit a crime. A crime is something more than a sin, something more than an immoral act. It is an act punishable by law. It is the law of the land and the penal sanction which follows law which make an act a crime. It is absurd, therefore, to speak as if the state, acting legally, could commit a crime. A law may be pernicious or bad. It may be so bad—most

moralists acknowledge—as to make it a moral duty to disobey it. But to be criminal it would have to be a violation of law. To speak of a legal act as criminal is to confuse discussion by perverting the recognized meaning of words.

If the penalties against theft were to be removed from the statute-book, it would cease to be a crime. But it would be as much an offence against morality as before. Can the state then be guilty of this moral offence? An individual is guilty of theft whenever he takes for his own use the property of another without that other's consent. He may be in greater need of the thing stolen, or may intend to use it for a better purpose than the owner would have done; but none the less he steals it, he is guilty of theft. Can the state steal and be a thief like this? If so, no private thief was ever so incorrigible and systematic an offender as the state is. At the present time it enters each man's house and demands a fortieth part of his income for its own purposes. It takes away part of his property for the support of the poor, part for the education of other men's children, and other portions of it in various ways for various purposes—for almost every purpose except religious purposes, which are supposed to have been sufficiently provided for by the piety of preceding generations. Surely no one will call this theft: there are few to be found who even think it wrong. The state has certain necessary functions to perform; and the most extreme *laissez-faire* politicians admit the justice of taxation for these purposes. Individuals must willingly or unwillingly contribute of their means to support the state. It must live and do its proper work, and it is with full moral right that it takes the goods of its citizens to enable it to do so. The reason is admitted to be a sufficient justification. But how would such an apology be received for the seizure of one man's goods by another? It is said that a French thief once used the argument, without any conspicuous success. "But, my lord, I must live,—il faut vivre," he said. "Je n'y vois pas la nécessité," was the reply of the pedantic moralist on the bench, as he passed sentence of death. If one man seizes another man's goods without his permission, this is called theft: seizure of this kind is con-



stantly carried out by the state in levying taxes; yet we do not say that the state steals the taxes it collects.

Vain attempts have indeed been made by certain political theorists—doctrinaire politicians of the first water—to base the morality of taxation upon the consent of the taxed. “No taxation without representation” is their motto: an excellent maxim as a partial safeguard against unfair levying of taxes, but far from sufficient to induce the whole world to go up willingly to be taxed. If any evidence were needed, the custom-house officers might have something to tell us as to the willingness of many people to pay the taxes to which—according to this theory—they have already agreed, if taxation be founded on consent. But how could the possession of a vote for a single member of Parliament constitute consent to the decisions of a majority of its members? If the moral law of honesty—the law against stealing or theft—is the *same* for the nation as for the individual, then all taxation to which the taxed have not consented must be regarded as theft. But it is a position far short of this which the *Spectator* moralist is anxious to maintain. The state steals (he says) “when it orders one man, or one class, to pay special taxes in order to benefit another.” The offence is somewhat loosely defined. It might seem to apply to the poor rate, which taxes the class of householders for the benefit of the class of paupers; and to the educational rate, which taxes persons who have no children, or who send their children to schools not assisted by the government, for the benefit of those who send theirs to the Board School. Yet the *Spectator* could never be suspected of calling such taxes theft. It is more easy to imagine a failure in drawing the proper distinction. But the very difficulty of defining the distinction between just and unjust taxation shows that an unfair tax is something different from stealing. Theft can be easily defined and easily recognized. But it is a difficult matter to determine what is a fair principle of taxation; and no chancellor of the Exchequer would pretend to do more than approximate to this fairness in practice. Perhaps there are cases in which the name and legal forms of taxation may involve something more specific than unfairness

or injustice. When one individual or class uses its control of the legislature to lay the taxes upon others and let itself go free, it is not easy to distinguish the procedure from common dishonesty. There have been times in the past in which the arbitrary power of a small class has been used to excuse itself from taxation and lay the whole burden on the trader and the peasant. There are indications at the present time that the arbitrary power of a very much larger class may be tempted in the near future to retaliate, and, for its own relief and gain, to levy all contributions upon the less powerful but richer few. We do not call such actions theft; for they are done under the forms and carry with them the sanction of law: and by theft we commonly mean a breach of the law, or a crime. Yet it seems none the less dishonest for individuals to use the advantage of their position to provide for national wants by taking from others only, without contributing themselves. But we call the act dishonest only when we are judging the agents as individuals. It is dishonest only if the agents are really acting for themselves when pretending to act for the state. Individual morality becomes mixed with national morality when those through whom the state acts act for themselves and their own interests, instead of for the common good. The appropriateness of the charge of dishonesty will thus depend upon the motives of the individuals. The same act of confiscation, carried out by the combined wills of many, will imply dishonesty in those only who have voted for it out of covetousness. Others may have joined with them who have had no thought of personal gain; and these it would be absurd to call dishonest, however unfair or unjust their action may have been. Their action has not been a personal one; they have acted as representing the state, and the state—as I have already argued—cannot steal.

The code of individual morals cannot, therefore, be applied to the state. National morality is not the same thing—cannot be expressed by the same laws—as individual morality. But it does not follow from this that there is no such thing as a moral law for the conduct of states. The recognition that

the law of the land—statute law—may be bad, and should be altered or amended, implies a higher law by which it may be judged and to which it ought to conform. Because the state cannot steal, it does not follow that it may not be unjust. What the measure and criterion are of national justice, I do not pretend to determine now. In the duty of justice, we may think—and we shall not be far wrong—national and individual morality meet. It is a law both for the state and for the individual. Justice is, in fact, more a national or social, than a merely individual virtue. It is when the individual has to act not for himself, but as representing the state or a corporation, that scope for its application enters. Justice is the virtue of a judge, or of an examiner, or, in a measure, of an employer of labor, or of the head of a family. And in all these cases, the man who recognizes his duty may be said to be acting for a community—the state or some smaller social unit—and as representative of it. In an early code of individual morals—in the decalogue—there is no word of justice among the duties of man.

We may see in this way how the morality of the individual and of the nation have come to be spoken of and thought of as the same. A man plays many parts, and we are apt to confuse them. Perhaps he confuses them himself. Pretending to act for the nation, the statesman or ruler may prostitute his office, and, working for his own ends, break the laws of individual as well as of national morality. The individual again is often called upon to act for the state or for some smaller social aggregate; and the code of individual morality must be widened to take in this national or quasi-national activity.

This distinction may enable us to deal with another case more difficult than the preceding. A state can not only steal, we are told, but it can murder. And it does so “when it executes any one knowing the execution to be unjust.” Here again there is the same confusion between individual conduct and national. We hear often enough indeed of “legal murder.” But it is the language of metaphor colored by passion. Murder implies malice; and the state bears no malice. If the ruler gratifies his hatred or his ambition by using the final

sanction of the state's authority against his enemy, this is malice; and, although under cover of law, the ruler has for himself incurred the moral guilt of murder. But it is because he has allowed his personal interest or enmity to sway his actions that he has brought himself within the scope of the law which says, "Thou shalt not kill." When David used his power as a king to gratify his private ends, and put Uriah in the forefront of the battle, he did not overstep the letter of the law by a hair's breadth. But he was guilty of murder as much as the moonlighter of to-day who shoots his landlord from behind a hedge or fires into a defenceless cottage. He was moved by malice against the obstacle in his path; his action was not taken in his quality of king or judge, but to gratify his private ends. It may be and is the right and duty of the state, in certain circumstances, to kill or to expose to death; and it must be admitted that a ruler may use the sword of the state unjustly without a personal or selfish motive in doing so. But it is not minimizing the guilt of such injustice when we say that it is a mistake to call it murder. There is no malice in the action, and malice is the essential note of murder. Murder is killing out of malice. Unjust killing is injustice; it may or may not be murder in addition. Perhaps an historical example instanced by Lord Lytton is in place here, although it refers to international morality rather than to the rights and duties of a state in relation to its own citizens. "It is certain," he says, "that, in his conduct of public affairs, the first Napoleon committed many such offences against private morality. But the language of private morality cannot be applied to his public acts without great limitations. The kidnapping of the Duc d'Enghien, and his summary execution after a sham trial, was about as bad an act as well could be. But I should certainly hesitate to describe it as a murder in the ordinary sense. Morally, I think, it was worse than many murders for which men have been tried and punished by law. But I do *not* think that the English government in 1815 could, with any sort of propriety, have delivered up Napoleon to Louis XVIII. to be tried for that offence like a common criminal."

The state stands to its citizens in a relation which no one individual bears to another. To further its ends it may take their property and even their life. It neither steals nor murders in doing so. And yet, on the other hand, it is clear that it would be unjust to do so at random. State action is, or ought to be, for the common good of the whole; and the sacrifice of property, and still more that of life, can only be justified when necessary for the common welfare. The state must therefore be regarded as having duties to its citizens: though they are not the same as those one citizen owes to another. Conversely, the citizen may be said to have rights against the state,—not, indeed, an absolute right either to life, or property, or freedom of action, but a right not to be deprived of these, except for the good of the state, acting impartially for the good of all.

Thus far I have spoken of the morality of the state only in relation to its own citizens: and the position for which I have contended may seem hardly to require so much argument. Were it not for the confusion which surrounds the question, a simple statement might almost have taken the place of controversy. Were it not contended, on the one side, that the code of private morality holds for nations as well as for individuals, and that a state can commit all or almost all the offences—the crimes even—of which an individual may be guilty; and, on the other side, were not some writers inclined to ignore or to deny that there is anything that can be properly called national morality at all, it might have been unnecessary to insist at such length that the state is a moral agent, and that the moral end and moral code which ought to regulate its relation to its citizens, are closely bound up with, although not the same as, the duties to which its individual citizens are bound.

But the state has to do not only with its own citizens, but also with other states. Can any ethical principle hold of its behavior towards them? Is there any such thing as international morality which bears to states a similar relation to that which the laws of private morality bear to individual

men? In this region of foreign relations the conflict between the different views of national morality is accentuated and brought to a point. There is a sufficiently strong analogy between the state and the individual to give an appearance of reason to the assertion that, when different states are brought into relation, their conduct should be governed by the same laws as those which regulate the conduct of individuals. But, on the other hand, the analogy is weak enough at places to give support to such a contention as that urged by Lord Lytton. "First of all," he argues, "the subjects of private morals, that is to say, individuals, differ from the subjects of public morals, that is to say, nations, so widely that hardly a single proposition applicable to the one can be properly applied to the others. In the next place, of the classes of obligations which constitute private morals, only one, namely, justice, has a place in public morals at all; and the sort of justice which finds its place in public morals is totally different from the justice which relates to individuals."

There is much good sense in this statement. But, if it does not exaggerate the difference between the individual and the nation, at least it disregards their connection. It overstates the case, so as to lead as far from the truth as the opposing doctrine that private and public morals are the same. There is an apparent cynicism in it, too, from which we are apt to recoil, and, in so doing, to fall into the opposite extreme of judging the state by a standard that would be too narrow even for individuals: condemning all war as "multitudinous murder," and looking upon conquest, and even upon colonization, as but theft on a large scale.

There has long been a party in our country who have adopted this view, regarding war as sinful and immoral, and the profession of arms as no better than trade in murder. The horrors of war, the sacredness of human life, and the precepts of the religion of peace have combined to make them testify against the use of the weapon, which no statesman has ever been bold enough to propose that the nation should lay aside. This sense of the horror of war has been shared and expressed by writers who are yet keenly alive to the martial

pride of arms. "The murder of the campaign is done to military music," Thackeray makes his hero, Henry Esmond, say, after listening to Addison's heroics on the victories of Marlborough. "I was ashamed of my trade," he continues, "when I saw those horrors perpetrated, which came under every man's eyes. You hew out of your polished verses a stately image of smiling victory; I tell you 'tis an uncouth, distorted, savage idol; hideous, bloody, and barbarous. The rites performed before it are shocking to think of. You great poets should show it as it is,—ugly and horrible, not beautiful and serene. Oh, sir, had you made the campaign, believe me you never would have sung it so."

"Murder done to military music." Does this sum up the triumphs of war? Do battle and warfare rouse only the evil passions of a man, turning him into an infuriate beast or an incarnate fiend? Surely this is one side of the shield only. There is no fire that tries a man so keenly, bringing out and lighting up both the good and evil in him, as the long privations of war and the wild shock of battle. In spite of the terror and the squalor which Thackeray describes with such vivid realism,—or, largely, because of them,—the field of battle, which every man enters with his life in his hand, has been the scene of the noblest heroism and self-sacrifice, and has shown human nature at its best as well as at its worst.

It would have been strange had it been otherwise. For warfare, stern and savage as it is, is the high road by which human civilization has been obliged to advance hitherto. Perhaps it may be possible in the future to construct less stony and dangerous paths for the progress of mankind. Already much has been done to soften even the stern art of war, by the spread of a common feeling among different nations. Compare, for example, the treatment of non-combatants and of prisoners as it was even in Marlborough's campaigns with what took place in the Franco-German war of twenty years ago, where strict discipline was maintained in the invading army, and no plunder or reckless slaughter was permitted. The dogs of war were kept in leash. Warfare between civilized states is no longer to be compared with Hobbes's state of

nature, where all things are permitted, and there is neither good nor evil. Common consent has established that no needless misery is to be inflicted, and that no injury is to be done which does not contribute to the great end of victory.

Here, then, at least, is a redeeming feature in the dark picture that has been drawn of the iniquity of warfare. War cannot be altogether bad, for it might be worse than it is. When nations cast aside the methods of diplomacy and peaceful negotiation, and appeal to the God of battles to settle their disputes, they are not freed from the bonds of morality; and they have even acknowledged the obligation (though they may not call it such) to restrain the misery of war within the limits of what is necessary for the attainment of its end.

These considerations are already pointing us to the same conclusion regarding international morality as that which we have reached regarding the morality of a nation in its relation to its own citizens. War is not "multitudinous murder." It gives the individual soldier opportunity for many offences which may escape detection and punishment: but probably much less opportunity for murder than for other offences. For the soldier cannot easily have malice, or any other personal feeling, towards those to whom he is opposed. To talk of the state committing murder is absurd; for the state is not a subject of feeling, and consequently can bear no malice. To say that the statesman who orders the war, or the general who conducts it, is guilty of murder, is almost equally absurd, except in the isolated cases in which he can be shown to have entered upon it to gratify his private ends. War may be the result of wanton aggression, or of an unjust claim where the interests of two states clash; and such wars are rightly called unjust. But if there are unjust wars, it follows that resistance to this injustice must itself be just. If all conquest and aggression is wrong, the war undertaken in self-defence, and to protect a nation's territory and the freedom of its citizens, must surely be justified, in spite of the sacrifice of life it is sure to involve.

It is a mistake to speak of a nation as committing murder



in war,—even in an unjust war. For not only is the state without the motive which is essential to murder; but it is only individuals that are killed: the conqueror does not kill the hostile state. It may weaken or even maim it; but the analogy with individual morality is not complete, except in the cases—so rare that they can hardly be said to exist at all—when the one state is entirely exterminated by the other.

Perhaps there is a more complete analogy with private morals in the case of conquest, when, as the result of war, or by forcible seizure, one nation deprives another of part of its territory. Here there is a complete similarity in the external action. It is in the absence of a personal or selfish motive that the act of conquest by a nation differs from theft by an individual. On the whole, it may seem, however, that the similarity of the two cases is much more striking than their difference: so much so as to make it difficult to deny that there is some appropriateness in the use of the term theft. Must we in all cases, therefore, mete out to conquest a similar moral condemnation to that with which we regard the act of theft? There is one consideration to which, I think, weight must be given before we pass so sweeping a judgment. Within a nation the state is above all individuals; and, although no citizen has a right to take or use the property of another without his consent, the state recognizes this absolute right of an individual to his property only as against other individuals, not as against itself. The state, therefore, is there as a superior power to prevent, if it see fit, the individual from grossly misusing his property, or from leaving it entirely unused, and thus depriving the nation of its share in the value which would be derived from its employment. But there is no corresponding superior power over nations, preventing the misuse or disuse of their property and power. Shall we say, therefore, that every nation has an absolute (moral) right to what it possesses as against the interference of any other nation? If we do, we push the rights of nations against one another further than individual rights exist, even in the eyes of the Liberty and Property Defence League. It is admitted on all hands that there is a limit restraining

individual rights to property. Is there no restriction at all—no moral restriction, I mean, for, of course, there is no legal restriction—upon a nation's right to its territory and all that it contains, to use ill or not to use at all? I do not see what good ground we can give for answering this question in the affirmative,—what reason there is for asserting the absolute moral right of a nation to non-interference from without, because it happens to be legally independent. It is more difficult to say to whom the right of interference belongs and on what occasions its use may be justified. Powerful nations are not unused to playing the part of mentor to their neighbors; and advice given in this way by a powerful state has commonly been found to end in some sacrifice of independence or integrity on the part of its weaker neighbor. We may condemn the injustice of the interference and of the loss of liberty or seizure of territory to which it may lead; but our view of national morality is hardly made clearer by applying to it the law against theft, borrowed without change from private morals.

In spite of the analogy, therefore, between the relation of individuals to one another and the relation of states to one another, the moral laws which hold of the former cannot be applied to the other without so much modification and explanation as to change their meaning in an important way. When we have explained all that can properly be meant by the laws, "Thou shalt not kill," or "Thou shalt not steal," as applied to nations, we find that we have explained away everything which makes "theft" different from "murder." What remains is in the form of a general obligation upon states to observe justice in their dealings with one another. As Lord Lytton puts it, in words already quoted, "Of the classes of obligations which constitute private morals, only one, namely, justice, has a place in public morals at all." With this I agree. But I dissent from the diplomatist when he goes on to assert that "the sort of justice which finds its place in public morals is totally different from the justice which relates to individuals. It is far less definite, it cannot be codified, and it consists mainly in moderation and kindly prudence." Justice, as

I have already argued, enters the sphere of private morals only when the individual is regarded as acting in a social capacity,—when he represents in some way a community or corporation. There are not two entirely different sorts of justice, therefore,—private and public,—but justice has various degrees and modes of application according to the kind of social whole within which it is applied. It is most clearly defined and most exactly codified when determined by a duly appointed legislature and enforced by the sanctions of an executive power. Yet the reality of justice, and of the moral obligation to observe it, does not depend on legal codification or penal sanction. The progress of legislation and of the administration of law is an attempt to bring the actual laws of the country and their application into closer and closer correspondence with the demands of an ideal justice: an ideal imperfectly apprehended, indeed, but yet appealed to as the criterion by which laws themselves are to be judged.

Such laws apply only to individuals and to corporations within the state. It is only there that justice is clearly defined and codified, and obtains the sanction of law. In international relations, on the other hand, we enter a region where definitions are less clear, where those rules only are codified which apply to the minor questions of international relation, to the neglect of weightier matters, and where the sanctions with which we are so familiar are conspicuous by their absence. We may even go the length of saying that there is no such thing as international law: for law implies a sovereign power over the subjects of it, enforcing obedience by penal sanctions. But this is no good reason for concluding that there is no such thing as international morality, or (with Lord Lytton) that the “sort of justice which finds its place in public morals is totally different from the justice which relates to individuals.” According to the diplomatist, the only justice to be recognized here “consists mainly in moderation and kindly prudence.” Overlooking the counsel to kindness and moderation,—as we may be allowed to do, for it is hardly put forward as a moral law,—we see that international justice is made to consist in prudence, a view which distinguishes it

sharply from justice in the ordinary acceptation of the term. Justice within the state involves impartiality in dealing with the competing claims of individuals; whereas the state is said to act justly to neighboring states if it is prudent,—*i.e.*, looks after its own interests. Self-preservation (as the theory is otherwise put) is the only end for the state in its foreign relations; self-interest the only standard by which its action is to be guided.

Even this, however, is not a denial of international morality, but only a special theory of its content. The theory overlooks, I think, important elements in the nature and development of nations; but yet it is one which may without inconsistency be held by those whose view of private duty has far transcended Egoism, the gospel of selfishness. As Lord Lytton says, "Think of a nation solely as a simple unit, and we must affirm that, as such, in its relations with other units of the same kind, it is not only entitled, but bound, to act with greater seeming selfishness than would be morally permissible to any single individual in the like relations. But look upon nations as what they really are,—aggregates of citizens holding each other's interests in mutual trust,—and then the moral significance of what is called national selfishness is wholly changed. It ceases to be selfishness in any proper sense of the word. It becomes patriotism. And the rulers of a nation who should sacrifice its interests to those of other nations would be guilty of a breach of trust, whether the ruling power be one or many, a despotism or a democracy." And, again, "we can all conceive of circumstances in which it might be the clear duty of an individual to sacrifice his life for the good of others. But are any circumstances conceivable in which it would be as clearly the duty of a nation to extinguish its national existence for the benefit of other nations or of humanity at large? To answer this question in the affirmative would be paradoxical." It would indeed involve a misconception both of individual morals and of the function of the state. Sacrifice of his individual life is only a duty for the individual when such a loss is the sole means of attaining a greater good than personal life, or avoid-

ing a greater evil than death. But the state has no such personal life to lay down. It is its function to guard and develop the lives of its citizens, and so to direct the national life, with its power of limitless continuance and development, as to make it contribute to that greater purpose which can be realized only through the social and political relations of men. How can we even conceive as possible the voluntary sacrifice of its own life by a nation? Is it the act (or idea) of the ruler without the consent of the people? In this case it is not national self-sacrifice at all, but a sacrifice of others,—a betrayal of trust on the part of the person whose duty it was to protect them. If, on the other hand, it is to be conceived as a unanimous act of self-sacrifice on the part of all the people, then all that can be said is, that any nation, whose citizens are capable of such heroism, must surely be worth preserving on account of their unique moral development.

National morality differs from individual morals in this respect, that a nation's first duty may be said to be to itself. There is no selfishness, there is only patriotism, in its recognizing the fact and acting upon it. A nation is complete and independent in a sense in which the individual is not. Throughout his whole life a man is dependent upon others. In what he does and what he gets he is equally a member of the body politic, and not an independent unit. Even his mind, which we sometimes regard as so peculiarly his own that freedom of thought has been erected into a first principle of individualistic ethics, is derived from and depends upon others, in respect of his inherited character and of the bundle of precepts and prejudices, of truth and truism, which he has learned with his mother tongue. But the national life is, in a sense, complete in itself, and we may conceive a nation living cut off from all intercourse with other nations, just as Bishop Berkeley thought that, if Ireland were surrounded by a wall of brass a thousand cubits high, its natives might nevertheless "live cleanly and comfortably, till the land, and reap the fruits of it."

In the case of an individual man, the causes which bring him into contact and union with others precede his own individual life and determine its character. But the national life

precedes international relations. We must, therefore, expect that international morality should be of later growth, and even, perhaps, of less importance than individual morals.

From this circumstance, too, results the absence—or almost complete absence—of any sanctions in the reign of public morals, such as we find compelling obedience to the more essential portions of private morals. This absence of sanction makes international law a dream of that distant future, in which a confederacy of states shall be strong enough to control the aggressive instincts of any single nation. But even now, with constant intercourse between different nations, the incomplete sanctions which at present appeal to the prudence and self-interest of nations have made them render homage to certain portions of international morality. Commerce has vindicated its importance, and no European state would now venture to repudiate a public debt. They have foresight enough to see the importance of money, and that the confidence of financial circles once shaken is not easily regained. Thus debts are paid, even when treaties are often broken, if it is worth a state's while to offend the other contracting parties by doing so, and it is powerful enough to run the risk.

The principles of morality have as yet had but a partial triumph in regulating the relations of states. But their validity does not depend on the recognition hitherto obtained by them, and the intercourse of nations can only reach a full measure of development under a common moral law, which recognizes the rights of one nation as of equal value with the rights of any other.

The conclusions of this paper may be summed up as follows:

1. That, since nations differ from individuals, the laws of national morality cannot be identified with those of private morality.

2. That, since a nation is a body of individuals connected by race and territory and organized for political purposes,—since, therefore, it is an organism consisting, in every part, of moral organisms,—the nation itself is the subject of morality.

3. That this conclusion is not affected by the almost complete absence from international relations of the usual sanctions of morality, seeing that morality is not, like law, dependent on sanctions, and that even private morality is, to a large extent, beyond the reach of social and political sanctions.

4. That the duty of self-preservation and self-development holds for a nation in a way in which it does not hold for an individual, seeing that a nation possesses an independence and self-sufficiency which are not shared by the individual.

5. That this duty of self-preservation should be recognized as holding for all nations, so that, when different nations are brought into contact, their relation to one another should be determined by an equal regard for the rights of all.

But it must still be added :

6. That, as long as there is no superior power to enforce this international morality, that nation only is wise which is prepared to defend its rights.

W. R. SORLEY.

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### J. S. MILL'S SCIENCE OF ETHOLOGY.

IN the preface to the first edition of his "Logic," Mill described the main drift of its concluding book in these words : " It is an attempt to contribute towards the solution of a question which the decay of old opinions and the agitation that disturbs European society to its inmost depths render as important in the present day to the practical interests of human life as it must at all times be to the completeness of our speculative knowledge,—viz., whether moral and social phenomena are really exceptions to the general certainty and uniformity of the course of nature ; and how far the methods by which so many of the laws of the physical world have been numbered among truths irrevocably acquired and universally assented to can be made instrumental to the for-

mation of a similar body of received doctrine in moral and political science." His own answer to this question largely consists in the exposition of what he called Ethology, or the Exact Science of Human Nature, an exposition which he repeated without substantial change from the first issue of his "Logic," in 1843, to the last made during his own lifetime. A brief summary will be sufficient to set this doctrine before us.

"Human beings," Mill remarks, "do not all feel and act alike in the same circumstances; but it is possible to determine what makes one person, in a given position, feel or act in one way, another in another. . . . In other words, mankind have not one universal character, but there exist universal laws of the formation of character. . . . It is impossible to obtain really accurate propositions respecting the formation of character from observation or experiment alone." Ethology cannot proceed empirically or inductively; empirical laws may be ample for verification, but our first procedure must be deductive. "The laws of the formation of character are, in short, derivative laws, resulting from the general laws of mind, and are to be obtained by deducing them from those general laws." That is to say, whereas psychology is the science that ascertains these elementary laws of mind, ethology is "the ulterior science which determines the kind of character produced in conformity to those general laws by any set of circumstances, physical and moral." In fact, "ethology stands to psychology in a relation very similar to that in which the various branches of natural philosophy stand to mechanics;" and among the social sciences, "political ethology, or the theory of the causes which determine the type of character belonging to a people or to an age," has the same method and the same general characteristics as political economy. Both of these sciences employ what Mill calls the physical or concrete deductive method, a method which they use in common with astronomy, and which is some day to give the sociologist something of the astronomer's powers of prediction.

The important question, then, is whether psychology is as



yet sufficiently advanced to make the creation of this deductive science of character possible. Mill answers in the affirmative: "I believe most competent judges will agree that the general laws of the different constituent elements of human nature are even now sufficiently understood to render it possible for a competent thinker to deduce from those laws the particular type of character which would be formed, in mankind generally, by any assumed set of circumstances." In all this Mill assumes, it should be noted, that the ethologist will "be able to explain and account for the characteristics of each particular type *by the peculiarities of the circumstances*: the residuum alone, *when there proves to be any*, being set down to the account of congenital predispositions."\*

It is not surprising that Mill, with convictions such as these, meant himself to attempt "the creation" of this new science, and turned his mind to it immediately the "Logic" was out of hand. His next book, Professor Bain tells us,<sup>†</sup> was to be an Ethology; but after a few months he wrote: "I do not know when I shall be ripe for beginning 'Ethology.' The scheme has not assumed any definite shape with me yet." "In fact," Professor Bain adds, "it never came to anything, and he seems shortly to have dropped thinking of it, . . . betaking himself soon after to the composition of his Political Economy." Spite of his own failure, Mill does not appear to have abated in his confidence that character like astronomy admitted of treatment *more physico*. "He was all his life possessed of the idea that differences of character, individual and rational, were due to accidents and circumstances that might possibly be, in fact, controlled; on this doctrine rested his chief hope in the future. He would not allow that human beings at birth are so very different as they afterwards turn out." So writes his friend and biographer, Professor Bain; and the repetition through eight editions of the same sanguine expectations fully bear this out. The crowning passage is one towards the end of the chapter on the historical method. "By the aid of this

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\* VI. v. § 6, 10th ed., p. 462.

† "J. S. Mill," a criticism, pp. 78, 79.

method," says Mill, "we may hereafter succeed not only in looking far forward into the future history of the human race, but in determining what artificial means may be used, and to what extent, to accelerate the natural progress in so far as it is beneficial, to compensate for whatever may be its inherent inconveniences or disadvantages, and to guard against the dangers or accidents to which our species is exposed from the necessary incidents of its progression." But the corner-stone of this imposing fabric of knowledge is ethology, which in turn is founded upon psychology.

First, then, as to Mill's conception of psychology. Let us note the parallel: Psychology is to ethology very much what mechanics is to the various branches of natural philosophy. In other words, as the energy of a material system may be manifested in this form or that, according to circumstances, similarly the simple laws of mind in general may be manifested as this type of character or that, according to the circumstances of the particular case. If we only knew the ultimate laws in the one case as we know them in the other, we should be able to deduce the character of an individual or a nation in given circumstances as surely as we forecast eclipses and tides. Answering to the stuff called "matter," there is a stuff called "mind;" to each pertain certain inalienable properties, but "circumstances" are the source of all the endless forms in which these stuffs appear. True, Mill does not expressly deny that there is anything ultimate or *sui generis* in the individual, but the whole bent of his discussion of the logic of the moral sciences is an implicit denial of this. Thus, after quoting with approval a piece of psychological analysis from Martineau, he remarks: "We see, from this example, that when the general laws of mind are more accurately known, and, above all, more skilfully applied to the detailed explanation of mental peculiarities, they will account for many more of those peculiarities than is ordinarily supposed. . . . The majority of those who speculate on human nature prefer dogmatically to assume that the mental differences which they perceive, or think they perceive, among human beings are ultimate facts, incapable of being either explained or altered,

rather than take the trouble of fitting themselves, by the requisite processes of thought, for referring those mental differences to the outward causes by which they are, for the most part, produced, and in the removal of which they would cease to exist."\* Now, it is plain that a line has to be drawn somewhere between these "outward causes" and the mind stuff which they modify and differentiate. If there is any truth in current theories of evolution, it will be very difficult to determine *where* this line is to be drawn. It is usual nowadays to distinguish general human psychology from ethnical psychology, and again to distinguish human psychology from comparative psychology. Thus, what from one point of view we should have—following Mill—to refer to circumstances, we should, from another point of view, refer to mind; and if we conceived mind as generally as he does, when he talks of the simple or elementary or ultimate laws of mind, we should have to account for all the diversity of mental life on earth by interactions between its environment and this primitive psychoplasma, as we might call it. The recent enormous advance of the biological sciences makes it hard for us now to believe that a thinker of Mill's rank should have found in physics or chemistry the most appropriate analogue to psychology. But even fifty years back such a comparison could only have seemed apposite to one who, like Mill, regarded the laws of association as constituting nine-tenths of the science. These quasi-mechanical or psychophysical laws, which Mill believed could accomplish such wonders, apply not only to the minds of men but also to the minds of brutes. It would be just as reasonable to attempt to deduce all the varieties of animal life from some ultimate physiological law of growth, operating under various circumstances, as to deduce the many diversities of human character in this fashion with the sole help of such fundamental laws as Mill assumes. In fact, if we allow the analogy between psychology and biology, it is clear that under psychology is included the counterparts both of physiology and of zoology, the science,

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\* VI. iv. § 4, p. 446.

that is, of the functional laws of mind as well as that of the types and orders of individual minds. The zoologist or the botanist can do some little towards explaining the diverse forms of life that exist or have existed, and his method in so doing is not unlike Mill's inverse or historical method. But many principles that are neither physiological nor physical have to be applied, as variability, heredity, natural selection, etc., etc., and the character and scope of these principles have to be inductively ascertained. In all this there is a great advance on the old "natural history" with its special creations; but it is not an advance that brings us appreciably nearer to foretelling the future fauna or flora of the globe. Quite the contrary, as is shown in the use of such artificial means of "acceleration" and "compensation" as Mill refers to,—means which correspond in some sort to his art of education and political art. The horticulturist and the stock-breeder are continually surprised by "sports;" some species, they find, reproduce "true" from seed, while others "break away" into the strangest vagaries; but why, no one can explain. It frequently happens, too, that stranger variations occur under cultivation than are found in a state of nature. But this brings us to remark a want of clearness in Mill's conception of an individual.

For aught Mill says to the contrary, we might represent his individuals as carved out of the original mind stuff by the operation of circumstances, as biscuits are stamped by the baker out of a roll of dough. It is surely strange that the writer, who defined "kinds" as classes divided by an impassable barrier,—all knowledge of which classes being obtainable only by observation and experiment,—and who dogmatically asserts that even the species of plants are kinds, should yet confidently believe in an exact science controlling all the types of human nature, a science which will one day materially help us to look far forward into the future development of our race! And this, be it remembered, although any inference from the properties of the pear to those of the quince must ever remain, to quote his own words, "no more than the sort of presumption usually characterized as an analogy, and gener-

ally in one of its fainter degrees."\* How are we to reconcile Mill, the expounder of ethology, with Mill, the expounder of "kinds"? In the sciences with which he compares psychology, that is, in physics and chemistry, there are no true individuals, only stuffs or aggregates of particles; and, accordingly, when he talks of a mind he ignores the capital fact that it is a unity and a whole, and speaks only of mental states and the laws of their succession and complication. The notion of a Self proved, on his own admission, "the real stumbling-block" to his psychological theory,† and how seriously he tripped over it is known to every reader of his examination of Sir William Hamilton's philosophy, as also that, strangely enough, he thought it "the wisest thing" to keep the theory and leave the offending Ego quietly on one side. Of course, if minds are resolvable in this fashion, there will be small need for distinctions of kind; the clay is the same in all cases, and circumstances are the potter. But for a psychology that finds personality the essential feature of human nature, every man, as respects conduct and character, is in some sense unique; and the same circumstances are not the same for any two of us. In Mill's opinion the only serious impediment to the general acceptance of what he calls "the subjection of historical facts to scientific laws" is "grounded on the doctrine of free will." But for this, as he believes, thoughtful minds would at once admit that their characters are "the consequence of the natural and artificial circumstances that constituted their education, among which circumstances must be reckoned their own conscious efforts."‡ This final saving clause may serve to show us, by the way, to what perversions Mill was led, all unawares, by his misconception of psychology. Fancy one's "own conscious efforts" being reckoned among one's circumstances!

Where and what, then, is one's self? But—leaving the question of circumstances for the present—even if we grant

\* IV. vii. § 4, p. 279.

† "Examination of Hamilton," 3d ed., p. 242.

‡ VI. xi. § 1, p. 532.

the determinist position to the full, there would still be an incalculable element in history in so far as every man is more or less unique in his tastes and his impulses and no two men see the world with quite the same eyes. All this, of course, Mill would have us lump together as an unimportant residuum to be "set down to the account of congenital predispositions!" Strictly speaking, general laws are never adequate to facts in all their concrete reality,—an obvious truism which Mill nevertheless is very apt to overlook. Still, when the facts we generalize belong only to the physical world, the particulars omitted are unimportant, and we may speak with a certain propriety of scientific laws which are "not approximate generalizations, but real laws." To apply this language in the case of human character, however, as Mill does, is to ignore entirely the significance of the particulars from which we abstract. Even in political economy Mill's physical method has proved sadly inadequate, especially so in the treatment of the labor question and other similar questions, in which character is a prominent factor. But if even the economic man is not a constant quantity, associating or dissociating, disintegrating at this pole and combining at that, obeying the laws of commerce as strictly as a molecule obeys the laws of chemistry, much less is the political man, the man of taste, or the man of speculation, such a constant quantity.

From many of the extravagances of this theory, as it is presented by such writers as Comte and Buckle, Mill guards himself by sundry qualifications. But though these qualifications may add to his reputation as a man of sobriety and judgment, they unhappily go far to stultify his theory as a theory. To take one example, in discussing the influence of remarkable men, he dissents from the extreme view that such influence is only of trifling importance. He allows that "whatever depends on the peculiarities of individuals, combined with the accidents of the positions they hold, is necessarily incapable of being foreseen." But apparently he is not aware how large a corner this admission, with its implications, cuts out of his political ethology as a deductive science. If great men are to be spoken of as accidents and disturbing

causes, and Mill does so speak of them, may not smaller men be also exceptional, and by their numbers disturb the invariable laws of social progress quite as seriously? Mill disposes of both difficulties and recovers his complacency by a timely recourse to physical analysis. "The varieties of character among ordinary individuals neutralize one another on any large scale, and though exceptional individuals in important positions do not in any given age neutralize one another,—there was not another Themistocles, or Luther, or Julius Cæsar, of equal power and contrary dispositions, who exactly balanced the given Themistocles, Luther, and Julius Cæsar, and prevented them from having any permanent effect,"\*—"yet undoubtedly these casual combinations might be eliminated like any others, *by taking a sufficiently large cycle*,"—say fifty million years.† Such are his words, but what are we to make of them? When we have set aside all the positive and negative Luthers and other divergents, big and little, who sooner or later neutralize each other, what are we to say of the mediocrity that remains, and of its progress? Is it not, by the way, inevitable that the superior minds, who by means of the political art would accelerate the natural progress, so far as it is beneficial, compensate for its inherent disadvantages, and guard against its incidental dangers, must be exactly balanced by others of equal powers and contrary dispositions, who will render their efforts nugatory? But what possible sense can there be in the notion of varieties of character neutralizing each other so that their effects on social advance are *nil*? May not the bad man's life point a moral, and the good man's adorn a tale? And though they have equal powers and contrary dispositions, may not both aid moral progress,—the one by repelling from vice, the other by attracting to virtue? However, what we have specially to insist on is the inappropriateness of Mill's conception of an individual character, and of the false analogies that he in consequence employs. Once allow that every man is so much of a kind that our knowledge of him is never

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\* VI. xi. § 3, p. 538.

† Ibid., p. 541.

complete,—that if we are to know him it must be by observation and intercourse, and that the most sagacious inference is only a sort of presumption,—and we must admit that so far character is a factor in history which cannot be foreseen.

It is time to look for a moment at the other factor. The problem of ethology, it will be remembered, is, Given any set of circumstances, what, according to the laws of mind, will be the influence of those circumstances on the formation of character? But what are circumstances? It is obvious that there are difficulties in the way of an answer to this question that do not occur in the cases to which Mill is always turning for illustration. In "tidology" or astronomy the earth and its tides are objective facts, the same for everybody, just as their circumstances, the attractions of the sun and moon, by which they are influenced, are objective and the same for everybody. But when we attempt to estimate the influence of circumstances on individuals, we must often know how the circumstances appear to *them*,—this personal equation, so to say, is frequently incalculable. Again, the very fact that the circumstances can "appear" to the minds that they are to affect, may alter the event entirely,—to be forewarned is to be forearmed. It is useless to tell a ship that unless she change her course she will be on a rock in another minute, but if the pilot could know this, the course would be changed, unless for private ends he wished to wreck the ship. Still another point: the most important circumstances affecting the formation of any given character are the characters of others. Mill does not seem at all adequately to recognize these uncertainties of a higher order that beset all prediction in the sphere of ethology, and from which the predictions of the astronomer and the physicist are entirely free. Such factors as climate, food-stuffs, natural powers,—in a word, the physical environment generally,—may perhaps be treated as constant factors influencing characters from the outside. But it is especially misleading to set mind in general against society in this way. We might as well regard the members of our own body as animals, as suppose man is man



apart from humanity. Such a false antithesis is on a par with the mistake of those who supposed that reason preceded speech, and that all the details of grammar and lexicon were settled by a primeval convention. A due recognition of the solidarity and continuity of social unit and social whole leads logically to conceptions of society and of history that leave little if any place for "universal laws," or laws of nature, in Mill's sense of the term—for generalizations, that is to say, that have any logical analogy with the laws of chemistry and mechanics, which he cites continually.

It is, no doubt, the prejudice of the hour to condemn all knowledge of fact as unscientific that cannot be formulated as a natural law or ultimate uniformity either of succession or co-existence. This prejudice Mill imbibed and fostered in a remarkable degree. Thus, in criticising the attempt to discover the law of progress from an analysis of the general facts of history, he remarks that such a law can never "amount to a law of nature. It can only be an empirical law, . . . and it cannot be the ultimate aim of science to discover an empirical law. . . . Until that law could be connected with the psychological and theological laws on which it must depend, and, by the consilience of deduction *a priori* with historical evidence, could be converted from an empirical law into a scientific one, it could not be relied on for the prediction of future events beyond, at most, strictly adjacent cases."\* Of course it couldn't; but that by the way. What is remarkable is that Mill uses here precisely the language that he applies to meteorology and the theory of the tides, and that he believed that these empirical laws of social order and progress are one day to be resolved into derivative or scientific laws, and "when this time shall come, no important branch of human affairs will be any longer abandoned to empiricism and unscientific surmise."† It is scarcely a caricature of such a view to say that it would entitle us to expect some day to see a vaticinal board constituted on the lines, not of the present, but of a thoroughly scientific ideal weather office; in those

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\* VI. x. § 3, p. 512.

† VI. x., Fin., p. 530.

days statesmen, too, would keep an eye on political cries and drums, and Zadkiel of the time be as trustworthy as the nautical almanac. It is often said that philosophy makes no progress. Be this as it may, it must, at any rate, be allowed that it has outgrown that idolatrous regard for laws of nature which Mill retained to the last. It seems as wise to think of understanding Shakespeare through cryptograms or a concordance, or of explaining Raphael by analyzing his paint, as to think of finding the significance of history by means of "the fewest general propositions from which all uniformities that exist in the universe might be deductively inferred,"—such being Mill's definition of the laws of nature.

History never repeats itself. The progress of our race is a sublime drama, the spirit of which we may catch so far as duly to discharge our part, but the *dénouement* we can never foresee. So completely does the old order change, giving place to new, that we cannot even deduce the present from the past,—the process by which Mill meant to verify his social principles,—much less anticipate and preform the future. Man is insatiable ; new wants arise that are unfelt till old wants are satisfied. Every advance in knowledge opens up unsuspected problems and incites to enterprises before undreamt of. Generalizations of this sort we may, doubtless, enunciate safely, and they do not warrant such hopes for speculative "sociology" as Mill entertained. He was probably justified in concluding that the order of human progression in all respects "will mainly depend on the order of progression in the intellectual convictions of mankind ; that is, on the law of the successive transformations of human opinions." To speak of a law of the successive transformations of opinion is, perhaps, not very appropriate, but no one will deny that knowledge—and what is held as such—is a specially powerful factor in human progress. Yet it is not everything ; religion, art, and manners are largely independent of it,—*i.e.*, of purely intellectual convictions. But who can forecast the progress of knowledge, and, without that, what can be said of the transformations of mere opinion ?

We may safely count it as one of the curiosities of specula-

tion that an empiricist of so extreme a type as Mill, who cannot be sure that there is not a world somewhere where two plus two equal five, and a world, if so we may call it, somewhere else, in which causes have no place, should yet believe in the possibility of an *a priori* science of character that can deduce universal laws from the truths of psychology, originally ascertained, as he insists they must be, from observation and experiment.

Mill, as we have seen, did not succeed in producing even the barest outline of this science. But he mentions incidentally in the "Logic" one or two generalizations that we may fairly suppose would have had a place in it. Here is one which seems important enough to deserve examination: "Since both the natural varieties of mankind, and the original diversities of local circumstances, are much less considerable than the points of agreement, there will naturally be a certain degree of uniformity in the progressive development of the species and of its works. And (here is the point) this uniformity tends to become greater, not less, as society advances; since the evolution of each people, which is at first determined exclusively by the nature and circumstances of that people, is gradually brought under the influence (which becomes stronger as civilization advances) of the other nations of the earth, and of the circumstances by which they have been influenced."\* Of course, if increasing uniformity is the law of human development the work of the ethologist and the political prophet is correspondingly simplified; hence the importance of this generalization for Mill's sociology. None the less this proposition is scarcely cogent, even if we admit its presupposition,—viz., that there is a constant material called mind, or human nature, and that this is only modifiable from without; *i.e.*, by the influence of circumstances. Mr. Herbert Spencer, who is perhaps as much dominated by biological ideas as Mill was by physical, maintains, as is well known, a doctrine almost the precise opposite, though both agree in treating the natural and the moral sciences as quite on a par.

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\* VI. x. § 4, p. 514.

As between the two, few people nowadays, I should suppose, would hesitate to side with Mr. Spencer, who has both learned and taught much where Mill remained alike incapable either to receive or to originate,—viz., in the matter of evolution.

JAMES WARD.

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## VICE AND IMMORALITY.

To make some trenchant distinction and a few suggestions of practical moment, and not so much to present a metaphysical system, is the object of this brief paper. Some of the principles herein set forth must necessarily fall far short of being even widely general—not to say universal—laws, inasmuch as they relate to those portions of man's mental and moral anatomy whose very function, in the highest stage of rational development at least, is to respond to outward stimuli in ever-changing fashion from ever-varying motives. But in relation to man's conduct as determined by outward and inward pricks, the distinction between vice and immorality will be found to strike deep into some problems well-nigh insoluble in words, from the fact that in great part the forces arrayed in the field of conduct are emotional and irrational, and, though not inactive, are as such dumb. They persistently refuse to speak for themselves or justify themselves, but as persistently they vaunt themselves and aggrandize their share in the affairs of the world. When we see featured spirituality and full-faced exuberance walking ignorant of each other's life and joys, but running foul of each other's imperfections and growing estranged and intolerant and driven to extremes in each other's company; when we see proud youth step into the arena to find that quite as likely as in moral or intellectual achievements his choice of destiny lies between nervous exhaustion and apoplexy, according as he puts his principles to the test of wear and opposition or submerges them in a general complacency; when maidenhood with fatal facility rushes to embrace the teachings (to indulge

in paradoxy) of her inferior elders; when half of humanity are seen to be struggling to get rid of conditions which the other half are straining to attain: problems, more or less vague, indeed, but problems still are presented to the fair-minded which demand practical treatment, whether it be by rational solution or by shunting them aside.

All the world will pretty much agree that sin is vile and ought to be discouraged, and were we treating the subject metaphysically we might easily dispense with any further question as to the proper attitude of the soul towards sin and make up a list of all such actions as are to be disparaged and rejected. But, unfortunately for our practical purpose, sin is not a tangible entity, and we are immediately driven to the reflection that the only sort of thing we can discourage is a thinking and feeling thing,—that is, a person. Now, there may be, there undoubtedly are, cases where sin is so far in the nature of an excrescence, a wart upon the fair structure of the person, that caustic treatment will serve to remove it once for all; and then the following statement fails of being a universal law. But in the main, for the larger share of cases, it may be stated that *sin exists intimately in, or as an inseparable affection or potentiality of, the person as a whole, and to discourage it is to discourage the person, and tantamount, therefore, to discouraging his goodness as well.* The shafts aimed at vice strike down virtue also, and the devil of abstract or total evil exults in being beyond their reach. If this be a true statement of affairs, the principle that sin is to be discouraged must be set aside for the present, and the question arises how to deal with sinful persons; and at this point the division of sin into vice and immorality becomes essential to a rational solution. If we review for a moment those acts which by common consent are disapproved as *vicious*, we shall see that the adjective is applied usually to a state of subjective consciousness or personal feeling on the part of the actor himself, while the adjective *immoral* is more frequently applied to acts whose particular object or general tendency is to injure other persons. In clear thought the line can be so sharply drawn as to make it possible to say,

A's conduct is vicious but not immoral, B's conduct is immoral but not vicious. But in life the distinction is not really so thorough, for, while the term vice more naturally allies itself with those classes of sins which proceed from and relate to one's own feelings, and the term immorality more easily lends itself to those sins which react upon other persons, still it might possibly be shown, on the one hand, that all vice reacts to the disadvantage of other persons, and that immorality, on the other, is a vice of the active powers or of the soul. Malice, hatred, envy, going about to do injury to their objects, are immoral actions because they have regard of consequences upon other persons, though there is in them a strong element of vice, and they are prompted by vicious feelings. Conversely, companionship in vice, though not indulged in from injurious intent, has in it an element of immorality, inasmuch as there is a mutually injurious effect. From a practical point of view, however, and for purposes of conduct, the distinction is sufficiently well drawn and in most cases will be evident. If the evil is subjective or in the conduct itself, it is vicious; if objective or in the effect of the conduct, it is immoral; if in both, then the conduct is both vicious and immoral. Conversely to this division of sins into such as are vices and such as are immoral, goodness might be divided into virtue and morality: the goodness of a virtue lying in itself, the goodness of morality in contriving the well-being of others. Here we catch sight of Kant's doctrine that the one thing good in itself is a good will. For, though good in itself, it is not selfish, but so far as it goes is an act towards the good of other persons. We have then set before us four grades of ethical quality,—morality, virtue, vice, and immorality, which may be roughly paraphrased as goodness to others, goodness in one's self, evil in one's self, and evil to others. These qualities having been enumerated and defined, we are now prepared for the consideration of the following thesis, which again is not put forward as deducible from the definitions given, or as an absolute law, but is supported upon grounds physiological and psychological of human nature,—namely, ethical culture and the advancement of good-

ness must in the main be sought through, and are to be attained by, the growth of morality rather than virtue and the cessation of immorality rather than vice as above defined. Or, in other words, *virtue, and more broadly goodness, are more likely to be attained through the means of morality than vice versa ; and vice, and evil generally, may more probably be diminished by the diminishment of immorality than vice versa.*

I have elsewhere \* called attention to the fact that, while "all men are created equal," they are thus made equal by reason only of the mysterious element of personality itself, whose definitive character is nevertheless that of a unique and unequalled entity. To the logical thinker this view need present no difficulty. Two peas in a pod may be unequal in every conceivable respect, and yet one is just as much a pea as the other. Two persons, totally unequal in internal structure, may nevertheless be equal to external classification, just as two soldiers with nothing at all in common may yet stand abreast in the ranks of the same army. So I now affirm, not as antithetical, but in enlargement of the principle there enunciated, this principle, that *all persons, though differing from one another in essence and degree, differ not in kind.* And let this statement be understood to be far-reaching. Wide apart as heaven from hell is the just man from the murderer in essence and in the purposes of his life, yet can the one not condemn the other without condemning himself in kind. Abstractly, murder is not justice ; nevertheless in truthful classification of men in the concrete I venture to say the just man is a murderer and the murderer is just. Pascal is credited with attributing to man a contradictory nature. I doubt he was too good a thinker to make that slip. *Not good* is the only contradictory of good ; to be both good and bad is not to be a contradiction. The much-suppressed and equally-read production of Count Leon Tolstoi, "The Kreutzer Sonata," deals with contrary tendencies in the character of man.

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\* In "The Ethics of the Declaration," a short essay in the hands of the editors of the "Annals of the American Academy," published at Philadelphia by the American Academy of Political and Social Science.

As a matter of fact, virtue and vice, morality and immorality, exist potentially, and in a greater or less degree actually, in the character of all. Every man is undoubtedly unique alike in his goodness and his sin. But that by which men are brought under the same class is not identity nor equality, but similarity. And by the test of similarity, and in a greater or less degree, every person will be found to be comparable with every other, even the most degraded. Even by the saint sin must at least be thought or imagined or he would not comprehend its character. Probably the initial act, that is, the conception of a crime, differs very little in the criminal and the moral man, and in each is offset by the thought of an alternative moral course of conduct. With many persons the possession of a power is an almost irresistible motive to action, and the suppression of it amounts to a starvation and curtailment of life quite grievous to endure. If the imagination of a crime be somewhat strongly excited, the character of the person, while it makes little difference so far as the nature of that excitement is concerned, does make a great deal of difference when it comes to reinforcing and carrying it into effect on the one hand, or suppressing and supplanting it by a more moral motive on the other. But whatever may be the issue of this struggle for supremacy among our internal motives, and whichever one finally secures the aid and abetment of the will, it is to be noted that there is the same *kind* of process going on in the consciousness of all. The imagination of crime may be lightly discarded by one mind, and it may surprise another with a vividness which requires the summoning of almost one's whole character to dismiss it, while to yet another it may come like a revelation of what it is in the fulness of its vitality most capable of executing. But in every act the various elements are present in greater or less proportions, so that almost none is wholly pure, but is a complexus, or consensus and forced agreement of many powers all subject to the direction of that one which happens to be predominant and of whose execution they constitute the life. In this view we see how strongly comparable must be all acts of all persons from the very fact of similarity of struc-



ture in the persons themselves. Nor, taking into account the natural history of the species, could it well be otherwise. In contemplating the evolution of functions out of more primitive forms, while admiring their present adaptation to ends so manifold, ends some of which we conceive to be worthy objects of our own most spiritual aspirations, it is well, nevertheless, sometimes to reflect upon those simpler organic conditions from which they have arisen and to which they owe much of their present quality. When we reflect that, whether considered with reference to phylogeny, or the growth of the race from a primitive form, or ontogeny, or the growth of the individual from the embryo, the development, in the one case through centuries, in the other through a few brief years, of the complex adult organism, with powers as various as the objects which the intellect of man is able to conceive, has been from a simple cell-like structure, we should expect that the simple antecedent would by the law of transmission hand along to its most complex organic consequent some trace or memento of its simple nature. Or, in other words, we should look to find in each most differentiated function some, however slight, element of similarity with every other function, whether in the same or in separate individuals.

Let the experiment be tried of striking out at some object within reach, first with the fist, then with the foot. In the experiment two highly-differentiated appendices, the arm and leg, are brought into operation, and many points of difference will be discoverable,—for one, the arm will be found to be susceptible of a much stronger and more certain aim. But, all differences aside, the two acts will be found quite comparable, inasmuch as they are both motor reactions of the organism towards an object, and in so far as they are thus comparable, they are suggestive of those simpler organic forms of life which are capable of like motor reactions, but which have not like man the several appendices necessary for accomplishing them in different ways. The arms and legs of a man are, no doubt, chiefly valuable to him by reason of their difference from each other and from the remainder of his body. But throwing out of consideration their more valuable functions

and looking only at that more vaguely distinguished element felt in striking out with the fist, which is similar to a like vaguely distinguished element realized in striking out with the foot, we become conscious of a more vaguely felt function of simple organic reaction, which is comparable with the vaguer feelings which less sensitive and highly-developed organisms are more dimly conscious of in their own struggles with the world outside of themselves. The same principle holds true not alone of muscular reactions, but of sensations and emotions. Let lightning be flashed upon the eyes and be followed by the roar of thunder in the ears. Man's chief interest in the senses of sight and hearing, and their chief value, undoubtedly result from their widely-differentiated natures, which enable that this electric occurrence should thus become known to him in such widely various ways. But again, all differences aside, there will be found in the shock of light and the shock of sound a vague element of similarity which again is comparable with the vaguer feelings of sensibility in organism of a lower class which have not developed different functions for variously apprehending external shocks.\* Again, let the experiment be varied by the firing of a cannon near by in the

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\* The modern psychologist will find little difficulty in multiplying instances of this principle. While it would be a grotesque conception to imagine a man as smelling with his eyes, seeing with his ears, or hearing through his nose, nevertheless many analogies formerly attributed to spiritual perception or fancy may probably be explained on the hypotheses (1) that the power of sensibility, now differentiated into five or more senses, was in origin one; (2) that there is a sympathetic attention and reinforcement on the part of several functions in the exercise of each, so that the life of many is concerned in the act of one. A pleasing illustration occurs to me in Edgar Poe's "Al Aaraaf:"

"Sound loves to revel in a summer night:  
Witness the murmur of the gray twilight  
That stole upon the ear, in Eyraco,  
Of many a wild star-gazer long ago—  
That stealeth ever on the ear of him  
Who, musing, gazeth on the distance dim,  
And sees the darkness coming as a cloud—  
Is not its form—its voice—most palpable and loud?"

And in annotation he adds, "I have often thought I could distinctly hear the sound of the darkness as it stole over the horizon."

dark. We stand grasping or leaning against some solid structure. Suddenly there is a simultaneous glare and sound and jar. We distinguish each through its appropriate sense. But all differences aside, there is an intensified and coalescent sense of something that is neither of the three, or rather of a similar element in all three, an emphasis of the very function of sensibility itself, which again is comparable with the vaguer sensibilities of lower organisms not possessing these finely differentiated functions. And now carrying the experiment one step farther, and looking for a basis of comparison not between different actions alone, but between sensation, emotion, and conscious action, all three, we shall find in all, even the most varied, a similar element of feeling; and we refer here not to the specific feeling of each, which is its fully expressed and differentiated value, but that vaguest of all feelings of which we are capable, that similarity of feeling in each, which, all differences aside, makes it comparable with every other. In that vaguest element of bare feeling we have an illustration or adumbration of the dawning of consciousness in the development of organic life which we attribute to the lowest animal structures.

From these generalizations it follows that virtuous and vicious, moral and immoral, conduct have each an element of similarity which makes them all comparable in kind, whether we compare different acts of the same individual or acts of different individuals. The difference in functions is due to their organs having been selected for various uses. Their resemblance is due to the identity of their origin and the similarity of structure in the organs themselves, which, whatever their functions, are fed by the same food, nourished by the same blood, and become sensate after the same neural fashion. While the unspecialized cannot take on the duties of the more highly specialized, the latter, on the contrary, may revert to the simpler functions and feelings of the former. The primary functions of irritability, mobility, and sensibility still appertain to the majority of the highly-specialized organs, and these may always relapse from their special to the common exercise. More or less distinct feelings of pleasure or

pain, too, pervade the exercise of all functions, so that subjectively, if the soul happens to be dormant, if the higher functions do not clamor and cry out against it, the activity of the lower may be entirely sufficient so far as the subjective feelings of the organism are concerned; it may never know the joy of the higher because constantly drunk with the pleasure of the lower. Vice as well as virtue may be suffused with the flush of subjective happiness; and immorality as well as morality may attach to itself undisturbed the whole charm of conscious existence, with its complement of emotional zest and intellectual vigor.

What, then, when we throw aside the force of habit and early teachings, are the real inducements that exhort us to virtue rather than vice, or to morality rather than immorality? First, it may be answered, there is the instinct to cling to dear life itself. A little investigation will speedily show that what are termed vices are in the main more or less destructive of life. But can immorality, or conduct which injures others, be so easily shown to abbreviate one's own life as vice? And again the question arises, Is life, bare life, so very desirable after all? If not, why, then, who cares? "Let's have one other gaudy night" and hail the end! But here it may well be urged that man, as he is possessed of life, whose essential character is to act on objects without itself, so is he possessed of instinctive attachments to those objects, the attainment of which is his very life. If we cease to deal separately with the abstractions "life" and "morality" and look at the concrete nature of the individual himself, we shall speedily see that his life is in great part an organized morality, and that morality, conversely, is in great part a conscious expression of the course and destiny of life. For the essence of organic life in its more advanced forms, and as compared with the earlier and simpler stages behind it, or as opposed to death, may be said to lie in the possession of powers of reaction towards external objects. The enlargement and multiplication of powers over external objects, if not an absolute law of the nature of life, has been at least a general law of the growth of life. But those objects which are external to the individual are also or may become

objects for other individuals. So that the *mos*, or usual action of man, as a social being, having to do with the objects which are common to both him and his fellows, has its foundation in the very nature of life itself, which he and they enjoy in one similitude. Now, as we saw that the immoral or vicious life in itself considered, subjectively that is, might be full and self-satisfied, unless the moral instincts were awakened, so here it follows that, once they are awakened, the normal and only sufficient appeal that can be made to them is from without,—that is, from their normal objects, which, be it noted, are common objects for the individual and society. Hence there arise all those struggles which invariably occur in the contact of the individual with social conventions and established customs. For while the foundation of morality lies in the nature of extra-active life, and while the normal appeal to morality is from objects without the organism, its products have become most conspicuously visible in what we call “manners and customs.” And, apart from living morality and its external objects, there has sprung up a *tertium quid* of convention and tradition, which is oftentimes upheld alike with detriment to those very individual lives in which morality is founded and to the obscuration of its proper objects, yet, in behalf of which, the more dogmatic of our brethren do not hesitate to appeal to our conscience, our pride, our fear of condemnation, our self-respect, or for our “own sakes,” as the case may be. Yet how vain are these whips and stimulants of our subjectivity, when we consider, not the customs, but the origin and nature of morality! For, partaking of the nature of life itself, morality involves not only a recipient subject, but an active nature and an outer object. Deprive life totally of either of the three, and it is no longer life. Deprive morality (not as an abstraction, but in the concrete) of either, and you deprive it of its life in proportion as you do so.

Provisionally we noted that the term immorality applied to conduct whose tendency is to injure other persons, and vice to conduct affecting the subjective character of the actor himself. But, looking, as we now are, at the full nature of conduct and its effects, we may see that immorality is crime against

living moral agents, whether its particular tendency be to abridge their subjective capabilities, their active powers, or the fulness of their proper aims and objects. And I submit that the nature of vice can hardly be defined at all, if it be not the spending of the forces of one's own life to the detriment of its moral capabilities. The conception of vice as a list or category of deeds which must not be committed has no ground upon which to stand. Medical science will confirm the statement, and in great part the tragedy of life will bear witness, that a course of conduct may with impunity be persisted in by one individual which would be ruinous to another. To confine the definition of vice to conduct which is subjectively disorganizing, that is injurious to the man's *structure* as a moral being, would be a nearly correct, though perhaps too closely drawn, limitation of the term. He who viciously bites or kicks his neighbor may thereby permanently impair or may cause the awakening of his own moral faculties; but he certainly commits the act to the present detriment of his *capabilities* for moral action,—for he is capable of leaving his neighbor unharmed. With reference to its effects, moral conduct may be defined specifically as any conduct in the line of those capabilities which as men we possess, whether it be the social virtues, or the instincts of family, patriotism, religion, or what not, which does not act prejudicially to the like interest of other persons in the drama of life. If, then, society, or the aggregate of us outside of the individual, allows fair play, without crowding, for the development of these and kindred tendencies in their respective fields, the inducements to morality become vastly multiplied and reinforced by some of the strongest instincts in the constitution of the race.

And here almost is the key to the situation. My belief is that, in our social capacity, we do not allow these primary instincts fair play. On the contrary, with unyielding respect for the individual on the one hand, I charge broadly society, as we are pleased to denominate ourselves on the other, with theft, murder, and seduction, for depriving the individual of his birthright, stabbing at his manhood, and the betrayal of his proper destiny to a common fate. The babe has not left

the cradle ere by common consent the blight upon his instincts has begun, and he is bereft of the objects to which he is by nature entitled; in compensation for which he is dawdled with and sugar-plummed and kissed whether he will or no; and thenceforward in his relation to society he is moulded rather than educated, repressed rather than reciprocated, and little else than wronged and injured from the cradle to the grave. Haply, if he possesses a little less than the average constitutional vigor, he offers little resistance to her encroachments, is consoled for his suffering by her blandishments, and dies a victim of her wiles. If he possesses a little more than the average, he goes about his business and good-naturedly overlooks her weakness. If of the average, he is deflected from his natural course, his aims and objects are postponed, and he is driven from their pursuit to the ludicrous alternative of maintaining his position and reasserting his natural rights.

Here again, if we reflect upon the natural history of the race, we shall see why this is as it is. The principle of natural selection means simply that those types survive which are fittest to survive,—not the fittest to be awarded the palm in accordance with some moral or æsthetic criterion. The rain falls on the just and the unjust, and the law that the fittest survive, as much as the law of gravitation, may be taken advantage of to controvert our most moral aims. For the fittest survives only in competition with others, whether more or less moral, of the race. Under these circumstances the inference is plain that, in spite of all moral laws and mollifying influences, there will have been developed among the fortunate survivors the very tendency of survival itself, an aptitude for overcoming and subordinating the individuals of the race, a tendency, be it noted, entirely independent of our moral aims, and, in many cases, instinctive and unconscious. The well-bred lady, never at a loss, and the man of the world, equal to all occasions, walk often unconscious that their unimpeded progress means an acquiescence and surrender on the part of less superior persons, and might so walk to the end, were it not that gloom too has its charms, and awkward,

ungainly, surly cynicism, though incomprehensible to them, is likewise constitutionally incapable of capitulation.

The rational conclusion, then, for a man who wishes to deal sanely and rationally with the forces around him is that, in a measure, every one hates him and consciously or unconsciously is plotting his destruction. And, as this is true of individuals, so is it true of any aggregate or synthesis of individuals which we may choose to class under the head society. I believe the individual is not furnished with all the data which he needs to act intelligently in furtherance of moral purposes unless he has discovered that we, society at large, are his natural enemy, arrayed against his attainment of the objects nearest and dearest to his heart. But, if fair play be not given for the development of his primal instincts, life, in the sense of reacting upon objects and towards ends, becomes diminished or impossible, and the factor of morality, which can only pertain to the individual in so far as he has objects beyond himself, is forced to quiescence or drops out entirely, and his motives, in consequence of this natural opposition, are reduced to personal considerations relating to his own character alone.

In this exigency natural or cultivated disposition comes to the rescue of many, not moved by moral considerations, and saves them for the commendation of society. For society, in dealing with the individual, undoubtedly usurps a disciplinary function which does not rightly appertain to it, and says, practically, to the individual, Thou shalt be agreeable to us or suffer, and if thy aims be apart from us thou shalt not pursue them in our midst in peace. Now, the agreeable and happy dispositioned, having no pressing aims of their own which demand their unconditional adherence, are just the best adapted in the world for falling in with whatever may be for the nonce our social aims. They will find the fulness of life and joy in any activities for which they are capable and to which they may be invited. Their conduct will be neither positively moral nor immoral. Perhaps no more self-satisfied nor commended lot is possible than that falling to him who, without vicious disposition, enters into the more or less mor-



ally directed activities of state, church, or society without being subjected to the doubts or critiques of a moral sense within; while he who, conscious of moral aims, falls into vice, is almost inevitably the butt and objurgation of his fellow-men. Nevertheless, the whole argument of this essay goes to show that the latter is of a more progressive type than the former, and further, that *unless they can be referred to moral aims, virtue and vice cease to be distinguished by any mark save it be of internal feeling.*

The argument that virtue promotes longevity has been alluded to and need scarcely be refuted, since length of life in itself considered is not of necessity more to be sought for than is a briefer life more full of other *desiderata*. The rapture of one moment of solitary prayer or praise may seem of more worth to the martyr than the life he surrenders. And are not the intoxications of vanity or wine far oftener preferred? In and for itself what is the advantage of sobriety over inebriety? One, it may be said, leaves the man a free and rational being, able to think, feel, and act rightly; the other makes of him a sot. But what is it to be a rational being? Is it to have such relations with objects that our feelings, thoughts, and acts, as the intellectualists say, "know," or as the materialists say, "correspond" to them? But what is referred to here? A world beyond ourselves which may be known or to which thoughts, feelings, and actions may correspond. Now, the sot's consciousness is full as yours or mine. His world may be less extensive and varied, is it any the less real? But, the answer is, he might know it in such a different way, as we ourselves know it. Ay, but here is introduced the element of morality,—for what is the moral but that universal or customary treatment of our common world which does no harm? If you can induce the sot to make it his aim to know the world as the free and rational know it, well enough, but you have, nevertheless, supplied him with a moral aim whereby to distinguish his present sobriety from his former inebriety. But the critic answers, We have induced him to so choose, not *because* the present course is moral, but because it is on acquaintance and in and for itself more desirable, pleasurable,

and happy. Very well, then, I answer, his course is no longer distinguishable from inebriety except as a matter of personal and internal feeling. Another person after tasting both might elect sottishness by preference, and his answer to your appeal would simply be, That is a personal matter; you go your way, and, so long as I don't injure you, let me go mine. How, then, can the viciously inclined be reached? I venture to say he cannot be except by an appeal to what may be called the moral instincts, and I use the word moral here in its generic sense. In the broad sense a wrong action may be moral, if it has regard for others besides the actor himself,—that is, if it has moral quality, whether good or bad. Now, vice may hinder a man from realizing his hopes and surmounting his fears, punishing his enemies and rewarding his friends, giving force to his hates and blessing the objects of his affection, and yet the most strenuous directing of his attention to these facts may not move him. Nevertheless, they constitute the strongest motive in his nature for abandoning it. He may be impervious to all arguments relating to them, but, unless utterly beyond recall, he will be susceptible to any real excitation of those instinctive affections towards ends and objects which, when consciously pursued, are moral aims. Though he may not distinguish their moral character, until it is distinguished virtue cannot be distinguished from vice. What would be the difference between loving one's neighbor and envying him, if the one contemplated no benefit and the other no injury? How would lust and greed be vices, if their aim and sole effect were naught but benefits? How would gluttony or any intemperance be vicious, if they only enhanced the value of one's fellowship and nourished his power of serving his fellow-men? In fine, man is in soul and essence a moral being: and vice, or evil in itself, is determined as vice logically by the fact that potentially it may, if it does not actually, injure others, inasmuch as it is an injury to his own character as a moral being.

Socially, then, we are guilty of a crime in that, while we discourage moral aims and do not shrink from immorality, we add to our natural abhorrence of vice an active scorn,—

whereas vice has naught in and for itself whereby it merits either scorn or praise, and no more has virtue. Granted that vice contracts and virtue enlarges one's powers, how can we make it an object for the weak to wax strong in virtue, when, even in their weakness, distinctly moral aims meet nevertheless with our discouragement, while fools without moral sense bask in our favor and acquire strength to sustain their position? Herein the discipline which society brings to bear upon the youth of our time is false and injurious. For generous youth turns ever by natural instinct to examples. Instead of initiating and inuring him by hard or easy degrees to our social order as it exists with all its imperfections, and flaunting before him our own sad offices, employments, and attainments as objects to be arrived at by more or less long-suffering and striving, it were more modest, more beneficent, and more moral to direct his gaze and youthful affections away from the strifes of contemporaneous society to the noble lights of all time, to the universal and perpetual principles of manhood, and not to its temporary products as exhibited in the tentative and perishable arrangements of our own particular week or hour. We are to-day victims of telephones, motors, and material improvements and conventions of all descriptions; and nervous tissue and the gray matter of the brain, and even the hearts and souls of youth, must perforce be inclined in conformity thereto. Now, this is wrong. Recognize the universal cravings of youth, cease to outwit his affections and play low comedy with his instincts, and he will come to the use of all these things naturally as he comes to walk the earth or discriminate the objects and command the faculties of touch, sight, or hearing. Do we want greater works and the advancement of our race here in America? Then must we exalt and foster, not inventions, but the faculty of invention, not the product, but the art, not the attainments of society, but the dreams of youth, not virtue as opposed to vice, but the hopes, aims, and aspirations of morality.

R. W. BLACK.

ON THE PROGRESS OF POLITICAL ECONOMY  
FROM THE TIME OF ADAM SMITH.

I AM induced to write on this topic, partly to take measurement of my own position, and partly from reading the address of Professor Alfred Marshall to the British Association, 1890.

My study of this subject began at the age of sixteen, and above seventy years have since passed. I naturally look back to Malthus as a beginning of change; further, to Ricardo; further, to Thornton and J. S. Mill, whose doctrine of Land is with me now complete in Dr. Alfred Russell Wallace. The phrase, "We are all Socialists now," seems to have become current of late. It was used by Sir William Vernon Harcourt, but perhaps playfully. So far as I understand what Socialists mean, I find them more amiable, but not more logical, when they prefix the epithet *Christian* to their title. So far from inclining towards their outline, it is precisely their axioms which to me seem false and dangerous. But I reserve this topic to my close.

On Malthus must fall the sad discredit of making the science *misanthropic* and widely unpopular. He lived to complain that those who called themselves his followers disregarded his limitations, and damaged the moral aspect of his doctrine. They certainly pushed it farther than he wished or approved; and yet it was hard for him to blame them. No one can deny that he maintained not only that unchecked population *on a limited soil* must outrun its power of feeding itself, but that our English population was *already* excessive. Moreover, he taught economists to infer excess of population from the mere fact of widespread misery; as if evil law and wasteful vice were insufficient causes of destitution. Savages in harsh climates perish of famine, where thoughtful and provident men would endure only hardship. The fundamental weakness of his great argument, as applied to England, was, that he did not see the unjust condition of our landed tenure, ever since the landlords (under Henry VIII.) were allowed to claim the soil as *their own*, and to eject the little farmers at their

pleasure. As a consequence, our poor laws were necessary to save the landlords from the despair of the able-bodied rustics who were dispossessed. Malthus in England, as afterwards Chalmers in Scotland, wished to do without poor laws; but when English land-tenure had spread into Scotland, the king's ministers dared not to repeal them. This was and is our difficulty. Our poorest *do* increase much too fast, but the chief cause is despair, and statesmen cannot let economy play the game of State. Politics (said Kossuth) is the science of exigencies.

I believe these few words detail our whole imbroglío. Our history has been that of *successive conquests*. Not to go back earlier than the conquest of Saxons by Normans, which reached its worst under Stephen, and was immensely relieved by the Plantagenets; especially by the edicts of Edward I., whose rule in England seems to have been as good as his violence in Scotland and Wales was lamentable. But the French war of Edward III., with Scotland intensely hostile, was accompanied by pestilence at home, in which the new Parliament overthrew the rural edicts of Edward I. and struck down our rustics anew, though not fatally, yet so that they have not yet recovered. When gold and silver came in from the New World, and the landlords betook themselves to Parliament as their strength, and assumed their modern form of *traders in land*, the local cultivators were overpowered by the barons and squires in a series of petty wars. Thenceforward every *landlord*, great or small, became a *land-owner*. Nearly four hundred years have since passed, yet we still suffer from that *landlord conquest*, which made it inevitable that afterwards any increasing wealth in England from the inventiveness of townsmen should never pass through farmers to peasants, but from farmers should soon pass to swell the wealth of landlords. When economists arose, professing science, they of course adopted the existing routine of industry in England; Adam Smith thoughtfully, but his followers as if without suspicion of error; and some even applauded landlords in raising their rents, when the market enabled them, without asking what they had given for the increment. Naturally, when

rustics were displaced with the approval of economists, the public blamed economists, when they ought rather to have blamed the law. This is true equally of leasehold tenure of buildings as of rural culture. The nation has at last been forced to open its eyes by events in Ireland, and now understands that ever since the return of Charles II. the landlords have been the permanent legislators, and have not allowed due attention to the rights of other classes. Economists have praised abstinence of the government from tampering with the market, which *with them* meant that the rights of the market, at present *legal*, are all *moral*; but that is not always the case; and socialism has thriven to the disgrace of economists, who are represented as the parties guilty, as though they had originated the errors of the law.

Other countries have had a very different history from England; but wherever a powerful king or aristocracy has possession of the land we generally find great abuse. In France the commonalty was weaker than in England, hence the starvation which caused the terrible upturn of the eighteenth century. To a Malthusian the France of 1790 seemed to be calamitously overfull of people; yet now their numbers are far greater, yet they send to us myriad tons of spare food; the starvation was caused not by too much population, but by too much unjust law. Europe tried to crush France, but in the result Germany, Italy, and Spain were overrun by French victory. Edmund Burke had scoffed at France in the words of Cæsar: "We have heard that the Galli were once celebrated in war;" how little did he expect such success of the half-naked,—the sans-culottes! Overthrown in the battle of Jena, the Prussians learnt that their common people had not sufficient stake in the soil; two patriotic noblemen persuaded the king to give small independencies to the general mass. Italy was severely but not unwisely ruled by Napoleon and Murat. Hungary was made mistress of her own soil by Batthyanyi and Kossuth in 1848; shortly after this, all the Austrian provinces received independent land. Before the middle of this century was reached, in the great mass of old Europe, the common people were largely possessors of their native

soil. The same was the case in Canada and the United States, so far as freedom ruled. Thus, to the large mass of Europe and much of America, the treatment of land in England had become out of harmony, and foreign critics treated our policy, towards Ireland especially, with much severity. At the same time from India arose wholly new views among our experienced officers, who thought of the rents as the natural and chief revenue of the State. Thus from many quarters at once arose on us claims for new treatment of the soil just when the great movement of 1848 agitated Europe. The Irish Potato Famine of 1847 had just led Sir Robert Peel to break with his party on the Corn Laws, and the Whigs, who inevitably succeeded to power, could not but issue the Devon Commission to report on the agriculture of Ireland. Out of this has come the present state of affairs.

Foreign economists, who had thrown off English principles, could not condone the English policy towards Ireland, and the defence of it by English economists was unconvincing and futile. The report of the Devon Commission was very slow in appearing, but the vastness of the work was its excuse, and the thoroughness was such that no ministry (I believe) had a chance of passing the remedies suggested by them through the ordeal of the Lords, even if it had passed in the Commons. When Mr. Gladstone became Prime Minister, in 1870, an attempt was made, in connection with a visit of John Bright (since Right Honorable) to Dublin, to amend the Irish tenure of land, but whether because of opposition in the Lords, or from want of calling the Irish members of Parliament into rightful council, nothing effective was done from 1870 to 1880, and in 1874 the dissensions in the Gladstone ministry (this leader afterwards informed the nation) were such that no scheme could be published. Mr. Disraeli in consequence became premier under the title of Beaconsfield, and for about six years seems to have thought chiefly of European and Indian wars, little of home agriculture in England and Wales, or Ireland and Scotland. "Political Economy" has encountered ignominy and disgrace for it all. And it is true that what was called the orthodox school, after it had

added Malthus to Adam Smith, never looked on the land with a just eye until Thornton and the younger Mill wrote, but that was before 1846; since then many valuable writers have moved on their line; nevertheless, their aspect towards Malthusianism was enough to make them odious to the many, and because they deprecated a political tampering with the market, all neglects of the government were imputed to their influence.

Their Malthusianism was unwisely exaggerated and unhappily applied. J. S. Mill, from his various accomplishments and sterling merit, is best known. He fancied himself a Malthusian, and propounded two doctrines hostile to Malthus, not Malthusian: (1) That to have more children than the right number justly brings on a father the imputation of *incontinence*, and we must hope that the public will at length learn to apply the stigma successfully to the guilty man. (I cannot now quote his words, but this was their meaning.) (2) If our workingmen take his advice and duly keep down their numbers, wages will rise to remunerate them. Apparently the *right number* of children is to be fixed by a council of economists. Report whispered that *three* was Mr. J. S. Mill's golden number. That so able a man should have expected anything but indignation from the former doctrine, and ridicule for believing the latter, is wonderful. I suppose it to be the result of his father's unwise mode of education. But, if the most enlightened part of our race leave the inferior part, in successive generations, to be the parents of the future, is any argument needed to show that the process aims at the survival of the least fit? That no Malthusian doctrine should have been admitted into the science might have been better than the present result.

Further, though Ricardo has really merit in clearing up foreign commerce, as virtually proceeding by barter, his doctrine of rent, adopted by most English authorities, is refused in America, where experience is largest and facts confute it. In general our economy begins from a few principles, so simple and certain that they are justly deemed axiomatic, as soon as this or that is admitted to be private property. So, when land is put forward as the property of a landlord (and as such



in the eighteenth century it was accepted), our economists justified a landlord in raising his rent as high as he could find a farmer to promise. In fact the English doctrine was so far adopted in America. Adam Smith had contented himself with saying simply that rent was the surplus which the farmer was willing to pay to the landlord. Ricardo thought to define it more accurately by the prices of wheat, arguing that there must be land so ill suited for wheat that no farmer can pay anything for it to a landlord. This admitted a new statement, that even the best land admits only a fixed amount of capital to be applied to it, in cultivating for wheat; and the surplus which it yields, beyond the "ordinary" profits of applied capital, measures the rent. Ricardo further supposed the best wheat land to be always the first occupied, and that only some *diversity* in quality or situation occasioned rent at all. Why talk only of *wheat*? at once asks every practical cultivator. May not twenty other crops be as valuable as wheat? In fact the whole theory is baseless. American experience shows that so far from the *best* soils being first cultivated, the poorest often take the lead, just because they are so often easiest to get at, and the richer soils are long buried in swamp or preoccupied by timber, and fruit is often more profitable than grain. In one thing Ricardo and the American economists agree,—viz., when a nation's food comes from its own soil, the rent tends to rise *highest* when the need of food is *greatest*. Our economists fought hard to prove that rent never *entered into* price; that, however the high price might raise rent, rent did not *cause* high price, but rather the high price of food caused high rent.

I never was able to believe this theory. Our landlords appeared to have a complete monopoly before our corn laws were abolished, and afterwards a large and unfair power over price in many things. That J. S. Mill was of the same opinion seemed clear by his doctrine of the universal increment of rent. Several other excellent writers seemed aware that the vast increment of rent which had accrued to landlords in the previous two centuries was largely won by them without reason, but could not now be restored to the more legal

earners, the farmers, nor yet distributed to their day-laborers. On the other side, to award it to the government as king's revenue seemed to make a king or his ministry dangerously despotic. What we read of old Egypt, and old India ; what we hear of modern China, seemed to forbid awarding the rents of the soil to the central executive if it could be done ever so justly. In this stage the argument rested, perhaps due to the publications of the friends, Thornton and J. S. Mill, till nearly 1880.

When Mr. Gladstone took up the Irish question at and after 1880, we first learned that Parliament could consent to lower rents by the agency of *land* courts, and listen to a prime minister's avowal that Irish landlords had been sponging on the life-sweat of cultivators. The thought was far more familiar to the English public than to our political economists. Now that a prime minister had spoken out concerning Ireland, many mouths were open concerning Scotland and England. It was no longer rare to hear the utterance that a landlord Parliament had adjudged to itself, both in the rural areas and in the towns, the funds which ought to sustain our vast public expenses. No political economy will now be thought fair and just which is based on the assumption that the tenure of land as a *private* possession can justly be the normal state in any nation. It must either be exceptional or transitional. Since the sale of estates up to the most recent time has passed them into innocent hands at increased prices, to repeal so old a system is no doubt difficult without new injustice ; but expressly *because* rents, in an industrious and increasing population, tend to rise, the repeal is at once popular and necessary.

No doubt there are other new questions which have arisen in political economy. One very old method of raising revenue is named among the tricks of Greek tyrants,—that of selling monopolies. In modern Europe many royal exchequers have been familiar with it. Our Queen Elizabeth reluctantly resigned it at the petition of Parliament. In a wholly new form it came to life again in the modern post-office, of which the government accepted the net gains while forbidding the rivalry of private firms. While the annual

gains were several millions sterling, the king of Persia, learning the fact from Sir John Malcolm, for a moment said, "I will have a post-office," but soon found that great prior sacrifices were requisite to make it pay. Our own authorities were very slow to believe that the penny post would pay. After fifty years it has pretty well reached its older height. But now we have superadded a new government monopoly in the telegraph system, and so long as the public is able to control administrators and careless expenditure, many other monopolies may meet approval. Locally, either towns or counties are moving to supplant private companies for water, gas, or electricity. But in the enormous blunders which our admiralty, our ordnance, and military arsenals have made and are making, we have a warning to be very slow in trusting to public management, whether by a royal or a socialistic bureau. One evil ahead we see, in America chiefly, the power of what are called trusts or syndicates to combine against the public for the gain of a few schemers. New study, possibly, will in the near future arm us against such mischief.

But, at the moment, our new claim of economists is, to learn and to diffuse a sound knowledge of just and wise tenure of the land for the benefit of all, a topic which even Mrs. Fawcett seems very little to understand. That Mr. Gladstone *pooh-poohs* it must be expected, until other persons convert his followers for him. Until the English nation takes it up we must not expect to be delivered from an outcry for a socialism which aims to destroy the *rights* and the *responsibilities* of the FAMILY, with the right of private property, to confound nation with nation, and blend mankind in a welter of unintelligible despotism.

About 1831, Whately (soon afterwards Archbishop of Dublin) was Professor of Political Economy at Oxford, and was with many in ill-repute for his severity against relieving beggars. This leads me to mention a saying attributed to him at his own table in Dublin. Some gentleman had extolled the great liberality of landed gentry to the poor on their estates, which led to various talk. At last the archbishop said, "Will you allow me to assume an old man's privi-

lege and to tell a parable? Travellers passing through an Arabian desert suffered from insufficiency of food. One of them had a dog with a very fine tail; so, seizing a hatchet, he called his dog, caressed him and chopped off his tail, then handed it to the cook as material for soup. After drinking up the soup, he threw to his dog the bones of his tail. Such, gentlemen, in my estimate, is the charity of English landlords." A single moral utterance of this type from a rigid doctrinaire may warn us how ill we may sometimes infer an economist's sentiment from his ostensible creed.

In my experience, even such men as Fred. D. Maurice and Charles Kingsley, professed *Christian* socialists, I do not admit to be socialists so long as they approve of interest on money; and while I read that Jesus of Nazareth called a servant wicked and slothful for *not* putting out his master's money to usury, I do not see the fitness of any socialists claiming Jesus as their sanction for condemning interest on loans. I know personally that in 1851 I was attacked as a socialist in conservative newspapers for my lectures, barely because I held my present doctrine concerning land. The confusion is natural, yet quite false, between movables and land with its raw materials. The confusion has been rather aided than cleared up by the school of Cobden and Bright. New economists must now teach our nation.

F. W. NEWMAN.

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## PROGRAM OF SCHOOL OF APPLIED ETHICS.

BEGINNING on Wednesday, July 1, and continuing six weeks, there will be held at Plymouth, Mass., a School for the discussion of Practical Ethics in the broadest sense of that phrase. The matter to be presented has been selected with regard to the wants of clergymen, teachers, journalists, philanthropists, and others who are now seeking careful information upon the great themes of Ethical Sociology. It is believed that many collegiate and general students will also

be attracted by the program. No such opportunity for study in this important field has ever been offered in this country.

The school will be held at PLYMOUTH, MASS.

Apart from its historic interest, Plymouth is a pleasant place for summer residence. The secretary of the State Board of Health declares it to be healthy. It abounds in attractive walks and drives, and there is good surf and still-water bathing, boating, sailing, and fishing. An electric railway connects the hotels, boarding-houses, and lecture halls which will be occupied by the school. It is a little over an hour by rail from Boston (Old Colony Road, Kneeland Street), from which also it may be reached by steamer daily during the summer. Board may be had at prices ranging from six to fourteen dollars a week. Dean, Henry C. Adams, Ph.D., Ann Arbor, Mich.; Secretary, S. Burns Weston, 1602 Chestnut Street, Philadelphia. Office of the School, 1602 Chestnut Street, Philadelphia (June 25 to August 12, Plymouth, Mass.).

The course of lectures will cover three different departments,—ECONOMICS, HISTORY OF RELIGIONS, AND ETHICS PROPER.

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## FACULTY.

### I.—Department of Economics.

#### DIRECTOR.

PROFESSOR H. C. ADAMS, Ph.D., University of Michigan.

Professor Adams will deliver seventeen lectures on the History of Industrial Society and Economic Doctrine in England and America, beginning with the Middle Ages, and tracing genetically the gradual rise of those conditions in the labor world which cause so much anxiety and discussion to-day.

#### ASSOCIATES.

PROFESSOR JOHN B. CLARK, Ph.D., Smith College.

“Modern Agrarianism.”

ALBERT SHAW, Ph.D., American Editor of the *Review of Reviews*.

“Social Questions suggested by the Crowding of Cities.”

PROFESSOR EDMUND J. JAMES, Ph.D., President of the American Society for the Extension of University Teaching.

"Education in its Social and Economic Aspects."

HENRY D. LLOYD, Esq., of Chicago.

"Trusts."

PROFESSOR FRANK W. TAUSSIG, Ph.D., Harvard University.

"Co-operation."

HON. CARROLL D. WRIGHT, U. S. Commissioner of Labor.

"Factory Legislation."

PRESIDENT E. BENJ. ANDREWS, Brown University.

"Socialism."

## II.—Department of the History of Religions.

### DIRECTOR.

PROFESSOR CRAWFORD H. TOY, Harvard University.

Professor Toy will offer a general course of eighteen lectures, extending through the six weeks, treating the history, aims, and method of the science of History of Religions, and illustrating its principles by studies in the laws of religious progress, with examples drawn from the chief ancient religions.

### ASSOCIATES.

PROFESSOR M. BLOOMFIELD, Ph.D., Johns Hopkins University.

"Buddhism."

PROFESSOR GEORGE F. MOORE, D.D., Andover Theological Seminary.

"Islam."

PROFESSOR MORRIS JASTROW, JR., Ph.D., University of Pennsylvania.

"The Babylonian-Assyrian Religion."

PROFESSOR G. L. KITTREDGE, Harvard University.

"The Scandinavian Religion."

PROFESSOR B. I. WHEELER, Ph.D., Cornell University.

"The Greek Religion."

MR. W. W. NEWELL, Editor of the *Journal of American Folk-Lore*.

"The Religion of the Laity in the Middle Age."

**III.—Department of Ethics.****DIRECTOR.**

**PROFESSOR FELIX ADLER, PH.D., New York City.**

Professor Adler will offer a general course of eighteen lectures, extending through the six weeks, on the *System of Applied Ethics*, with special reference to the moral instruction of children, including a brief survey of the various schemes of classification adopted in ancient and modern ethical systems, the discussion of the relation of religious to moral instruction, of the development of the conscience in the child, etc.

**ASSOCIATES.**

**DR. CHARLTON T. LEWIS, New York.**

“Criminals and the State.”

**PROFESSOR J. B. THAYER, Harvard Law School, and HON. HERBERT WELSH, Philadelphia.**

“The Indian Question.”

**MR. J. H. FINLEY, Secretary of the State Charities Aid Association of New York.**

“The Problem of Charity in Great Cities.”

**REV. C. R. ELIOT, Boston.**

“Temperance Reform and Legislation.”

**EMIL G. HIRSCH, PH.D., Chicago.**

“The Ethical Ideal in Education.”

**PROFESSOR WM. E. SHELDON, Boston.**

“Humane Treatment of Animals.”

**MRS. CAROLINE EARLE WHITE, President of the Woman's Branch of the Pennsylvania Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals.**

“Vivisection.”

**MR. W. L. SHELDON, St. Louis.**

“Reform Movements among Workingmen.”

**MR. WM. M. SALTER, Chicago.**

“Ethical Theory.”

**PROFESSOR ROBERT ELLIS THOMPSON, D.D., University of Pennsylvania.**

“Politics and Ethics.”

## PROGRAM.

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### **Wednesday, July 1.**

- 10 A.M.* Introductory Addresses by the Directors of the three departments, PROFESSORS ADAMS, TOY, and ADLER.
- 5 P.M.* PROFESSOR ADLER, "The Problem of Unsectarian Moral Instruction. The Position of Religion in the German Schools, in the American Public Schools."

### **Thursday, July 2.**

- 8.45 A.M.* PROFESSOR ADAMS, "The Modern Social Movement, and the True Method for its Study."
- 10 A.M.* PROFESSOR TOY, "History of Religions: Definition of the Subject."
- 5 P.M.* MR. SALTER, "The Idea of 'Ought.'"

### **Friday, July 3.**

- 8.45 A.M.* PROFESSOR ADAMS, "The Manor considered as the Unit of Agricultural Industry in Feudal Times."
- 10 A.M.* PROFESSOR ADLER, "The Special Function of Moral Instruction in the Development of Character."
- 5 P.M.* PROFESSOR JASTROW, "The Gods, Spirits, and Beliefs of the Babylonians and Assyrians."

### **Saturday, July 4.**

- 8.45 A.M.* PROFESSOR ADAMS, "The Town considered as the Unit of Manufacturing Industry in Feudal Times."
- 10 A.M.* PROFESSOR TOY, "History of Religions: Method of Study."

### **Monday, July 6.**

- 8.45 A.M.* PROFESSOR ADAMS, "The Black Death and Tyler's Rebellion considered in Their Industrial Consequences."
- 10 A.M.* PROFESSOR ADLER, "Development of Conscience."



4 P.M. MR. SALTER, "The Realization of Man's Nature as the End of Morals."

5 P.M. PROFESSOR JASTROW, "The Religious Literature of the Babylonians."

**Tuesday, July 7.**

8.45 A.M. PROFESSOR ADAMS, "The Times of Henry VIII. and Elizabeth considered as Foreshadowing Modern Ideas of Capital."

10 A.M. PROFESSOR JASTROW, "The Relation of Culture to Religion among the Babylonians and Assyrians."

4 P.M. MR. SALTER, "The Truth in Utilitarianism and Intuitionism."

5 P.M. PROFESSOR THOMPSON, "The Ethics of Patriotism."

**Wednesday, July 8.**

8.45 A.M. PROFESSOR ADAMS, "The Spirit of Nationalism as expressed in Industrial Legislation of the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries."

10 A.M. PROFESSOR ADLER, "Efficient Motives of Good Conduct."

5 P.M. PROFESSOR BLOOMFIELD, "The Origin of Buddhism."

**Thursday, July 9.**

8.45 A.M. PROFESSOR CLARK, "The Nature and History of Agrarianism."

10 A.M. PROFESSOR TOY, "Growth of the Science of the History of Religions."

5 P.M. PROFESSOR THOMPSON, "The Ethics of Party."

**Friday, July 10.**

8.45 A.M. PROFESSOR CLARK, "The Single-Tax Movement."

10 A.M. PROFESSOR ADLER, "Classifications of Duties, Ancient and Modern Systems considered."

5 P.M. PROFESSOR BLOOMFIELD, "The Doctrines of Buddhism."

**Saturday, July 11.**

8.45 A.M. PROFESSOR CLARK, "The Farmers' Alliance."

10 A.M. PROFESSOR BLOOMFIELD, "The Ethics of Buddhism."

5 P.M. PROFESSOR THOMPSON, "International Ethics."

**Monday, July 13.**

8.45 A.M. DR. SHAW, "The Housing of Metropolitan Populations, illustrated by Paris, London, Berlin, and Naples."

10 A.M. PROFESSOR ADLER, "Suicide; the Stoic and Modern View of it Contrasted."

5 P.M. PROFESSOR TOY, "History of Religions: Select Bibliography."

**Tuesday, July 14.**

8.45 A.M. DR. SHAW, "The General Booth Project in its Relation to the Scientific Treatment of Congested City Population."

10 A.M. PROFESSOR TOY, "Classification of Religions."

5 P.M. DR. LEWIS, "Theories of Penal Legislation."

**Wednesday, July 15.**

8.45 A.M. DR. SHAW, "Practical Education for Young Men and Women, illustrated chiefly by London Experiments."

10 A.M. PROFESSOR ADLER, "Ideals of Culture."

5 P.M. PROFESSOR TOY, "History of Religion; Preliminary Statements; Relation of Religion to Civil Government and to Art."

**Thursday, July 16.**

8.45 A.M. PROFESSOR ADAMS, "Liberal Writers of the Eighteenth Century, considered with Especial Reference to the Industrial Liberalism of Adam Smith."

10 A.M. PROFESSOR TOY, "Relation of Religion to Science, Philosophy, and Ethics."

5 P.M. DR. LEWIS, "The History of Prisons."

**Friday, July 17.**

8.45 A.M. PROFESSOR ADAMS, "Industrial and Social Results of the Development of Textile Machinery."

10 A.M. PROFESSOR ADLER, "Ethicising of the Feelings."

5 P.M. PROFESSOR TOY, "Conceptions of the Deity: Examination of Animism, Fetichism, and Idolatry."

**Saturday, July 18.**

8.45 A.M. PROFESSOR ADAMS, "Critical Analysis of the Effect of Machinery on Wages."

10 A.M. PROFESSOR TOY, "Polytheism and Mythology."

5 P.M. DR. LEWIS, "Recent Progress and Prospect of Prison Reform."

**Monday, July 20.**

8.45 A.M. PROFESSOR ADAMS, "Industrial and Social Results of the Development of Steam Navigation."

10 A.M. PROFESSOR ADLER, "Duties of Veracity, Justice, and Charity."

5 P.M. PROFESSOR TOY, "Monotheism."

**Tuesday, July 21.**

8.45 A.M. PROFESSOR ADAMS, "Mill's Political Economy, considered the most Perfect Expression of the Industrial Ideas of the Middle Classes."

10 A.M. PROFESSOR MOORE, "Mohammed and the Beginnings of Islam."

5 P.M. PROFESSOR THAYER, "The Legal Status of the Indian."

**Wednesday, July 22.**

8.45 A.M. PROFESSOR ADAMS, "Changes in Economic Ideas since Mill. (a) Fundamental Economic Conceptions."

10 A.M. PROFESSOR ADLER, "Ethics of the Family."

5 P.M. PROFESSOR WHEELER, "General Characteristics of the Greek Religion."

**Thursday, July 23.**

8.45 A.M. PROFESSOR ADAMS, "Changes in Economic Ideas since Mill. (b) Relation of Government to Industries."

10 A.M. PROFESSOR MOORE, "The Formative Period of Moslem Dogma."

5 P.M. MR. WELSH, "The Indian Question in the Past."

**Friday, July 24.**

8.45 A.M. PROFESSOR ADAMS, "Is Our Civilization Just to Workingmen?"

10 A.M. PROFESSOR ADLER, "Professional and Political Ethics."

5 P.M. PROFESSOR WHEELER, "The Ritual of the Greek Religion."

**Saturday, July 25.**

8.45 A.M. MR. LLOYD, "History of a Trust."

10 A.M. PROFESSOR MOORE, "The Ruling Ideas of Islam."

5 P.M. MR. WELSH, "The Indian Question at Present and its Relations to Politics."

**Monday, July 27.**

8.45 A.M. PROFESSOR TAUSSIG, "Distributive and Credit Co-operation."

10 A.M. PROFESSOR ADLER, "Ideals of Friendship in Ancient and Modern Times."

5 P.M. PROFESSOR WHEELER, "Homeric Beliefs concerning the Existence and the Immortality of the Soul."

**Tuesday, July 28.**

8.45 A.M. PROFESSOR TAUSSIG, "Profit-Sharing and Productive Co-operation."

10 A.M. PROFESSOR KITTREDGE, "Scandinavian Religion: The Service of the Gods."

5 P.M. MR. FINLEY, "The Problem of Charity in Great Cities."

**Wednesday, July 29.**

8.45 A.M. PROFESSOR TAUSSIG, "Workingmen's Insurance."

10 A.M. PROFESSOR ADLER, "Man's Relation to Nature and the Lower Animals."

5 P.M. PROFESSOR TOY, "Monotheism," *continued.*

**Thursday, July 30.**

- 8.45 A.M. COLONEL WRIGHT, "Factory Legislation in England."  
 10 A.M. PROFESSOR KITTREDGE, "Scandinavian Religion: The Future Life."  
 5 P.M. MR. FINLEY, "The Problem of Charity," etc.,  
*continued.*

**Friday, July 31.**

- 8.45 A.M. COLONEL WRIGHT, "Factory Legislation in the United States."  
 10 A.M. PROFESSOR ADLER, "The Use of Stories in the Moral Teaching of the Young, illustrated by a Collection of Stories from the Bible and from Greek and Hindu Sources."  
 5 P.M. PROFESSOR TOY, "Approach to the Deity: Sacrifice."

**Saturday, August 1.**

- 8.45 A.M. COLONEL WRIGHT, "The Ramifications of Factory Legislation."  
 10 A.M. PROFESSOR KITTREDGE, "The Odinic System."  
 5 P.M. MR. FINLEY, "The Problem of Charity," etc.,  
*continued.*

**Monday, August 3.**

- 8.45 A.M. PROFESSOR JAMES, "Development of Educational Ideals and Systems."  
 10 A.M. PROFESSOR ADLER, "The Use of Proverbs and of Extracts from Great Speeches in the Moral Teaching of the Young."  
 5 P.M. PROFESSOR TOY, "Magic."

**Tuesday, August 4.**

- 8.45 A.M. PROFESSOR JAMES, "Recent Tendencies in Education at Home and Abroad."  
 10 A.M. MR. NEWELL, "Religion of the Laity in the Middle Age; Differences of Ideas and Periods."  
 5 P.M. MR. SHELTON, "The Reform Spirit among Labor Leaders."

**Wednesday, August 5.**

- 8.45 A.M. PROFESSOR JAMES, "American Educational Problems."  
10 A.M. PROFESSOR ADLER, "The Moral Value of the Study of Selected Biographies."  
4 P.M. PROFESSOR SHELDON, "The History of the Relation of Man to Animals."  
5 P.M. PROFESSOR TOY, "Righteousness."

**Thursday, August 6.**

- 8.45 A.M. PRESIDENT ANDREWS, "The Social Plaint."  
10 A.M. MR. NEWELL, "The Religion of the Ignorant Mass in the Middle Age."  
5 P.M. MR. SHELDON, "The Literature of Labor Movements and Social Reforms; Single-Tax Leagues, Nationalist Clubs, Educational Efforts, etc."

**Friday, August 7.**

- 8.45 A.M. PRESIDENT ANDREWS, "Socialism as a Remedy."  
10 A.M. PROFESSOR SHELDON, "The Ethics of the Relation of Man to Animals."  
5 P.M. PROFESSOR TOY, "The Ideal Human Society."

**Saturday, August 8.**

- 8.45 A.M. PRESIDENT ANDREWS, "The Better Way."  
10 A.M. MR. NEWELL, "The Religion of the Poets in the Middle Age."  
5 P.M. MR. SHELDON, "What should be the Attitude of the Pulpit and Ethical Platforms towards the Labor Movement?"

**Monday, August 10.**

- 8.45 A.M. PROFESSOR ADAMS, "Trades-Unions considered as the Workingman's Solution of the Labor Question."  
10 A.M. PROFESSOR ADLER, "The Individualization of Moral Teaching" (Hints for the Study of Character).  
5 P.M. PROFESSOR TOY, "Sacred Books."

**Tuesday, August 11.**

8.45 A.M. PROFESSOR ADAMS, "Public Commissions considered as a Conservative Solution of the Monopoly Question."

10 A.M. PROFESSOR TOY, "Religious Reformers and Founders."

5 P.M. MRS. WHITE, "Vivisection."

**Wednesday, August 12.**

8.45 A.M. PROFESSOR ADAMS, "Review of Industrial History and Doctrine."

10 A.M. PROFESSOR ADLER, "The Correlation of Moral Instruction with Other Branches, especially with the Teaching of History."

5 P.M. PROFESSOR TOY, *concluding lecture*, "The Ethical Element in Religion."

**DISCUSSIONS.**

[Following the excellent suggestions of our correspondent, whose letter appears below, as well as our own judgment, it is our purpose to insert hereafter, under the present head, brief contributions, together with editorial observations such as from time to time are offered or suggested to us by our correspondents, or are brought to our notice by current controversy. Contributions bearing upon either ethical theory or ethical practice, of a length suitable to this department, are cordially solicited.—EDS. INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS.]

**THE MORAL ASPECT OF "TIPS" AND "GRATUITIES."**

It occurs to a reader of the INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS that it would be a very good thing if that journal were to add a department for the discussion of such ethical topics as are not of sufficient importance to demand an article to themselves. Nearly every question of conduct is in some of its aspects a question of ethics, and is capable of having light thrown upon it by such persons as are thoroughly familiar with ethical principles, and have formed the habit of applying them correctly to particular instances,—in other

words, by such persons as have knowledge and trained reasoning powers. There is hardly a dinner-table where some question of conduct does not come to discussion in regard to which people are found to have widely different views, and concerning which they would gladly know, while their interest in the subject is warm, what are the opinions of the professional expounders of ethical doctrine. It is not that they will be in too great haste to accept those opinions, but that they are anxious to know how the arguments by which they are influenced will stand the criticism of experts. There is hardly any question upon which ethical considerations have any bearing that is really trivial. It has been well said by a recent writer on logic that whenever we come to a wrong conclusion, we injure ourselves, not only by the wrongness of the conclusion, but in one (or both) of two other ways as well: either there has been an error in our method of referring this instance to a leading principle,—in which case we have weakened our reasoning powers,—or else the leading principle has been itself wrong, and by appealing it we have increased its force; for we cannot use as actual guides the principles which lie more or less vaguely in our minds without strengthening, to some extent, their hold upon us. In case the principles are ethical principles, there are hardly any wrong ones whose hold upon us we can afford to have strengthened.

As an example of the kind of question I mean, take the subject of giving fees to our inferiors when they perform some service for us for which they are (or ought to be) otherwise well paid. This is a question which always awakens warm interest whenever it enters a conversation. I insist upon it that the way in which it is settled is a matter of very grave consequence. It is certain to have an immense effect, one way or the other, upon dignity of character in a large number of human beings. The most important difference between the people of this country and those of the older civilizations, according to those foreigners who have studied us, is that in this country one person may be as good as another as regards essential worth of character. Now, it would seem to be impossible that this subjective feeling of worth and dignity could



continue to exist among individuals who have accustomed themselves to taking fees. If it were a question of waiters in restaurants and hotels alone it would be one thing, but the custom of making little presents to menials (one cannot avoid calling them menials as soon as they begin to accept little presents) is sure to extend itself over countless others of the relations between the rich and the poor, if it once gets a foothold. Are we willing, simply because a few thoughtless rich people, returning from Europe, find the European custom the most conducive to their comfort, to give up our manly American custom of straightforward pay for straightforward service? In the April number of the JOURNAL OF ETHICS, Mr. Leslie Stephen quotes Mr. Lowell's noble words descriptive of America,—“she that lifts up the manhood of the poor,”—and plainly says that the thing that grates most painfully upon him in his own country is the servility of the lower classes. Is any sacrifice involving possible comfort, or possible imputation of meanness, too great to make to preserve uninjured, in however slight a degree, a quality which is one of our country's most important distinctions?

On the other hand, that this view of the matter is not “absolute ethics” is apparent from the fact that in Japan a totally different sentiment prevails. The Japanese (as Miss Bacon has just shown in her charming little book on “Japanese Girls and Women”) consider that it is plain buying and selling that is degrading, and that compensation for service of all kinds should always be in the form of a present. The only gentlemanly way in which a cup of tea can be taken in a restaurant is by leaving a *douceur* of a few cents in payment on the tray. Has ethics anything to say as to which is, in reality, the higher ideal of conduct?

But even if it were admitted that the no-fee plan is the better one, is not individual observance of it absolutely without effect? Is not the opposite custom so firmly established already that there is no possibility of changing it, for one thing; and, if it were not, is not the nature of the custom such that what one person does is unseen by, and consequently ineffective upon, what another person does? If the latter is

the case, is there any principle which requires us to do what inflicts immediate loss upon our neighbor, and immediate discomfort upon ourselves, for the sake of theoretical considerations upon which our conduct is admittedly ineffective?

Besides cultivating a lordly condescension in the rich and servility in the poor, there is a third class of people upon whose happiness the custom of feeling has a marked influence. The moderately well-dressed people are quite sure of being neglected by all but superhumanly virtuous waiters for the sake of those persons from whom large fees may be expected. Is this a state of things which the moralist, whose motto is to be, according to Mr. Leslie Stephen, "social equality except for cause," can endure to see fastened upon us without a protest?

It is thus that I heard this question debated *pro* and *con* the other day by a company of people who had all, in the words of William James, "a strong vocation for the moral life," but who were unable to convince each other that one way was better than another in this matter. Has a *Journal of Ethics* anything to say upon the question? Whoever thinks it a question of insignificant importance may well reflect upon those other noble words of Mr. Lowell's:

"In life's small things be resolute and great  
To keep thy muscle trained: know'st thou when Fate  
Thy measure takes, or when she'll say to thee,  
'I find thee worthy; do this deed for me?'"

CHRISTINE LADD FRANKLIN.

#### COMMENT ON THE FOREGOING.

The interesting letter of Mrs. Franklin introduces to our readers a topic that has wider social bearings than appear on the surface. In *Westermann's Monatshefte* for April, 1882 (pp. 82-100), Rudolf v. Ihering, the famous Göttingen jurist, author of "Der Zweck im Recht," presented to the German public, for the first time, what one may call a relatively scientific view of the social significance and consequences of "Das Trinkgeld." The tale, as told by v. Ihering, is an impressive one. The widely-extended mischief done by so seemingly insignificant a custom is depicted by an expert in social problems with extraordinary vigor and persuasiveness. Paulsen, in his "Ethik" (1st ed., p. 423; 2d ed., p. 446), mentions v. Ihering's "Interessante Studie" with approval, and apparently full agreement. A little consideration, for the rest, shows how suggestive the custom of "tips" and "gratuities" is of certain very general processes

that accompany social evolution. Of these processes, viz., of the growth of all customs of fixed compensation for services rendered, and of the relatively abnormal growths that are opposed to these customs, v. Ihering himself, a good while before the publication of the essay on "*Trinkgeld*," gave an instructive account in his "*Zweck im Recht*" (vol. i., Leipzig, 1877), in chap. vii., "*Die Sociale Mechanik*" (see, in particular, pp. 109-127, 149-165, 199-212). In the second volume of the same treatise (published in 1883), v. Ihering specifically names for the first time the custom of giving *Trinkgeld* (as a case of irregular compensation or pretended compensation) on p. 246; condemns it as an *Unsitte* on p. 251, and summarily suggests his whole case against it (with a reference to the article above referred to) on p. 284 of the same volume. He calls the custom, "this marvellous bastard of wages and alms." In the article in the *Monatshefte* he denounces very effectively the utterly anarchical character of the custom, its entire irregularity and capriciousness. His reference is, of course, to the custom as it exists in Germany. It is not, he points out, payment for service as such. If it were, we should pay the cook rather than the waiter in the restaurant. "Our first criterion is, that whoever wants a gratuity from us must seek us out; we do not seek him out. The social compulsion that forces from us the gratuity depends on personal meeting and immediate contact. It is simply the situation that drives us to the act." If this is already an irregularity; if we pay our gratuity not for service rendered, but because of the accident of the presence of the man that we are to pay, the rest of the caprices of custom in the matter are very skilfully exposed and ridiculed by our author. "There is no other social creation so without principle as this custom; every effort to carry through any rule about it fails; every time one has to come back to the fact that so the fashion is, and that is all there is to be said." Such caprice governs all the decisions as to *when* and *how* and *whom* to pay. As for the actual social mischief wrought under the German conditions by *Trinkgeld*, v. Ihering makes some rather startling revelations, based upon his own observations. In sum, our author quite deprives his topic of the amusing and relatively trivial character that it is generally supposed to possess. In his hands it becomes a highly serious affair.

So much for an indication of what has been said about the subject. There is, to be sure, little reason to fear in the United States either the elaborate caprices of custom that v. Ihering describes, or the degree of evil that he depicts as possible and even as actual under continental conditions. The practical means suggested by v. Ihering for diminishing and finally remedying the evil are, therefore, hardly called for at present in America. It is interesting to find that he hopes for most aid in the matter from the healthy influence of the best part of the English travelling public upon continental hotels.

If the personal opinion of the writer of this comment as to the present situation of the problem in America is of any value, it may be as well to say that he sees in the custom of gratuities, as it at present exists among us, a minor and actually rather harmless social abnormality,—although certainly a social abnormality. But, as v. Ihering's paper shows, the custom at its worst becomes very decidedly mischievous. In no case, however, is the affair one for merely individual interference. If a reform is needed, only such co-operative means as v. Ihering himself suggests can be effective. If we think that it harms the manhood of

our waiters to "tip" them in this irregular fashion, let us say so, and, perhaps, some time move all together to end the custom. But let not the individual traveller try to convert to manhood the individual waiter, by insisting, against the custom of the place where he happens to find himself, upon his own "ideal social ethics," to the extent of refusing the expected "tip." If the mischief is ever shown to be considerable, let us meet it by organized devices, such as v. Ihering proposes. His plans, to be sure, are too elaborate for discussion here.

J. R.

#### NOTES ON CURRENT PERIODICAL LITERATURE.

OUR contemporary, the *Monist*, a quarterly magazine published in Chicago, is working in the broad field of general science and philosophy after a fashion that cannot fail to be of very great service. The paths of the two quarterlies—the *Monist* and our own JOURNAL—are sufficiently separated for us easily to avoid actual concurrence, and still near enough together for us to feel constant co-operation. Worthy of every acknowledgment is the skill of the indefatigable editor, Dr. Paul Carus, in gathering so wide and representative a company of thinkers about his editorial table, to discuss together the problems of the day. In the April number, Professor Jos. LeConte discusses the burning question of the moment, the "Factors of Evolution," suggesting in somewhat characteristic fashion the direction in which, according to him, we should look for a reconciliation of the "Lamarckians," as they are now so often called, and their opponents. That the problem of Professor LeConte's paper is one of great moment for the future of practical ethics, he himself suggests, and the suggestion is one that readers of Mr. Ball's recent little monograph, entitled, "Are the Effects of Use and Disuse Inherited?" will readily appreciate. Only, perchance, Professor LeConte's optimistic reconciliation of the Lamarckians and their opponents is rather too confident a solution of the very grave practical issue that seems to be involved in the controversy raised by Galton and by Weissman, and further developed through Professor James's treatment of the mental aspects of the whole matter in his recent "Psychology." The contributions of Professor Lombroso to recent numbers of the *Monist* carry with them the authority of his name and the waywardness of his

brilliant powers. They consist, in the main, of "Illustrative Studies in Criminal Anthropology."

THE *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* contains, in the second number of Volume IV. for the present year, an interesting study of Thomas Carlyle, by Professor Wilhelm Dilthey, of Berlin. Dilthey expresses a gentle surprise that the English have felt so much "interest in the domestic affairs of Carlyle." Germans, he says, do not share this interest, and the fact that Mrs. Carlyle had to do so much domestic work, to her own dissatisfaction, "leaves us [Germans] altogether indifferent (*lässt uns vollkommen kalt*)." Dilthey's own interest in Carlyle is, first, to review his general relation to German literature; and, second, to sketch the development of his thought sufficiently to "determine his place in the movement of the transcendental philosophy in Europe." That this place was mainly one of an ethical character is obvious. Dilthey makes much of Carlyle's practical efficiency. "Carlyle started upon the path that modern England has pursued: appeal to the laborers,—an effort to come to honorable understanding and co-operation with them. His work upon Chartism did an extraordinary service to England." "He found in our own Transcendental Philosophy," continues Dilthey, "the means of giving a reflective form to the faith that was in him; and to this philosophy he gave a new and effective expression, whereby it was enabled to become a power in social conflicts. Hereby he comes to occupy a significant place in the context of those spiritual movements that grew out of the Transcendental Philosophy." At this moment, when Carlyle's historical significance is unjustly neglected among us, Dilthey's essay comes as a serviceable reminder.

THE fourth number of the sixth volume of Wundt's "*Philosophische Studien*" contains a paper, by Johannes Schubert, on "Adam Smith's Moral Philosophie." The first section of the paper discusses the "Evolution of Moral Philosophy, from Shaftesbury to Hume." The second section treats of Smith's own views; the third section is devoted to a brief summary

and estimate. The key-note of the paper, as is natural in a study appearing in Wundt's own laboratory journal, is the thought of Adam Smith's significance as psychological analyst of the moral consciousness. Smith's doctrine is a "Gefühlsmoral,"—a doctrine of the "moral sentiments" of the most "consistent" and yet "natural" sort ("Zwanglosester Art"). The few psychological inconsistencies that occur here and there are slight errors, which do not alter the general effect. Especially does Schubert praise the skill of Adam Smith's deduction of justice. In the frequent comparisons with Kant, Schubert, as psychological student, easily gives the preference to Smith, whose purpose it is, after modern fashion, "to bring all the facts of the region of experience that is in question into the most consistent organization possible." Nevertheless, Smith's theory has the defect of giving insufficient attention to the specific problems of the will. Taken, however, in its wholeness, Smith's theory makes upon us now "an incomparably better impression than it would have made some decades ago, when ethics, to use an expression of Schopenhauer's, was still slumbering on the pillow that Kant had placed under its head." Finally, as an apparently faithful disciple of Wundt, Schubert blames the "extreme individualism" of Smith, which was, to be sure, a characteristic of his century, and points out that the new psychological school of ethical students works in the lines that have led Wundt to his definition of the "Gesamtwillen," or Universal Will. We should be glad, indeed, if our mention of Schubert's excellent paper attracted any reader's attention afresh to the ever-suggestive "Moral Sentiments" of Smith, so much neglected nowadays,—so worthy of attention always.

J. R.

## BOOK REVIEWS.

ON THE DOCTRINE OF MORALITY IN ITS RELATION TO THE GRACE OF REDEMPTION. By Robert B. Fairbrain, D.D., LL.D., Warden of St. Stephen's College, Annandale, N. Y. New York: Thomas Whittaker, 1887. Pp. iv., 331.

While this little volume, consisting of "lectures read to classes in moral philosophy," does not depart very far from the familiar path of the theological textbooks of ethics, it is by no means devoid of freshness and suggestiveness both in formulation and in content. The main outline of the thought is as follows: The work of the mere moral philosopher is of necessity incomplete, since formulating reflective principles does not make men moral. The work of the philosopher needs supplementing by the "still greater work" of showing the "relation of the moral life to the redemption and grace of the gospel." "It remains to show how the one depends on the other, and how the one cannot be carried into practical life without the other. This is the task which I set myself." The pursuit of this plan brings the author face to face with such questions as the well-known one concerning the relation of "natural" morality, as embodied in "Buddhist and other systems of morality," to the morality of Christianity. The author is very kindly towards the natural man, whose unaided conscience he regards as capable of remarkably high ethical formulations. Conscience he defines with considerable regard to its psychological complexity. "Conscience, from the very nature of the mind, is not a simple faculty" (p. 88). As Butler already suggested (p. 83), it is both a "sentiment of the heart" and a "perception of the understanding." Dr. Fairbrain meanwhile objects to treating conscience too much "as if it were an independent power of the soul" (p. 104), and corrects some of Butler's expressions accordingly. Man, as a moral being, in presence of the universe, sees indications of his place therein, and of his right relations to God,—indications which vary with his civilization, his light, and his careful observation. "God has so constituted and formed us, that we do certain things. It is just as much the voice of God when we perceive that the tendency of man's nature is to exercise charity, as when we listen to the declarations of the New Testament. There are certain indications in that nature, and in the nature of everything. . . . In this sense, the conscience is a part of nature; and it speaks a language, which, as far as it goes, is plain. . . . We are so made" (p. 104). The ideal is therefore furnished by the conception of a well-balanced or completely organized human nature (p. 148); and such an ideal, in various degrees of perfection, has been very fairly approached by that depitted in the moral philosophy of the Stoics (p. 154), and by the moral teachings of Buddhism (p. 245). Yet those who, because of the nobility of the moral teachings of extra-Christian systems, have put them upon a level with Christianity are ignorant "of what Christianity is in its essence" (p. 244). For although man is thus by nature a moral being, and cannot do well, or fulfil his purpose, outside of the highest moral life, the fallen state of man needs Christianity, not chiefly to teach man morality as such, for this the wise have well and frequently thought out as an ideal for themselves, but to "regenerate" man's nature, and "to give it the help of grace

to fulfil its destiny" (p. 292). The result of this attitude towards his problem is that Dr. Fairbrain is not so much disposed as theological teachers have often been to put the moral ideals of the New Testament, regarded merely as moral ideals, on an inaccessible pinnacle, or to make their superhuman elevation itself a warrant for their divine authorship. The divinity of Christianity is shown on its "dynamic" side. Only grace gives man power to overcome sin. And it is as revelations of divine grace that Christianity and its founder are indeed, in our author's eyes, supreme and superhuman. The little volume deserves appreciation for its humane and kindly tone, its learning, and its conception of the wealth and complexity of the problems involved.

JOSIAH ROYCE.

OUTLINES OF A CRITICAL THEORY OF ETHICS. By John Dewey, Professor of Philosophy in the University of Michigan. Ann Arbor, Michigan: Register Publication Company, 1891. Pp. viii., 253.

The author, one of the most brilliant, clearly conscious, and enviably confident of all our philosophical writers in America, has offered us in this admirable little volume a welcome gift. The backbone of his theory is "the conception of the will as the expression of ideas, and of social ideas; the notion of an objective ethical world realized in institutions which afford moral ideals, theatre, and impetus to the individual; the notion of the moral life as growth in freedom, as the individual finds and conforms to the law of his social placing." The author acknowledges, of course, most obligation to Green, Bradley, Edward Caird, and Hegel, together with one or two others near to the same general point of view. The Hegelian conception, both of the "individual" and the "universal" informs the whole exposition. The "moral end or the good" is the "realization of individuality" by a "person,"—i.e., by "a being capable of conduct,—a being capable of proposing to himself ends and of attempting to realize them." And "individuality," which is the end that the "person" has to realize, has itself two aspects. "On one side it means special disposition, temperament, gifts, bent, or inclination; on the other side, it means special station, situation, limitations, surroundings, opportunities, etc. Or, let us say, it means *specific capacity* and *specific environment*" (p. 97). The "universal," meanwhile, which controls this realization of the individual, is the "fitting in," which gives the "law" of the "whole man" (p. 96). "What is required to give unity to the sphere of conduct is . . . a principle which shall comprehend all the motives to action, giving each its due place in contributing to the whole,—a universal which shall organize the various particular acts into a harmonious system" (pp. 87, 88). The law of a man's life should then be to find his place as "individual" in the "universal" of which he is an organic part,—to find this place not as a plant finds it, mechanically and unconsciously, but with consciousness both of his "specific capacity" and of his "specific environment;" and then, having defined this place, to live in it socially, to enlarge it, to organize his world, and so to grow, both inwardly and in outer relationships. Thus, then, "the moral end is wholly social," and this consideration guides us as much in judging the apparently "unpractical" activities of pure science and art as in judging the work of a social reformer. The "motive which actuates the man of science" is probably, even in the most



"unpractical" of investigations, "a *faith* in the social bearing of what he is doing." Laying thus at the basis the "social" and "organic" character of moral action, the author feels free to accept as subordinate formulations numerous less systematic maxims about life. "We wish the fullest life possible to ourselves and to others. And the fullest life means largely a complete and free development of capacities in knowledge and production" (p. 123). "The ordinary conception of social interests, of benevolence, needs a large overhauling. It is practically equivalent to doing something directly for others,—to one form or another of charity. But this is only negative morality. A true social interest is that which wills for others freedom from dependence on our *direct* help, which wills to them the self-directed power of exercising, in and by themselves, their own functions. Any will short of this is not social but selfish" (p. 125). "As society advances, social interest must consist more and more in free devotion to intelligence for its own sake" (*id.*). "The basis of moral strength is *limitation*, the resolve to be one's self only, and to be loyal to the actual powers and surroundings of that self" (p. 128). "The good man is 'organic'; he uses his attainments to discover new needs, and to assimilate new material. He lives from within outward, his character is compact, coherent; he has *integrity*" (p. 221). "Art has been made such an unreal Feticch—a sort of superfine and extraneous polish to be acquired only by specially cultivated people. In reality, living is itself the supreme art; it requires fineness of touch; skill and thoroughness of workmanship; susceptible response and delicate adjustment to a situation apart from reflective analysis; instinctive perception of the proper harmonies of act and act, of man and man" (pp. 120, 121).

If these maxims, and others of similar skill and impressiveness give this little book a continual charm, our author's *Lebensweisheit* does not exhaust itself in mere maxims. The philosophical basis of his system is, of course, by no means a novel one, as his frequently-acknowledged obligations, already mentioned in this review, easily remind us. But the doctrines of self-consciousness as the end in itself, of the universal as the organic whole of the individuals, and of morality as the realization of each self through the law of its social calling, have seldom been more briefly and ingeniously expounded than here. Hedonism our author condemns for its "abstractness." "Pleasure" is not an "activity," but an accompaniment thereof. It cannot, therefore, furnish an "organizing principle" of conduct, since such a principle must be based upon the nature of activity in its "wholeness." Pleasure is, also, psychologically speaking, not the "end of impulse" (p. 17),—*i.e.*, "the motive of action, in the sense of the end aimed at, is not pleasure." The author's arguments for this view are those of Green and Professor James. On this same basis, as well as in view of the special difficulties arising concerning the "sum of pleasures," our author condemns Utilitarianism and the Spencerian ethics, while pointing out, indeed, in the latter, several points of agreement with his own views. But equally "abstract," in its own fashion, is the Kantian "formal ethics," which our author criticises in large part after Caird. The positive view, which he himself holds, appears as a synthesis (in forms, on their subjective side, not far removed from Aristotle's well-known formula, referred to p. 31) of Kant's doctrine with the truth at the basis of hedonism. In the later portions of the book a considerable number of special ethical problems

—such as those of the “idea of obligation,” of “freedom,” and of the “virtues”—are discussed in turn,—always in the same tone of assurance, with the same suggestiveness, clearness, and condensation of language.

The present reviewer's strongest objection to the book, from a theoretical point of view, relates to the untroubled optimism of the author's mood in presence of all the harder problems of ethics. In the teacher of youth this optimism must be a most acceptable trait. The mature reader, who has followed the foregoing very imperfect sketch with any acquaintance with the literature of controversy, must, however, have wondered a little how so much could be made sure in so brief a space as our author's pages cover. The wonder remains in the present reviewer's mind also. Hegel himself said (*Phänomenologie des Geistes*, p. 15) “The divine life and the divine insight may indeed be called a play of love with itself,” and he added that there was little in such an idea “*wenn der Ernst, der Schmerz, die Geduld, und die Arbeit des Negativen darin fehlt.*” Now, in Professor Dewey's moral world, and in his vigorous account of it, there is indeed more than the mere “play of love with itself.” The divine life, whose human aspect he here depicts, while it develops each self in a social environment, while it apparently gives everybody a chance for fulfilment, and ordains the moral world so that: “In the realization of individuality there is found also the needed realization of some community of persons of which the individual is a member; and, conversely, the agent who duly satisfies the community in which he shares, by that same conduct satisfies himself” (*Dewey*, p. 131),—still has room in its cheerful world for much hard work. (And yet, what I miss in Professor Dewey's universe is the still graver aspect that Hegel bids one look for, the *Geduld und Schmerz des Negativen*, those real pangs and the terrible negations of the actual moral world, whose theoretical correlates are the deeper problems of ethics, the antinomies of self and task, of inner and outer, of ideal and fact, which, as I must think our author, after all, rather too gayly ignores. Were the world what he depicts, where would be the true problem of evil?

The book then has precisely the office that vital and sinevy optimism always has. Herein lies also its limitation.

JOSIAH ROYCE.

PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS. By Alfred Marshall, Professor of Political Economy in the University of Cambridge. Macmillan & Co., London and New York, 1890. Vol. I. Pp. xxviii., 754.

“Political economy, or economics, is a study of man's actions in the ordinary business of life; it inquires how he gets his income and how he uses it. Thus it is, on the one side, a study of wealth, and on the other, and more important side, a part of the study of man. For man's character has been moulded by his every-day work, and by the material resources which he thereby procures, more than by any other influence, unless it be that of his religious ideals. . . . Religious motives are more intense than economic; but their direct action seldom extends over so large a part of life. For the business by which a person earns his livelihood generally fills his thoughts during by far the greater part of those hours in which his mind is at its best; during them his character is being formed by the way in which he uses his faculties in his work, by the thoughts and the

feelings which it suggests, and by his relations to his associates in his work, his employers, or his employés.

"And very often the influence exerted on a person's character by the amount of his income is hardly less, if it is less, than that exerted by the way in which it is earned. It makes, indeed, little real difference to the life of a family whether its yearly income is one thousand pounds or five thousand pounds. [*Query, Does not the influence of an increase of wealth become negative after a certain point?*] But it makes a very great difference whether the income is thirty pounds or one hundred and fifty pounds; with one hundred and fifty pounds the family has, with thirty pounds it has not, the material conditions of a complete life. It is true that in religion, in the family affections, and in friendship, even, the poor may find scope for many of those faculties which are the source of the highest happiness. But the conditions which surround extreme poverty [*Query, and extreme wealth?*], especially in densely crowded places, tend to deaden the higher faculties. Those who have been called the 'residuum' of our large towns have little opportunity for friendship; they know nothing of the decencies and the quiet, and very little even of the unity, of family life, and religion seldom reaches them. No doubt their physical, mental, and moral ill-health is partly due to other causes than poverty, but this is the chief cause.

"And in addition to the residuum, there are vast numbers of people both in town and country who are brought up with insufficient food, clothing, and house-room, whose education is broken off early in order that they may go to work for wages, who thenceforth are engaged during long hours in exhausting toil with imperfectly-nourished bodies, and have therefore no chance of developing their higher mental faculties. Their life is not necessarily unhealthy or unhappy. [*Query, May we not say that they are unhappy if they but knew their unhappiness?*] Rejoicing in their affections towards God and man, and perhaps even possessing some natural refinement of feeling, they may lead lives that are far less incomplete than those who have more material wealth. But for all that, their poverty is a great and almost unmixed evil to them. Even when they are well their weariness often amounts to pain, while their pleasures are few; and when sickness comes the suffering caused by poverty increases tenfold. And though a contented spirit may go far towards reconciling them to these evils, there are others to which it ought not to reconcile them. Overworked and undertaught, weary and careworn, without quiet and without leisure, they have no chance of making the best of their mental faculties.

"Although then some of the evils which go with poverty are not its necessary consequences; yet, broadly speaking, 'the destruction of the poor is their poverty;' and the study of the causes of poverty is the study of the causes of the degradation of a large part of mankind."

Strange as it may seem, these are the opening paragraphs\* of a treatise on political economy by the most eminent of its English professors. It is not necessary to add anything to them in order to make it evident how completely Professor Marshall has altered the point of view from which political economy has been traditionally regarded, and how important his work must be for students of

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\* The queries in brackets are, of course, inserted by the reviewer.

ethics. The second volume will, no doubt, be even more interesting, from this point of view, than the first. The economic value of the book does not concern us here; but the name of the author is a sufficient guarantee of its thoroughness and fairness. In the latter part of the book the method of treatment is more mathematical than most ethical students are likely to desire; and there are some calculations of pleasure which to the present reviewer seem somewhat frivolous and misleading. But to have definitely taken the problem of the abolition of poverty, instead of that of the acquisition of riches, as the starting-point, and to have treated the subject throughout with a constant reference to the moral welfare of humanity, constitutes a sufficient claim on the gratitude of all students of ethics as well as of economics. It is a truly great book, and will exert an incalculable influence for good.

JOHN S. MACKENZIE.

OWENS COLLEGE, MANCHESTER.

DER HANDFERTIGKEITS-UNTERRICHT, SEINE THEORIE UND PRAXIS. Von Ferd. Em. Rauscher. III. Theile: pp. vi., 194; iv., 162; iv., 147.

This is a work of great interest and importance, which ought at once to receive the attention of all students of education. It is, so far as I know, by far the most complete account that has yet appeared of that method of education which is commonly known as *Slöjd*. The work is in three parts, of which the first appeared in 1885, the second in 1887, and the third in 1888. The first part is the longest and the most generally interesting, containing (1) a general introduction on the aim of manual training in schools, (2) an account of the materials and methods of teaching, (3) an historical sketch of the theory of the subject, including interesting extracts from the writings of Locke, Rousseau, Pestalozzi, Fröbel, Herbart, and several others, (4) a short account of the progress of the teaching of *Slöjd* in various countries. In the second volume there are some further statements of the present position of the different countries with regard to the teaching of *Slöjd*. After this, Herr Rauscher proceeds to give a detailed account of the tools employed and the objects produced. This part contains many excellent illustrations. The third volume is occupied with details of the methods in a large number of particular schools in Germany, Denmark, and of work Sweden.

The first volume is, as has been already said, the one of greatest interest. The statement of the aims and methods of manual training in schools is admirably full, methodical, and exact. It ought to be mentioned that this part of the book is a reproduction of a course of lectures delivered by Herr Solomon at Nääs. It may consequently be regarded as in some sense an authoritative statement of the ideas by which the promoters of the *Slöjd* system are guided. On these ideas a few observations may here be in place.

It is scarcely necessary to state that the principles by which the movement is animated are not in any degree similar to those somewhat Philistine considerations, which sometimes lead men to advocate the substitution of a training in what is immediately "useful," in place of a culture in those elements which tend to strengthen the character and enlarge the intelligence. Nor, again, is it the primary aim of its promoters to add a certain training of the body to the cultivation

of the mind. On the contrary, though the fact that manual training tends to strengthen the physical powers and to supply a useful corrective to an excessive mental strain is stated as one of the subordinate arguments in favor of its adoption, yet the general attitude of its leading advocates is very similar to that of Plato, who held that the primary aim of gymnastics, as well as of music, is to supply a certain element of culture to the soul rather than to the body. What, then, it will be asked, is the precise element of culture with which the Slöjd system is supposed to furnish us? The answer to this question, as given in the first volume of the work before us, is not a brief one; and we cannot do more here than give the barest outline of it, hoping that some readers may thus be induced to fill in the details from the book itself.

In the first place, then, it is stated in these lectures that the chief aims of manual training in general education may be summed up under these five heads, (1) to awaken pleasure in and love of work, (2) to produce general manual skill, (3) to accustom pupils to the habit of self-help, and to confirm them in it, (4) to infuse the virtues of carefulness, order, and accuracy, (5) to cultivate attention, diligence, and perseverance. This somewhat bold statement, however, though perhaps it sums up all the really important considerations, is far from suggesting the full extent of the benefits that are to be expected from a well-regulated system of manual training. For instance, it is pointed out that the pleasure in and love for work which such a training stimulates, consists not merely in such a love for exertion as may also be stimulated by a purely mental discipline, but includes also a certain respect for all kinds of labor, and tends to destroy that contempt for the less purely intellectual forms of work which is one of the chief dangers in a highly educated community. It is said with some force that "the pleasure in and love of work has much significance with reference to the modern social question. If honest manual labor were held in a more just esteem, the number of social democrats would certainly be less." This is, perhaps, a somewhat perverse way of putting it, more natural on the continent than in England, where the fear of social democrats is less; but the point is at any rate a real one. Again, the statement that manual training is to aim at infusing the virtues of carefulness, order, and accuracy, is a somewhat mild way of expressing what is meant: for it is pointed out afterwards that, when rightly conducted, such training may be made the means of producing a true artistic sense,—a true perception of the essential beauty of workmanship as distinguished from the adventitious beauty of mere ornamentation. The part of the book in which this point is enforced is, to my mind, one of the most interesting in the whole work. But in a similar way all the points that have been here briefly summarized acquire a new meaning and importance when they are read in the light of the detailed discussion which follows.

Again, the aims which the teacher is to have in view become still more clearly apparent when we proceed to the second part of the first volume, in which the materials and methods of teaching are discussed. The most important point which comes up here is the consideration of the question, What particular kind of manual work is best adapted to be used as a basis for manual training? It is well known that the answer which has usually been given to this question is that a certain form of carpentry is the best,—viz., that form of carpentry which

has come to be known as Slöjd-carpentry, and which in the volume before us is very carefully distinguished from ordinary carpentry. The reasons which lead to the choice of this particular form of work are very fully set forth in Herr Rauscher's book; and the gist of the argument is summed up in a striking table, in which ten different forms of work are set in a vertical column, and the answers to ten test questions with regard to each are placed in horizontal columns. The ten kinds of work are smith's work, basket-making, painting and varnishing, ornamental carving, book-binding, working in paste, carpentry, turning, wood-carving, and straw-plaiting. The ten questions to be answered with regard to each of these are—(1) Does it rouse interest in the pupil? (2) Can its product be utilized? (This is partly a condition of interest; but there are also other reasons why the furnishing of a useful product is desirable.) (3) Does it lead to general manual skill? (4) Does it tend to develop order and carefulness? (5) Does it admit of cleanliness and neatness? (6) Is it adapted to the capacity and bodily strength of children? (7) Does it tend in some degree to develop taste? (8) Does it strengthen the physical power? (9) Does it afford a relief from excessive sedentary occupation? (This is regarded as one of the great evils of the present system of elementary education.) (10) Does it lend itself readily to a methodical treatment? Carpentry (*i.e.*, Slöjd carpentry) is the only one of the ten forms of work with respect to which all these ten questions can be answered in the affirmative. The second-best seems to be turning, and the third working in paste; while in the case of painting and varnishing all the questions except the ninth have to be answered in the negative. Basket-making and smith's work also come off rather badly.

With regard to the historical part of the book, and the part which deals with the details of work, it would be impossible to epitomize results in a profitable way. The chief thing that strikes an English reader is the small part which this country has played in the development of the movement. Indeed, we ought rather to say that England has taken no part in it at all. No doubt, there may be some good enough reasons for this. Some of the arguments in favor of the Slöjd system do not apply with so much force either in England or in America as they do in Germany and some other European countries. In Sweden, for instance, where the system was first started, there seem to be both special facilities for acquiring the requisite material and special reasons for attaching importance to a training in carpentry as a part of general education. These special facilities and reasons do not exist to the same extent in America, and do not exist at all in England. Again, the relatively less-developed state of general elementary education in England, as compared with Germany, together with the relatively greater development of field-sports, makes it less necessary to have a counteraction to excessive sedentary work and merely intellectual development. Still, if on this account the adoption of such a system is less urgent, it is not therefore shown to be undesirable. In any case it ought certainly to receive the most careful attention of our educationists.

There is, however, one respect in which England seems to be, if anything, rather in advance of continental countries with reference to this matter. I mean in the application of the Slöjd method to the teaching of girls. Almost the only reference to England in Herr Rauscher's book occurs in the statement (with a

mark of exclamation after it) that two English lady teachers had in 1884 gone to Nâs with the view of studying the system. The interest which has since been taken in the subject by Miss Hughes, of the Cambridge Training College, and one or two others, is well known; and perhaps we may hope that this aspect of the subject will be most fully worked out in England. In the mean time, however, all that we have to do here is to recommend Herr Rauscher's book most cordially to all who are interested in education. It is written in an attractive style, and is full of valuable information and suggestive remarks.

J. S. MACKENZIE.

EDUCATIONAL ENDS, OR THE IDEAL OF PERSONAL DEVELOPMENT. By Sophie Bryant, D.Sc. London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1887. 1 vol. Pp. x., 292.

Although it is now more than three years since this excellent volume appeared, yet, as it does not seem to be so universally known as it deserves to be, it may be worth while to call attention to its existence in an ethical journal. The attractive title of the book serves to indicate that it has at least as much bearing on Ethics as on Education. It is, in fact, an effort to analyze the ends at which a true education must aim. These ends are provided by the two great normative sciences, Ethics and Logic,—of which the latter lays down the regulative principles for thought, and the former for conduct. The book thus resolves itself into a discussion of the fundamental principles of Ethics and Logic in their bearings on education. The importance of such a method of treatment, especially when carried out by one who is not merely a philosopher but an experienced teacher as well, can scarcely be exaggerated. The present reviewer is of opinion that it might have been advisable to introduce some consideration of *Æsthetics* as well as of Ethics and Logic, and also that it would have conduced to clearness of arrangement to place the ethical part after the logical. But these are matters in which opinions may very well differ. All intelligent readers of the book must agree that, though on several points it is open to criticism, it is full of valuable instruction and suggestion, and bears evidence both of thought and of wisdom on every page. In psychological matters, Miss Bryant expresses her indebtedness to Dr. Ward. Though she does not say so, one cannot but think that in her treatment of Ethics she owes much to Green. The following extract may serve both to bear out this remark and to give some idea of the writer's point of view and style of treatment:

"I realize myself by devotion to my community. Be it a good community or a bad one, it offers the only available field for that moral activity in which I seek my perfection, as complete, harmonious, and free. For me it is a good community if it supplies me with means of moral development in the requisite quantity and of the requisite quality; and it is a bad community if it fails in this supply, or supplies me with means of moral perversion. If the claims of the community are inadequate to the energy of personal growth, that energy expands itself in wasteful unrest, or sinks at last to apathy. If they are inconsistent with each other, as in an ill-adjusted family they often are, the conflict of adaptation demanded issues either in arrest of growth or in confusion. I cannot be harmonious with myself if I accept duties that are inconsistent with each other; and if I refuse them, or either of them, my devotion to duty is at that point impaired and

growth injured. I cannot grow towards perfection in the full degree if my duty is opposed to that growth. I cannot grow by adaptation to my environment when the adaptation demands inconsistency of growth. My duty will be opposed sooner or later to my growth, if that duty be not a consistent whole, in correspondence with which I can develop myself into a consistent whole. The perfect self cannot come into existence out of relation to the perfect community, although the idea of the perfect self is logically prior to that of the perfect community. And, at any period of development, the better self, that is immediately possible to each person, cannot come into active existence, without the community that is good enough for him.

"The bettering impulse, driven back on itself by the unfitness of its environment, takes refuge in the construction of an ideal environment in which it could fulfil itself, and seeks to transform the real environment in accordance with its idea. It builds for itself a castle in the air of duty, and throws its energy into the work of constructing that castle upon the earth. This it does, if it be strong enough to retain its vitality of growth, under adverse circumstances. Growth under such circumstances can only progress by transformation of the circumstances. And man, by reason of his intellectual character, has the power of seeing adverse circumstances far ahead; and then, provided with sight to penetrate the distance, his bettering impulse leads him to modify his environment from the first, so that it may supply him throughout with the means of development. Thus the realization of the perfect self takes on a double aspect; on the one hand, it is the production of perfected character by me *in* me; on the other hand, it is the production of the perfected community by me *for* me." \*

In such passages as this (and many others might be quoted like it) our admiration is equally divided between the soundness of the doctrine and the clearness of its exposition. Altogether, the work is admirable, and it would be hardly possible to recommend it too strongly.

J. S. MACKENZIE.

WORKINGMAN'S SCHOOL, United Relief Works. Society for Ethical Culture, 109 W. Fifty-fourth street, New York, 1891. 27

We have before us the report of this institution for 1891, just issued. The Workingman's School was founded thirteen years ago by the New York Ethical Society, and is intended to be an exemplification of what is now often called the new education. Pupils are received into the institution at the age of three, and are kept at present until their fourteenth or fifteenth year. We understand that the managers hope eventually to extend the course, so as to add a system of secondary instruction to the Kindergarten and elementary teaching already supplied.

In addition to the ordinary common school branches, the school offers to its pupils manual training in all classes, free hand-drawing and modelling, elementary science, vocal music, and gymnastics, while special attention is given to unsectarian moral instruction. The number of pupils has risen from thirty-three, at

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\* Pp. 83, 84.



the start, to between three hundred and four hundred at present. Most of these are free scholars, whose parents are unable to pay for their tuition. But a limited number of "paid pupils" has recently been received, in order to extend the benefits of the system to the well-to-do, and to secure the educational advantages of the mingling of classes. The following extracts from the report of the school may be of interest to the readers of the journal :

"Our experience has clearly shown that the standard of education, heretofore universally accepted, which makes the literary progress of a pupil the principal test of his intellectual capacity, is altogether false. Literary ability is a special talent, as much as is proficiency in music or in any of the fine arts. And as there are many persons who have not the slightest gift in these directions, so are there many who cannot write a pleasing essay or letter, or appreciate the style of a great author. Yet the unmusical man may be a clever and successful business man, and the non-literate man may become a great artist or develop genius in some other direction. In fact, many a man who, in his boyhood, found it difficult to adapt himself to the literary standard of the school, has broken his way to fame and success by means of talents of which his pedantic teachers had not the faintest inkling. A genius will rise superior to the most unfavorable conditions, and will triumph over them despite the most formidable obstacles. But many a man of modest yet useful talent has been spoiled for life by the prevailing narrow and one-sided system of education.

"It is certainly an interesting observation that most of the non-literate pupils decidedly lack the sense of the grammatical relation of words in a sentence. They drop the endings, and their declension and conjugation are always defective. A mere grouping of words serves to indicate in a general way the drift of their meaning, but grammatical discipline and exactness are foreign to them. The construction of their sentences forcibly reminds one of nations who have never succeeded in developing an inflected language." . . .

#### AS TO THE METHOD.

"The principle of producing or reproducing the object of knowledge pervades the whole curriculum. The pupils are led to discover the properties of an object while they toil over it in the effort to make it; or where that is impossible, to reproduce it in drawing; or, again, where the subject of instruction is remote from the senses, the teacher places definite concrete examples before the mind of the pupil and ascends from these to abstract mental concepts. This applies to the mechanical and art work of the school, the geometry, the natural history, and geography teaching, as well as to the work done in history and literature, essay writing, etc. . . .

"Further, the aim is to link the different branches of instruction closely together, so that they may interact upon one another in a system of progressive education and instruction. Thus the pupils model, in the art-room, those forms of leaves which they have previously analyzed under the teacher of botany. The skill they acquire in free-hand drawing and modelling assists them in the geometry and geography work. And certain elementary theorems of mathematics and laws of nature are demonstrated to the eye in the workshop. The feature to

which we attach great importance are the weekly excursions into the field or factories and machine-shops, which form part of the regular program of the school. What information is gathered by the scholars on these excursions is brought out in their essays, the topics of which are never sought outside of the pupils' experience, but which are, with us, one of the principal means of combining all they have learned in school and elsewhere into a unity of conception and thought." . . .

#### AS TO MORAL EDUCATION.

"The object-lessons given in the lower grades are made the means of imprinting on the minds of the children a great moral truth, namely, that all the gifts of nature and civilization which they enjoy are mediated to them through the love and labor of their parents. While in the upper grades the mind of the pupil is pointed forward to the time when he will become a worker himself, will find his own place in nature and society, and gain access to their benefactions through his own labor.

"Moral education proper also occupies the prominent place in our school which belongs to it. Every Monday and Friday morning the pupils of the entire school, with the exception of the Kindergarten children, are assembled in the large hall. Here they unite in singing appropriate songs and take part in moral exercises of an entirely unsectarian character, which are conducted by the superintendent. The mere assembling of a large school promotes a feeling of social unity which is favorable to the awakening of moral ideas. These receive their proper interpretation by means of stories and talks from the platform, carefully planned beforehand. The latter again form the basis of independent moral work in the respective class-rooms and on the part of the individual scholars. On Monday morning the moral theme for the week is given out, and on Friday is the "harvest time," when the pupils are called upon to express their own ideas on the subject which has been discussed with them during the week.

"They do this in the form of original compositions or discussions, using for illustration appropriate proverbs, or by reading and reciting pieces of poetry and the like, which have a bearing upon the moral topic of the week. As to the arrangement of the subject-matter taught, we begin with the duties of the children as pupils, and proceed from these to their other duties in life. In connection with each moral theme, at least one proverb, in which the ethical idea of the lesson is crystallized, is committed to memory by all pupils.

"There are also numerous other opportunities in the school for imparting moral instruction and exercising moral influence, more or less directly. Among these may be mentioned the government and discipline of the school in general, the noon games, and the school festivals.

"There are besides, in the highest classes, special lessons on the duties of life. These duties are grouped under the convenient heads of the self-regarding and other-regarding duties. The latter class is again subdivided into duties which we owe to all men as such, such as veracity, justice, and benevolence, and duties which arise out of the special relations of the family, the state, and so forth. The manner of teaching is Socratic, particular instances being submitted to the pupils for analysis, and the rule of duty being elicited in the course of the discussion." . . .

## OBJECT-LESSONS.

"The chief ends of object-teaching as hitherto conceived are to educate the senses, to cultivate the faculty of expression, and to lay a foundation for the future work of the school in natural history and science. While approving of these ends and keeping them faithfully in view, the school has added another, a moral aim, namely, to gather up the contents of the child's experience into an harmonious whole by grouping the elements, which make up its little world, around a single central idea. That central idea, as indicated above, is the parents' love. Thus, the teacher speaks to the child of the house in which it finds shelter (building-material, glass, the mason's and carpenter's trades are discussed); of the clothing which the child wears (an opportunity is afforded for speaking of wool, cotton, flax, of the art of weaving); of the food which it eats, etc., and in all these cases the thought is impressed that it is the parents' labor and love which provide shelter, clothing, food for the child. The phenomena of the weather are talked over in a simple way (giving opportunity for introducing elementary scientific notions), and it is shown that it is the parents' kindness which shields the child from the inclemency of the weather or enables it to enjoy the beauties of nature in the spring and summer. In speaking of the habits of animals, birds, etc., the analogy between animal and human life, in the care and kindness of animals for their young is emphasized. The principal moral idea expressed by the object-lessons is that only labor permits us to enjoy the benefits and beauties of the world in which we live, and that at first the child receives these benefits indirectly through the unselfish affections of his parents. Later on this idea is so developed as to show the pupil that he can only hope to win his own place in the world by contributing, through his own labor, to the sum total of benefits.

"As the face of nature varies with the seasons, and as the ideas which fill the mind of the child vary correspondingly in winter, spring, summer, and autumn, the material of the object-lessons has been arranged according to the seasons." . . .

## PARENTS' MEETINGS.

"Once a month, the parents of the pupils of the school are invited to meet the teachers. The object of these meetings is, first, to familiarize the parents with the methods pursued in this school, and also to afford them an opportunity of freely talking over with the teachers all matters that may come up with respect to their own children and their life in school. The meeting is usually opened with a short address by the superintendent on some educational topic of particular interest to parents. Then follows a sample lesson or illustration of methods in some department by one of the teachers, and, lastly, an opportunity is given for an informal talk between teachers and parents. These meetings have done much towards furthering an intelligent co-operation of the home with the school."

S. B. W.

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## ERRATA.

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Page 40, line 35, for " $\frac{3}{4}$ " read " $\frac{1}{2}$ ."

Page 42, line 32, for "objectivism" read "subjectivism."

Page 55, line 38, for "Thus far go Lombroso and Garofalo" read "Thus far Lombroso and Garofalo."

Page 56, line 22, and page 59, line 3, for "Doctijevski" read "Dostojevski."

Page 97, last line, for "Absolutely" read "Resolutely."

January number, 1891.

Page 131, last line of text, for "as" read "on."

Page 132, last line but two, for "confession" read "confusion."

Page 135, line 9, for "opinions" read "opinion."

Page 136, line 2, for "consequence" read "consequences;" line 17, for "exists" read "exist."

Page 137, line 6 from foot, for "jealous" read "zealous."

Page 138, line 4, for "time" read "line."

Page 140, line 12 from foot, for "best" read "least."

Page 141, line 16, after "disobeys a law" insert "for conscience' sake;" footnote, the words "On the Ethics of Resistance" should not be quoted.

Page 160, line 12, strike out "and."

April number, 1891.

Page 338, line 13, for "we" read "He."













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